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This thesis analyses the long-distance control of the environmentally-situated 
imagination, in both spatial and temporal dimensions. Central to the project is what I 
call the extended social brain hypothesis. Grounded in the Peircean conception of 
‗pragmaticism‘, this re-introduces technical intelligence to Dunbar‘s social brain—
conceptually, through Clark‘s ‗extended mind‘ philosophy, and materially, through 
Callon‘s ‗actor–network theory‘. 
I claim that: 
There is no subjectivity without intersubjectivity. That is to say: as an 
evolutionary matter, it was necessary for the empathic capacities to evolve 
before the sense of self we identify as human could emerge. 
Intersubjectivity is critical to human communication, because of its role in 
interpreting intention. While the idea that human communication requires three 
levels of intentionality carries analytical weight, I argue that the inflationary 
trajectory is wrong as an evolutionary matter. The trend is instead towards 
increasing powers of individuation. 
The capacity for tool-use is emphasized less under the social brain hypothesis, 
but the importance of digital manipulation needs to be reasserted as part of a 
mature ontology. 
These claims are modulated to substantiate the work-maker, a socially situated (and 
embodied) creative agent who draws together Peircean notions of epistemology, 
phenomenology and oral performance. 
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The social context of creativity is a place of negotiation—one where there is uncertainty 
regarding outcomes, but one where there is potential for success and gratification, 
however loosely defined these might be. This claim—modest to the point of banality—
entails, however, the adoption of certain normative assumptions. It presumes that the 
point of view is human, first of all. It further implies a humanist perspective—that is to 
say, it implies an assumption that agency is vested in the subject, rather than the subject 
being the vehicle of miscellaneous predetermined causes, whether natural or 
supernatural, physical or metaphysical. Further, again, the initial claim might be held to 
presume a specific form of negotiation, supported by the laws and institutions of the 
contract, locating creativity in the specific cultural context of modern urban civilization. 
Although ‗creativity‘ is a vague term, it is (almost) universally regarded as a positive 
concept, whether the context be vocational, recreational or educational. It is consonant 
with industrious Lockean liberalism; it is powerfully affirmative enough to transcend the 
negativity in Schumpeter‘s ‗creative destruction‘. There is one ironic sense, however, 
which leads us away from this confident, optimistic prospect and towards the nuanced, 
ambiguous territory that we are about to explore. In the colloquial term ‗creative 
accounting‘, the narrator creams off the choicest reality to tell a story that serves the 
best interests of one party at the expense of another. Typically the ‗other‘ is the public in 
some form, and the public—mindful of fallibility and self-interested conduct alike—sets 
up laws and institutions designed to minimize if not eliminate the margin for 
imagination.  
The key point about creative accounting is that it is intersubjective. That is to say, there 
needs to be both a narrator and an audience, and the audience needs to understand the 
tale being told. Understanding, here, implies a specifically rational evaluation of the story 
being presented, meaning that comparison, contextualization, precedent and analysis 
support the interpretation of content as it is received. To clarify the intersubjective 
transaction, therefore, we need to develop a framework synthesizing three broad 
perspectives. First of all, there is a cognitive question about producing narrative, in the 
normative sense associated with human discourse. What are the physiological attributes 
that distinguish these human capacities? Secondly there is an epistemological question 
about the state of nature, the environment in which rational enquiry takes place. Thirdly 
there is what might best be called an ethical question, recognizing that both of the 
previous questions are subject to culturally sustained nuances and perspectives. The 
Introduction 2 
background against which this framework is advanced is relativistic, evolutionary, and 
falliblist—it is a process philosophy rather than a progress philosophy. 
A useful starting point is ‗Computing Machinery and Intelligence‘, where Alan Turing 
(1950) re-imagined a problem previously posed by Descartes—how to distinguish 
between animal, human and machine—in the form of a parlour game.1 Players A and B, 
a man and a woman, are situated so that they can only communicate indirectly with the 
third player, an interrogator, who must determine the gender of the players based on 
their responses to written questions. The catch is that the male player is sanctioned to 
cheat, with the purpose of tricking the interrogator into reaching a false conclusion. 
Implicitly, therefore, he is obliged to think creatively in order to respond 
(in)appropriately to the interrogator‘s questions. Turing then asks: ‗What will happen 
when a machine takes the part of A in this game?‘ (434). 
Turing‘s paper prompted intensive research programmes, and these quickly focused on 
attempts to simulate professional expertise. Early implementations of so-called ‗expert‘ 
systems were capable of remarkable feats. LUNAR, an artificial lunar geologist, knew 
about the chemical composition of lunar rocks (although it had no opinion on the value 
of space flight); CYRUS, programmed to be intimate with the course of then-US 
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance‘s career, knew (more or less) who Mr Vance met and 
when in the course of his professional (though not his unreported personal) life (and it 
could not cope with questions about his resignation). These systems were, in Daniel 
Dennett‘s words, ‗Potemkin villages… cleverly constructed facades, like cinema sets‘ 
(1985, p. 135).   
‗Classical‘ artificial intelligence (AI) research appealed to two variants of a traditional 
account of human evolutionary success, what Richard Byrne (1997) calls the ‗technical 
intelligence hypothesis‘. One variant is that—uniquely—we are language users; the other 
                                                 
1 ‗…if there were machines bearing the image of our bodies, and capable of imitating our actions as far as 
it is morally possible, there would still remain two most certain tests whereby to know that they were not 
therefore really men. Of these the first is that they could never use words or other signs arranged … 
variously so as appositely to reply to what is said in its presence, as men of the lowest grade of intellect 
can do. The second test is, that although such machines might execute many things with equal or perhaps 
greater perfection than any of us, they would, without doubt, fail in certain others from which it could be 
discovered that they did not act from knowledge, but solely from the disposition of their organs. …[B]y 
means of these two tests we may …know the difference between men and brutes; (Descartes, Principia V, 
1644). 
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is that we are tool users. Both of these views are universalist, meaning that either claim 
is true of all humans. However, anthropologists find tool use among primates, 
undermining the ‗uniqueness‘ claim, while under pressure from AI research, certain 
assumptions about language-use have been shown to rest on an underlying set of 
assumptions about tool-use that are bound up with a specifically bourgeois evaluation of 
the relationship between work and material output. Leading commentary on Andy 
Clark‘s paper, ‗Minds, Brains and Tools‘ (1999), Dennett remarks that certain key 
aspects of language use are specific to written language. The computational/ 
representational model of mind that emerged out of classical AI research conflates the 
language-using and the tool-using paradigms, and leans on this material paradigm in 
doing so.  
What Turing‘s original game turned on, however, is the difference between solving the 
problem posed in the guise of an embodied agent on the one hand (where determining 
the gender of a fellow human is normally the intuitive work of a split second), compared 
to the task of reaching a judgement in the guise of a computer, based solely on the 
symbolic (i.e. written) responses of the players on the other.2 Implicitly, the fact that the 
game calls for two players in addition to the interrogator represents a social dimension 
entirely ignored by the classical AI programme. This social dimension is subject to the 
same evolutionary pressures that act on the individual scale, but it is difficult to gain 
analytical purchase on the issues involved. Byrne‘s ‗technical intelligence hypothesis‘ 
prefigures the ‗social brain hypothesis‘, an amalgamation of neuroscience, evolutionary 
psychology and anthropology that affords a much clearer focus on specifically 
interpersonal, intersubjective aspects of the social relationships in which the Turing 
enquiry about communication is embedded. 
The appeal to the social discloses a secondary problem: just what is the social? Latour 
and Strum (1986) review a range of historical and contemporary philosophical, 
biological and anthropological authorities—from Rousseau and Hobbes to Axelrod and 
Hamilton, Leakey and Lewin, Trivers, and Dawkins. While showing that these 
authorities don‘t agree on much, Latour and Strum‘s analysis in terms of an opposition 
between ‗mythic‘ and ‗scientific‘ barely establishes grounds for resolving their 
differences. In a companion paper (Strum & Latour, 1999), the authors propose 
                                                 
2 An agent is an entity capable of action; embodiment locates this entity in a material environment. 
Humans are good examples, but the terms ‗embodied agent‘ and ‗human‘ are not coextensive. 
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‗technology‘ (to be exact, the deployment of extrasomatic resources) as the intermediary 
between the two. However, in developing this line of argument, the present thesis 
identifies a systematic failure to distinguish between a second- and third-person sense of 
‗social‘. While political philosophy is generally concerned with the third-person variety, 
grounded in seemingly timeless human behaviour on the mass scale, the creativity 
envisaged in Turing‘s game is of the second-person variety, altogether more intimately 
geared to interpersonal, intersubjective communication.  
The methodological stance adopted in developing this perspective is modelled on 
Daniel Dennett‘s so-called heterophenomenology—his third-person science of 
consciousness, but with two important modifications. The first introduces Peirce‘s 
semeiotic, which, instead of fixing on a third-person perspective, combines first-, third-, 
and second-person perspectives. Additionally, Peirce‘s work on abductive logic helps us 
understand the relationship between reason and creative thinking. The second 
modification draws in the concept of performativity developed by Austin, with its 
emphasis on action embedded in social discourse. However, in retrofitting Peircean 
pragmaticism and Austinian performativity to Dennett, certain tensions are disclosed 
regarding the nuances in determinism and logocentrism as they relate respectively to the 
analytical and continental traditions in contemporary philosophy. The relativistic, 
evolutionary, falliblist framework pursued in this thesis cannot support either. 
Taking determinism first of all, for simplicity‘s sake we can distinguish between three 
types of determinism: natural, metaphysical, and historical. The term ‗natural‘ is used 
here in the ordinary sense of ‗pertaining to nature‘; no ethical position is implied. 
‗Natural‘ determinism is the experimentally proven realm of cause and effect, but it is 
bounded (in scientific practice) on one—subatomic—side by quantum mechanics, and 
on the other—where molecular biology gives way to ecology—by quasi-irreversible 
path-dependent lock-in (a fancy way of saying ‗history‘). Both of these boundaries are 
governed by statistical probability, and it is in this sense that Peirce—an important 
figure in the history of probability theory—is anti-determinist. 
‗Metaphysical‘ determinism references the appeal to extra-material cause characteristic 
of religious practice. To be anti-determinist in this sense can mean a materialist stance in 
the qualified sense implied by the previous clause, but it can also mean resistance, on 
hermeneutic grounds, rather than outright denial. The latter seems to capture the sense 
in which Bergson is anti-determinist. In a late essay, he remarks: 
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Listen to the discussion between any two philosophers one of whom upholds determinism, and the 
other liberty: it is always the determinist who seems to be in the right. He may be a beginner and his 
adversary a seasoned philosopher. He can plead his cause nonchalantly, while the other sweats blood 
for his. It will always be said of him that he is simple, clear and right (1946, pp. 41–2). 
‗Historical‘ determinism is a little different, in that it bears a social sense—via translation 
of the German term Bestimmt—of consent vested in inheritance. Something is 
determined by virtue of a debate having been settled. It is difficult to oppose social 
consent, but there are two grounds on which the opposition can be expressed: one is to 
appeal to a particular species of logocentrism, which I will return to shortly; the other is 
to refuse the elision of social consent with material trace. It is a convenient and 
productive elision, but this elision is a process, and as such our enquiry is obliged to 
analyse this process in order to understand its operation.  
Turning now to logocentrism, the two major traditions dominating contemporary 
philosophy both have their debates. In continental philosophy, critique focuses on the 
bias implicit in the emphasis on verbal as opposed to non-verbal communication. This 
can take two forms, either taking oral performance as the paradigm and privileging 
speech over (for instance) gesture, or taking speech as the paradigm and privileging the 
spoken word over the written form. For Derrida, logocentrism is a secular form of 
metaphysical determinism that philosophy has inherited from the Greeks, for whom the 
word logos can be translated as ‗word‘, but can signify ‗ultimate truth‘. 
In the analytical tradition logocentrism is more elusive, the term being sometimes used 
as a means to categorize what ‗ordinary language‘ philosophy isn’t. Ordinary language 
philosophy, associated principally with the Oxford culture of the 1950s and 1960s but 
also embracing the later Wittgenstein, grounds philosophical problems in language as it 
is ordinarily used. The notion of an ideal language to which it might be conjecturally 
opposed derives in part from theology, but also from natural science. In both cases, the 
underlying assumption is of an objective universal truth that the process of enquiry 
progressively yields access to. Perhaps the most familiar form of ideal language thinking 
in the analytical tradition is the so-called ‗language of thought hypothesis‘ associated 
principally with Jerry Fodor and Noam Chomsky (the latter indirectly, through his 
nativist concept of ‗universal grammar‘), but associated also with the 
computational/representational model of mind referenced previously.  
Reviewing the legacy of Turing‘s paper, Blay Whitby (1996) summarized its trajectory in 
terms of three ages: ‗1950–1966: A source of inspiration to all concerned with AI; 1966–
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1973: A distraction from some more promising avenues of AI research; 1973–1990: By 
now a source of distraction mainly to philosophers, rather than AI workers‘. What 
emerged in this latter age was an opposition between a computational/representational 
theory of cognition exemplified by Jerry Fodor (1968, 1975) and an 
embodied/embedded theory of perception that first took shape as a critique of 
‗classical‘ AI‘s limitations and blind spots, for instance in Hubert Dreyfus‘s What 
computers can’t do (1972) and John Searle‘s ‗Minds, Brains and Programs‘ (1980). What 
turned critique into a positive programme was the rise of connectionism, and this is 
where Andy Clark comes in. 
One obvious retrospective objection to the set-up Turing proposed is to ask what 
exactly he meant by ‗a‘ machine. The ecology of computing familiar in the present day is 
expressed in a dense mesh of interrelated devices, layers, protocols, applications and 
users. Correspondingly, the self, the individual, the embodied agent—in short, the 
user—has modulated as an interpretative entity in response to the changing 
understandings that have emerged from the vast programme of research Turing 
spawned. 
In Microcognition (1989), Clark tackles philosophical issues raised by the pioneering work 
of Rumelhart, McClelland and the Parallel Distributed Programming Research Group 
(1986), which offered an alternative to the dominant, serial Von Neumann computer 
metaphor in cognitive science. Against this ‗symbolic paradigm‘ the PDP Group posited 
a ‗subsymbolic paradigm‘ which, rather than involving procedural symbolic 
manipulation involves ‗the ―spread of activation‖, relaxation, and statistical correlation. 
The mathematical language in which these concepts are naturally expressed are 
probability theory and the theory of dynamical systems‘ (1986, 1, 195). A typical PDP 
network depends on superpositional storage to maintain these separate instances 
simultaneously, and in consequence they exhibit a characteristically human 
phenomenon, crosstalk. This manifests both in a tendency to mix up items—like an 
urban human confusing two similar telephone numbers—and in the facility to 
generalize (Clark 1989, 122–3).3  
However, the PDP model‘s competence does not equate to comprehension. Data in the 
system does not become information to the system. In Associative Engines (1993), Clark 
                                                 
3 Additionally, Clark (1989) defends the PDP programme against criticisms made by Fodor; this thesis 
inherits Clark‘s position vis-à-vis Fodor rather than engaging the latter directly. 
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cites an example in which a net was trained on data relevant to the granting of bank 
loans, such as income and job. It was able to make a good correlation between patterns 
such that in a prevailingly benevolent economic climate it could accurately distinguish 
between good and bad risks. This competence was not transferable to recession 
conditions, income level being the more critical element in boom times but job stability 
being more salient in recessionary conditions (Clark 1993, 71). 
The computational role of the environment begins to emerge as a theme in Associative 
Engines, and matures—under such influences as the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, 
the gestalt psychology of James Gibson, the biosemiotics of Maturana & Varela, 
Dennett‘s multiple drafts model of consciousness, and Hutchins‘ distributed 
cognition—to become his signature concept, the extended mind, as expressed in Being 
There (1997), ‗The Extended Mind‘ in collaboration with David Chalmers (1998), and 
‗Minds, Brains and Tools‘ (1999). Briefly stated, the significance of the extended mind is 
that ‗Embodied agents use bodily actions and environmental interventions to make the 
world a better place to think in‘ (Clark, 2006). Above all, this strategy is economical, 
maximizing cognitive output at the same time as maximizing the efficiency of the 
vehicle. 
Parallel to the emergence of connectionism, criticism of the underlying paradigm 
equating intelligence with tool use emerged among anthropologists studying and 
comparing primate populations. Andrew Whiten and Richard Byrne (1988) delivered an 
evolutionary perspective on the emergence of intelligence that stressed social rather than 
technical aspects of behaviour. Initially their focus was on ‗Machiavellian‘, manipulative 
behaviour that suggested intentionality on the part of the agent. A second volume 
(Byrne & Whiten (1997)) explored a broader range of intersubjective and empathic 
states; Robin Dunbar‘s analysis and interpretation of primate brain evolution (1993), 
(1998) led him to conclude that the answer to the question ‗what did the human brain 
evolve for?‘ is answered primarily by addressing social rather than 
technical/technological issues. For Dunbar, this entails specific claims about group 
interaction among humans, which, although grounded in the distant evolutionary past, 
are nevertheless foundational in modern human culture. 
Complimenting this perspective, neuroscientists led by Giacomo Rizzolatti discovered a 
previously unsuspected facet of brain physiology, the so-called ‗mirror neuron‘. Mirror 
neurons are part of the sensorimotor system. This is the part of the brain that 
coordinates physical action; what Rizzolatti and colleagues discovered is that the same 
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neuron groups ‗fire‘ when a relevant action is witnessed, and also when the agent is 
‗thinking about‘ the relevant action. Significantly, ‗relevant action‘, in this sense, is 
restricted to specific physiological data—focused on the hand and the mouth (Gallese, 
Keysers, & Rizzolatti, A unifying view of the basis of social cognition, 2004).  
Action understanding, on this view, entails attunement to conspecifics‘ intentional 
states, but using the term ‗understand‘ begs the question. To understand is to be able to 
manipulate discrete thoughts and assemble them in narrative form so that an intention 
becomes an evidentiary sequence with a causal trail. Skilled motor action can certainly 
constitute evidence of an intention, but so too can unskilled, unintended or 
misinterpreted action. What humans are uniquely capable of is the deliberate shaping of 
the environment so that the varieties of misunderstanding can be managed and 
minimized. 
The Social Context of Creativity draws together these two approaches—embodied mind and 
social brain—that in differing ways lay stress on the proactive role of the environment 
in shaping human thought processes. They converge to form what I call the ‗extended 
social brain hypothesis‘, which claims that: 
There is no subjectivity without intersubjectivity. That is to say: as an 
evolutionary matter, it was necessary for the empathic capacities to evolve 
before the sense of self we identify as human could emerge. 
Intersubjectivity is critical to human communication, because of its role in 
interpreting intention. While the idea that human communication requires three 
levels of intentionality carries analytical weight, I argue that the inflationary 
trajectory is wrong as an evolutionary matter. The trend is instead towards 
increasing powers of individuation. 
The capacity for tool-use is emphasized less under the social brain hypothesis, 
but the importance of digital manipulation needs to be reasserted as part of a 
mature ontology. 
These claims are modulated to substantiate the ‗work-maker‘, a socially situated (and 
embodied) creative agent who draws together Peircean notions of phenomenology, 
epistemology and environmentally situated oral performance. The key concept is the 
notion of polyphony, which is used to identify cognitive elements and understand their 
mutually supportive function. The reference is not primarily to medieval vocal 
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polyphony, but to early-modern instrumental polyphony, specifically Bach‘s fugues. In 
these, several discrete melodic lines are coordinated in time by metrical pulse, and in 
space by functional harmony. Each element lends support to the other, and no element 
can claim primordial pre-eminence. 
In outline, the scheme grows initially from thinking about ambiguities in the term 
‗common sense‘. I identify four strands—sensory, psychological, semiotic, and 
cultural—each of which exhibit internal polyphony as well as being in polyphonic 
relationship with each other.4 Sensory polyphony is the singular stream of consciousness 
made out of the several sense inputs—vision, touch, etcetera. Psychological polyphony 
concerns the sense that humans understand each other to share these sensory inputs, 
thanks to the interrelation of neurological attributes such as emotion, sensorimotor 
control, the mirror neuron system and so on.  
Semiotic polyphony concerns the emergent capacity to share, on the basis of sensory 
data, an understanding of the material environment. Theorizing this development 
involves a second concept, recombinant Intentionality. With psychological polyphony 
comes a simple capacity to read the intentions of conspecifics, which I call ‗bucket-
brigade intentionality‘. However, humans shape their local environment by detaching 
intention from performance, deliberately creating an interpretable trace. This practice 
exploits what might be termed our innate hylozoism, after the pre-Socratic doctrine that 
life and matter are inseparable.  
However, the interpretant‘s response to these environmental cues is probabilistically 
interpretative, and this calls in a third concept, Intersubjective Technology. The 
significance of probability lies in its topic-neutral capacity to conjoin multiple layers of 
supervening causal loops. Environmental features (including one‘s own body) can be 
locked in to minimize the flexibility of chance, enabling the generation of durable 
cultural forms, as argued in Actor–Network Theory. We will require, however, a 
definition of ‗technology‘ that adequately scaffolds the polyphonic model: in order to 
make the notion of polyphony more than an analogy, some means of conceiving a 
cognitive equivalent to the musical ‗note‘ is required.  
                                                 
4 I use the Peircean spelling, ‗semeiotic‘, where Peirce‘s ideas are specifically involved, and the 
conventional ‗semiotic‘ otherwise.  
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In short, the solution is found in the mind–tool ontology developed in the late 1990s by 
Daniel Dennett and Andy Clark. At length, the topic is bound up in the problem of 
individuation, and involves a solution in which the sought entity is defined not in itself 
but in its relationships by virtue of its capacity to stabilize them. The price of this 
settlement is a certain vagueness, which, for both Peirce and Heidegger, is sanctioned 
(to differing degrees) by leaning towards essentialism at the expense of a nominalism 
that would demand a full intrinsic accounting for the entity in itself. 
The thesis is in three parts: methodologies; performativities; and technologies. In broad 
terms these correspond to Peirce‘s semeiotic categories of secondness, firstness and 
thirdness. Since these categories afford enormous scope for confusion, suffice it to say 
initially that these correspond approximately to epistemology, phenomenology, and 
sociology. Part one begins the task of circumscribing the topic of individuation, with the 
purpose of laying the epistemological foundation for the subsequent argument. Part two 
elaborates the extended social brain hypothesis, polyphonic consciousness, mind–tools, 
and recombinant intentionality. Part three develops the theory of intersubjective 
technology, which seeks to account for the pragmatic reality of the mind–tool ontology 
in action. The trajectory leads to a correlation with the notion of ‗Barnesian 
performativity‘ developed by Donald MacKenzie in recent work on the sociology of 
economics. I introduce the work-maker, the figure at the hub of the social context of 
creativity, a cognitive agent utilizing mind–tools in the service of Barnesian 
performance. 
There are three chapters in part one. The first, Peirce and the problem of abduction, 
introduces an initial formulation of the cognitive agent, Peirce‘s ‗interpretant‘, in the 
context of a review of the main themes in Pierce‘s work revolving around the theme of 
vagueness and the initiation of thought. The second chapter, Acts of institution, sets 
out to define two terms: dispositif, which can conveniently be termed ‗a story in the 
process of being told‘; and the obligatory passage point, which can be termed ‗the 
subject of that story in process of being disclosed‘, via Austin‘s concept of 
performativity, which elides story and teller to establish an auctorial figure resembling 
Peirce‘s interpretant. The third chapter—despite its name, Rorty, elimination and 
meiosis—principally concerns Dennett‘s ‗heterophenomenology‘: a development that 
intriguingly reflects the prior discussion of obligatory passage points. In formulating his 
ontology, Dennett ‗passed‘ through Rorty, apparently without realizing its significance 
until some time later. Not only is this interesting in itself, but it becomes the more so 
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when the connection between Rorty and Peirce is explored, suggesting that the 
phenomenology behind Dennett is less Husserl‘s than Peirce‘s.  
In part two, the focus shifts to the social brain, beginning in chapter four with an 
outline of the principal claims of the extended social brain hypothesis. Chapter five 
introduces polyphonic consciousness, a concept that fuses four separate construals of 
‗common sense‘—sensory, psychological, semiotic, and cultural—though the initial 
focus is on the third of these. The mind–tool ontology as developed by Dennett and 
Clark is subjected to detailed analysis with attention focused first on the functional 
nature of the tool, and second on the institutional nature of the mind. Chapter six, 
intention, intersubjectivity and implicature, develops the specifically social aspect of 
this analysis, uncovering the conflation of second- and third-person senses in a review 
of Gricean implicature. Chapter seven then introduces a second concept, recombinant 
intentionality, which extends the ‗passage point‘ from part one to develop a sense of 
how mind–tools progressively populate and equip an environmental niche. 
Part three entails a change of register, enlisting the sociohistorical dimension scorned by 
Peirce and the analytical tradition. The difficulty Peirce diagnosed in the Hegelian 
historical method can be mitigated by separating the phenomenological from the social 
and treating the former in terms of Peircean firstness and the latter as thirdness. Chapter 
eight, the technologizing of intersubjectivity, introduces a third concept, 
‗intersubjective technology‘, the result of inverting Walter Ong‘s ‗technologizing of the 
word‘ while analysing the spoken/written distinction‘s normative assumptions about 
language. The impact of literacy is examined in three locations—classical Greece, 
medieval England, and modern Papua New Guinea—to understand the capacity for 
mediating intersubjective transactions via material traces that is conjecturally implicated 
in the concept of literacy. Since we cannot speak of intersubjective technology without a 
theory of technology, chapter nine, art loves chance, develops an attitude that draws 
on Marx, Heidegger, McLuhan, Clark, and post-Peircean probability theory. Finally, 
chapter ten introduces the work-maker, the embodied agent actively engaged in 
creating the frontiers of knowledge. This figure is explicitly embedded in the world of 
economic activity and, accordingly, the argument draws on recent work by Donald 
MacKenzie and others regarding the performativity of economics as a discipline 





‗Common sense‘ in its most unreflective form tells us that things are plainly and 
obviously ‗as they are‘. Things are identified by consent, and the processes by which 
consent is negotiated are presumed equally plain and obvious. People disagree about 
what is plain and obvious. There is consent, nevertheless, regarding the method by which 
disputes may be resolved. Philosophers inherit two main approaches from the medieval 
Scholastic tradition: essentialism (or realism—though adopting the latter term would be 
to beg the question) and nominalism.  
The differences between the two positions are slender—indeed, it was the intensity of 
arguments over unfalsifiable differences that led Scholasticism to ridicule. Essentialism 
follows Plato in claiming that universal forms—essences—promulgate the instantiation 
of matter as humans experience it. Nominalists deny the existence of universals, treating 
the problems posed by apparently universal terms such as creativity (or intelligence, or 
strength) as simply non-particular and thus compositional. Nominalists do not deny the 
existence of abstract particulars (such as numbers or geometric axioms), and these require 
a mental faith that closely resembles that of essentialists. The ‗mental‘ modifier here 
introduces a distinction from ‗naïve‘ belief on an assumption of evidential reason 
wrought (disclosed) in extended (acculturated) debate. 
Nominalism is favoured by philosophers of nature, on the premise that intellectual 
enquiry seeks to disclose compositionality in nature that is presumed to exist 
independently of human endeavour. Nominalist methods account for innovation by 
recourse to some variant or other of ‗trial and error‘, imputing ‗natural‘ selection to the 
process of discovery. Essentialism, by contrast, appeals to a difficult-to-define meiotic 
synthesis of addiction and adduction. Addiction has a literal meaning of enslavement, 
while adduction (and its inverse, abduction) has a literal meaning of being led towards (or 
away from), rather than led into in the logical sense associated with induction. 
Accordingly, there is a sense that there is something about human physiology that 
implicates the organism‘s continuing relationship with its environment in the process of 
discovery. 
The Peircean position is somewhere towards the centre of this debate, a position leaning 
in favour of an essentialism that he called ‗moderate Scotist realism‘—after Duns 
Scotus, the Scholastic semiotician he particularly admired. In present-day terms, he 
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would be recognized as a ‗structural realist‘, one whose commitment is not to the 
content deemed ‗real‘, as would be the case with ‗naïve realism‘ or ‗scientific realism‘, 
but rather to stipulations concerning the apparatus through which enquiry is conducted.  
Peirce recognized that enquiry is a rhetorical practice, in which ‗methodeutic‘ is an 
endogenous problem of individuation requiring symmetrical attention. Accordingly, 
Methodologies is about rhetorics of individuation. The term ‗individuation‘ has a 
longstanding ambiguity over a distinction between the practice of rendering a particular, 
and the apriori existence of a particular. The distinction should be between individuation 
and individuality, but the exigencies of language intervene (Gracia 1988, 18–21).1 It is 
the process that concerns us. Therefore, I use the term ‗individuation‘ in the abductive, 
Peircean sense that I will elaborate in detail shortly. With respect to ‗individuality‘, we 
will find that ‗individuation‘ discloses an intriguing paradox regarding ‗methodological 
individualism‘, but that will be a matter for Part Two. 
                                                 
1 Making the distinction between individuatio and individualitas might seem unnecessarily cumbersome, so 




The inventor Thomas Alva Edison wanted not only to make the lightbulb, but the 
socket it plugged into, the power supply to which it was connected, and the dynamo 
that generated the power supply. Likewise the logician Charles Sanders Peirce sought 
answers that systematically solved problems across his innumerable domains of enquiry. 
The corporate orderliness of Edison‘s Menlo Park invention factory makes for an 
intriguing conceptual comparison with the insular entanglements of Arisbe, the 
Pennsylvania address of Peirce‘s later years. It is a contrast that dramatizes a key aspect 
of Peirce‘s speculation about method and innovation. The relative rhetorical status of 
speaker, apparatus, and datum is clearly articulated in the Menlo Park environment in a 
way that it is not at Arisbe. Some preliminary remarks are required to contextualize 
Peirce‘s analysis, given that the matter of relative status bears on his reception both in 
his own time and now. 
It is instructive to deconstruct the name ‗Arisbe‘, because it says much about Peirce‘s 
relationship with the world. The reference is to book VI of Homer‘s Iliad: 
Axylus, hospitable, rich, and good: 
In fair Arisbe‘s walls (his native place) 
He held his seat! a friend to human race. 
Fast by the road, his ever-open door 
Obliged the wealthy, and relieved the poor. 
To stern Tydides now he falls a prey, 
No friend to guard him in the dreadful day! 
  (Alexander Pope‘s translation) 
The self-pitying final line is as important as the previous, approbatory ones. Although 
known and respected among professional mathematicians for his developments in 
statistics and logic, he was academically peripheral, acknowledged for his considerable 
gifts by the scholarly community but at best a dysfunctional member of it. According to 
his biographer Joseph Brent, when Peirce applied to the Carnegie Trust in 1903,  
The fact that Peirce was refused a grant even though Carnegie himself, the president of the United 
States, various other politically prominent men, and a majority of the leading members of the 
scientific community favoured it, was due largely to the nature of his evil reputation, some of it well 
deserved, and the power of the self-righteous men who controlled the politics of American science 
in the late nineteenth century. They considered Peirce morally degenerate, mentally unstable—
perhaps insane—arrogant, and irresponsible, a man of broken and dissolute character (1993, 288). 
Though there are a number of factors contributing to this ‗self-righteous‘ disgust, the 
most pertinent and difficult, with respect to Peirce‘s achievement, is the sense about him 
of narcissistic dishonesty. This is a matter of actively creating the illusion that things are 
(or will be) other than they are (or are realistically likely to be). Mention should be made, 
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too, of Peirce‘s trigeminal neuralgia, an extremely painful and debilitating affliction that 
he is likely to have medicated with alcohol, opium, morphine and possibly cocaine 
(Brent 1993, 14).  
His writing style is dense, prolix, digressive, and demanding. William James, writing to 
his old friend during the genesis of Peirce‘s 1898 Harvard lectures, at one turn says: 
‗now be a good boy and think a more popular plan out. I don‘t want the audience to 
dwindle to 3 or 4…‘ (Peirce 1992b, 25). Peirce replies: ‗… Your Harvard students of 
philosophy find it too arduous a matter to reason exactly. Soon your engineers will find 
it better to leave great works unbuilt rather than go through the necessary calculations.‘ 
Responding to a later draft, James says: ‗the fourth lecture seems to me a model of what 
a popular lecture ought to be. …  
Therefore I remark that I implore you on bended knees to give it first, instead of the one you have 
written, which being full of ―sass‖ to the audience and paradoxical irradiations in all sorts of 
directions, would have, I fear somewhat of an opposite effect (ibid, 32). 
 
James understood that Peirce‘s method of clarification often involved the systematic 
coining of neologisms. Note, in this example, the formal logic projected into the 
semantic: 
Three modes of evolution have thus been brought before us: evolution by fortuitous variation, 
evolution by mechanical necessity, and evolution by creative love. We may term them tychastic 
evolution, or tychasm, anancastic evolution, or anancasm, and agapastic evolution, or agapasm. The 
doctrines which represent these as severally of principal importance we may term tychasticism, 
anancasticism, and agapasticism. On the other hand the mere propositions that absolute chance, 
mechanical necessity, and the law of love are severally operative in the cosmos may receive the 
names of tychism, anancism, and agapism (Peirce 1992a, 362). 
This is from the last essay in the Monist series, ‗Evolutionary Love‘, but in the third, ‗The 
Law of Mind‘ (ibid., 312ff), the term following tychism (with an ‗i‘) is ‗synechism‘. For 
Peirce, the contextual difference between tychism and tychasm renders interpretation 
unproblematic; for the reader (never mind the listener, for whom James feared), such 
attunement to fine detail is difficult to sustain. Nevertheless, growing familiarity with 
Peircean habits, most noticeably the habit of making three-fold distinctions, begins to 
generate an explicative force of its own. Not only does the core argument here divide 
into three—tychasm, anancasm and agapasm—but so too does the deployment of 
variants—tychasm, tychasticism, tychism. This is the Trichotomic in action.  
The trichotomic underpins Peirce‘s entire thought-system. In mathematics, the axiom of 
trichotomy is that for any pair of real numbers, exactly one of three relations is true: x < 
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y, x = y, or x > y. Peirce‘s Trichotomic is not so clear-cut. ‗Trichotomy‘, and 
‗Trichotomic‘, were titles for draft first chapters of a projected book on logic dating 
from the late 1880s, and he considered the topic to be an essential point of departure. 
Repeatedly, among his papers, Peirce reasserts this dogma. In the 1888 draft, he writes: 
‗For my part, I am a determined foe of no innocent number; I respect and esteem them 
all their several ways; but I am forced to confess to a leaning to the number three in 
philosophy‘ (1992, 247). Later, writing to Victoria Welby (1904): 
I was long ago (1867) led, after only three or four years‘ study, to throw all ideas into the three 
classes of Firstness, of Secondness, and of Thirdness. This sort of notion is as distasteful to me as to 
anybody; and for years, I endeavored to pooh-pooh and refute it; but it long ago conquered me 
completely.  
His pioneering editor Charles Hartshorne hints at a broad range of classical and 
medieval influences (1941, pp. 49–50), and there is an understated hylozoic flavour 
diffused around the obvious initial source in Aristotle. The connection to Duns Scotus 
and medieval scholasticism is more firmly established (Boler, 2004). In particular, the 
formulation has a relationship with the structure of syllogism, which I will discuss 
further in section 1.3. Most immediately present in Peirce‘s formulation is the 
instruction he received from his father in the works of Kant, with which he became 
critically engaged from his student days at Harvard. The first appearance of the 
fundamental trichotomy is in an 1868 paper, ‗On a new list of categories‘ (1992a, 1ff), 
although the distinctions are not, at this point, named ‗firstness‘ etc.  
These categories of firstness, secondness and thirdness do not correspond precisely to 
the mathematical axiom, where each of the three alternative relations are identical in 
status. Instead, Peirce uses the term ‗prescission‘ (cut off), in distinction from ‗precision‘ 
(cut down), to create a systematic relationship between his three terms. Prescission and 
abstraction ‗are now limited, not merely to mental separation, but to that which arises 
from attention to one element and neglect of the other‘ (1992a, 3). Secondnesses can be 
prescinded from thirdnesses, but the reverse is not true; likewise firstnesses from 
secondnesses.  
Peirce‘s categories exhibit a richness of functional distinction and relationship. He 
develops the explicit association between his categories and his trichotomy twenty years 
later. The 1868 category ‗quality (Reference to a ground)‘ becomes Firstness, which ‗may 
have manifold varieties, or rather arbitrariness and variety is its essence, but it is absolute 
and unsusceptible of differences of degree‘ (1992a, 280). ‗Relation (reference to a 
correlate)‘ becomes Secondness, ‗dynamical connection‘; ‗Representation (reference to 
an interpretant)‘ becomes Thirdness, 
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…where of the three terms A, B, C, each is related to each of the others, but by a relation which 
only subsists by virtue of the third term, and each has a character which belongs to it only so long as 
the others really influence it. It would not be enough to say that the connection between the terms is 
dynamical, for forces only subsist between pairs of objects; we had better use the word ―vital‖ to 
express the mode of connection, for wherever there is life, generation, growth, development, there 
and there alone is such genuine Thirdness (1992a, 280–1). 
Connected to the matter of prescission, Peirce now identifies ‗degenerate‘ forms of 
secondness and thirdness—the term ‗degenerate‘ being used in its mathematical sense, 
‗A limiting case in which a class of object changes its nature so as to belong to another, 
usually simpler, class‘ (Weisstein, Degenerate, n.d.). Characteristically, he plunges into a 
discussion of degenerate secondness before he has even defined the genuine article:  
…a single object considered as second to itself is a degenerate second, and an object considered as 
second to another with which it has no real connection, so that were that other taken away it would 
still have those same characters which are implied in relation, is also a degenerate second (1992a, 
280–1) 
Whereas genuine secondness, as we have seen, is a dynamical connection, ‗degenerate 
Secondness is a relation of reason, as a mere resemblance‘ (ibid.). Where secondness has 
two ‗varieties‘ of degeneracy, thirdness has two ‗orders‘ of degeneracy. The first is 
expressed with a precision that makes paraphrase hazardous: 
Thirdness of the first order of degeneracy is where two of the three terms are identical, so that the 
other only mediates between two aspects of the same object or where in some other way there is no 
vital connection between A, B, and C, but only a dynamical connection between A and B, and 
another between B and C, thus bringing about a dynamical connection between A and C (ibid). 
The second order of degenerate thirdness again invokes the deficiency of ‗mere relations 
of reason‘, in this case where the terms are more or less identical or otherwise lacking in 
independent dynamical relationships of the kind specified as indicative of the genuine 
article.  
Something is missing, however, in the definition of thirdness that would make it both 
contained and complete. Given that he has strayed from the precision of the 
mathematical definition of trichotomy, it is not clear why it is that fourth and multiple 
terms could not be imagined, other than the exigency of keeping things simple. Russell 
believed that he could conceive a fourthness, though it is not clear from the fragmentary 
account in Welby‘s correspondence that he was fully apprised of the scope of Peirce‘s 
intent (Cust 1931, 159).1 Intriguingly, though, there is potential in the term that 
                                                 
1 Cust was Welby‘s daughter. Her editorial habit was to elide technical material; an ellipsis marks the 
continuation of Russell‘s sentence, where he may have elaborated a proof. Since Welby, in response, asks 
whether Russell is not proposing two secondnesses, he may have had something resembling Aristotle‘s 
square of oppositions in mind. Regarding the rigour of Peirce‘s use of the term ‗trichotomy‘, note that 
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intervenes between two secondnesses to create thirdness, an explicitly ‗extuitive‘ term 
having the potential to be both necessarily transforming and necessarily constraining. At 
its simplest and purest, it performs the function of a mirror with a clarity that supports 
more and more elaborate indicative entanglements. Developing this interpretative 
potential leads us first, though, to Peirce‘s semeiotic, and then to his tychic. 
 
Peirce‘s early conception of the thought-sign stands at the opening of a lifelong struggle 
to capture the nature of sign-structure, a struggle that yielded a dense, difficult, but 
ultimately inconclusive system, an adjunct to logic that he called ‗semeiotic‘. There is an 
innate confusion over whether the object is to develop algebraic tools as a logical end in 
itself, whether it is to anatomize nature holistically in less formal but nonetheless 
rigorous ways, or whether it is to analyse the linguistic support for logical discourse in 
the limited sense of the rhetoric in which logical arguments are presented. Peirce‘s 
semeiotic would these days be recognized as being interstitial between symbolic logic, 
linguistics, and biosemiotics, but it is couched in material likely to take a specialist in any 
of these fields well outside their comfort zone.  
There is an eroticism, a performative sense of rhetorical complexification (symplokē, or 
complexio) about the semeiotic that continues to prove seductive, but it is a somewhat 
unrequiting temptation. The scholar wants to be able to say with confidence, ―famisign 
means this‖ or ―delome means that‖, but seldom does Peirce assure his reader of solid 
ground. Indeed, a remark he makes in reply to James‘s previously cited advice is a 
general cautionary: 
But as you know that my style of ‗brilliancy‘ consists in a mixture of irony and seriousness, —the 
same things said ironically and also seriously, I mean... (1992b, 27). 
The erotic metaphor extends to Peirce‘s late development of the semeiotic. This was 
stimulated by a lengthy correspondence with Victoria Welby, initiated in response to a 
1903 review he wrote of her book What is Meaning? It is less the fact of the relationship 
that makes the point, and more the observation that scholarship has been intent on 
‗cutting in‘, attending to Peirce and excluding Welby‘s contribution.2 While her services 
                                                                                                                                          
Peirce refers to Welby‘s tripartite distinction between sense, meaning and significance as a trichotomy 
(Cust 1931, 309), though hers appears not to have logical force (of the Peircean kind) behind it. 
2 The EU library‘s copy of Cust 1931, the second volume of Welby‘s correspondence, has only one 
borrowing before mine (2008) on the stamp sheet, dated 1982. 
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are acknowledged, such as her furnishing C. K. Ogden with the copies of Peirce‘s letters 
that eventually formed the basis of the appendix on Peirce in The Meaning of Meaning 
(Ogden & Richards 1944; cf. Nubiola 1997, 10), little account is taken of her own 
lengthy letters of reply. The ‗cutting in‘ tends to exclude materials that are difficult to 
grasp (both literally and figuratively), but which contribute support without which the 
whole is more likely to fail. For instance, on Nubiola‘s account (1997, 20), Frank 
Ramsay influentially adapts the type/token distinction from Peirce‘s explication in the 
Welby correspondence, but omits the third (or rather, first) term ‗tinge or tone‘ (Peirce 
1998, 488). J.L. Austin (1975, 98) adopts ‗rheme‘ (a first) and ‗pheme‘ (a second) but not 
the third, ‗delome‘ (Peirce 1998, 490). 
An early difficulty with Peirce‘s explication of semeiotics was the distinction between 
interpreter and interpretant in his first writings on what he at that time (1866–9) called 
‗thought-signs‘. An interpretant is an idealization of the particular instance of 
interpretation that the personalized term ‗interpreter‘ implies; it represents the capacity 
to interpret. Only towards the end of his late exchanges with Victoria Welby does he 
make the significant concession of specifying a human interpretant: 
I define a sign as anything which is so determined by something else, called its object, and so 
determines an effect upon a person, which effect I call its interpretant, that the latter is thereby 
mediately determined by the former. My insertion of ―upon a person‖ is a sop to Cerberus, because 
I despair of making my own broad conception understood (1998, 478). 
The interpretant is the thirdness to (first) sign or representamen and (second) object. 
Thomas Short, in an paper that addresses the widely-acknowledged incompleteness of 
Peirce‘s semeiotic, summarizes the early exposition as follows, stressing that Peirce‘s 
original contribution to a line of analysis stretching via Kant and Locke back to 
Aristotle, was the shifting of emphasis from individual thought-signs to the interpretive 
process: 
If this same sort of analysis applies to each thought, then every thought is both a sign and an 
interpretant. Hence, each is but a moment in an infinite regressus and infinite progressus of thought-
signs. That thought begins and ends in time is accounted for by its being a continuum, packing an 
infinity of infinitesimal thoughts into a finite flow of thought. Among much else, this entails that 
there is no cognition not determined by a previous cognition, hence, that none is determined directly 
by its object. If no cognition is determined directly by its object, then there is no intuitive knowledge 
(Short 2004, 215). 
The chief weakness of the early semeiotic was its failure to account for the presumed 
capacity of the interpretant to claim the cognitive foreground. This is connected to 
Peirce‘s position on ‗intuition‘, which he regarded as an essential component of the 
Cartesian introspective method. The semeiotic, both early and late, seeks to generate an 
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apparatus (ironically reminiscent of Bergson‘s cinematograph) that can account for 
human consciousness as a vehicle moving through an infinity of sign potential. The idea 
that cognition can emerge ex nihilo during immediate contemplation must be false, he 
believes. Thus, Peirce states, ‗the term intuition will be taken as signifying a cognition not 
determined by a previous cognition of the same object, and therefore so determined by 
something out of the consciousness‘ (1992a, 11). 
In the late work on semeiotic, under way from around 1903, Peirce substantially 
develops his system so that this blemish is submerged in an inflationary currency of 
intricately circulating terms and categories. His attention was turning to the project of 
getting his theories into sufficient order for him to write and publish them in book 
form. For Peirce that did not mean ‗a‘ book, of course: his Carnegie Trust prospectus 
envisaged a 36-volume work. The place of the semeiotic was modelled after that of 
Aristotle‘s Categories, the initial work of his Organum, and Peirce propounded a ten-fold 
classification of signs now based on three trichotomies, governed by a base distinction 
between Representamen (a term that he later concedes can be replaced with ‗sign‘), 
Object and Interpretant. 
In the first trichotomy, concerning the nature of the sign, the early distinction between 
Quality/Relation/Representation becomes one between Qualisign (a quality that is a 
sign), Sinsign (where ‗sin‘ represents singular iteration) and Legisign (a law that is a sign). 
The second trichotomy, concerning the nature of the object, is the most familiar: An 
Icon is likeness in the sense of simulacrum. Its relationship with its object is a matter of 
mere resemblance. An Index refers necessarily to its object. A Symbol relates to its object 
via laws that tend to cause the symbol to be interpreted as referring to the object in 
question. In the third trichotomy, concerning the nature of the interpretant, a Rheme is a 
sign of qualitative possibility; a Dicent is a sign of actuality or, again, iteration; an 
Argument is a sign of law (1998, 290–5). These three trichotomies yield ten classes of sign 
because, although there would be 27 possibilities in all, several are redundant. Every 
qualisign is an icon, every icon a rheme, every symbol a legisign, and every argument is a 
symbol (Preucel 2006, 57). Peirce, in a late P.S. to Welby, rendered these in a diagram, to 
which I append Preucel‘s gloss: 
. 
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The number above to the left describes the object of the sign [2nd]. That above to the right 
describes its interpretant [3rd]. That below describes the sign itself [1st].  
1 signifies the possible modality, that of an Idea. 
2 signifies the actual modality, that of an Occurrence. 
3 signifies the necessary modality, that of a Habit (Peirce 1998, 491)
Qualisgn-Icon-Rheme 1-1-1 The feeling of red 
Sinsign-Icon-Rheme 2-1-1 Specific Diagram 
Sinsign-Index-Rheme 2-2-1 Spontaneous cry 
Sinsign-Index-Dicent 2-2-2 Weathervane 
Legisign-Icon-Rheme 3-1-1 Diagram 
Legisign-Index-Rheme 3-2-1 Demonstrative pronoun (e.g. ‗this‘) 
Legisign-Index-Dicent 3-2-2 Street cry 
Legisign-Symbol-Rheme 3-3-1 Common noun 
Legisign-Symbol-Dicent 3-3-2 Proposition 
Legisign-Symbol-Argument 3-3-3 Syllogism 
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By 1908, the three trichotomies have become ten, and Peirce‘s system generates 59,049 
(310) classes of sign, which, subject to the principles of connection he advances, render 
down to 66. Peirce‘s definitions are at times arbitrary or uncertain in their associations 
(he marks them as such). A generative principle emerges, a sort of evolutionary 
feedforward mechanism, which challenges the system‘s analytical valence.  
In this period, between 1906 and 1908, while in correspondence with Welby, Peirce 
introduces the tone/type/token trichotomy, which he renames 
potisign/actisign/famisign. The new terms are inelegant, and after further mulling he 
considers reinstating the earlier ones, with ‗mark‘ replacing ‗tone‘ (1998, 488).3 Potisign 
relates to the notion of potential, as a matter of positive possibility. Actisign is 
simultaneously unique and transitory, received in the act of experiencing ‗here and now‘, 
such that the same word printed in the same paragraph in two separate copies of the 
same book is not the same sign in terms of its immediate impact on the reader (482–4). 
Famisign, on the other hand, recognizes the multiple familiarity of that sign in its 
different contexts. An example he develops concerns the war memorial commonly 
found in US towns and villages after the Civil War. The configuration is recognizibly 
similar—a centrally-located statue—but the implementation always local. To each 
bereaved citizen there is a personal story that threads a singular loss together with a 
communal and ultimately civic narrative bound in to the symbol of the statue (486).  
Further, he introduces a new principle aimed at forestalling the infinite progressus by 
asserting that the process of sign-interpretation is end-directed:  
… by this revolution of 1907, we break out of the circle of words, of words interpreting words and 
thought interpreting thoughts. The pragmatic distinction between meaningfulness and 
meaninglessness becomes this: meaningful speech and thought have ultimate logical interpretants, 
while nonsensical speech and thought, though they may always be translated into further thoughts 
and words, lack ultimate logical interpretants. Being interpretable by habits of action, meaningful 
speech engages with the nonverbal world: for example, assertions may be acted upon and tested 
against the consequences of those actions (Short 2004, 229). 
The notion of ‗habit‘ is important. For Peirce, who uses the word frequently and 
normatively in relation to his category of thirdness, the allusion is to a classical 
distinction between habit (exis) and disposition (diathesis). According to Fleming‘s 
Vocabulary (1860), disposition is ‗the arrangement of that which has parts‘; it ‗gives a 
                                                 
3 This first term might benefit from a designation appropriate to the sensory organ, so that auditory signs 
are tones, visual ones tinges and so on. ‗Mark‘ seems a hylozoic stage beyond this immediate 
apprehension, suggesting that a judgement has already been made. 
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colour to the whole character of the man… His thoughts run in a particular channel, 
without his being sensible that they do so‘. Habit is more narrowly defined as being the 
appropriate transliteration of the greek exis, though the ‗abusive‘ additional English 
sense of custom or use is already noted by Monboddo (1779, p. 26). Fleming continues: 
‗habit is a certain constitution, frame, or disposition of parts… by which every thing is 
fitted to act or suffer in a certain way‘. In Liddell & Scott‘s definition of exis there is a 
clearer emphasis on embodied practice. 4 For Aristotle, as Stefania Bonfiglioli (2008) 
points out, a habit is a particularly stable species of disposition, which in turn is  
First of all, a quality, then ranked under a category admitting contraries; secondly, a relative (pros ti), 
because a disposition is always said to be disposition of something else or in relation to something 
else (118). 
There is a potential confusion, however, to be found in the similarity of diathesis—a 
species of secondness in Peirce‘s terms—and the rhetorical term taxis, which also 
translates as ‗disposition‘, and which is more in the nature of a Peircean thirdness. 
As a result, far from breaking out of the circle of words, Peirce‘s gesture seems almost 
theological, seeking to lock the semeiotic inside a teleological loop whose extent is only 
obscured by the underexplored nature of the extended divisions his fertile imagination 
brought forth. A better term might be ‗fundamental logical interpretant‘—bottom up, 
rather than top-down, but that way lies the primordial.  
In the relationship between his logic and his semeiotic there is an impetus to construct, 
which meets an impetus to analyse, to seek bottom, from the semeiotic standpoint. The 
third element still lacks definition, however; it concerns a sense, coming between top 
and bottom, of ‗moving through‘; though this is a mobility governed by probability. 
 
Chance and probability are fundamental to Peirce‘s thought, and central to his legacy. 
His term ‗tychism‘ is from the Greek for ‗necessity, fate... chance regarded as an 
impersonal cause‘ (Liddell & Scott). The deductive logic that underpins rational enquiry 
valorizes reliable replication, and reliable replication in turn validates deductive logic. 
Inductive reasoning—generalizing from the particular—is more familiar and more 
practical, but also more hazardous. Peirce, in tackling this problem, contributed 
                                                 
4 Lewis & Short‘s Latin Dictionary, Liddell & Scott‘s Greek Lexicon, and other similar resources, are 
collected in Tufts University‘s Perseus Digital Library database, www.perseus.tufts.edu 
Methodologies 1: Peirce and the problem of abduction 24 
significantly to the development of the primary Aristotelian mode of anagoge, usually 
rendered as ‗abduction‘. Although Peirce was satisfied that the distinction between 
inductive and abductive was important and worth pursuing, a clear-cut distinction 
eluded him. Nevertheless, he was firm in his view that the abductive—the only 
intellectual modality in which original ideas are created—rests on chance subject to 
mathematical law.  
The relationship between probability and pragmatism as he conceived it is close, and 
there is necessarily some overlap in discussing the two. For Peirce, probability is an 
empirical matter with clear empirical procedures for fixing content. In his Popular Science 
Monthly article ‗The Probability of Induction‘ (1992a, 155ff), Peirce elaborates John 
Venn‘s pioneering work on statistical sampling and the logic of chance. Peirce 
characterizes the distinction between probability and chance as a distinction between 
subjectivity and objectivity: 
Probability and chance undoubtedly belong primarily to consequences, and are relative to premises; 
but we may, nevertheless, speak of the chance of an event absolutely, meaning by that the chance of 
the combination of all arguments in reference to it which exist for us in the given state of our 
knowledge. Taken in this sense it is incontestable that the chance of an event has an intimate 
connection with the degree of our belief in it (158). 
However, for the event to have any status at all, it must be empirically grounded: 
‗probability, to have any value at all, must express a fact. It is, therefore, a thing to be 
inferred upon evidence‘ (159). This is where the connection between logic and method 
is made explicit. 
The imperative that drives the distinction between inductive and abductive arises from 
the Trichotomic. In the last paper of the Popular Science series, ‗Deduction, Induction, 
and Hypothesis‘ (1992a, 186ff), Peirce develops the distinction by introducing a room 
where there are number of bags containing different kinds of beans. On finding some 
white beans on a table, he characterizes the exploratory options as follows: 
Deduction 
 Rule.—all the beans from this bag are white. 
  Case. —these beans are from this bag. 
∴  Result. —these beans are white. 
Induction 
 Case.—these beans are from this bag. 
  Result.—these beans are white.  
∴  Rule. —all the beans from this bag are white.  
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Hypothesis 
 Rule. —all the beans from this bag are white. 
  Result. —these beans are white. 
∴  Case. —these beans are from this bag. (188) 
In the deductive mode it makes no difference how many beans there are in ‗this bag‘, 
because we know that all the beans in the bag are white. Nor does it make any 
difference how big the bag is. In the inductive mode, though, we can easily see that our 
confidence in the induction depends on the ratio of sample to whole. 
In the Hypothesis example, the inference is neither necessary nor probable; the size of 
the sample is again of no consequence. The inference is a guess, but not a wild guess—
the chance of making a successful guess is constrained in a minimal way by the 
environmental variables that contribute to its framing. If there were only one bag, the 
guess would be altogether more secure than if there were ten bags. The precise nature of 
the difference between the inductive and hypothetic examples is difficult to establish, 
but in the first there is only one bag, whose volume and therefore contents are 
presumably finite. In the third, the number of possible bags from which the sample 
might be taken is not specified, and presumably cannot be specified conveniently. The 
distinction, then, is between closed and open operational contexts—and conceivably 
between tractable and intractable logical problems. Alternatively, a potentially fruitful 
connection can be made with the commonplace terminology of belief and desire, where 
belief is understood to be a world-to-self relationship, and desire a self-to-world 
relationship corresponding respectively to the inductive and abductive modes.5 
Later, in notes for a Johns Hopkins lecture, Peirce makes an interesting distinction 
concerning the place of chance in his thinking compared to the evolutionary theory 
advanced by Spencer:  
Herbert Spencer and many other evolutionists hold that the operation of chance is an important 
factor in the development of self-consciousness. But they all admit other primordial elements, the 
conservation of energy and the like, to be necessary factors. Whereas my principle is that [chance] 
holds a place in nature independent of every accident of matter (1992a, 222). 
                                                 
5 Parenthetically, it is worth pointing out a pragmatic distinction between bags and urns. Often these 
syllogisms are represented in terms of balls in urns, subliminally evoking unhurried and uncompromised 
Grecian elegance. Beans in sacks convey an altogether more transient and commercial encoding in which 
Peirce‘s professional practice of scientific method becomes distinctly relevant. As the historian Stephen 
Nihm notes (2007), the practice of adulterating bulk commodities was widespread in the emergent United 
States. An 1859 reform committee found, among other things, that ‗Hundred-pound bags of coffee 
labeled ―Fine Old Java‖ turned out to consist of three-fifths dried peas, one-fifth chicory, and only one-
fifth coffee.‘ 
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Peirce does not make a direct analogy between beans and ideas, but there is an implicit 
connection. In ‗How to Make Our Ideas Clear‘, he pays attention to small and trivial 
decision-making, implicitly making the case for a cognitive scalability that striates nature 
from the primordial to the material: 
If, for instance, in a horse-car, I pull out my purse and find a five cent nickel and five coppers, I 
decide, while my hand is going to the purse, in which way I will pay my fare. To call such a question 
Doubt, and my decision Belief, is certainly to use words very disproportionate to the occasion. To 
speak of such a doubt as causing an irritation which needs to be appeased, suggests a temper which 
is uncomfortable to the verge of insanity. Yet, looking at the matter minutely, it must be admitted 
that, if there is this least hesitation as to whether I shall pay the five coppers or the nickel (as there 
will be sure to be, unless I act from some previously contracted habit in the matter), though irritation 
is too strong a word, yet I am excited to such small mental activity as may be necessary to deciding 
how I shall act (1992a, 128). 
The allusion to habit reprises the problem identified at the conclusion of the previous 
section, but here the trajectory is seemingly reversed. In general, Peirce‘s use of the term 
‗habit‘ gives him a familiar and convenient means of accessing the probabilistic language 
of logic he developed from (in particular) Venn. In ‗Man‘s Glassy Essence‘, he writes of 
a ‗law of habit‘ which has the ‗peculiar characteristic of not acting with exactitude‘ 
(1992a, 345). Were it not for the statistical background, this formulation would be 
curiously oxymoronic. Instead, Peirce is able to draw on an emerging ecological 
vocabulary, citing James‘s explanation of habit in terms of plasticity, meaning a limited 
flexibility in the face of environmental variability. Subsequent developments in the 
theory of probability have developed this perception significantly, notably in the 
heuristics of George Pòlya (cf chapter 9.3 below). 
A century later, we can see that Peirce‘s tychism anticipates modern biology‘s view of 
genomics as probabilistic molecular attunement to local environmental conditions. 
Bergson wrote of the evolutionary process of accumulating options; Peirce‘s tychic 
trichotomy substantiates an aspect of this accumulation that feeds forward into the 
concept of pragmatism. The secondness, ‗synechism‘, asserts continuity. (The alternative 
secondness referenced previously, ‗anancism‘, asserts mechanical necessity.) The 
organism is initialised with a minimal set of attunements, and accumulates its options 
either in a phylogenetic trajectory or an ontogenetic. In the former, the class of 
organism is the subject—vertebrates evolved from invertebrates, and so on. In the 
latter, the individual organism is the subject. The traverse from embryonic state to 
maturity may be short (a matter of hours or days), or it may be long (as in the case of 
humans, for whom the process takes years). 
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Where the individual organism is the subject, then the third term of Peirce‘s trichotomy, 
‗agapism‘ takes over. Here we encounter an unusually mystic dimension of Peirce‘s 
thought, because the term is chosen for its particular resonance with a theological 
dimension of the concept of love concerning the early Christian doctrine of the self-
sacrificing love of God for humanity. One aspect of medieval scholasticism that Peirce 
particularly approved of was its unselfish devotion to truth and knowledge as an end in 
itself, divorced from the modern bourgeois necessity for establishing property rights 
over one‘s own thought in distinction from that of others. He was keenly aware that the 
philosophical trends of his day were being harnessed to acquisitive, self-interested 
individualism. Though recognized by the 1890s as ‗social Darwinism‘, Peirce was at 
pains to minimize Darwin‘s contribution to this movement, highlighting instead what he 
saw as Herbert Spencer‘s rhetorical acyrologia. 
He is particularly critical of the same mechanistic bent in Spencer that offends Bergson; 
like Bergson, Peirce finds his refutation in the very evolutionary theory that Spencer 
advances. The difference between Peirce and Bergson is first that Peirce rests his case 
on the laws of probability, and second that he complements this with an explicitly social 
continuation of the mechanistic element—which he regards as a part, and not the 
whole, of a satisfactory evolutionary theory. 
For Peirce,  
Love is not directed to abstractions but to persons; not to persons we do not know, nor to numbers 
of people, but to our own dear ones, our families and neighbors. ‗Our neighbor,‘ we remember, is 
one whom we live near, not locally perhaps, but in life and feeling (1992a, 353-4). 
The analogy he develops is between the conventional, domestic notion of an extended 
family, and communities of scientists whose numbers and whose social practices tend to 
resemble the extended family, although the prosthetic support afforded by 
intersubjective technologies virtualizes the experience. This sense of agapism more 
closely resembles Aristotelian philia than the overtly sexual eros. The Aristotelian sense is 
a matter of wishing something good onto another so that the other may share the 
experience of its goodness. It is in this spirit that Peirce notes the frequency with which 
significant discoveries were being made simultaneously by spatially remote but 
intellectually similar specialists—Leverrier and Adams (predicting the discovery of 
Neptune), Rankine and Clausius (mechanical theory of heat), Wallace and Darwin 
(evolution) are among the examples he gives (370–1). 
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Noting (per Brent 1993) that in family and social life Peirce was a borrower and not a 
lender, there is a second sense in which the notion of evolutionary love is apt, but which 
Peirce overlooks or discounts—he merely speaks of Empedocles as having set up a 
foundational opposition between passionate love and hate (1992a, 352). However, eros—
which we might characterize as ‗addictive love‘—bears usefully on the matter of 
localizing attention to the specific objects of pursuit and enquiry. Regarding eros, the idea 
that Empedocles‘ relationship between opposites is intended to represent 
productiveness and innovation is developed by Bonfiglioli (2008). She points out that 
Aristotle uses synthesis and symplokē (weaving) in similar ways, and traces this usage to 
Plato: 
Symplokē is a very rare word in Plato‘s works. Its first occurrence is in the Symposium (191c4), where it 
appears within the famous mythical tale by Aristophanes on the nature of Eros. More precisely, this 
occurrence has to do with the probable first perception of opposition: the contrariety between male 
and female, whose symplokē permits generation to happen (112).6  
 
The tychic trichotomy thus lays the foundation of Peirce‘s theory of action. The term 
‗pragmatism‘, which he coined in his Harvard days, had acquired a currency that began 
to alarm him because its appropriation was causing it to lose specificity. Peirce, who felt 
that it was proper for a philosopher to coin neologisms in order to maintain a one-to-
one relationship between word and meaning, coined a new term in response, 
‗pragmaticism‘. He set about substantiating this in the two 1905 papers published in the 
Monist, ‗What Pragmatism Is‘ and ‗Issues of Pragmaticism‘ (collected with a number of 
drafts for a projected third paper in Peirce 1998). This is the pragmatism Richard Rorty 
(1961) enlarges upon, remarking that the correspondence theory of truth, logical 
positivism and verificationism emerge from the broader pragmatism as nominalist 
concepts to which Peirce was explicitly opposed. 
What, then, is Peircean pragmaticism? In ‗Issues of Pragmaticism‘ (1998, 346ff), Peirce 
identifies four principal contributory factors: the Metaphysical Club; Kant; Scotch 
Common Sense; and medieval scholastic realism. The last of these invests Peirce with 
the essentialism that distinguishes him from the emerging pragmatic tradition. Most 
immediately present in Peirce‘s mind was the influence of the Metaphysical Club‘s 
doubt about Cartesian doubt. This club was a short-lived, ironically-named association 
                                                 
6 According to Liddell & Scott, in the Ionian dialect eros means ‗wool‘. 
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of Harvard classmates, including Peirce and James, whose discussions (moderated by 
Chauncey Wright, an early American advocate of Darwin) prompted Peirce to write a 
paper (now lost) which circulated among the group to general approbation. This paper 
helped form the basis of the Popular Science Monthly essays. Hence James‘s muddled 
citation (cf. Dewey 1916, 709): the idea was germinating in these essays, but the term was 
not, at that stage, broached. 
The ‗maxim of pragmatism‘, as Peirce later termed it, was given in the second of these 
essays, ‗How to Make Our Ideas Clear‘: 
Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of 
our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the 
object (1992, 132). 
In the 1903 Harvard series, this statement has become the rhetorical focus of the first 
lecture, though Peirce here assumes that the audience shares a common understanding 
of the term‘s meaning.7  
On Dewey‘s (1916) account, the idea of pragmatism came to Peirce from reading Kant‘s 
Critique of Pure Reason, while the name comes from the same author‘s Critique of Practical 
Reason. Peirce himself stresses the laboratory-centred nature of his own life in 
experimental science, with its philosophical debt to the Bacons Roger and Francis. In 
‗What Pragmatism Is‘, he writes that the thought of some philosophers—alongside 
Kant he names Spinoza and Berkeley—sometimes finds resonance for him with his 
own laboratory experience. His puts the problem with Kant like this: 
…praktish and pragmatisch were as far apart as the two poles, the former belonging in a region of 
thought where no mind of the experimentalist type can ever make sure of solid ground under his 
feet, the latter expressing relation to some definite human purpose (1998, 332–3). 
Peirce rejects Kant‘s separation of instinct, thought and purpose, arguing that the latter 
two in particular cannot be distinguished.  This, he says, ‗determined the preference for 
the name pragmatism‘ (ibid.).  
Peirce also rejected the notion of ding an sich (‗thing-in-itself‘) as an a priori of perception, 
saying: ‗The Kantist has only to abjure from the bottom of his heart the proposition that 
a thing-in-itself can, however indirectly, be conceived‘ (334). The nature of belief, its 
                                                 
7 In their commentaries on the 1898 Harvard lectures, Kentner and Putnam suggest that the socializing of 
Peirce‘s thought in this public arena may have been an important factor in generating a sense of 
pragmatism as a movement (Peirce, 1992b, p. 36). James characterized those Harvard lectures as ‗flashes 
of brilliant light relieved against Cimmerian darkness‘ (Peirce 1998, 133). 
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relationship to judgement, and the emergence of the phenomenological concept of 
intention is the contextual metier for Peirce‘s 1905 series. However, while the influence 
of Kant is pervasive, here as elsewhere in Peirce‘s writing, it is also elusive. In the two 
volumes of The Essential Peirce, for instance, there is a single, short, unpublished paper on 
Kant highlighting his importance in the formulation of the trichotomic. In contrast, the 
common sense and scholastic aspects of pragmaticism receive extended discussion in 
‗Issues of Pragmaticism‘. 
In his Harvard lecture ‗Pragmatism as the Logic of Abduction‘ (1998, 226ff), Peirce 
presents three ‗cotary‘ propositions (from ‗cotis‘, whetstone, in order to ‗put the edge on 
the maxim of pragmatism‘). First, adopting the Stoic maxim, ‗there is nothing in the 
intellect that is not first in the senses‘, he understands by ‗intellectus‘ the ‗meaning of any 
representation in any kind of cognition, virtual, symbolic, or whatever it may be‘; 
The second is that perceptual judgements contain general elements, so that universal propositions 
are deducible from them in the manner in which the logic of relations shows that particular 
propositions usually, not to say invariably, allow universal propositions to be necessarily inferred 
from them. 
The third cotary proposition is that abductive inference shades into perceptual judgement without 
any sharp line of demarcation between them; or in other words our first premisses, the perceptual 
judgements, are to be regarded as an extreme case of abductive inferences, from which they differ in 
being absolutely beyond criticism (loc. cit.). 
Now, William Hamilton, glossing Reid (1863, p. 756ff) adduces a number of ways in 
which the term ‗common sense‘ may be understood: one refers to a class of experiences 
which have it in common that they are received via the several sensory organs—touch, 
hearing, sight and so on; another is to take a different normative perspective where it 
refers to a sensory resource held in common between people, the assumption being that 
when I see red, so do you. Fleming, in his Vocabulary, mixes these, as in his citation of 
Harris‘s 1783 Treatise on Happiness: 
As every ear not absolutely depraved is able to make some general distinctions of sound; and, in like 
manner, every eye, with respect to objects of vision; and as this general use of these faculties, by 
being diffused through all individuals, may be called common hearing and common vision, as 
opposed to those more accurate energies, peculiar only to artists; so fares it with respect to the 
intellect.8 There are truths or universals of so obvious a kind, that every mind or intellect not 
absolutely depraved, without the least help of art, can hardly fail to recognize them. The recognition 
of these, or at least the ability to recognize them, is called nous koinos, common sense, as being a 
sense common to all except lunatics and idiots (1860, 96). 
                                                 
8 Cf. Dennett & Clark on florid representation, 6.1.1. The novice sees red; the expert sees scarlet, 
vermilion etc.  
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An alternative, more recent term is naïve realism, the pejorative connotations of ‗naïve‘ 
being subsidiary to its etymological root meaning ‗native‘ (similar to the root of ‗pagan‘), 
located in a presumed natural state of attuned but unacculturated relationship with the 
local environment. It is distinct from scientific realism, which ‗asserts that the nature of 
the unobservable objects that cause the phenomena we observe is correctly described by 
our best theories‘ (Ladyman 2007). Typically, though, Peirce distinguishes three senses 
of ‗science‘: classical knowledge-for-certain; enlightenment systematised knowledge; and 
modern heuretic science, of which he says: ‗in the mouths of scientific men themselves 
―science‖ means the concrete body of their own proper activities, in seeking such truth 
as seems to them highly worthy of life-long devotion‘ (Peirce 1998, 372). Peirce‘s 
position, then, is more akin to structural realism, where we ‗commit ourselves only to the 
mathematical or structural content of our theories‘ (Ladyman, op. cit.).  
Although there are disadvantages to a stress on the primacy of common sense—notably 
a socio-political connection to conservatism and the appeal to religious faith which 
contextualizes the passage from Harris cited previously—its philosophical virtue is its 
economy regarding the normative sensory state, in contrast to Cartesian doubt. Early 
on, in the Popular Science series, Peirce writes: 
When Descartes set about the reconstruction of philosophy, his first step was to (theoretically) 
permit scepticism and to discard the practice of the schoolmen of looking to authority as the 
ultimate source of truth. That done, he sought a more natural fountain of true principles, and 
professed to find it in the human mind; thus passing, in the directest way, from the method of 
authority to that of apriority … The distinction between an idea seeming clear and really being so, 
never occurs to him. Trusting to introspection, as he did, even for a knowledge of external things, 
why should he question its testimony in respect to the contents of our own minds? (1992a, 125) 
This mistrust of unmediated introspection is important as it suggests not a transition 
from authority to apriority, but rather indicates the displacement of authority from the 
exterior and supernatural ascription familiar in the middle ages to the human-centred 
discourse familiar in modernity. Peirce, though, recognizes two problematic issues with 
doubt. First, it is out-of-equilibrium when compared to belief, and thus not an initial 
state. Second, there is the problem of scale that we encountered in the horse-car episode 
cited previously (see p. 26 above). 
Peirce elaborates Critical Common Sensism in two directions in ‗Issues of Pragmaticism‘ 
(1998, 346ff), first in relation to the Scotch (sic) Common Sense school and second to 
the scholasticism of Duns Scotus. He discusses a series of distinctive characters that sets 
his Critical version apart from the Scots‘. However, characteristically, he does not begin 
with an exposition of his predecessors‘ ideas. Immediately he states that, as well as 
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indubitable propositions there are indubitable inferences, but these inferences are 
indubitable in the sense of being acritical. ‗Critical‘ here means the binding of a relation 
of necessity specific to Peircean secondness; ‗acritical‘ thus means a state of knowledge 
prior to the application of such process. The term ‗reasoning‘, he argues, ought to be 
reserved to fixations of one belief by another that are deliberate and self-controlled. He 
recognizes, however, that the stimulus for such deliberation is in some sense external to 
reason, though not external to sensory flux.  
Second, he notes that the Scots thought it feasible to draw up a complete list of 
humankind‘s indubitable beliefs that would hold good from Adam forth. Under the 
influence of Darwin, he recognizes that his own set of indubitable propositions changed 
from year to year. This feeds the third observation, which is that the putative original 
beliefs only remain indubitable so long as the affairs they relate to remain ‗primitive‘—
something the Scots failed to recognize (347–9). 
The fourth issue is important, and links to the scholastic debate. Peirce insists that ‗the 
acritically indubitable is invariably vague‘ (350). He criticizes logicians for failing to 
analyse vagueness, and launches an extended etymological meditation on the question of 
precision versus prescission: 
If we desire to rescue the good ship Philosophy for the service of Science from the hands of lawless 
rovers of the sea of literature, we shall do well to keep prescind, presciss, prescission, and prescissive on the 
one hand, to refer to dissection in hypothesis, while precide, precise, precision, and precisive are used so as 
to refer exclusively to an expression of determination which is either full or made free for the 
interpreter. We shall thus do much to relieve the stem ―abstract‖ from staggering under the double 
burden of conveying the idea of prescission as well as the unrelated and very important idea of the 
creation of an ens rationis out of an  [winged word] (352). 
Essentially the distinction is between cutting off (prescind) and cutting down (precide); the 
notion of the ‗winged word‘ calls to mind Bakhtin‘s terms raznorecie (rendered in a 
variety of ‗literal‘ meanings, among which ‗the state of being in contradiction‘ is 
particularly apt here), and slovo, the intrinsically lambent utterance (Beebee, 1989, pp. 
163–4); (Fox, 2005)), which has the Peircean sense of necessary secondness.  
Fifth, unlike other critics of Cartesian doubt, Peirce has a plan that we can see effecting 
a link between Baconian induction as personal practice and Foucauldian rhetoric as 
social practice—a large leap, but a justifiable one. Peirce says that he is not content to 
doubt; but makes a practice of planning a programme of enquiry by which he can 
examine whether the grounds for doubting are valid. This programme may take months 
of effort—which brings it into the realm of professional practice—before the author is 
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prepared to declare his result and pronounce his belief indubitable or otherwise (1998, 
353).  
Regarding the dialogue with scholasticism, Peirce revisits an example that he gave in his 
Popular Science series. There he envisaged a diamond mysteriously materializing inside a 
boll of cotton wool, and then being consumed by fire before anyone could bring tests to 
bear. The question of whether it really exhibited such properties as would authenticate 
the claim that it was a diamond, he previously said, ‗would be merely a question of 
nomenclature‘. In his mind was the raznorecie of the diamond in another rendering of 
Bahktin‘s term—‗multi-thinged-ness‘, where each ‗thing‘ is itself subject to 
compositional assembly. However, he criticized his prior self for the use of the word 
‗merely‘. The properties constituting the notion of ‗diamond‘ include hardness; a 
crystalline composition that is susceptible to cutting in certain specific facets; the optical 
property of refracting light in a particular way and so on. Each of these properties can 
be assayed, each being inseparable from the others in defining the object as ‗diamond‘. 
Peirce wants to insist that the specimen really is hard, in the event that fire destroys it 
before it can be brought to assay. Real, that is, in the scholastic sense—which involves 
Peirce in an extended discussion of the concept of necessity in relation to the 
indeterminacy of the future. This in turn reflects his interpretation of the scholastic 
debate between nominalism and realism.  
Rorty says that Peirce used the term ‗nominalism‘ more or less pejoratively, to dismiss a 
range of doctrines that he considered to be reductionist and/or deterministic. 
Nominalists believed that things Peirce recognizes as vague could be reduced to ‗real‘, 
discrete entities. Peirce insists that such things as Intelligence, Intention, Habit and 
Meaning are not reducible to discrete entities (Rorty 1961, 199). Some confusion is due 
to the word ‗thing‘ having both a precided and a prescinded sense. That is, its German 
etymology recognizes the oral, social process of debate by which a thing becomes a 
settled, precided particular as well as the normative prescinded usage in which that 
debate is (literally) taken as read. For Peirce, contained in the word ‗diamond‘ is a set of 
practical actions by which the doubter may relate the particular specimen to the various 
universal concepts that converge to establish the singularity of this specific concept of 
diamond. This is what he means by the practical consequences entailed by a conception; 
this is how he precides the scope of the pragmatic maxim. However, such a definition is 
only possible, concludes Edward Moore in a paper on Peirce‘s scholastic realism, ‗if one 
believes that concepts are real, that is, if he believes that the concepts have a real 
external counterpart‘ (1952, 416). 
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This is a key, fundamental problem. Recalling the second of Peirce‘s departures from 
Scotch Common Sense, it is the problem of the succession of indubitables. By what 
means do new indubitables arise, and old ones fade away? If old ones fade away, were 
they not real after all? This, after all, is at the core of our question about the nature of 
creativity. For Peirce the additional problem is to reconcile the seemingly arbitrary 
nature of the creative act with the systematized epistemic mechanism of his logical 
system. An additional problem for us, via Peirce‘s scholastic dimension, is whether he is 
deferring—subliminally or otherwise—to an exterior, supernatural causative force in 
order to do so. At first blush, there does not seem to be enough in his conception of 
hypothesis to account successfully for the function he ascribes to it. 
 
Here we return to the logical category that Peirce variously calls hypothetical, 
retroductive, or abductive. Now, though, we find the term ‗hypothetical‘ obstructive. 
Any reasonable construal recognizes that content governed by the term is already 
substantially assembled, yet the term ‗working hypothesis‘ suggests minimal 
commitment. There is too much breadth in the term for it to be helpful at this point. 
Recall, then, the third cotary proposition, given in ‗Pragmatism as the Logic of 
Abduction‘ (see p.30), which says that abduction shades into perception as though the 
latter materializes from the former by some process of spectral attunement or 
calibration. The nature of that distinction, or that process, has remained elusive. As a 
preliminary discussion, I want to dwell on the term ‗heuretic‘, and correlate it with 
Peirce‘s notion of ‗methodeutic‘. This is an underdeveloped strand in Peirce‘s thought—
not only in his own work, but in subsequent commentaries. It is germane to the schism 
between analytic and continental philosophy that emerges with Pragmatism; it is 
germane to the formulation of the sociology of knowledge as an epistemic corollary to 
the practice of natural science; and it is germane to the complementary development of 
a philosophy of technology.  
Evidence for the claim that this line of enquiry is underdeveloped hinges first on the 
relationship between Peirce and Hegel, on which there is little commentary—apparently 
because scholars have taken Peirce at his word regarding his derogatory opinion of 
Hegel.9 An alternative view sees Hegel as the philosopher Peirce feels himself to be the 
                                                 
9 See Stern 2007 (n3) for what I take to be a thorough review of the available literature on Peirce‘s Hegel. 
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most in competition with; his disparagement can therefore be regarded, in 
contemporary argot, as ‗trash talk‘. After the realization that there is more to Peirce‘s 
relationship with Hegel than has hitherto been credited, it follows that questions arise 
regarding the impact of Peirce‘s critique of Hegel on readings of Marx‘s relationship 
with Hegel.  
In relation to Hegel and Marx, the distinction Peirce makes is between the historical 
method (in the philosophical sense) associated with Hegel, and what he calls the analytic 
method. He argues that the former ‗studies complex problems in all their complexity‘ 
without ever reaching satisfactory conclusions. He recommends instead that what 
should be done   
…is at first to substitute for those problems others much simpler, much more abstract, of which 
there is a good prospect of finding probable solutions. Then, the reasonably certain solutions of 
these last problems will throw a light more or less clear upon more concrete problems which are in 
certain respects more interesting (Peirce 1931, 27). 
It is to this method, he says, that modern physics owes its success. However, transferred 
to philosophy it is an approach that seems to beg questions that ought to be addressed 
to the indubitables on which the enquiry is founded, unlike Bergson‘s differentiating 
method in which nothing is a priori at cost of not knowing where to start—or end.  
There is an implicit assumption on the one hand that the first step of an enquiry, the 
abduction or the hypothesis, is necessarily minimal in content. On the other, 
simultaneously, is an idealism regarding contentfulness that grants the enquiry its 
imprimatur of worth—and this, it turns out, is assayed by the interpretative community: 
this is the heterogeneous socio-technical device analysed in actor-network theory (cf. 
infra, 2.2.1) and not merely the pooled voice of an interest group.  
What, then, does Peirce mean exactly by methodeutic? The first thing to point out is its 
position in his modern trivium. Grammar, in the medieval model, falls in with his 
semeiotic but is here called stechiologic (after Hamilton, meaning the doctrine of 
elements); logic, his core concern, he designates ‗critic‘ in this context, while 
methodeutic concerns the way these relate to the interpretant. Remember that—apart 
from that late concession, the ‗sop to Cerberus‘—Peirce did not regard the interpretant 
and individual human subjectivity as coterminous. There are three drafts of a definition 
in his 1902 Carnegie application (the application as a whole running to seven drafts). In 
draft B, he writes: 
In methodeutic, it is assumed that the signs considered will conform to the conditions of critic, and 
be true. But just as critical logic inquires whether and how a sign corresponds to its intended ultimate 
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object, the reality; so methodeutic looks to the purposed ultimate interpretant and inquires what 
conditions a sign must conform to, in order to be pertinent to the purpose (1902). 
In draft A, he stresses that ‗since the whole business of heuretic, so far as its theory 
goes, falls under methodeutic, there is no kind of argumentation that methodeutic can 
pass over without notice‘ (ibid.). In draft D, 
…to discover is simply to expedite an event that would occur sooner or later… Consequently, the 
art of discovery is purely a question of economics. The economics of research is, so far as logic is 
concerned, the leading doctrine with reference to the art of discovery. Consequently, the conduct of 
abduction, which is chiefly a question of heuretic and is the first question of heuretic, is to be 
governed by economical considerations (ibid.). 
Heuretic is another term that Peirce inherits from Hamilton, meaning ‗The branch of 
logic which treats of the art of discovery or invention‘ (OED). But what do these 
matters have to do with rhetoric? The reference to economical considerations is an 
important clue. It is a gesture that simultaneously salutes the scope of Spencer‘s 
ambition and points forward in time to the Vienna Circle‘s aspiration to theorize a 
unified science. In Peirce‘s hands the speculation—in terms of its being an economic 
question—remains unpursued, although the general sense (previously referenced) of 
science being defined as the corporate practice of scientists is instructive. As Latour 
(1987) argues, the rhetorical practice of science is closely bound to the mobilization of 
resources. 
Regarding the heuretic, just as the distinction between sensory inputs in common, and 
shared experience of sensory input held in common, needs teasing out, so too the 
mirror distinction between conversation and rhetoric is a social-brain issue in need of 
further exploration. It is all very well to cite the practice of scientists in defining science, 
but we need to ask how they go about practicing science.  
Abduction, the traditional philosophers‘ term for the logical mode Peirce identifies with 
originary development, means ‗to lead away from‘, whereas ‗induce‘ means ‗to lead into‘, 
with a subsidiary sense of persuasion. Laid beside each other, there is a sense that the 
motions pull in opposite directions—one towards, the other away—where similarity of 
motion seems desirable. The Greek term is apagoge, which means to draw off or lead 
away. Like related terms, epagoge (bringing on or to) and paragoge (leading by or past), 
there is a military flavour in which the subject of the term is corporate action: not just 
drawing off an individual, but drawing away part of an military formation so that the 
remaining part is more vulnerable to attack. Other senses of apagoge are appropriate, too: 
in chemistry, when concentrating a solution by fractional freezing, one draws off the 
concentrate.  
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All of these senses suggest that there is something left over that will be returned to, 
some kind of residue. The distillate may be of intrinsic value, but the question of how it 
is productively recombined remains. One answer is to adopt the simple inverse of 
abduction, which is adduction—‗to lead towards‘, but without the sense of persuasion 
that clinches the idea of ‗leading into‘. This is my preferred term, but we should 
recognize that in this most conjectural of modes, both abduction and adduction are in 
play, complementing each other. I prefer ‗adduction‘ because the experience of 
improvising at the piano instructs me that the equipment at my disposal significantly 
shapes the outcome. There is a strong sense in which certain gestures inevitably lead 
toward others; recollection of what has gone before—taking away and returning, in real 
time—is imperfect. 
Peirce makes explicit a methodological issue in relation to these processes that otherwise 
went unmentioned in contemporary thought. The fixation of belief really does include 
the material–semiotic reification of belief. The procedure that leads from adductive event 
to inductive or deductive resolution involves, for modern humans, an equipmental 
relationship with the local environment: 
A psychologist cuts out a lobe of my brain (nihil animale a me alienum puto) and then, when I find I 
cannot express myself, he says, ―you see, your faculty of language was localised in that lobe.‖ No 
doubt it was; and so, if he has filched my ink stand, I should not have been able to continue my 
discussion until I had got another. Yea, the very thoughts would not come to me. So my faculty of 
discussion is equally localised in my ink stand (CP 7.366, cited in Skagestad 2004, 248). 
This is a key insight, which regards introspection as initially an intersubjective 
relationship with one‘s prior self. Peirce develops this theme in ‗The Law of Mind‘, part 
of the 1892 Monist series (1992a, 312ff), which relates ‗idea‘ to ‗concept‘ through his 
synechist account of continuity. There is a passing resemblance, in his initial exploration 
of the word ‗idea‘, to Bergson‘s exploration of memory in Time & Free Will, which 
suggests a common link to Spencer. Writing on the ‗individuality of ideas‘, Peirce says: 
taking the word ‗idea‘ in the sense of an event in an individual consciousness, it is clear that an idea 
once past is gone forever, and any supposed recurrence of it is another idea. These two ideas are not 
present in the same state of consciousness, and therefore cannot possibly be compared (313). 
Some caution is due regarding the precise meaning of the word ‗consciousness‘ as Peirce 
uses it. Our multifaceted modern approach to the complexity of cognitive theory and 
experimentation is a rich speculative environment. The entry for ‗consciousness‘ in 
Fleming‘s 1860 Vocabulary (109–13) stresses the etymological root meaning ‗joint 
knowledge; a knowledge of one thing in connection or relation to another‘. Hamilton 
notes (and OED tends to confirm) that the word is a neologism from around the 16th 
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century, when it had a specifically social sense in which knowledge of a given datum is 
shared in the ‗common sense‘ sense discussed previously. 
Peirce continues by asking how a past idea can be present: 
Can it be present vicariously? To a certain extent, perhaps; but not merely so; for then the question 
would arise how the past idea can be related to its vicarious representation (1998, 314). 
Foreshadowing the peristaltic relationship between intension and detente that Deleuze 
derives from Bergson, he notes three elements that constitute an idea—its intrinsic 
quality; the energy it brings to bear on other ideas; and its tendency to bring other ideas 
along with it (325). He continues: 
The insistency of a past idea with reference to the present is a quantity which is less the further back 
that past idea is, and rises to infinity as the past idea is brought up in the coincidence with the 
present. Here we must make one of those inductive applications of the law of continuity which had 
produced such great results in all the positive sciences. We must extend the law of insistency into the 
future (326). 
This he connects to synechism by asserting: ‗that ideas can nowise be connected without 
continuity is visually evident to one who reflects upon the matter‘ (327). Less evident, 
but important, is the connection between this expression of Peirce‘s with his prior 
research work on the gravitational attraction of celestial bodies, where the visibility of 
the evidence is indirect.  
In drawing to a characteristically provisional conclusion, Peirce turns to the 
manifestation of this expression in the human individual, in a discussion of ‗personality‘ 
which, for him, is defined as ‗some kind of coordination or connection of ideas‘ (331). 
This notion of coordination pushes personality beyond ‗immediate self-consciousness‘: 
… it implies a teleological harmony in ideas, and in the case of personality this teleology is more than 
a mere purposive pursuit of a predetermined end; it is a developmental teleology. This is personal 
character. A general idea, living and conscious now, it is already determinative of acts in the future to 
an extent to which it is not now conscious (331). 
‗Teleological‘ is perhaps an odd word to find in the Peircean universe, being at odds 
with his anti-determinist position. Indeed, Peirce goes on to claim that his thought does 
not exclude the possibility of a ‗personal creator‘. However, he stresses that ‗were the 
ends of a person already explicit, there would be no room for development, for growth, 
for life; and consequently there would be no personality‘; the position that places 
mechanism over growth he styles ‗pseudo-evolutionism‘ (loc. cit.). This scope that Peirce 
provides for the plasticity of personality, gathered together with the provisional nature 
of the evolving universe as he conceives it, locates the pragmaticist intellect in a 
dynamical context to which it must continually respond and adapt.  
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By his own lights, though, there is an outstanding issue arising from his definition of 
methodeutic. The distinction between analytical and socio-historical methods is a 
distinction between a method of secondness and a method of thirdness, but there is no 
method of firstness. There ought to be a method of firstness, and this is probably an 
introspective, or intuitive method that is clearly distinct from the analytical method, and 
distinct from a putative, third, socio-historical method. He doesn‘t bother with this, 
presumably, because the same criticism, ‗complex problems in all their complexity‘ 
applies to both. However, a transpersonal, auctorial dimension of enquiry as rhetorical 
practice requires further attention. The next chapter develops a methodological 
perspective on the institutional nature of the socio-historical method via actor–network 
theory, while the chapter that follows complements this by paying further attention to 




Austin‘s account of performative utterances cannot be restricted to the sphere of linguistics. The 
magical efficacy of these acts of institution is inseparable from the existence of an institution defining 
the conditions (regarding the agent, the time of place, etc.) which have to be fulfilled for the magic 
of words to operate. As is indicated in the examples analysed by Austin, these ‗conditions of felicity‘ 
are social conditions, and the person who wishes to proceed felicitously with the christening of a ship 
or of a person must be entitled to do so... (Bourdieu 1991, 73) 
Peirce‘s theory of action implicitly respects the institutions of scientific practice, but, 
apart from the remark about economic context in Methodeutic draft D, he leaves the 
nature of the institution unexamined. Nevertheless, the link previously adduced between 
induction in the scientific tradition and rhetoric as critiqued by structuralist sociologists 
is vestigially signposted and in need of more detailed mapping. The notion of institution 
to be pursued, though, incorporates elements of semiotics and sociology that remain 
characteristically Peircean. Our objective is to define two terms: dispositif, which can 
conveniently be termed ‗a story in the process of being told‘; and the obligatory passage 
point, which can be termed ‗the subject of that story in process of being disclosed‘.  
As the citation above suggests, the route passes through Austin‘s concept of 
performativity. Some preliminary remarks are warranted, though, in respect of 
Bourdieu‘s criticism of Austin and others who seek to locate performativity explicitly in 
the structure of language and not in the institutional conditions governing its use. 
Bourdieu is right, and I will argue that Austin‘s project was tending towards sociological 
realization prior to his death. However, there are other ‗flavours‘ of performativity that 
impinge on Bourdieu‘s critique and its reception, which should be distinguished from 
Austin‘s. 
The sociologist Harold Garfinkel‘s signature concept, ethnomethodology, is a useful 
term in the operationalizing of scholarship on performativity, and has become so closely 
associated with the topic via fields such as discourse pragmatics that it is worth pointing 
out that Garfinkel does not use the term directly. Though a rough contemporary, he did 
not draw on the ordinary language philosophy developed at Oxford by Austin and 
colleagues in formulating ethnomethodology.  
Garfinkel‘s methodology lent important theoretical perspective to the sociologists who 
developed actor–network theory. Briefly, the principle is to pay attention not to what 
people say they do, but rather to observe them as they perform actions. Retrospective 
accounts filter, edit, and discard information that may have a material bearing on the 
topic of enquiry, and do so on the basis of unacknowledged tacit knowledge of 
interlocutors‘ shared beliefs. However, as Garfinkel notes: 
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The ‗relevant other persons‘ for the scientific theorizer are universalized ‗Anymen.‘ They are, in the 
ideal, disembodied manuals of proper procedures for deciding sensibility, objectivity and warrant. 
Specific colleagues are at best forgivable instances of such highly abstract ‗competent investigators‘ 
(1967, 275). 
Similarly contemporaneous with Oxford philosophy, a corresponding distinction 
emerged between performance and competence, articulated by Chomsky as a 
development from the distinction in Saussurean semantics between langue and parole, and 
developed by Greimas as an adjunct of narrative theory. The distinction turns on the 
same problem in the scholastic analysis of abstract particulars that Peirce grapples with, 
and which Austin indirectly tackles too. Competence refers to the system governing the 
instantiation of a phenomenon, while performance refers to the process by which 
instantiation comes about (Schleifer 1987, 82). Schleifer notes an important difference 
between Chomsky‘s formulation and that of Greimas, indirectly connecting Chomsky to 
Peirce because of the latter‘s stress on semeiotic as a logical system. Greimas was intent 
on developing Saussure‘s goal of semiology as ‗a science that studies the life of signs 
within society‘. This would be ‗a part of social psychology and consequently of general 
psychology‘ (ibid., 83).  
Austin‘s distinction between constative and performative speech finds him poised 
between the logical analysis of signs in a broadly post-Peircean manner, and the analysis 
of institutional processes of self-replication grounded in the performance of a traditional 
method for training competent administrators that reaches back to classical Greece. 
 
As Oxford educated the British empire‘s colonial administrators, so too for a time did 
‗Oxford Philosophy‘ rule the world. The period in question runs from about 1935 to 
about 1970, though its heyday—coinciding with the intellectual maturity of its principal 
figures—spanned the late 1940s to the early 1960s. Oxford was then the philosophical 
centre of the English-speaking universe, and a striking feature of the practice of 
philosophy at that place and time is its orality. Speaking in Logic Lane (Chanan, 1972), 
Isaiah Berlin remarks: 
Philosophy thrives on discussion, on dialogue, on conversation, and if we could convince each other, 
that‘s all we wanted. The reason why so comparatively little was published was that if we could 
convince each other in our little discussion groups, or in tutorials, this was enough; people didn‘t 
really seek a wider audience, nor did they feel that there was one. 
John Langshaw Austin is an extreme case in point. Neither of his books—Sense and 
Sensibilia and How to Do Things with Words—were prepared for publication by him, both 
being the conjectural reconstructions of his colleagues Geoffrey Warnock and James 
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Urmson urged into print in the aftermath of Austin‘s premature death. The few papers 
Austin published are generally associated with occasions at which they were orally given. 
Moreover, as an oral performer of philosophy, he was almost peerless. In this respect, 
though, there were two Austins. While leading his clan, his attitude to opponents—Ayer 
in particular—was competitive and destructive. In his grooming circle, though, Austin 
was collegiate and constructive; acute, lucid and inspiring. 
It was A. J. Ayer who set the agenda for Oxford philosophy of the period, with the 
publication in 1936 of Language, Truth, and Logic. On Ayer‘s account (Chanan, 1972), 
interest in the work of Cambridge philosophers Moore, Russell and Wittgenstein—
never mind personal contact with those individuals—was frowned upon. Ayer‘s mentor 
Gilbert Ryle, however, was different. At Ryle‘s recommendation, Ayer visited Vienna 
and attended meetings of the Ernst Mach Society, a group of around twelve influential 
thinkers, including Rudolf Carnap, Herbert Feigl, and, at one time, Ludwig Wittgenstein. 
Ayer had planned to spend the time in Cambridge with Wittgenstein, but Ryle reasoned 
that he would be better off hearing a range of views rather than (a highly singular) one.  
Language, Truth, and Logic was the result of this visit, introducing to English-speaking 
philosophy the so-called verification principle. This divided all ‗meaningful‘ statements 
into two classes. Statements of fact—statements descriptive of the world—were deemed 
meaningful on condition that they were testable; statements of logic were held not to be 
descriptive of the world, but instead concerned methods of description. Everything 
else—the whole of metaphysics and a great deal of traditional philosophy besides—was 
excluded as strictly meaningless. The verification principle provided a clearly stated, 
logically articulated doctrinal position that focused discussion; in doing so it had the 
effect of creating a new sense of professionalism. Political philosophy was an immediate 
casualty. In Berlin‘s opinion (loc. cit.) this was a field that had anyway fallen into discredit 
owing to the inflated Hegelian language that had become the currency of discourse.  
The fierce Oxford debate about the verification principle was not about what was 
explicitly excluded by way of ethical, moral and political matters. Rather, it was about 
whether the principle was correct with respect to what was included. The way Austin 
went about attacking verificationism was to attend to the way in which statements 
descriptive of the world used words. In a typical passage from Sense and Sensibilia, he 
asks: 
…of how many people really, who know quite well where they live, could it be said that they have at 
any time verified that they live there? When could they be supposed to have done this? In what way? 
And why? What we have here, in fact, is an erroneous doctrine which is a kind of mirror image of 
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the erroneous doctrine about evidence we discussed just now; the idea that statements about 
‗material things‘ as such need to be verified is just as wrong as, and wrong in just the same way as, the 
idea that statements about ‗material things‘ as such must be based on evidence. And both ideas go 
astray, at bottom, through the pervasive error of neglecting the circumstances in which things are said—
of supposing that the words alone can be discussed, in a quite general way (1962, p. 118). 
This is the public Austin in action: Sense and Sensibilia was compiled from lecture notes 
for a series Austin gave repeatedly in the post-war period, and the attack on Ayer is 
remorseless. That aggression should not obscure the intensity of Austin‘s gaze on the 
underlying problem; Ayer offered a convenient (and resilient) means of personifying it. 
It is relevant to mention, in respect of the developing professionalization of philosophy, 
that Ryle was by this time organizing the postgraduate study of philosophy in a 
systematic way. On Ayer‘s account, though, Austin sought disciples whereas Ryle didn‘t. 
Following his wartime experience as an intelligence officer (an organizational role, 
contributing among other things to the lengthy preparations for D-Day), Austin set 
about organizing the younger dons at Oxford as a kind of military general staff. They 
were set to particular problems in the use of language, analysing the way in which 
particular words were used. By the 1950s, the term ‗Oxford philosophy‘ was associated 
with what Austin and his circle were doing.  
For Ayer, the extent to which the linguistic approach depended on Austin's authority is 
shown by the fact that it did not survive his death. Ayer‘s criticism is widely echoed, that 
the analysis of ‗ordinary‘ language usage was ultimately futile—in the philosophical 
sense that it led nowhere. Despite his evident residual distress at the wounds Austin 
inflicted on his personal amour-propre, and the equally evident relish with which he takes 
the opportunity to land a few after-the-bell blows of his own in the course of his 
contributions to Logic Lane, Ayer expresses nothing but the highest respect for Austin‘s 
central achievement, the discovery of performatives. These are statements like ‗I 
promise to do so-and-so‘ that are not descriptions of facts but are statements in which 
one engages one‘s self. Such ‗performative‘ statements enact; they effect change, 
development or consequence by indissoluble predication on the embodied maker of the 
statement. 
 
In How to do things with words (1976), Austin‘s provisional conclusions on performatives 
are presented somewhat in the style of an evolving drama, in three acts. The book is 
largely based on the William James Lectures Austin gave at Harvard in 1955, and some 
characteristics of that oral mode of presentation are inherited. The audience is assumed 
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to be attentive and competent, but not able to flip back to previous pages when an 
argument becomes obscure. In the interval between lectures—to which some people 
may return faithfully, while others drift in and out—life goes on and details are 
forgotten. Hence there is a certain recapitulatory rhythm from chapter to chapter. The 
title is a characteristic piece of Austin meiosis—a title that may seem colloquial and 
generalized is in fact precise and specific in its remit. 
In act one (approximately chapters I through VII) we encounter first the distinction 
between constatives and performatives.1 Constative is to be used in preference to 
‗descriptive‘, but broadly speaking this is the realm of ‗statements descriptive of the 
world‘. Performatives do not describe the utterer in the act of doing something, or state 
that the utterer is doing something. The utterance is the act itself—to say something is 
to do something. However, 
Besides the uttering of the words of the so-called performative, a good many other things have as a 
general rule to be right and to go right if we are to be said to have happily brought off our action 
(14, emphasis added). 
This is the famous happiness axis, which is opposed—or rather, orthogonal—to the 
verification axis. A series of conditions, essentially social in nature, are necessary in 
order for the performance to have a ‗happy‘ outcome. For instance, the prevailing 
institutional conventions assumed by the utterer must be shared by the witness. It is 
worth pointing out that the verification axis runs not from ‗true‘ to ‗false‘, but 
deductively from certainty to uncertainty; true and false are at the same (certain) end. 
The gamut from happiness to unhappiness is an analogous progression from order to 
disorder, mindful of the Bergsonian distinction in which disorder is merely another kind 
of order, albeit an undesirable one.2 
In act two (approximately chapters VIII through XI), Austin introduces a distinction 
between locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts. He opens chapter VIII 
wondering about the senses in which to say something is to do something, or in saying 
something we do something, or by saying something we do something (94). Locutionary 
acts are the act of saying something—presumably something comprehensible and 
                                                 
1 Several subsequent writers on performativity, including Latour, use the Wittgensteinian term ‗ostensive‘ 
in preference to Austin‘s ‗constative‘, however Hinweisende more accurately translates as ‗indicative‘, which 
parallels Austin‘s distinction more closely. 
2 There is another way of looking at happiness that is more forgiving of dimensionality: in the 
neurochemistry of reward, there is a sense in which happiness is an expression of continuing satisfaction 
that sustains the subject‘s attention. Its antonym is not so much ‗un-happiness‘ as ‗non-happiness‘. 
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referential, but without force or consequence. Illocutionary acts involve the 
performance of an act in, rather than of, saying something, while perlocutionary acts 
involve the performance of an act by saying something.  
Something of the distinction can be glimpsed in the first example Austin gives (101–2). 
The speech act in question is ‗shoot her!‘ However, to understand its effect under the 
conditions Austin proposes it is necessary to adjust viewpoint from the utterer to the 
confidant holding the gun (though we might whimsically suppose that the addressee is 
Cupid, armed with bow and arrow). In the case of a locutionary perception of utterer‘s 
intention, the speaker informs, in a parental sense: ―this is a bow, if you put an arrow 
here, it will go there‖, and so on. The confidant becomes aware that the opportunity 
and means are available; beyond that, any subsequent action is the confidant‘s own 
responsibility. In the case of an illocutionary perception, utterer is reported, by using the 
words ‗shoot her‘ to have urged, ordered or encouraged the confidant to take advantage 
of means and opportunity. We might say in this case that responsibility is transferred 
from utterer to confidant. In the case of a perlocutionary perception, the confidant 
ascribes responsibility to the utterer for the decision to shoot: utterer succeeded in 
persuading the confidant to act. Here, responsibility remains with the utterer, but is 
shared paronymically between utterer, confidant and target. 
To get a flavour of the orality of this example, let us imagine a speaker lecturing on the 
topic who chooses to illustrate the point by indicating that the imaginary Cupid should 
fire at one member of the audience in particular. Nervous laughter rustles through the 
disinterested part of the audience; the target blushes; some immediate neighbours whose 
immediate social relationships might seem challenged by the gesture exchange 
uncomfortable glances, while for others the incident serves to confirm pre-existing 
suspicions; third parties with amorous ambitions of their own are obliged to re-evaluate 
their estimations based on the evidence that the microtheatrical event provides. 
Austin goes on to declare that his intention is to focus on illocutionary acts, using the 
other two categories for contrast. John Searle (initially a student of Austin‘s) follows this 
line in Speech Acts (1969). Since Searle‘s work has come to be regarded as definitive, we 
might hazard that, by extension, what people nowadays mean by performative speech 
(to the extent that they reference Austin) is, in the main, the generation of illocutionary 
detente. Being transactional, the illocutionary is easily tractable within the confines of 
another Viennese concept—methodological individualism—to which Searle (2005) 
subscribes, whereas perlocutionary force is an altogether more problematic 
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reconciliation. You could not experience the example given in the previous paragraph 
merely by reading about it subsequently, even if the characters had names personally 
familiar to you. The perlocutionary is inescapably and irreducibly oral and immediate in 
character. 
Act three is just getting under way in chapter XII, where Austin introduces some 
speculative classes of illocutionary force. Verdictives are, as the name suggests, 
judgements or evaluations, though not necessarily final ones. Exercitives are the 
exercising of powers, rights or influence. Commissives are undertakings, commitments, 
or declarations of intent. Behabatives, a miscellaneous group, are social behaviours such 
as congratulating, apologizing or cursing. Expositives are somewhat reflexive, being 
expressions of otherwise invisible processes, such as saying ‗I assume‘, ‗I concede‘ or ‗I 
postulate‘ (151–2). These categories are the product of intensive labour on the part of 
Austin and his general staff, poring over dictionaries and analysing their content. 
However, Austin finds them provisional and unsatisfactory. 
 
Owing to his untimely death, these conclusions remained provisional and unsatisfactory. 
Various Süssmayrs continued and completed his work as best they could, but the 
trajectory of his investigation was incompatible with the epistemic regimes current in the 
early 1960s. We can recognize, with hindsight, that there was a distinctly sociological 
dimension to the project that in the present day would require radical cross-disciplinary 
collaboration to operationalize as a research programme. Back then, the assumption was 
made, reasonably enough, that the subject of How to Do Things with Words was words; 
and as Ayer remarked (Chanan, 1972), the analysis of language in the way Austin 
approached it had been exhausted.  
Given the normative definition of ‗language‘ adopted by Ernst Gellner in his 
energetically muddled critique of linguistic philosophy, Words and Things (1979), this is 
undoubtedly true. Gellner‘s principal target is Wittgenstein, professional courtesy 
presumably restraining his fervour with respect to his Oxford foes. His complaint 
against an obsessive triviality that leads to ‗philosophy by filibuster‘ (192–7) has some 
merit; his complaint against the Eleusinian practices of the Oxford school, though, 
mingles personal animus with public principle. In Gellner‘s version of the ethos Berlin 
characterized with approval (cf. p. 41 above),  
Their communication … requires a special atmosphere, a special willingness and a special 
preparation. It is true that the members of the movement have published, but not soon and not 
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much and not willingly; and it has always been made clear that a perusal of such publications is 
wholly insufficient for an understanding of a true significance of the ideas contained in them. … The 
authoritarian, capricious, messianic and exclusive characteristics of Wittgenstein‘s practice are well 
known (264–5). 
Gellner exemplified the disciplinary evolution of the period, being first a professor of 
philosophy at LSE and then of social anthropology at Cambridge. Another exemplar, 
another author of ‗Words and Things‘ (published in English as The Order of Things) was 
the philosopher, psychologist, sociologist and historian Michel Foucault.3 Stressing the 
seriality, the synechism, of linguistic production, Foucault says that ‗language is an 
analysis of thought: not a simple patterning, but a profound establishment of order in 
space‘ (2002a, 91). He continues: 
General grammar is the study of verbal order in its relation to the simultaneity that it is its task to represent. Its 
proper object is therefore neither thought nor any individual language, but discourse, understood as a 
sequence of verbal signs. 
This statement illuminates a normally overlooked word in Austin‘s title, ‗things‘, and the 
social processes that constitute thinging. Berlin says that Austin was concerned with the 
nature of human thinking; attention to syntactic structure was merely an essential 
preparatory step (Chanan, 1972). To put the matter slightly differently, both ‗thing‘ and 
‗word‘ are from Anglo-Saxon/Germanic roots, the two terms echoing the debate in 
protestant theology about the distinction between authoritas rerum and authoritas verborum 
as a problem in translating ‗the word of god‘. ‗Thing‘ originates in the custom of 
deliberative assembly; ‗word‘, more speculatively, derives from Indo-European roots 
conflating the sense of ‗a man‘ and ‗I shall speak‘. ‗Think‘ derives again from North 
European sources, conflating ‗to seem, appear‘ (think v.1) and ‗to cause (something) to 
seem or appear (to oneself)‘ (think v.2) (OED). 
Austin‘s ultimate objective is to reach the deep level of abstraction where semiosis is 
bound to utterance to give it prosthetic extension, fusing think and thing. The 
grammatical net he casts over the linguistic form he approximates as ‗first person 
singular present indicative active‘ (1976, 64) can be seen as an elaborate attempt to 
scaffold the translation process by which the homeostatic immediacy of the 
performative in language can reach beyond the present. One dimension is intention, 
another is signification, and meaning is a co-creation that must precariously and 
provisionally negotiate the scaffolding as it moves between actants. 
                                                 
3 Foucault‘s Mots et les Choses was first published in French in 1966. Apparently the title ‗L'Ordre des Choses‘ 
had already been used twice by contemporary structuralists. 
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Austin‘s conception of ‗ordinary‘ language requires attention, however. Paul Feyerabend 
(1963) takes a critical position, citing Austin‘s paper ‗A Plea for Excuses‘: 
Our common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have found worth drawing, and the 
connexions they have found worth marking, in the lifetime of many generations: these surely are 
likely to be more numerous, more sound, since they have stood up to the long test of the survival of 
the fittest, and more subtle . . . than any that you or I are likely to think up (50–1).4 
This aligns Austin with the Scottish Common Sense notion of indubitability that we 
encountered previously in Peirce (above, p. 31), suggesting that words in themselves are 
a collection of acritical propositions and acritical inferences. For Feyerabend this leaves 
no scope for language to evolve; the word-hoard should be regarded as being in some 
way nomadic. He develops this argument into a claim that the prevailing view of our 
ability to acquire introspective knowledge is incorporated in the language being used to 
describe such knowledge. This language is used ‗instrumentalistically‘ to project into the 
world certain peculiarities of our way of constructing knowledge. According to this 
interpretation of Cartesian theory, ‗the world consists in two domains: the outer, 
physical world and the inner, mental world. The outer world can be experienced, but 
only indirectly; the inner world can be directly experienced … and thus knowledge 
gained within it is absolutely certain‘ (61). The conservatism of ‗ordinary language‘ is, 
perversely, too low a price to pay for circumventing this objection, as we will later 
discover (cf. 3.1 below). 
The solution to Feyerabend‘s problem is social. The nature of the ‗happiness‘ Austin 
sets as the condition by which a performative outcome is achieved is not a simple and 
straightforward matter of personal contentment, but rather the product of the kind of 
brokering William Foley (1997, pp. 5–11) discovers in present-day Polynesian oral 
cultures. There, Foley says, what a word means is communally established in the 
immediate, oral context of its utterance. In more abstract, Peircean terms, there is 
implicitly a trichotomic of happiness concerning respectively the satisfaction of personal 
intention; the satisfaction of mutual intention; and the satisfaction of contextual 
consent. 
A contextualizing fact about Oxford philosophy connects close interest in classical 
concepts of the public good with the contemporary function of training state 
administrators (Oxford retains a tradition of furnishing Whitehall with senior civil 
servants and Westminster with politicians). The medium of political discourse is, of 
                                                 
4 [J.L. Austin] Philosophical Papers, ed. Urmson and Warnock (Oxford, 1961, 130) [Feyerabend‘s citation]. 
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course, rhetoric. With that in mind, it is worth dwelling briefly on the concept of 
auctoritas, a term that captures the amalgamation of word, character and context in the 
development of rhetorical trajectory. It is as true in Westminster as it is in Polynesia that 
the question of ‗who speaks?‘ has a bearing on how a statement is understood. In a 
paper called ‗Auctoritas, Dignitas, Otium‘ (1960), Balsdon notes that this favourite 
concept of Cicero‘s evades strict definition. Auctoritas was vested in the Senate, but its 
exercise depended on the performance of individual senators. 
Anyone who spoke in the Senate gave consilium [counsel]. A senior senator who spoke early in the 
debate spoke with auctoritas and, if things went properly, made the side on which he spoke the 
winning side (43, emphasis added). 
According to Lewis & Short, auctor means ‗he that brings about the existence of any 
object‘. In transference it is frequently interchanged with ‗actor‘, and it is also the source 
of the modern ‗author‘. In its classical sense, though, ‗bringing about the existence‘ did 
not necessarily mean a personal intervention in the manufacture or construction of an 
object, but rather the initiation and direction of such labour as necessary. Balsdon goes 
on to link auctor to the Greek axioma, rendered by Liddell & Scott as ‗that of which one 
is thought worthy‘, and, in its scientific sense, ‗that which is assumed as the basis of 
demonstration, self-evident principle‘. The Perseus database shows that the word often 
appears in conjunction with hegemonia, ‗leading the way‘. However, as Balsdon notes, 
axioma links back to dignitas, which has an interesting relationship with auctoritas: ‗The 
two words were very closely linked, the one static, the other dynamic. Auctoritas was the 
expression of a man‘s dignitas… In politics a man‘s dignitas was his good name‘ (45). 
 
Noting Balsdon‘s phrase ‗if things went properly‘, I want to return to Austin‘s question 
of ‗happily‘ bringing off our actions, and ponder exactly what Austin might have meant 
by this. On the face of it, the orthodox, quotidian sense is perfectly adequate. But 
etymologically, the word ‗happy‘ turns out to be intriguingly Peircean: ‗coming or 
happening by chance; fortuitous‘, says OED. Fleming‘s Vocabulary cites Coleridge to the 
same effect, adding that as well as eusoia, ‗the sum total of the pleasure which is allotted 
or happens to a man‘, there is, ‗more religiously‘, the alternative eudaimonia—favourable 
providence (1860, 215). Eudaemonics figures in Jeremy Bentham‘s utilitarian calculus, 
where it is ‗the object of every branch of art‘, and the subject of every branch of science … 
Eudaemonics may, therefore, be termed the Common Hall, or central place of meeting, of all the 
arts and sciences‘ (1816, 173–4). 
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We know that Austin had a close interest in Aristotle‘s concept of eudaimonia because 
there is a paper on the subject in his slender archive. ‗Agathon and Eudaimonia in the 
Ethics of Aristotle‘ (1967) is a response to a 1935 paper by Harold Pritchard, one of 
Austin‘s mentors. Pritchard argues that Aristotle uses agathon (generally translated as 
‗good‘) to mean ‗conducive to our happiness‘, and maintains consequently that every 
deliberate action stems, ultimately, from the desire to become happy. Austin says that 
agathon has several meanings in Aristotle; and that, moreover, the meaning Pritchard 
suggested was not among these. He finds Pritchard‘s argument resting on an unstated 
premise, that ‗happiness‘ (Pritchard‘s translation of eudaimonia) means a state of feeling 
pleased. 
Austin further finds Pritchard to have been ‗misled‘ in translating eudaimonia as 
happiness, although this is a matter of nuance rather than outright error. He notes 
(1967, 26–7) Aristotle‘s threefold distinction between synonym, homonym and 
paronym, the latter being an instance where a word has connotations that are partly 
similar and partly different. For example,  
When we speak of a ‗healthy exercise‘ the word ‗healthy‘ has a connotation which is only partly the 
same as that which it has in the phrase ‗a healthy body‘ (27). 
Earlier, remarking that eudaimonia is ‗certainly quite an unchristian ideal‘, he says 
nevertheless 
That eudaimonia did mean life of activity of a certain kind is almost certainly the correct analysis (19). 
At this point we need to pay closer attention to the construction of the word eudaimonia. 
Conventionally translated as ‗happiness‘, eudaimonia breaks down to ‗good spirits‘, the 
spirits being subtly external. According to OED, daimon means ‗a supernatural being of a 
nature intermediate between that of gods and men; an inferior divinity, spirit, genius 
(including the souls or ghosts of deceased persons, esp. deified heroes)‘ cognate with the 
Biblical (and especially early Christian) notion of angel, and distinct from the inwardly-
directing daimonion claimed by Socrates as his guide and apparently misrepresented by 
his accusers as evidence for the presence of a malevolent spirit. (Svenbro (1999, p. 50) 
suggests that the distrust of fellow Athenians for Socrates‘ daimonion is due precisely to 
the fact that no one else could hear it.) In present-day usage the word daemon crops up in 
computer operating systems, where it refers to programs that perform background 
administrative tasks. We could ascribe these ‗good spirits‘ to an appreciation for the 
regard in which the individual is held by others—in other words, those who hold good 
opinions of the happy one personify an ongoing polyphonic dialogue whose outcome 
yields ‗good spirits‘ subtly blended into a singular experience.  
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As is characteristic of Aristotle, eudaimonia lies between clearly opposable concepts. 
Elsewhere it might be courage that lies between timidity and foolhardiness. Here, 
happiness lies somewhere between the entirely individual and the entirely public—
although the self-indulgence of individual consumption is nevertheless embedded in a 
network of social obligation and consent if this is to be a sustained state of gratification. 
However, there is a supplementary interpretation that Austin‘s attention to paronym 
alerts us to. The etymology of ploutos, according to Liddell & Scott, derives from ‗wealth 
in corn‘, ‗probably from ―pleo‖ in an early sense ―flow‖, ―abound‖, as phortos from phero’. 
We can posit that hedony is entirely an immediate excitement of gratification; wealth is a 
presumption of a continuing flow of gratification, while contemplation accepts the 
desirability of both but acknowledges the necessity for directive reason to be applied to 
maintain the individual‘s access to both. 
The connection I want to make is with the social brain hypothesis and related cognitive 
aspects of human mutuality, on the assumption that illocutionary and perlocutionary 
language-use evolved prior to the invention of writing. In Aristotle‘s milieu, we tend to 
forget, those who could read and write constituted the minority. The clan-oriented 
organization techniques associated with Sparta (Ober, 1998) and their associated 
economy of means of the kind lauded by Socrates in Protagoras (1999, p. l. 2204ff), are 
identifiable characteristics of a predominantly oral culture. 
In particular, the happinesses induced in consumption are (at least in part) social 
pleasures intimately bound up in the negotiation of status. If there is a circulation of 
obligation grounded in performative exchanges of mutuality and trust—especially 
asymmetric, perlocutionary exchanges—then some attention to the means by which 
asymmetry is sustained is due. Strum and Latour (1999) argue that baboon communities 
are engaged in a perpetual negotiation of social relationships, while human communities 
use extra-somatic means to simplify and extend relationship networks. I use the term 
‗intersubjective technology‘ to characterize this as the skilled experience of mutuality via 
material–semiotic displacements. Austin‘s connection between ‗thing‘ and ‗word‘ helps 
us trace the specifically perlocutionary force behind this phenomenon back to a simpler, 
oral milieu where the animation of objects with semiotic meaning is more clearly a 
performative social practice.  
We are not yet ready to develop the concept of ‗intersubjective technology‘, but we have 
the basis for an understanding of the performative dimension of knowledge-holding. 
What we need to add, in order to develop Austin‘s perspective, is a more explicitly 
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sociological grounding for the analysis of modern scholarly practice and apparatus. To 
orient ourselves, let us first revisit the link between Austin‘s and Foucault‘s attention to 
the place of words in the performance of communication. 
 
Michel Foucault opens The Order of Things (2002a) by noting the rich taxonomic 
vocabulary of resemblance already available by the sixteenth century.5 He chooses four 
terms in particular to develop and discuss: convenienta; aemulatio; analogy; and sympathies 
(19–28). Convenienta concerns adjacency. ‗Places and similitude become entangled‘ (20); 
resemblance acts in space ‗in the form of a graduated scale of proximity‘ (21). Aemulatio 
finds convenienta freed of its spatial binding, enabling it to function at a distance (21). The 
relationship between objects so conjoined need not be (and mostly is not) a relationship 
of equality, so that one may act on the other (22). Analogy, Foucault notes, was already 
known to the Greeks. He says that its usage has ‗probably become different now‘ (24), 
but in context it is difficult to determine whether by ‗now‘ he means the sixteenth or the 
twentieth century. He finds convenienta and aemulatio superimposed in analogy, giving it 
enormous power to act, but also enormous power—by modern lights—to err. He cites, 
for instance, the analogy between animal and plant that sees the plant as an animal living 
upside down, with its head beneath the soil (24). Finally, sympathy ‗plays through the 
depths of the universe in a free state. It can traverse the vastest spaces in an instant‘ 
(26). Such is its power that, were it not counterpoised by antipathies, sympathy would 
reduce the world to homogeneity. 
Foucault continues with a discussion of ‗signature‘, by which means the apparatus of 
resemblance is bound to that which is resembled. Being accustomed to the English 
pronunciation of the word, it is easy to overlook the ‗sign‘ contained within the gesture. 
A signature is not just a binding, but an act of binding; in a sense, an authorization. The 
terminology erects a virtual library; understanding this of Foucault helps explain the 
function of Velasquez in his argument, establishing a visual metaphor for the changing 
sense of order brought about by the birth of the book as we know it today. Intriguingly, 
the authorities he cites in chapter two are all early-modern, but in their antecedence is a 
                                                 
5 Actually he doesn‘t open with it. It is merely Anglo-Saxon impatience that rushes through the dilatory 
vestibular material to find the argument ‗beginning‘ there, discarding the meditative preface on the 
‗Chinese taxonomy‘ found in Borges‘ essay ‗The Analytical Language of John Wilkins‘, and the opening 
chapter‘s discussion of Velasquez‘ painting Las Meninas. 
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Neo-Platonist strand in which the recruitment of nature to support authoritative 
performance is rooted in oral practice.  
The foregrounding of the book-as-signature brought with it the backgrounding of 
rhetoric-as-performance, and the concomitant minimization of performance-as-
signature. For medieval scholars, knowledge was intimately—physically and 
physiologically—bound to the practice of wisdomcraft. The exercise of rhetoric was 
intimately linked to the exercise of memory, the latter being a privileged resource in the 
absence of material means of storing knowledge. Of course scribal culture supported oral 
performance, but the practice of writing was at the hub of an extended ritual enactment 
of society.  
Modern practice retains its relationship with embodied wisdomcraft. Paul Feyerabend 
recalls ‗defending absurd ideas with great assurance‘ at a Kraft Circle meeting in the late 
1940s, in an autobiographical appendix to Against Method (1993, pp. 254–5). His 
assurance was conferred by a theatrical training; the conclusion he reached was that the 
rational substance of arguments is in tension with semiotic factors regarding their 
presentation in the impact they make. This disquiet is representative of a shift in 
emphasis in the mid-twentieth century from an interest in scientific method towards an 
interest in scientific practice. Curiously complementary is the concept of tacit knowledge 
developed by Michael Polanyi (1958); (1966), where the verificatory prowess of 
scientists is inscribed in the social processes constituting their acculturation. Feyerabend 
and Polanyi stand either side of a symmetrical demarcation problem that simultaneously 
concerns the relationship between science and pseudoscience, and the relationship 
between observation and theory. The problem is that epistemic adjustment in one 
element has a reciprocal impact on the balance of the other, and this dynamic tends to 
overthrow the homeostatic, ‗common-sense‘ view of nature as semantically stable, 
simply ‗out there‘ waiting to be discovered. 
Feyerabend favoured the notion of semantic instability, and his critique sought to 
understand how this might be viable in the laboratory. In fact, his anarchic view has a 
certain unacknowledged parity with Peirce‘s concept of abductive logic—that is to say, it 
posits educated guesswork constrained by a probabilistic field. On the question of 
anarchism, Feyerabend is misunderstood: he didn‘t say that scientists should be 
anarchistic in method; merely that they are (seen in a historical perspective cf. 
Feyerabend 1993, 17–19). In Feyerabend‘s view, science advances by the proliferation of 
theory, theoretical pluralism furnishing potential falsifiers. Controversially, he argued 
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against the idea that theories are compared with one another primarily for their ability to 
account for the results of observation and experiment. Instead, he believed that social 
and aesthetic factors significantly influence theory-choice. The anthropological term 
‗lekking‘, normally associated with male displays of prowess, is to the point. 
Thomas Kuhn shared Feyerabend‘s position on semantic instability. He arrived at the 
theory published in his seminal Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1996) after following a 
trail from history to philosophy and sociology, though the historical perspective in 
question is, initially, specific to the theoretical physics in which he was researching a 
PhD at the outset of his journey. Social science being methodologically young by 
comparison to physics, Kuhn was exposed to animated disagreements about the nature 
of legitimate problems and methods. This prompted him to reflect and doubt whether 
his native discipline had better responses to these issues (1996, ix–x). From these 
observations coalesced a concept that has become familiar both in the language of 
scholarly enquiry and in the vernacular: 
Attempting to discover the source of that difference led me to recognise the role in scientific 
research of what I have since called ‗paradigms.‘ These I take to be universally recognised scientific 
achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners 
(x; emphasis added). 
Although this statement is significant for its broaching of Kuhn‘s signature term, it is 
the controversial yet easily-missed clause ‗for a time‘ that gives the statement its force.  
Some took the implication of this clause to be that scientific ‗truth‘ is no less or more a 
faith than any other kind of faith, that science is a ‗subjective and irrational enterprise‘. 
Responding to these criticisms, Kuhn refines his definition of paradigm in a postscript 
published in subsequent editions: 
On the one [sociological] hand, it stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, 
and so on shared by the members of a given community. On the [philosophical] other, it denotes 
one sort of element in that constellation, the concrete puzzle-solutions which, employed as models 
or examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal 
science (175). 
Reconciling Kuhn‘s stronger, philosophical definition with the positivist philosophy of 
science advanced especially by Karl Popper and Imre Lakatos is one of the 
achievements of David Bloor‘s Knowledge and Social Imagery (1991) that makes this book 
as significant a staging post as Kuhn‘s in the development of a fully reflexive science. 
The real foundation for that claim of significance, however, is Bloor‘s articulation of the 
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Strong Programme in the Sociology of Knowledge.6 Bloor argues that the natural 
sciences are as dependent on such social factors as tradition, convention and personal 
prestige as any other field. In consequence, the prevailing supposition among 
sociologists of the early 1970s that the content of scientific knowledge—as distinct from 
the circumstances of its production—is beyond the grasp of sociological method is 
mistaken (1991, 1). He goes on to set out four principles that together constitute the 
Strong Programme: 
1 [The Programme] would be causal, that is, concerned with the conditions which bring about 
beliefs or states of knowledge. Naturally there will be other types of causes apart from social 
ones which will cooperate in bringing about beliefs. 
2 It would be impartial with respect to truth and falsity, rationality or irrationality, success or 
failure. Both sides of these dichotomies will require explanation. 
3 It would be symmetrical in its style of explanation. The same types of cause would explain, say, 
true and false beliefs. 
4 It would be reflexive. In principle its patterns of explanation would have to be applicable to 
sociology itself. Like the requirement of symmetry this is a response to the need to seek for 
general explanations. It is an obvious requirement of principle because otherwise sociology 
would be a standing refutation of its own theories (7). 
Note that although Bloor begins by speaking of knowledge in the round, by page five 
his topic has become ‗knowledge, including scientific knowledge‘, and by page seven, 
scientific knowledge exclusively. This is connected to the question, ‗What makes the 
Strong Programme strong?‘ It is a rhetorical claim of strength, made for reasons that are 
now historical but nonetheless intriguing, in light of the emphasis both Feyerabend and 
Latour place on the notion of ‗trials of strength‘ as central to the scientific method. The 
four principles are presented as a priori conditions. Presumably they emerged from the 
flux of scholarly attention, having first been hypothesized, analysed, reformulated and so 
on. The process of locating what Callon will call ‗obligatory passage points‘ has been 
enacted, and these principles are the result. Here, though, they are not OPPs separately 
or collectively, but rather they constitute a vestibular apparatus. One is obliged to enter 
the text through them. It is an efficient arrangement, but not a reflexive one—at least, 
not within the confines of that particular volume. 
In respect of the causal principle, the second sentence seems entirely superfluous, 
except that it hints at acquiescence in respect of the major difficulty faced by 
sociologists attempting to tackle cognitive aspects of social behaviour without engaging 
                                                 
6 Also known as the Edinburgh Strong Programme, acknowledging the institutional role the sociology 
department of the University of Edinburgh played in bringing Bloor together with Barry Barnes, Steven 
Shapin, Steve Woolgar and Donald MacKenzie among others.  
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cognitive science. The impartiality principle is the one that promises a fruitful 
connection to Dennett‘s heterophenomenology, which I will develop in the next 
chapter. It bears, too, on the symmetry principle, a major bone of contention between 
Bloor and the Mine School. Here the parallels between ANT and embodied mind 
ontologies suggest that, if ANT fails with respect to the symmetry principle, it fails (pace 
Bloor) in not taking it far enough.  
 
Although bound up in complex epistemological debates and—dare one suspect—
personal animosities, the acrid exchanges between Bloor and Bruno Latour conducted 
in the pages of Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science essentially resolve to this 
question (Bloor 1999a, 1999b; Latour 1999a). What Latour does is to effect a radical 
performative shift in the terms of the strong programme with the consequence that its 
principles demand (for Latour) that non-human artefacts be granted equivalent status 
with the human observer. What Bloor advances as a criticism—‗Latour makes no 
systematic distinction between nature and beliefs about, or accounts of, nature… It is as 
if he has difficulty telling these two things apart‘ (Bloor, 1999a, p. 87)—Latour embraces 
as doctrine: ‗Yes, I have great difficulties in convincing myself that it is useful to create 
an artefact to get at the facts‘ (Latour, 1999a, p. 122).  
There are two modulations entrained by this shift. The first, the key advance that 
Latour‘s approach encapsulates over Bloor‘s, concerns the mobility of the observer—
and it is significant that the book that epitomizes this, Science in Action (Latour 1987), is 
intended to be a textbook. Latour organizes his text around a series of ‗rules of method‘, 
the first of which states: 
We study science in action and not ready-made science or technology; to do so, we either arrive 
before the facts and machines are black boxed or we follow the controversies that reopen them. 
(258) 
The black box is Latour‘s version of the paradigm. The real point, however, is in the 
stressed modifier ‗in action‘. Adapting Garfinkel‘s ethnomethodology, Latour‘s guiding 
principle is to observe what actants do, rather than depending on actors‘ accounts of 
what they have done.7 Interestingly, too, the immobile hierarchy that Kuhn sets up with 
                                                 
7 The actant/actor distinction is a difficult one. In Science in Action, Latour says: ‗…both people able to talk 
and things unable to talk have spokesmen. I propose to call whoever and whatever is represented actant.‘ 
(1987, 83–4, emphasis inherited). Callon (1986b) uses the term ‗actor‘, but notes (n. 21) that he uses it in 
the sense of ‗actant‘. What emerges is a distinction between ‗actant‘ as narrative function and ‗actor‘ as 
embodied individual. See further discussion below. 
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‗scientists‘ at the apex, ‗engineers‘ beneath them, and ‗technicians‘ beneath engineers, 
becomes an altogether more dynamic web of interests, career paths and mobilized 
resources as Latour follows the various actants while they go about their work. Latour 
typically interrogates chains of associations, as in the case drawn from his work on 
Pasteur that is raised in the course of his debate with Bloor. Pasteur‘s  approach to the 
problem of fermentation is compared with Liebig‘s then-dominant paradigm. 
Latour comments that chains of 
associations include psychological, 
ideological, cognitive, social, and 
material entities, many of which 
are non-human agents. Each 
element takes the meaning given 
to it by the adjoining elements in 
the series (1999a, 124). 
The second modulation flows from the first, operationalizing a deliberately unstable 
reflexivity that permits hypothesis to keep pace with data: 
The strategy in any research program is to distribute topics and resources in the most intelligent and 
fecund way—and, I would add, to move fast and to change tack often enough to maintain the 
strategic aim through many empirical moves (Latour 1999a, 122). 
Latour‘s colleague at the Paris Ecole des Mines, Michel Callon, coined the term ‗acteur-
reseau‘ to frame the arc resulting from such procedures. The term—especially in its 
English rendering as ‗actor-network theory‘—has become widely recognized, and its 
source in Greimasian semiotics correspondingly obscured. In the process, it has 
undergone a semantic evolution similar to Peirce‘s ‗pragmatism‘, something that has 
become a locus of critique for Latour. In ‗On recalling ANT‘ (1999b), he finds four 
terms to criticize: ‗actor‘, ‗network‘, ‗theory‘, and the hyphen. In particular, there is 
dynamic potential in the French ‗reseau‘ where ‗network‘ tends to suggest all the 
shortcomings of Austin‘s ‗constative‘ language.  
Indeed, ANT as it is first introduced (Callon 1986a, 19–34) attempts to be a theory of 
the constative, and a reductionist one at that. Callon writes that ‗Simplification is the 
first element necessary in the organization of an actor-world: indeed it is the inevitable 
result of translation‘ (28). However, it is not clear here that it is the performance of 
simplification that is at issue—not yet clear, I think, to the author. Seen from outside 
the programme, from the present (c. 2008), actor-network theory really is a theory: it is a 
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hylozoic theory of rhetoric, one that symmetrically—and pragmatically—grants a voice to 
non-human actants.8 We should take care not to hyphenate, but instead conjoin: the 
hyphen makes a compound noun and renders the result as a constative object; joining 
the terms with an en dash creates a symmetrical, reciprocal and dynamic relationship. 
Not actor-network but actor–network.  
The major Callon contribution of the period (marking a significant evolution over 
1986a) uses the term ‗actor-network‘ just once, in a footnote in his seminal paper on 
scallops, fishermen and scientists, ‗Some elements of a sociology of translation‘ (1986b). 
The story begins with a number of out-of-focus premises concerning the life-cycles of 
French and Japanese species of scallop, the local geography of St Brieuc Bay, and the 
regional fishing industry. With these are aligned social, economic and political 
trajectories—including those of two groups of scientists: the natural scientists 
investigating the lifecycle issue, and the social scientists studying the dispositif. 
Callon‘s first theoretic move is to align with the Edinburgh Strong Programme (3–4). 
He sets out three principles: agnosticism, symmetry, and free association. Agnosticism 
assumes that the initial, nebulous state of enquiry finds its subjects acting abductively, 
feeling for connections and solidifications. He argues that the sociologists, studying the 
process, should be in the same abductive frame of mind. The generalized principle of 
symmetry extends Bloor‘s principle, as we have already noted. Bloor is willing to 
eliminate the explanatory distinction between expert human and non-expert; Callon 
proposes that the continuity of register should extend to all aspects of the problem, 
human or material. Free association translates Bergson‘s procedure of differentiating 
between genuine and false problems by granting elements the closely-observed liberty to 
seek their own solutions: 
Instead of imposing a pre-established grid of analysis upon these, the observer follows the actors in 
order to identify the manner in which these define and associate the different elements by which 
they build and explain their world, whether it be social or natural (4). 
Callon‘s second move is to align the operationalization of a Strong-Programme enquiry 
to the structuralist semiotics of (in particular) A. G. Greimas. His term ‗actant‘ is 
significant in this respect, and requires a brief review. The structuralists are not directly 
cited in the 1986a volume; as far as I can tell, the authors‘ collective principal 
                                                 
8 Hylozoic, but not panpsychic; cf. further discussion in chapter 5.4. 
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semiolinguistic source is Francoise Bastide, who is little published in English. Greimas 
& Courtes‘ Semiotic Dictionary is cited in Callon 1986b, in a footnote. 
On Schleifer & Velie‘s account (1987, 1126–33), Greimas, following Propp, is primarily 
interested in analysing folk tales—treating these as a primitive form of narrative that is 
nonetheless distinctively ‗literary‘. Propp proposes a seven-fold typology of actant: hero, 
sought-for person, villain, false hero, helper, donor, dispatcher. Greimas simplifies this 
to subject, object, opponent (fusing villain and false hero), helper (fusing helper and 
donor), sender, and (a new type) receiver. The distinction between actor and actant is a 
matter of fusion or syncretism. An actor is taken to be a discrete individuation, but not a 
person since, under narrative analysis, a person cannot be said to be ‗individual‘. An 
actant is a provisional, conceptual entity articulated for the purpose of focusing the 
narrative. In ‗Toward a theory of modalities‘, Greimas (1987, p. 125) writes of the 
modality of being (and doing): ‗It must be understood that the terms used are semiotic 
terms that have no relation whatsoever with the ontological concepts to which they can 
be compared‘. How can he be so sure? Because, like Peirce, his argument can be traced 
to Scholastic interpretations of Aristotle. The semiotic/ontological distinction suggests, 
though, that he is committed to a stronger or more extreme realism than Peirce. Peirce 
would not, I think, find this distinction acceptable because it places the legitimacy of the 
sign outside or beyond the scope of the first cotary maxim (cf. p.30 above). 
The actant is a consistent narrative role that individual actors adopt in the course of 
narrating. In Greimas‘ scheme, the actant‘s narrative trajectories are ‗exploded‘ into ‗at 
least four‘ actantal positions on a square derived from Aristotle‘s square of oppositions 
as the scholastic tradition developed it:  
 
Referencing Levi-Strauss‘s Boolean notation, Schleifer & Velie gloss this as follows, 
applying the concept to Greimas‘s ‗subject‘ (the authors‘ own gloss is also represented in 
italics):  
Methodologies 2: Acts of institution 60 
Finally, a gloss that connects Callon‘s use of Greimas to the significant fraternal 
influence of Latour & Woolgar‘s Laboratory Life (1986). Schliefer (1997) draws on this to 
further an argument about interdisciplinarity between the humanities and the social 
sciences:  
Béziau (2003) notes that European languages tend to have primitive names for three of 
the corners, but not the fourth, so that we find correspondences for ‗all‘, ‗some‘, and 
‗no‘, but not for ‗not all‘. This observation may correlate with Havelock‘s claim about 
the difference writing makes to the philosophical methods of Plato and Aristotle, to be 
explored in part three. For the moment, though, the implicit trichotomy highlights an 
intriguing ‗not all‘: not only does the square of opposites not crop up in Peirce (so far as 
I can tell), but Peirce‘s semeiotic does not figure in Greimas‘s semiology to any 
significant degree. 
Callon‘s negotiations yield what he calls ‗four moments of translation‘. These are 
‗problematization‘, ‗interessement‘, ‗enrolment‘, and the ‗mobilization of allies‘. In the 
first stage, there are interests (actant vectors) but no ‗interessement‘ (coordination 
among actors). The function of ‗problematization‘, then, is to create a locus of ‗narrative 
gravity‘ which establishes a narrative dynamic that moves through the narrator. Because 
narration is an actant function, its practice may be shared between mutually-interested 
actors—in this case, the marine scientists who have seen the Japanese scallop 
husbanding techniques and who want to investigate the possibility of translating that 
practice to St Brieuc Bay: 
They determined a set of actors and defined their identities in such a way as to establish themselves 
as an obligatory passage point in the network of relationships they were building. This double 
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movement, which renders them indispensable in the network, is what we call problematization 
(Callon 1985b, 6). 
In this process, the researchers identify three principal actants: the scallops; the 
fishermen; and fellow scientists. The scientists do not know a great deal about the 
lifecycle of the local species, pecten maximus—especially the question of how and when 
they anchor themselves. The scientists are assumed to be interested in furthering their 
knowledge. The fishermen fish until there is no stock to fish, but they are assumed to be 
interested in restocking the bay. The scallops—assumed to be interested in 
reproducing—normally appear as adults, at the point of harvesting. Will their larvae 
adapt to the Japanese technique of providing a shelter? By identifying one or more 
‗obligatory passing points‘, the researchers consolidate the narrative trajectories through 
which the actants pass. In this case, the OPP concerns the anchoring of pecten maximus. 
All actants‘ interests pass through this issue. 
Initially, though, these interests are not indexed. Callon says of the second moment of 
translation, interessement, that to be interested is to be interposed. Clearly, though, 
interessement is a performance and not a mere state of affairs. Moreover, it is an attitude 
of contention—a trial of strength, to use a favourite Mine School conception, that 
references Feyerabend‘s incorporation of social and aesthetic influences on hypothesis 
formation (see p. 53): 
Interessement is the group of actions by which an entity … attempts to impose and stabilize the 
identity of the other actors it defines through its problematization (1986b, 8). 
In the St Brieuc case, the ensemble of techniques reified in the towline constitute an 
interessement device that extracts larvae from their context. Collectors are attached to 
the towline, which is tethered to anchored floats. The collectors are fine-mesh bags 
containing media that allow larvae to enter and anchor while affording protection from 
currents and predators. The material dimension, though, is complemented by the 
semiotic: 
The devices of interessement create a favourable balance of power: for the first group, these devices 
are the towlines immersed in St. Brieuc Bay; and for the second group, they are texts and 
conversations which lure the concerned actors to follow the three researchers‘ project. For all the 
groups involved, the interessement helps corner the entities to be enrolled. In addition, it attempts to 
interrupt all potential competing associations and to construct a system of alliances (10). 
The third moment of translation is the most arduous. Interessement identifies and tests 
vectors, aligning some while minimizing or excluding the implicatory capacities of 
others. While an ensemble of techniques may now be reified in the interessement 
device, what has not yet been reified is the ensemble of actants. Enrolment seeks 
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commitment, and here the distinction between actant and actor becomes particularly 
striking. What is sought is the commitment of an actant-role to the vector that has been 
identified with its potential contribution. This may either conflict with an actor‘s 
interests or fail to be a sufficiently significant element in that actor‘s role-repertoire to 
impress the necessity of participation upon it. In the St Brieuc case, it is the scallops 
which prove to be the most difficult actors to negotiate with; their enrolment proves to 
be the lengthiest and most difficult task. Identifying the most effective medium for the 
bags, for instance, involves testing straw, broom, vegetable horsehair or nylon at various 
depths. However, in the course of these negotiations, a scientific premise comes into 
question: do the scallops anchor in the larval stage in the first place? The St Brieuc 
results were not achieving success rates comparable with the Japanese example. By 
contrast, the fishermen watch and wait. They are prepared to accept the conclusions 
reached by the researchers, but contribute nothing during this process except their 
consent (10–12).  
Nevertheless, the emergence of results begins to transform the epistemic standing of the 
initial hypothesis. Callon notes the researchers‘ wry view that ‗bona fide discoveries 
miraculously unveil precursors who had been previously ignored‘ (12), but his citation 
extends this beyond scientific literature search:  
Dao: ‗… Our experience suggests that in general it is when the work has been done that tongues are 
loosened and we start to get information. For example, the fishermen had never seen scallops 
attached by a byssus. But since we have revealed that they are fixed in this way, they know where 
these are to be revealed, that they are fixed in this way, they know where these are to be found and 
they know where they were before. I believe that much the same thing is true for scientific 
information‘ (n44). 
By this seemingly organic process, we can see the transition taking place from Peirce‘s 
abductive modality to the inductive.  
The fourth moment of translation endorses this transition when it has been happily 
brought off. Callon calls it the ‗mobilization of allies‘. Still the representatives of pectens 
maximus remain troublesome. Yes, the anchorages are not accidental, but they are few in 
number. Are these anchored larvae reliable informants? The ones that do not attach 
themselves at no time contradict the assumption that those which do attach themselves 
are the true representatives of scallop behaviour. In this respect the anchored larvae 
resemble the representatives of the scientific community—only those with a close 
interest in the topic follow the reports closely enough to make an informed 
contribution—and the representatives of the fishermen.  
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This particular tale is not one with a happy ending. After the initial tentatively promising 
results, subsequent work proves less successful. The larvae no longer anchor in the nets; 
effectively they exhibit dissent against the scientists‘ preliminary conclusions. Worse, 
after the initial informants reach a state of maturity, certain fishermen mirror this dissent 
by ignoring the consensual apparatus negotiated with their representatives. In short, 
they take the young scallops, trading potential long-term gain for immediate, short-lived 
benefit. At the same time, the scientists‘ confidence in the initial hypothesis comes 
under pressure. It becomes doubtful whether the obligatory passing point identified at 
the outset is, after all, obligatory (15–17). The process of differentiating problems is 
unable, in this case, to fasten onto a set of enrolments capable of transforming the initial 
hypothesis into a satisfactorily durable dispositif. 
 
The distinction between ‗actant‘ and ‗actor‘ gives us the beginning of a theory of 
‗narrative gravity‘ (a term of Dennett‘s to be developed in part two), but if we are going 
to deny that a discrete notion of ‗self‘ is at the centre of it (and we are), then what are we 
going to put in its place? To begin with, we need to understand the issue at stake 
regarding obligatory passage points in relation to (for instance) Bloor‘s vestibular 
principles. They (the OPPs) may implicitly stand at the gates waving you in, so to speak, 
but paradoxically they arrive late; they possibly got there only a little before you! For the 
purposes of epistemic construction, vestibular architecture is important and 
indispensable, but at the point of active epistemic enquiry—where science is ‗in action‘; 
where knowledge is in evolutionary flux—scholars are working to the last minute, 
always under pressure to put on the next show. While the show is on, obligatory passage 
points and the vestibule are one and the same. If one can either not get in, or else get in 
without paying, then its stability breaks down. While stability lasts, though, we can 
consider this to be a local equilibrium. 
The term I want to use for this, dispositif, originates in Aristotle‘s Rhetoric as taxis, but has 
acquired a dynamic semiotic valence in poststructuralist theory. Jean-Louis Baudry first 
made a distinction between appareil de base and dispositif, where the former refers to all the 
machinery involved in producing and showing a film, while the latter—echoing Plato‘s 
cave—‗concerns only the projection as it involves the interpretant‘ (Baudry 1978, 31 
cited in Kessler 2007, 8–9).9 For Foucault, the term first appears in The History of 
                                                 
9 Kessler cites the original French; the gloss is mine. 
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Sexuality (1976). He uses it to signify a dense, shifting, often conflicting heterogeny of 
materials, institutions and actors (Foucault 1980, 194–5, cited in Kessler 2007, 2). 
Dispositif is often translated as ‗apparatus‘, but Kessler (2007) notes that beside the more 
or less mechanical arrangement implicit in Aristotelian taxis, ‗a dispositif also implies a 
field of forces acting upon a technological, social, legal etc. context or environment‘ (1). 
This suggests an interesting and valuable affinity with Austin‘s concept of the 
performative. The relationship between dispositif and interessement constitutes a sort of 
‗perlocutionary lens‘ acting to focus and guide the subjectivity of the mobilized.  
The nature of the affinity is this: Austin is interested in the scalability of perlocutionary 
force. For example, the Queen can ‗name this ship‘, but I cannot. I can call it anything I 
like, but everyone else will call it by the name the Queen gave it—hers is a speech-act 
(given the right circumstances); mine merely an act of speaking. I can, however, name 
my child with the assurance that (in normal circumstances) my child will keep that name 
in perpetuity; ironically I have more influence over my child‘s name than I have over my 
own. The dispositif, too, is scalable by virtue of the chains of enrolled consent that 
constitute it, and the duration of these allies‘ interessement. 
A preliminary definition of my term ‗intersubjective technology‘, then, addresses this 
perlocutionary lens to the links of the chain, which, in accord with Callon‘s extension of 
Bloor‘s symmetry principle, are symmetrically composed of dynamically interacting 
human and non-human, material and semiotic elements. In his gloss of Foucault‘s usage 
of the term, Gilles Deleuze (1992) stresses this dynamism: 
… a social apparatus [dispositif] consists of lines of force. It could be said that they proceed from one 
unique point to another in the preceding lines; in a way they ‗rectify‘ the preceding curves, they draw 
tangents, fill in the space between one line and another, acting as go-betweens between seeing and 
saying and vice versa, acting as arrows which continually cross between words and things, constantly 
waging battle between them. 
This is a metaphor that appeals to a physicist‘s reading of nature, suggesting the visual 
image created by iron filings sprinkled over a magnetic field. By itself, though, this 
metaphor is of limited value: 
Foucault, for his part, was concerned that the social apparatuses which he was analysing should not 
be circumscribed by an enveloping line, unless other vectors could be seen as passing above it and 
below it (ibid.). 
The danger here is that the emerging picture comes to resemble a curiosity of 
condensed-matter physics, spin glass. There, metal atoms‘ electrons have spin that 
creates a magnetic field, influencing the fields of their neighbours, but, unlike in iron 
where the spins align to constitute a polarised field, each atom‘s spin is random, 
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continually impinging on the randomness of the others—a state that physicists call 
‗glassy‘. In practice, a degree of stability, of tolerance for the prevailing local spin 
inclination, leads to ‗local equilibrium‘, though locality is—of course—in constant flux 
(Waldrop 1992, 138–9). Among the moments of translation that Callon lays out, which 
of them does local equilibrium resemble? Is local equilibrium sustained solely by the 
attention-span embracing the issue under examination? For that matter, what is the 
platform capable of sustaining a sense of narrative as it passes through the dispositif? 
Surely the traditionally singular notion of the subject is imperilled? 
John Law, the third principal actor–network theorist, addresses this problem in a paper 
that highlights some of the paradoxical consequences of the approach (1997). 
Referencing a paper on the UK Cervical Smear Programme (Singleton & Michael 1993) 
that highlights a fascinating ambivalence in the performance of expertise by GPs, Law 
points out that the theorist‘s stories do not add up, and that attempting to force them to 
do so would betray the integrity of these stories—the way the theorist chooses to tell 
the story is part of the story. He argues, in consequence, that 
…we are witnessing a shift in the character and the role of narrative in STS writing, and especially 
in the character and role of chronological narrative. …we need to attend to lots of little stories, and 
then to the patterns that subsist between those stories, patterns that will often not reduce themselves 
to the chronology of narrative, patterns that do not form a chronological narrative—because there is 
no narrative.  
The consequence of this is not to abolish obligatory passage points. Instead, the 
implication is that it is necessary to envisage a more fluid, polyphonic conception, one 
that may involve ‗pragmatic passage points‘ as well as the obligatory ones, points that 
recruit selectively and temporarily, but which are ultimately expendable.10 
A sense of this operationalization of pragmatism can be found in a term coined 
elsewhere by Law (1987), the ‗heterogeneous engineer‘. It usefully binds embodied 
intention to actant vectors in an envisaged polyphonic relationship between materials, 
conventions, existing technologies, resource-holding interest groups and so on, each of 
which must be engineered by the focal subject. Once a narrative process has been 
initiated, the structure in which the performance takes place has a catalytic effect on the 
course the performance follows, polarizing the relationship between actants and 
witnesses, granting the former the privileged position of directing that course within 
constraints to which all have been recruited.  
                                                 
10 To be clear, the modulation from ‗obligatory‘ to ‗pragmatic‘ is mine, not Law‘s. 
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Encounters with works of art may be considered to simulate, or to perform a safe 
enactment of, moving through dispositif. Nowhere is that connection more evident than 
in media theory where modern discourses concerning the boundary between fiction and 
reality are at their most acute. Passage points provide stability; they literally point (though 
we also need to be aware that they literally point. That is to say, they engrain, and are 
engrained by, literacy in ways that we will need to deconstruct in part three). By locating 
the performance of cognition within the dispositif we have potentially liberated it from a 
range of constraints associated with classical notions of the scientific method. There is 
even a case for calling the dispositif a device for harnessing cognitive practice—implicitly, 
therefore, for managing the production cycle that yields useful work. 
 
 
So we turn to the problem of introspection, which has stalked us from the outset. Peirce 
was critical of common-sense indubitability, as you will recall. One of the problems 
posed by this criticism is one that later resurfaced in the work of Daniel Dennett, and 
acutely concerns us as we pursue the theorizing of the actant in part two. How, exactly, 
can a subject be certain of introspective knowledge? In his pursuit of a science of 
consciousness, Dennett engaged with German phenomenologists, notably Husserl, but 
rejected the privileged status they grant to introspective knowledge. He formulated his 
‗heterophenomenology‘ as a ‗third-person‘ science of consciousness, based on the 
principle of treating subjective reports as evidence that must nevertheless be correlated, 
as is proper to the scientific method, with other evidence. 
The course that led Dennett to his formulation reflects intriguingly on the previous 
discussion of obligatory passage points. As we will see shortly, Dennett ‗passed‘ through 
an important body of work, notably the contribution of Richard Rorty, apparently 
without realizing its significance until some time later. Not only is this interesting in 
itself, but it becomes the more so when the connection between Rorty and Peirce is 
explored. Rorty is well known as a latter-day exponent of pragmatism. Among his 
supervisors in his student days was Charles Hartshorne, one of the early editors of the 
Peirce papers. Rorty may well, therefore, have been familiar with a particular paper of 
Peirce‘s, one that we have already passed through, ‗The Pragmatic Maxim‘ (1998, 133ff). 
If we wondered whether Dennett might have been influenced by it, the answer would 
appear to be: ‗indirectly, yes‘. It is the first of the 1903 Harvard lectures, in which Peirce 
discusses the idea of phenomenology as a science: 
The science of phenomenology is in my view the most primal of all the positive sciences. That is, it 
is not based, as to its principles, upon any other positive science… 
… nevertheless [it] must, if it is to be properly grounded, be made to depend upon the 
conditional or hypothetical science of pure mathematics, whose only aim is to discover not how things 
actually are, but how they might be supposed to be, if not in our universe, then in some other (144). 
This grounding, in other words, is in an aspect of Scholastic realism that survives the 
decline of the indubitable, with the proviso that nature, in ‗making up rules as it goes 
along‘ (as it might seem from a human perspective) as the universe evolves, may bring 
about some future amendment that we cannot foresee. 
Rorty‘s tactic, in turning to Peirce, prefigures his later critical position in respect of the 
analytical tradition:  
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I want to suggest that Peirce's thought envisaged, and repudiated in advance, the stages in the 
development of empiricism which logical positivism represented (1961, 197–8). 
He develops the point by drawing a comparison between Peirce and the course of 
Wittgenstein‘s philosophy, which turned from an early interest in verificationism to a 
later interest in language. He cites Wittgenstein‘s slogan ‗don‘t look for the meaning, 
look for the use‘ (198) as being a restatement of Peirce‘s pragmatic maxim. Considering 
experience and rigour to be mutually repugnant, Rorty says that ‗nominalism‘ and 
‗reductionism‘ are forms of a single error. In a series dubbed ‗the incorrigibility papers‘, 
he develops a critique of introspection that brings into focus a constructive alternative 
to nominalism and reductionism. This has been called ‗eliminativism‘, but the term has 
become synonymous with ‗eliminative materialism‘—a derived, and radical, claim 
concerning the ambition to supersede certain ‗common sense‘, or folk-psychological, 
ways of accounting for the phenomena of consciousness with terms couched in 
elementary biological, chemical and physical causes and effects. At its most radical, this 
programme seeks to decouple consciousness from the human vehicle.  
I use an alternative term, ‗meiosis‘, which preserves the force of Rorty‘s argument 
without endorsing (or otherwise debating) the more radical claim associated with it. In 
rhetoric, meiosis refers to ironic belittling, such as calling an arsonist a ‗naughty boy‘. To 
interpret the speaker‘s meaning, one has to reconstruct the enormity of the event to 
which it is related in order to recognize the imperfect match between speaker, subject 
and event. In biology, meiosis is the process by which chromosomes in a cell are 
reduced by half prior to the formation of gametes. Both usages have a sense of 
‗explosive reduction‘ (where ‗explosive‘ entails rapid reversibility with limited 
predictability). 
 
In ‗The case for rorts‘ (1996a), his contribution to Rorty and his Critics, Dennett refers to 
a body of work that he calls ‗the incorrigibility papers‘. These are three papers by 
Richard Rorty (1965, 1970, 1972), but it seems appropriate to add to this body the 
significant papers that Rorty references in building his argument: Cornman 1962, 
Feyerabend 1963, Putnam 1964, Sellars 1965, and Cornman 1968. Perhaps because ‗the 
reigning methodology in that brand of analytic philosophy ignored the sorts of 
questions that would have provoked the relevant discussion‘, Dennett says that the 
importance of these Rorty papers ‗have never been properly appreciated by 
philosophers of mind‘,  
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… myself included (of all people). I say ‗of all people‘ because Dick Rorty has always drawn explicit 
links between his ideas and mine, and has played a major role in drawing philosophers‘ attention to 
my work. If anybody was in a position to see the virtues of his position, it was I, and while I can now 
retrospectively see that I did indeed subliminally absorb his message and then re-invent some of it in 
my own terms (without sufficient acknowledgement), I certainly didn‘t proclaim my allegiance to, or 
even deign to rebut, clarify or expand upon, those claims (Dennett 1996a, 1–2). 
With these remarks in mind, it is worth attempting to reconstruct a kind of ‗audit trail‘ 
that leads through these ‗incorrigibility papers‘ to the concept of heterophenomenology 
Dennett broaches in the early 1980s. We can begin with the logical behaviourism of 
Dennett‘s Oxford mentor, Gilbert Ryle, in which a distinction between the workings of 
the mind and the actions of the body is denied. Although behaviourism was already in 
decline in the early 1960s, it retained the attraction firstly of insisting that psychology be 
considered a natural, empirical and objective science, and secondly of refusing to 
entertain unexplainable Cartesian or Lockean ideas about such things as images or 
intentions (Nelson 1989, 306). The place of behaviourism was being taken by a 
cognitivist modulation, the ‗identity theory‘ proposed in the late 1950s by (among 
others) the Vienna Circle veteran Herbert Feigl, which held that mental events can be 
directly correlated with physical events in the brain. In a paper that has been identified 
as germinating the concept of eliminative materialism, Feigl‘s sometime associate Paul 
Feyerabend asks whether materialism will give a correct account of human beings, and 
rehearses the familiar objection: 
The following reason is put forth why this question must be put in the negative: human beings, apart 
from being material, have experiences; they think; they feel pain; etc., etc. Hence a materialistic 
psychology is bound to fail. 
The most decisive part of this argument consists in the assertion that experiences, thoughts, etc. 
are not material processes (Feyerabend 1963, 49–50). 
The ‗incorrigibility papers‘ represent a concerted effort to find the means to develop an 
understanding of experience that is compatible with materialism. 
Feyerabend claims that the prevailing view of our ability to acquire introspective 
knowledge is incorporated in the language being used to describe such knowledge, and 
that it is literally inconceivable, from this perspective, that such a thing as an 
introspective mistake might be made:  
When I am in pain, then there is no doubt, no possibility of a mistake. This certainty is not simply a 
psychological affair, it is not due to the fact that I am too strongly convinced to be persuaded of the 
opposite. It is much more related to a logical certainty: there is no possibility whatever of criticizing 
the statement (56). 
Feyerabend argues that from the materialist perspective, ‗it is then possible to test 
statements of introspection by physiological examination of the brain, and reject them 
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as being based upon an introspective mistake‘ (56), noting further that ‗there are many 
facts which are inaccessible, for empirical reasons, to a person speaking a certain idiom and 
which become accessible only if a different idiom is introduced‘ (52–3). This is the basis 
for Feyerabend‘s anticipation of heterophenomenology: 
To solve the problems arising from this apparent inaccessibility of processes in the living brain we 
need only realize that the living brain is already connected with a most sensitive instrument—the 
living human organism. Observation of the reactions of this organism, introspection included, may 
therefore be much more reliable sources of information concerning the living brain than any other 
‗more direct‘ method (55). 
Recast in Dennett‘s terms,  
… at the outset, heterophenomenology is neutral, leaving the subject‘s heterophenomenological 
worlds bereft of any priming stimuli—that is how it seems to the subjects, after all—while 
postponing an answer to the question of how or why it seems thus to the subjects. 
Heterophenomenology is the beginning of a science of consciousness, not the end. It is the 
organization of the data, a catalogue of what must be explained, not itself an explanation or a theory. 
(This was the original meaning of ‗phenomenology‘: a pretheoretical catalogue of the phenomena 
theory must account for.) And in maintaining this neutrality, it is actually doing justice to the first 
person perspective… (Dennett 2003, 9). 
This method, as conceived by Dennett, is radically impartial with respect to the truth or 
falsity of data points as perceived by the subject: 
And what kind of things are beliefs? Are they sentences in the head written in brain writing? Are 
they nonphysical states of dualist ectoplasm? Are they structures composed of proteins or neural 
assemblies or electrical fields? We may stay maximally noncommittal about this by adopting, at least 
for the time being (I recommend: for ever), the position I have defended… that treats beliefs from 
the intentional stance as theorists’ fictions similar to centres of mass, the Equator, and parallelograms of 
forces. In short, we may treat beliefs as abstractions that measure or describe the complex cognitive 
state of a subject… (ibid., 2). 
He is willing, in other words, to treat pieces of subjective evidence as ‗pragmatic passage 
points‘, in a sense that continues the notion of the obligatory passage point from the 
previous chapter—a continuation that I will pick up in part two. 
In respect of the language in which negotiations are conducted, and the terminologies 
developed in order to advance such negotiations, Feyerabend despatches the defects of 
the ‗ordinary language‘ position crisply: 
Every interesting discussion, that is every discussion which leads to an advance of knowledge, 
terminates in a situation where some decisive change of meaning has occurred. Yet it is not possible, 
or it is only very rarely possible, to say when the change took place (1963, 58). 
This sense of succession is at the core of the eliminativist position (and the principle of 
meiosis), and is picked up by Rorty:  
There is simply no such thing as a method of  classifying linguistic expressions that has results 
guaranteed to remain intact despite the results of  future empirical inquiry (Rorty 1965, 25). 
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Examples in the history of science, such as phlogiston or caloric fluid, exemplify the 
way in which grammars develop and vocabulary progresses as more economic and 
flexible interpretations of nature emerge in response to empirical enquiry. 
Initially, Rorty is out to show that mental privacy is not fatal to the identity theory. In 
part this is related to Sellars‘ suspicion that identity theory is either interestingly flawed 
or uninterestingly true (Sellars 1965, 430). Restricting himself to the parity between 
brain-states and sensations, Rorty makes a distinction between a ‗translation‘ form and a 
‗disappearance‘ form. The translation form involves the adoption of ‗topic-neutral‘ 
language, a terminology adapted via Smart from Ryle, for whom words such as ‗if‘, ‗or‘, 
‗not‘, ‗and‘, & ‗because‘ are topic-neutral because hearing them tells you nothing about 
the topic of conversation. Smart narrowed the sense to neutrality between physicalism 
and dualism, where terms such as ‗going on‘, ‗occurring‘, ‗intermittent‘, ‗waxing‘, 
‗waning‘ are topic neutral with respect to the imperatives of one or the other doctrine 
(Smart 2004).  
The disappearance form is the prototype of eliminativism. Beyond the example of the 
vocabulary of ‗caloric fluid‘, which gave way to ‗mean kinetic energy of molecules‘, 
Rorty elaborates his discussion in terms of a culture that explains disease in terms of 
demons, discerned by shamans under the influence of hallucinogenic drugs. It is 
conceivable, he concludes, that saying ‗nobody has ever felt a pain‘ might come to seem 
no more absurd than saying ‗no one has ever seen a demon‘, should our state of 
knowledge develop terminologies that make it seem normal to say ‗my C-fibres are 
firing‘ instead of ‗my leg hurts‘. For this change to occur, though, it is not sufficient 
merely for knowledge to advance—we understand that temperature is ‗caused‘ by the 
kinetic energy of molecules and not by caloric fluid, but we still find it convenient to 
speak of temperature. There needs to be a positive advantage to be gained from making 
the change (1965, 29–37). 
Satisfied that the disappearance form is at least sufficiently tenable to warrant further 
thought, Rorty sets about tackling the problem posed to identity theory by the privacy 
of sensation. Although broached in the 1965 paper, this theme is developed more fully 
in 1970. Here he sets about isolating the features that thoughts and sensations have in 
common with each other but with nothing physical, in furtherance of the materialist 
cause. First he distinguishes between ‗mental entities‘, events such as occurrent thoughts 
and sensations, and ‗mental features‘ that more recent terminology recognizes as 
enactive (that is, arising in dynamic environmental interaction), such as beliefs, desires, 
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purposes, intentions, motives; or features with a physiological dimension such as 
emotions and moods (1970, 406–7). Implicitly, Rorty is essaying a Peircean distinction 
between ‗consciousness‘ and ‗mind‘ (‗that great dumping-ground of  out-dated entities‘, 
as he elsewhere puts it), where ‗features‘ differ from ‗entities‘ by virtue of their capacity 
for contextualization. Features are critical whereas entities are acritical, in Peirce‘s logical 
sense of critical. There is, though, a subliminal sense that the ability to distinguish a 
mental event is already dependent on communicative faculties that enable the report to 
be made. 
The problem of how to put language to one side, even if only temporarily and 
provisionally, is very much to the point in respect of heterophenomenology, and we 
shall return to it. Having denied ‗intentionality, purposiveness, nonspatiality, 
introspectibility, privacy as incommunicability, privacy as special access, and privacy as 
unsharability‘ as marks of the mental (414), Rorty settles on incorrigibility: 
Mental events are unlike any other events in that certain knowledge claims about them cannot be 
overridden. We have no criteria for setting aside as mistaken first-person contemporaneous reports 
of thoughts and sensations, whereas we do have criteria for setting aside all reports about everything 
else (413). 
As Wittgenstein put it, ‗it makes sense to say of other people that they doubt whether I 
am in pain; but not to say it about myself‘ (1967, a246). Wittgenstein, in the ‗private 
language‘ passage of Philosophical Investigations, is more concerned with the problem of 
what constitutes a report. To draw out the problem, we can observe that a cat or a dog, 
when accidentally trodden on, will yelp; they do not yelp in that way unless caused to do 
so, and a human becomes accustomed to interpreting yelps, yowls and so on in relation 
to their likely cause.  This response would seem to satisfy one definition of a report, 
though the directness of cause and effect renders it hermeneutically banal. Evidently it is 
the possibility of intervention and deceit—intentional or otherwise—that has 
accumulated in the course of evolutionary divergence that attends the question of 
incorrigibility. Correction, after all, is a social engagement that strongly implicates 
pointing—which, as we will see in part two, is a uniquely human capability. 
Feyerabend recapitulates Peirce‘s remark to the effect that the ‗original‘ propositions of 
Critical Common Sense ‗are indubitable in the sense of being acritical‘ (Peirce 1998, 
347): 
The first question which arises in connection with this argument concerns the source of this 
certainty of statements concerning mental processes. The answer is very simple: it is their lack of 
content which is the source of their certainty (Feyerabend 1963, 56; emphasis inherited). 
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Feyerabend draws attention to an interesting case of the analytical glass being half-
empty while the introspective glass is half-full. From an analytical point of view, lack of 
content means lack of referent, a deficit in inferential resources with which to isolate 
and triangulate semantically functional states. From the introspective point of view, the 
same lack of referent is what gives rise to interpretative feedback. For an obvious 
instance, the pain of a foot trodden on is not like the pain of a sprained ankle, though 
both the bodily origin of the sensation and its name is similar—‗pain‘ is an acritical term 
that covers both episodes. Pains that have no immediately obvious cause require skilled 
interpretation, leading ultimately to c-fibers and the rest of the physiological apparatus. 
This is where the significance of Rorty‘s enquiry for the heterophenomenological 
project becomes apparent. Rorty asks: 
Did the meaning of  ‗thought‘ change when people came to make noninferential reports of  their 
own thoughts? … Would it change if  cerebroscopes came to be regarded as offering better evidence 
for what someone was thinking than his own introspective reports? (415) 
Although the term ‗cerebroscope‘ is used here in a semi-jocular fashion, it usefully 
classes a group of technologies that have revolutionized scholarship in the broad field of 
mind, brain and consciousness. It is less a case of ‗offering better evidence‘ than 
offering the grounds for comparing verbal and non-verbal reports, and for building 
hypotheses on the basis of findings. In the matter of yelping pets, for instance, a range 
of physiological markers would now be used to indicate stress reactions in 
circumstances where animals would previously have been classed as ‗dumb‘. The first 
distinctive feature of heterophenomenology, then, is that it treats language as one 
cerebroscopic tool among several—one that can be examined cerebroscopically, to 
boot. The second distinctive feature arises from the way language is then used 
introspectively by the heterophenomenologist: the heterophenomenologist is better able 
to formulate hypotheses capable of withstanding scientific enquiry than heretofore. 
 
A worry remains that the price of Rorty‘s triumph over incorrigibility—marking off 
‗mental entities‘ from ‗mental features‘—is a high one. While the focus has been on 
identifying the unique property or properties of ‗the mental‘, it is becoming apparent 
that there is a co-definitional problem in defining just what constitutes ‗the mark‘. If the 
pursuit of ‗the mark‘ obliges us to put aside matters of interest that are not amenable to 
the style of enquiry being adopted, we may find it more productive to set aside the 
terminology altogether. (The ‗mental‘ is what phenomenologists study, and ‗marks‘ are 
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what anthropologists, say, study.) For Rorty, the problem is that of using mental 
faculties to define mental faculties. Even when circumscribed with the elaborate care 
that Rorty brings to the matter, there is (at the very least) the ghost of a begged question 
remaining to be exorcised. This, I think, is the ultimate point that Rorty wishes to make.  
At this point, another dimension to heterophenomenology that Dennett does not 
explicitly enumerate seems relevant. As a consequence of Dennett‘s multiple drafts 
model of consciousness, terms such as ‗multi-modal‘ and ‗multi-layered‘ are also 
appropriate so that ‗heterophenomenology‘ characterizes a more nuanced, ‗polyphonic‘ 
perspective. In place of problematic distinctions between mind and body, or between 
mind and consciousness, we can envisage accounts that marshal distinct physiological 
elements such as the neurochemistry of reward, proprioception, and neuronal action-
understanding, to find that the distinctively human emerges from the richness of their 
interaction, which might by turns be harmonious or dissonant. ‗The mental‘ then might 
be regarded as being analogous to ‗white‘ light, an energy spectrum that amalgamates a 
range of wavelengths, either end of which are beyond human visual perception.  
The comprehending use of simple and fruitful language to account for complex, 
difficult and time-consuming realities turns out to have a lot in common with the 
primitive evolutionary idea of ‗fight/run away‘. Given that attention is a scarce resource, 
we may at certain times use language appropriate for an exhaustive explanation of the 
contributory circumstances relevant to a particular event—where that explanation 
contributes in some way to rewarding development, for instance. At other times, that 
same event might be described and dismissed by the quickest means possible. To 
humans, such disposals are perfectly normal, but in offloading the mental load to 
semiotic resources in the environment—to autonomous noemata—can humans install 
plausible discretion? Rorty comments on this dimension of a discussion of computing 
machinery that unfolded in parallel to the functionalist paradigm: 
It is tempting, perhaps, to think that we can distinguish between the machine‘s beliefs and its 
utterances by distinguishing between its program and its performance and thus between 
‗programming errors‘ and ‗machine errors‘ (1972, 212). 
Here Rorty is alluding to questions raised by Hilary Putnam (1960), concerning the 
distinction between mistakes, errors, faults, algorithmic flaws and so on, in machines 
and their makers, which he (Rorty) compares with a passage of Dennett‘s (from an early 
work, Content and Consciousness (1972)) that makes equivalent distinctions between 
physical and logical states in humans, concluding that ‗it makes no sense to suggest 
about a report of either that a mistake … was made‘ (Rorty 1972, 209). Dennett in turn 
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glosses Rorty somewhat broadly, calling ‗a mind‘ a control system whose self-reports are 
incorrigible, and asking whether there could be such a control system: 
One of Rorty‘s shrewdest observations is that our underlying materialist skepticism about this very 
possibility is the chief factor that propels us towards dualism and other mysterious doctrines. 
Dennett continues: 
It does seem at first blush as if the states and events in any material or physical control system would 
have to be exactly as knowable by ‗third persons‘ as by their ‗owner,‘ and if this is so, then no such 
states and events could be thoughts and sensations. It seems to follow that in any purely material 
entity, first-person privilege would evaporate, at which point there would be nothing left to anchor 
the mental at all (1996a, 3). 
The account that Dennett gives of the possible route by which ‗people‘ may come to 
eliminate their belief in ‗mind‘ is curious, since an outcome that would need to be 
accomplished at an individual level is represented instead as being a modulation at a 
phenotypic, or cultural, level. We may very well ask, ‗which people?‘ The answer surely 
would never be ‗everyone‘; even if it were to become a cultural norm among adults, the 
naïve preference for mind-talk among children would continue to be a convenience 
such adults would be obliged to adjust to. Is it, then, worth pursuing this line of 
enquiry? Dennett later remarks that: 
Many are deeply skeptical of anti-metaphysical moves such as Rorty‘s suggestion that a linguistic 
convention of incorrigibility accounts for the existence of minds, but what they tend to overlook— 
and what Rorty himself has overlooked, if I am right—is that the existence of such a convention can 
have effects over time that make it non-trivially self-fulfilling (10). 
There are two possible routes forward arising from this identification of a productively 
self-fulfilling convention. One is the orally-inflected, second-person relationship, 
fashionably characterized in the Bantu term ‗ubuntu‘, meaning (approximately) ‗I am 
because you are‘. What makes it possible to conceive of one‘s own incorrigibility, 
paradoxically, is the oral experience of others‘ incorrigible reports. The reliability of these 
enable the construction of the self-fulfilling consequences Dennett envisages. The other 
possible route is an abstract, third-person relationship sustained by material 
substitutions for the second-person relationship, out of which non-triviality emerges. 
The former, second-person formulation corresponds with a heuretic conception of 
performativity, while the latter, third-person dimension is implicated in stigmergic 
performativity and the ‗grandparent‘ account of intersubjective technology. These are 
threads that will recur as my argument develops, ultimately finding resolution in the 
concept of the Work-Maker discussed in part three.  The immediate business of part 
two, though, concerns the operationalization of enactive performativity—or rather, the 
performative modulation of the enactive. 
 
The central concept of part two, and of the thesis—‗polyphonic consciousness‘—is like 
Peirce‘s interpretant, but not quite the same thing. It is like the structuralist dispositif, but 
it is not quite the same thing as that, either. Further, the dispositif, emerging as it does 
from Aristotelian disposition, is like the interpretant but not quite the same thing. What 
we carry forward into part two, then, is a conflation of these two styles of disposition, 
the interpretant/dispositif. To the extent that this is an individuated entity (which is not 
far, unsurprisingly, since the formulation is intended to resist commonsense 
individuation), it is an entity that marshals and harnesses processes of individuation in 
ways that will require further delineation in parts two and three. Before proceeding, 
though, let us review part one. 
Our broad orientation has been to epistemic questions regarding the means by which 
we may proceed, and the grounds from which we depart. In Peircean terms, part one 
deals with secondness, with relationships of necessity, and with the stipulations that 
support the fixation of belief. Peirce clearly had an appreciation for the institutional 
dimension of knowledge production, whether that term is taken to imply curation or 
innovation. This social dimension, though underdeveloped in his own writing, is 
complemented by later structuralist analysis, which, in turn, benefits by being aligned to 
the Peircean apparatus. There is a clear continuity in the emphasis on rhetoric and 
performance highlighted in the Oxford, Edinburgh and Mine School ontologies. 
Peirce‘s contribution to the evolving argument is substantial, and difficult to summarize, 
but we can highlight three aspects of his work in particular: the categories; chance; and 
abduction. The categories are the foundation of his semeiotic. It is convenient to 
simplify somewhat, and refer to firstness as being broadly phenomenological; to 
secondness as being broadly epistemological; and to thirdness as being broadly 
sociological. In simplifying, we eliminate definitional problems that arise from engaging 
with the varieties of degeneracy he identifies, at cost of tolerating a degree of vagueness 
regarding such things as disciplinary boundaries. 
Chance, in Peirce‘s hands, is no longer an intractable and arbitrary frontier in the pursuit 
of knowledge, but rather an empirical topic subject to clear methods and procedures. Its 
philosophical valence (in this mathematical form) remains, perhaps, under-developed. In 
part three, it becomes clear that part of the reason for this is the degree of specialization 
necessary to fully grasp the mathematics involved. Nevertheless, Peirce‘s thinking on 
chance permeates his commitments, the connection between methodeutic and 
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entanglement being expressed through his theological notion of brotherhood among 
scientists, which vestigially anticipates certain aspects of social brain theory. 
Ironically, the chance aspect of trial and error—the conception of the way natural 
science proceeds that prevails in the present day, following Popper and allies such as 
Polanyi and Feyerabend—would not have seemed a fully satisfactory settlement to 
Peirce. His theory of abduction, nevertheless, is difficult to grasp as an alternative. 
Additionally, his line of argument is founded in an essentialist tradition that analytic 
practice has sought systematically to minimize if not eliminate altogether. Abduction, 
and its corollary, adduction, is pitched at the ambient end of the cognitive spectrum. It 
concerns what attracts attention in the first place, what germinates a thought process 
insofar as such a process is to be deemed ‗rational‘—that is, approximately, consisting in 
an array of mutually supporting components, however ill-defined the notion of 
‗component‘ might be at this point. 
That the array of mutually supporting components need not necessarily be a somatic 
resource is an idea that challenges ordinary, common-sense notions of cognition as a 
purely phenomenological experience. There are two dimensions of extra-somatic 
resource that need to be distinguished. The first is rhetorical, and is vested in those with 
whom the cognizer interacts. Because of the shared nature of this resource, it is by no 
means obvious that any distinction is necessary, but Austin‘s analysis of perlocutionary 
language-use makes it clear that this sharing should not be allowed to beg the question. 
However, the necessary equipment (to be explored in part two) was not available to 
Austin and his colleagues. Symmetrically, the second dimension of extra-somatic 
resource concerns the capacity of the interpretant/dispositif to respond to its 
environment in a specifically hylozoic manner. In the radical view of actor–network 
theory, nature participates actively in this rhetorical traffic. Symmetrically too, however, 
the equipmental question is left unasked by sociologists of knowledge. 
Social brain theory, and in particular the variant I will explore—which I call ‗the 
extended social brain hypothesis‘, lends substance to the vestigial articulation of the 
interpretant/dispositif that part one has outlined. As stated, this development revolves 
around a concept that I call ‗polyphonic consciousness‘, which is an evolution of Daniel 
Dennett‘s ‗multiple drafts model‘. In order to seed this development, part one concludes 
by forging a connection between Dennett‘s operating method (heterophenomenology), 
via Rorty, to the specifically Peircean variant of pragmatism with its moderate 





The Extended Social Brain Hypothesis is drawn from three principal sources: one is 
sociological, one is philosophical, one is psychological. We have already encountered the 
first two of these, although in the philosophical case what we have done so far is to 
establish a back-story concerning ‗common sense‘. Part two engages with contemporary 
issues in the philosophy of mind, drawing on a variant identified in particular with Andy 
Clark, the extended mind. This is a minimal-nativist, vehicle oriented approach to the 
analysis of cognition whose interest for our purposes lies in its stress on the role of 
environmental cues in ‗fast and frugal‘ hypothesis generation.  
We have already reviewed the sociological perspective, actor–network theory, in part 
one. This hylozoic ontology treats the relationship between agent and environment as a 
systematic articulation of semiotic (meaning, in this context, disembodied) rhetoric, 
neatly complementing the extended mind. The psychological perspective is introduced 
as the social brain hypothesis, though its status has matured to the point where 
‗theory‘ can be substituted for ‗hypothesis‘. It developed out of ‗theory of mind‘ stories 
about human evolution, which superseded the technical intelligence hypothesis by 
arguing that brain size is correlated with social complexity rather than an aptitude for 
practical skills such as digital manipulation. 
I will advance three claims in part two, under the ‗extended social brain hypothesis‘ 
(which is hypothetical): 
There is no subjectivity without intersubjectivity. That is to say, as an 
evolutionary matter, it was necessary for the empathic capacities to evolve 
before the sense of self we identify as human could emerge. 
Intersubjectivity is critical to human communication, because of its role in 
interpreting intention. While the idea that human communication requires three 
levels of intentionality carries analytical weight, I argue that the inflationary 
trajectory is wrong as an evolutionary matter. The trend is instead towards 
increasing powers of individuation. 
The capacity for tool-use is emphasized less under the social brain hypothesis, 
but the importance of digital manipulation needs to be reasserted as part of a 
mature ontology. 
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For the most part, these claims are pursued in chapters 6 and 7. The notion of 
consciousness supporting them is developed in chapter 5, and the social brain 
hypothesis is introduced later in the current chapter. 
 
In Economy and Society, Max Weber argued that social phenomena must be explained by 
showing how they result from individual actions, which in turn must be explained 
through ‗methodological individualism‘—that is, in reference to the intentional states 
that motivate the individual actors (Heath 2005). Later, Hayek and Popper among others 
seized upon the concept as a means of  refuting Marxian historical materialism. In truth, 
the claim that invoking the term ‗methodological‘ insulated the theoretical issues from 
ideological inflection was constitutive of  the very ideology that motivated its 
promulgation. When we find John Searle, then, endorsing methodological individualism 
in his 2005 paper ‗What is an Institution?‘, some associations pull into focus. Searle, of  
course, is the heir of  J. L. Austin, but his work on Austin‘s legacy focuses on speech acts, 
and on illocutionary acts in particular. Human intentionality, however—and in particular 
Austin‘s notion of  the perlocutionary—seems to demand the acknowledgement of  an 
intrinsically social semiotic level. The notion of  an institution goes beyond that, strongly 
suggesting the kind of  extended material–semiotic entanglement theorized in part one 
as the dispositif. The distinguished economist Kenneth Arrow suggests an emergentist 
approach that endorses this perception, and which is worth looking at in a little more 
detail. 
The case Arrow (1994) states is that, on close inspection, most standard economic 
analysis rests on social categories that are absolutely necessary to the analysis and are 
therefore not merely figures of  speech that could be eliminated at the expense of  
brevity. Historically, the issue first appears in economic literature with the Austrian Carl 
Menger in the 1880s. Menger argues that a ‗national economy‘ is the outcome of  
individual economic efforts, or the ‗singular economies in the nation‘ (2). It follows that 
all social interactions are interactions among individuals, whose role is analogous to that 
of  the atom in chemistry. An army, for instance, is composed of  individuals, and any 
analysis of  its functions must rest on the way individuals give or respond to orders (3). 
For Hayek, as it had previously for Edmund Burke, ‗this leads to a principled rejection 
of  deliberate changes in society, for the existing institutions, having arisen by so many 
individual choices, embody the wisdom of  the ages‘ (3). In this respect, institutions 
resemble Austin‘s ‗ordinary language‘. Though emergence may account for the 
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institutional nature of  social phenomena that exhibit no obvious relationship to the 
individual motives constituting them, there is no principled way of  distinguishing 
between an emergent phenomenon at one level and an atomic phenomenon at another. 
Emergence remains a concept in want of  precise definition. 
Arrow focuses on the issue of  price. Prices are determined by social institutions 
commonly called markets, which equate supply and demand (4). Economists model the 
effects of  individual choice-acts in game theory, but the recurrent problem is: where do 
individuals (for this purpose an individual corporation suits just as well as an individual 
human) get the information to support a rational decision? For each individual to 
maximise their return, they need to have information available that enables them to 
evaluate the likely returns of  their competitors. They also need to evaluate the effects of  
their own decisions on those returns which, once they enter the marketplace, feed back 
as effects that cause competitors to make adjustments of  their own. We have a problem 
in respect of  information-gathering and resource allocation.  
The conventional way that economists approach this problem is with the concept of  
externality, which Arrow calls social interactions that are not mediated through the 
market (5). Externalities are costs or benefits accruing to third (external) parties in a 
transaction, often from the use of  a public good. In other words, the first and second 
parties do not bear all of  the costs or reap all of  the gains from the transaction. The 
prime example is information, especially technical knowledge, but Arrow finds it 
striking that neither Hayek nor his socialist opponents seem to have been concerned 
with changes in knowledge (6). The appearance of  a new product or technical 
phenomenon is eo ipso a communication about itself  and thus an externality. Even if  the 
precise know-how entailed in making the appearance take place is withheld for one 
reason or another, mere appearance is informative. For example, while there was great 
secrecy about the building of  the first atomic bomb, the fact of  its explosion 
demonstrated that it was possible to make such a device. This information was more 
valuable than any details of  manufacture, and could hardly be kept secret (7).  
Ultimately the question of  where change and innovation comes from turns into a 
version of  the old chicken-and-egg question. In language that economics has borrowed 
from biology, the question is posed as an arbitration between the respective merits of  
exogenous and endogenous analyses of  growth. More accurately, the exogenous view—
that new knowledge accretes to the economy as a natural and inevitable process like the 
growth rings of  a tree—was a convenient accommodation made in the pioneering 
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model of  growth developed by Robert Solow in the 1950s. The endogenous view—that 
new knowledge arises from the skills and practices of  individuals (propagating 
rhizomatically like grass), whose endeavours are harnessed by investment decisions 
within the economy—was developed by Arrow among others, building on the 
foundations laid by Solow (7–8). Arrow winds up with a paradox, one that has become 
familiar. Knowledge has both a personal and a public aspect: 
Methodological individualism has indeed one major implication for information acquisition, 
ironically one not very compatible with neoclassical paradigms, particularly not with rational choice. 
Information may be supplied socially, but to be used, it has to be absorbed individually (8). 
Both terms—personal and public—are too loose to fasten an argument to, but the 
social brain hypothesis offers a mediating path on which we can build. 
 
What is this ‗information‘ of which Arrow speaks? How does ‗inform‘ relate to 
‗perform‘? Where in the evolutionary process does whatever it takes to make the 
distinctive cognitive modulation of sensory process from data to information arise? 
Whiten and Byrne, introducing the first volume of Machiavellian Intelligence (1988), couch 
their introductory discussion in terms of traditional definitions of intelligence. 
Sometimes the term is used to mean the ability to solve problems, sometimes the ability 
to learn, or sometimes the ability to make sense of a novel conjunction of events (4). 
Since on Byrne‘s 1997 account some degree of technical intelligence (in monkeys) 
precedes social intelligence (in apes) in a way that suggests a principled relationship, a 
useful point of departure is Robin Dunbar‘s patient evaluation of competing hypotheses 
that seek to correlate the evolution of large brains with potential environmental factors. 
Dunbar‘s paper, ‗The Social Brain Hypothesis‘ (1998), distinguishes six potential ways of 
accounting for large brains, which fall into four categories: 
1. Epiphenomenal explanations that simply correlate large brains with large bodies, 
with superior information-processing capabilities emerging opportunistically. 
These explanations fail the cost test (in reference to the increasingly steep energy 
cost of maintaining a large brain) because the evolutionary stability of animals 
with comparable body mass does not show a correlation with their brain sizes.  
2. Ecological hypotheses that in all likelihood have some bearing: 
a. Fruit harvesting imposes greater cognitive demands than grazing. 
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b. Brain size constrains the size of the mental map, thereby constraining 
range size and navigational competence. 
c. Extractive foraging, such as nut cracking and root digging, draws in 
features of both a. and b. above. 
3. Social hypotheses that see brain size as a constraint on the size of social 
network, impinging on memory for relationships, or on the maintenance of a 
repertoire of social strategies. 
4. Developmental hypotheses that focus on length of gestation, and duration of 
immaturity, in order to correlate brain size with reproductive success (179). 
In order to arbitrate between these competing hypotheses, Dunbar seeks measures that 
will enable him to evaluate the validity of comparisons between widely differing body 
sizes and habitat types. He settles on the ratio between medulla and neocortex, which in 
insectivores is approximately one to one. In prosimians the neocortex is about ten times 
larger than the medulla; in anthropoids 20–50 times larger, and in humans as much as 
105 times larger (180). 
Six lines of evidence support the ascription of fundamental importance to the skilled 
management of social relationships. First, Dunbar finds stratification in the anthropoid 
primates, such that prosimians, monkeys, and apes show distinct gradings that suggest a 
social nexus that places increasingly complex demands on the respective individuals. 
Second, the observed use of tactical deception correlates with neocortex size. Third, 
male rank correlation with mating success is negatively related to neocortex size, 
suggesting that brain power trumps physical prowess. Fourth, although total brain size 
correlates with gestation length in mammals, neocortex size does not; rather, the latter 
correlates with duration of immaturity, suggesting that the need for social learning 
pressures the limits of genetic encoding. Fifth, grooming clique size, a surrogate variable 
indicating alliance size, correlates well with relative neocortex and social group size in 
primates, including humans. Sixth, the areas of the primate brain responsible for 
executive function (neocortex and striate cortex) are under maternally rather than 
paternally imprinted genes, whereas the converse is true for those parts of the brain 
most closely associated with emotional behaviour. This suggests a relationship with the 
more intense cognitive demands of social life in matrilineal female-bonded societies 
(184–6). 
Performativities 4: The extended social brain hypothesis 84 
Noting that human cultural evolution, in the last 250,000 years, has comfortably 
outpaced anatomical evolution, Dunbar (1993) infers that our present-day brain size 
reflects the group size prevalent at that prehistoric stage. That assumption permits him 
to seek plausible correlates in present-day human society by which he can test the 
theoretical outcome of projecting the medulla/neocortex relationship onto human 
group size. This is the projection that yields the famous Dunbar Number of 150 (147.8, 
to be exact). To place this figure in some kind of context, he points out that ‗the various 
human groups that can be identified in any society seem to cluster rather tightly around 
a series of values (5, 12, 35, 150, 500, and 2,000) with virtually no overlap in the variance 
around these characteristic values‘ (1998, 187). Using terms such as ‗grooming circle‘, 
‗social network‘, ‗camp‘, ‗clan‘ and ‗tribe‘, he compares group sizes between a variety of 
hunter-gatherer and settled horticulturalists from Australia, Africa, Asia, and North and 
South America, finding that ‗clans‘ really do gravitate around the figure of 150 members 
(see also Dunbar 2003, 164–6; Stiller, Nettle & Dunbar 2003).  
The difficulty in Dunbar‘s account is that for humans to sustain this group size by the 
same means as monkeys and apes, it is projected that it would be necessary to spend 
approximately 45% of their time engaged in grooming.1 Since we do not, the question 
arises: how do we sustain our social bonds with relatively minimal expenditure? Dunbar 
notes the neurochemical role of grooming in the release of endorphins, which promote 
states of relaxation, enhancing individuals‘ sense of community while beneficially 
influencing their immune systems, and possibly triggering the release of oxytocins, 
leading to the generation of a sense of ‗euphoric love‘. In other words, group cultural 
practices act in loco parentis, so to speak, exploiting the brain‘s architecture to generate the 
desired neurochemical effects economically.  
 
Briefly, Dunbar‘s story draws on traditional ‗theory theory‘, or ‗theory of mind‘, whose 
explanatory force is immediately challenged by Rorty‘s abolitionist position; simulation 
theory is a modulation of ‗theory theory‘ grounded in a particular feature of neural 
architecture, the Mirror Neuron System. Simulation theory, though, still requires the 
simulator to do something (and tends to be articulated from a methodological 
individualist perspective), while the parsimonious story I propose is more in the nature 
                                                 
1 Figures and implications presented by Dunbar during a seminar at Edinburgh University, 13 February 
2009. 
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of a vehicle theory, drawing on the foregoing with the addition of Clark-style minimal 
nativism: 
Instead of building in large amounts of innate knowledge and structure, build in whatever minimal 
set of biases and structure will ensure the emergence, under realistic environmental conditions, of 
the basic cognitive modules and structures necessary for early success and for subsequent learning. 
(Clark 1993, 185) 
Jonathan Opie introduces the notion of a vehicle theory of consciousness, grounded 
(like Clark 1989 & 1993) in parallel-distributed-processing computing architectures, to 
supersede what he calls process theories of consciousness: 
A vehicle theory places consciousness right at the focus of cognition by identifying it with the 
explicit representation of information in the brain. Classicism can‘t support such a theory 
because it is committed to the existence of explicit representations whose contents are not 
phenomenally conscious (Opie 1998, abstract). 
Following Rorty, the alternative is to take an anti-representationalist stance, meaning 
‗there are no final answers to the traditional questions about knowledge, truth, and 
representation‘ (Boros 1998). This entails concern for the stipulations by which stability 
is achieved, sustained, and (where necessary) superseded—hence a stress on 
individuation as a process. 
These perspectives—theory theory, simulation, and vehicles—will recur and intermingle 
during the next three chapters. Before getting started with that, some preliminary 
remarks about language are in order, because ‗language‘ is a natural term that stands in 
for a number of competing perspectives on the topics at issue.  
Dunbar muses that understanding the intention behind a speech act is crucial to 
successful communication, remarking that without these abilities it is doubtful that 
literature would be possible. To state it thus is to get cause and effect the wrong way 
round, however, snagging language with an overly narrow and possibly under-theorized 
definition in the process. No human population has been discovered that does not have 
language. When we say that we cannot imagine modern human life without language, 
though, it is in the sense that we understand language to be deeply implicated in the 
achievement of modernity, because the term simultaneously represents oral 
communication and a deeper sense of order. The puzzle is to make a connection 
between the two conditions, and to find a way to account for the latter in a way that 
retains plausible connections with, but makes principled distinctions from, the former. 
Rather than using the term ‗language‘, I prefer to use the twin terms ‗intersubjective 
technology‘ and ‗the technologizing of intersubjectivity‘. The former (already introduced 
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briefly in part one) recognizes that the individual DNA regime is able to perform 
differentially according to its accumulated semiotic skill set, and the neologism 
represents the pooled ensemble of action possibility. The latter is a direct modulation of 
Walter Ong‘s ‗technologizing of the word‘ (1982), and recognizes that the value of such 
an individually-held resource depends on the environment in which it is deployed, an 
evolving environment that places a premium on flexibility and adaptability.  
Perhaps the hardest part of building an argument for the technologizing of 
intersubjectivity as an endogenously driven social process is accounting for the 
phenomenon that Andy Clark has termed ‗the paradox of active stupidity‘ (1999, 6/29). 
Briefly, the problem concerns the idea that humans set about actively making the world 
a better place to think in. Nicholas Humphrey expresses the same paradox in slightly 
different terms, suggesting that ‗subsistence technology, rather than requiring 
intelligence, may actually become a substitute for it‘:  
Provided the social structure of the species is such as to allow individuals to acquire subsistence 
techniques by simple associative learning, then there is little need for individual creativity. … Indeed, 
there might seem on the face of it to be a negative correlation between the intellectual capacity of 
the species and the need for intellectual output. … Studies of contemporary bushmen suggest that 
the life of hunting and gathering, typical of early man, is probably a remarkably easy one. The 
‗affluent savage‘ (Sahlins 1974) seems to establish a modus vivendi in which, for a period of perhaps 10 
million years, he could afford to be not only physically, but intellectually lazy (Humphrey 1988, 16–
17). 
This puzzle neatly ties up with the problem posed by Herbert Simon (1978) regarding 
the best strategy for dealing with an excess of information when attention is the scarce 
resource. Clark (1997, 180ff) uses the term ‗scaffolding‘ to capture the institutional 
constraints employed to minimize the necessity for choice-acts to occasion deep 
thought.  
Simplifying the mental landscape—including cognitive sculpting afforded by such 
faculties as memory—can be accomplished by recruiting and preserving intersubjective 
technologies through neural path dependencies that are continuous with the ‗external‘ 
environment. The somatic boundary, from this perspective, is more apparent than real. 
The problem, from the perspective of an analyst seeking to reconstruct the processes by 
which these path dependencies become established, is to locate the point in the evolving 
relationship between organism and environment when the principle under scrutiny 
becomes established and stabilized.  
Andy Clark, in ‗Minds, Brains and Tools‘ (1999), makes a slight but telling shift that 
reinstates the observed capabilities of the environment in a coupling with those of the 
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subject (which is not necessarily human). In an imagined dialogue, Clark asks and 
Dennett answers: 
Q/ What are minds made of?  
A/ Tools for thinking. 
Q/ Who or what uses the tools to do the thinking?  
A/ No-one, nothing. The tools-are-us. 
Q/ Intentionality, aboutness, content and consciousness: can all these really be brought into being 
by grab-bags of userless tools? 
A/ Yes (Clark 1999, 2/29). 
This mind–tool ontology dissolves the somatic boundary. In respect of the list of terms 
just advanced, we need not expect to find solutions to their respective epistemological 
challenges entirely within our own bodies. The problem is, however, to find the means 
to explain skilled engagement. We require a clearer understanding of the terms ‗mind‘ and 
‗tool‘. Whether it is necessary or wise to make a functional distinction in this context 
between the brain and the body‘s other organs is a separate question, which need not 
detain us. The theme I want to develop, following on from part one‘s exposition of the 
dispositif and of meiosis, concerns the transparency of the somatic boundary. This will 
require close attention to the nature of ‗function‘ and its relationship to ends and 
intentions, which will entail a return to my Austinian question about happiness. To 
contextualize all of this, however, we need to attend to the nature of consciousness, the 




Previously we established a useful distinction between two senses of ‗common sense‘, 
one referring to the common product of sensory input experienced by the individual, 
the other referring to the shared experience of this product among individuals. I 
distinguish not two but four species of common sense. In addition to the sensory and 
psychological, I argue for a third (semiotic) and fourth (cultural) kind. The first three 
correspond to the Peircean categories. The fourth is supported by an extension of 
Peircean chance, and could be called Polyà semiotics. (This dimension is further 
explored in part three.)  
The polyphonic model sets out to reintegrate these. The idea, essentially, is that under 
polyphony, discrete strands of content mutually support each other. In music, voice-led 
melody, functional harmony and measured pulse is found in a mutually supportive 
relationship in renaissance and early modern polyphony. In the polyphonic model of 
consciousness this idea of mutual support characterizes each of the strands—sensory, 
psychological, and semiotic—that separately articulate the aspects of ‗common sense‘ 
previously distinguished. Importantly, it also characterizes the relationship between these 
three aspects. Sensory polyphony refers to the integrated phenomenal inputs (to the 
extent that speaking of ‗inputs‘ does not beg questions). The matter of shared 
experience, though, can be split on Peircean lines so that we have a psychological 
polyphony, which is a secondness (albeit a crude one, indexed by conspecifics), and a 
semiotic polyphony, which is a thirdness—sensory polyphony, obviously, being a 
firstness.  
What makes each of these polyphonic, and what makes their mutual relationship 
polyphonic, will take some explaining. To begin with, ‗Polyphonic consciousness‘ is an 
evolution of Daniel Dennett‘s ‗multiple drafts‘ model that takes the ‗white light‘ of 
consciousness to the prism. Polyphony implies, first of all, several ‗thingings‘ happening 
simultaneously. Further, each of these ‗things‘ has antecedence and consequence and is 
thus the subject of continuity in the Peircean sense discussed in part one. In music, the 
‗thing‘ is equivalent, normatively, to an individuated, quantized element called the ‗note‘; 
in this polyphonic model of consciousness, the equivalent of a ‗note‘ is the passage 
point, given semiotic articulation by the mind–tool. 
Assembling this argument is going to be a long and difficult process, extending beyond 
this chapter to the following two. The present chapter falls into three parts. First I 
review Dennett‘s multiple drafts model, and present the outline of the polyphonic 
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modulation. Next, I elaborate the sensory and psychological dimensions of polyphonic 
consciousness. Finally, I develop the semiotic dimension, paying close attention to the 
relationship, in Clark‘s ‗Minds, Brains and Tools‘, between Gibsonian affordance, 
Heideggerian equipment, and Dehaenian code-switching.  
 
Dennett‘s multiple drafts model is presented in Consciousness Explained (1991) as a 
solution—or riposte—to dualist approaches to the problem of defining mind and 
consciousness. His approach has been to distinguish two complementary lines of 
enquiry, ‗a theory of content or intentionality—a phenomenon more fundamental than 
consciousness—and then, building on that foundation, a theory of consciousness‘ 
(Dennett 1994).  
Dennett invokes the ‗Cartesian theatre‘ to model the supposition that somewhere in the 
brain is a physical centre (1991, 101–10) where deloma takes place. (Deloma means 
‗making known to one‘s self‘, and is the root of Peirce‘s sign-type ‗delome‘.) In its place 
he proposes a more materially realistic alternative, the ‗multiple drafts‘ model, in which 
the perception of mental activity is the outcome of multiple parallel processing of 
sensory input under constant ‗editorial revision‘ (111). Descartes wanted to claim that 
somehow the mind arrives at deloma in advance of the body, as though the body is there 
to witness the performance of the mind. Dennett adduces two examples to refute this 
claim.  
In Grey Walter‘s precognitive carousel, patients had electrodes implanted in their motor 
cortex in order to test the hypothesis that certain kinds of cortical activity were the 
initiators of intentional actions. The subjects were given a slide-show with a button to 
activate the carousel. In fact, the button was a dummy, the carousel instead being 
activated by the amplified signal received from the subjects‘ implanted electrode. The 
subjects reported that it seemed as though the slide projector was anticipating their 
decisions, because the carousel would advance before they actually pressed the button 
(167).  
Benjamin Libet‘s ‗case of backwards referral in time‘ is one that has stimulated a 
considerable volume of commentary. Libet compared the time course for a sensation 
induced by direct stimulation of the somasensory cortex with the time course for the 
same kind of sensation induced in the ‗normal‘ manner—in this case, a mild electric 
pulse applied to the hand. When initiated simultaneously, the expected result was that 
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the patient should report that the sensation which travelled via the nervous system from 
the hand would take longer to ‗arrive‘, or be rendered conscious, than the sensation 
directly induced in the cortex. According to Libet‘s data, the reverse was in fact the case; 
patients reported that the pulse applied to the hand ‗arrived‘ first. Even when he 
staggered the impulses so that the direct cortical stimulus was initiated in advance of the 
distal stimulus, patients continued to report that the hand-stimulus ‗arrived‘ first (153ff).  
The issue of ‗neuronal adequacy‘ has a bearing on the subsequent debate: for either 
stimulus, there was a delay of about 500 milliseconds before the patients‘ consciousness 
registered an event. The argument advanced by Libet and others was that the temporal 
incongruity reported in these results had the consequence of affirming the dualist 
hypothesis and undermining materialism. Dennett (to cut a long story short) does not 
agree, arguing instead that the interval between stimulus and its registration is evidence 
for the resolution of the perceptual issue by parallel distributed processing of the raw 
sensory data. 
On the one hand, there are editing procedures in play that tend to reorganize memory, 
causing the story to shift as time goes by. Dennett calls this mode ‗Orwellian‘, after the 
revisionist practices of the Ministry of Truth imagined by Orwell in his novel Nineteen 
Eighty-Four. In contrast, Dennett posits a ‗Stalinist‘ mode, where evidence that suits the 
desired outcome is marshalled and presented at a kind of show-trial, such that from the 
historical point of view of the Orwellian mode, we could not know what was true in the 
first place.  
‗Stalinist‘ and ‗Orwellian‘ are part of the problem of realizing deloma, and the terms 
neatly exemplify the way in which the idea of narrative gravity can help us understand 
this problem. The terms bring things into focus in the manner of the perlocutionary lens 
discussed in part one: the authorial act of citing these terms obliges the witness to 
engage with the author‘s intention in doing so. However, the witness‘s interpretative 
resources do not necessarily match the author‘s. In this case, the names that Dennett 
chooses—Orwell and Stalin—are both pseudonyms, which may account for a certain 
discomfort entailed in this instance of Foucauldian discursive practice. There are a 
variety of issues that fall under the term ‗Orwellian‘, not least the notion of surveillance 
familiar from Foucault‘s own work. Few writers, furthermore, have more pervasively 
shaped perceptions of the nature of Stalinism than did Orwell. Similarly, but differently, 
the show trial is by no means the preserve of Stalinist Russia (cf., for instance, Carey 
1998).  
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A specific objection to the idea of a ‗Stalinist‘ modality in consciousness concerns 
another of Orwell‘s observations about Stalinist Russia (in Animal Farm) that is relevant 
to forthcoming discussions of the problems of framing, namely the assumption that any 
failure within the system must be the fault of external sabotage. The computational 
model of mind was founded in the same determinist mould as the historical materialism 
that in Orwell‘s parable now seems extreme and absurd. Some caution, then, is 
appropriate when recruiting computational metaphors for the explanation of mental 
processes. 
A problem that arises here is the tendency to conflate attention and consciousness. 
Since attention is by and large a serial phenomenon, the assumption is made that the 
consciousness that supports attention must be serial too. Jonathan Opie (1998, 44) 
suggests that there are two ways of examining the serial experience of consciousness: 
one is to regard it as a serial stream ‗containing only one conscious content at a time‘. 
The other, taking account of evidence such as Dennett‘s, is to treat it as a dynamic 
fusion of distinct components. Opie dubs the former ‗monophonic‘ and the latter 
‗polyphonic‘, with reference to medieval vocal music. The idea is to treat consciousness 
‗not as a matter of physical oneness, but as a matter of harmony or coherence‘ (54). He 
goes on to invoke multi-track recording technology as a metaphor for the model he 
endorses, where the agent has the means to attenuate or suppress elements in the overall 
mix in real time. 
 
What, then, does the term ‗polyphonic‘ add to Dennett‘s ‗multiple drafts‘? The multi-
stranded view I will propose benefits from mutual support whose valence can get lost if 
one element is detached and analysed in isolation. To amplify Opie‘s characterization, 
polyphony is a texture in which several lines or voices sound simultaneously, in 
distinction from a texture where a single (monophonic) voice sounds, or in which a 
prominent voice is supported by one or more subsidiary, supporting (homophonic) 
voice. As the literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin uses the term, polyphony suggests a kind 
of rowdy democracy, where voices compete for the reader‘s attention so that 
interpretation is more actively a matter of continuing evaluative judgement than it might 
be in a more orthodox narrative where the reader is engaged in a relationship of trust 
with a singular, authoritative voice (Dentith 1995, 42). This, I think, is a reasonable 
approximation of Dennett‘s model. 
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Bakhtin‘s usage is by analogy to the musical sense, in which the simultaneous sounding 
is actual and necessary. However, it is not enough merely to speak of events happening 
simultaneously. It is the way in which musical elements—pitch, pulse and melos—
interact and support each other that matters here. These elements can and do interact 
satisfactorily without providing the support for extended rhetorical discourse. By 
analogy, classical and medieval painters were able to create approximations of 
perspective without access to the mathematical tool developed by Brunelleschi in the 
early 15th century. 
The archaeological suggestion made by Roger Wibberley (2004a, 2004b) is that the 16th 
century reformation of tuning practice enabled a shift from a performers‘ art to a 
compositional (i.e., technologically engaged and remote) one. This occurred for two 
connected reasons. First, the pre-existing Pythagorean tuning system taught as part of 
the medieval quadrivium was highly somatic: that is, the rules for adjusting the 
relationship between one pitch and another had to be internalized and deployed in the 
act of performance. Second, the system intensified certain unpleasant dissonances. 
Under the reformed system, palliated dissonances became a discursive resource used to 
sustain a relationship with the notion of resolution, a concept that was expanded, as a 
result, from a singular point of stability to become a device of overarching structure.  
The significance of this evolution in tuning practice concerns the function of meiosis. 
Most simply put, tuning is a term associated with optimization—especially where a lot 
of components are required to work successfully with each other under duress, as in an 
internal combustion engine. Etymologically, via ‗tone‘, the word inherits the senses of 
‗stretching, tension, raising of voice … exertion of physical or mental energy‘ (OED). 
This seems somewhat at odds with the familiar musical sense of being ‗in tune‘, in 
which mastery over pitch is so fundamental to successful performance that the stresses 
entailed in achieving such mastery can easily be overlooked. The point of the 
polyphonic analogy is that it was not until the sixteenth century (approximately) that a 
tuning system emerged that was capable of supporting the functional harmony that we 
now take to be ‗normal‘. This system, perfected by Adrian Willaert as Wibberley (op. cit.) 
argues, was a simplification that permitted new kinds of complexity, an outcome of 
Rortian meiosis as discussed in part one. Rather than the medieval vocal model that 
Opie references, then, I would point to a particularly dense example of Bach ‗on a good 
day‘, his intensely wrought ‗St Anne‘ fugue BWV 522, in which five independent voice-
led melodic lines are marshalled into a broader rhetorical shape by functional harmony 
supported by metrical coordination. 
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Such musical structures are neither ‗natural‘, nor are they ‗artificial‘. Rather, they are 
facilitated by the capacity to fashion nature into durable patterns. Crucially, the ability to 
conceptualize durability rests on intersubjectivity. It is because these resources are 
fashioned—hand-made—that the language of tools and technology is appropriate to the 
problem of understanding the relationship between the material reality of their existence 
and their subjective efficacy. The musical elements can each be organized and 
technologized. In respect of pulse, for instance, the practice of a West African drummer 
differs from that of a North Indian tabla player, who differs again from a European 
orchestral percussionist. The differences can be articulated in terms of an individual 
instance of performance, a single beat, being fixed in place by its institutional context—
the apparatus that gives each genre its signature. In polyphonic consciousness, the 
various strands of sensory experience that are moulded into perception, reason and 
computation—the somatic faculties we tend to represent as quintessentially human—
are similarly amenable to deconstruction and technologizing.  
Cerebral structure is already present in Dennett‘s model, and this structure is 
environmentally situated. However, little account is taken—at this point—of a social 
dimension intervening to create elements of the conscious experience under analysis. 
We cannot simply add ‗the social‘ to the picture without being able to give a principled 
account of what the social dimension adds to a theory of consciousness. The argument 
through (though not necessarily of) Dunbar is that intersubjectivity precedes 
subjectivity. In other words, subjectivity is inconceivable without the potential for 
correlation (the positive sense of ‗what it is like‘). If we wish to understand this complex 
phenomenon, we need to eschew the attractive short-cut afforded by the artefact of 
language—partly because it is as difficult to say precisely what language is as it is to say 
what consciousness is; we might suspect, further, that these two problems are 
intertwined. 
Polyphony, to reiterate, involves not only stuff happening simultaneously, but it posits 
discrete, principled continuities, and implicates each of these in the co-creation of an 
apparently singular continuum whose antecedence and consequence depends on 
sustained coordination. One source of this insight is a simple analogy developed out of 
post-Turing research on mechanical computation, and relates to communication 
protocols. Computers, in the early days, were solitary, craft-built machines. Although an 
individual machine‘s architecture generally followed the standard logic of the stored 
program and the separation of instructions and data, individual implementations varied. 
Once it became desirable to connect machines, a set of protocols evolved. Now we 
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have the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol, or TCP/IP for short. It is a 
layered suite of protocols—physical, data link, network, transport, presentation, session, 
application—with each layer providing a service to the layer above it, while each and all 
are implemented in the same single serial stream of binary digits. 
The brain expresses an embodied physics that can be compared to this idea of layers 
exchanging services. In some degree, the brain performs this expression in any organism 
that possesses a brain, so that our definition of certain organic structures as a brain is in 
consequence of their capacity to perform in this way.  A small range of resolutions have 
been found to be optimal for the gathering of environmental data:  
 Touch is the basic, ‗original‘ sensitivity to the immediate environment. It has 
several constituents: mechanoreception responding to pressure and vibrations; 
thermal reception; kinesthetic reception, or proprioception, monitoring our 
bodily disposition in space; and nociception, the sense of pain. Common to 
these is distribution throughout the body, whereas the remaining sense organs 
are all localized in the head: 
 Smell and taste operate at the molecular level. That is to say, the cognitive 
reception of such data is initiated by the chemistry of molecular interaction. 
 Sound is an emergent property of matter at the molecular level, being the 
manifestation of energy transmitted in the form of waves through fluid medium.  
 Light, insofar as it answers wavey questions, is like sound except that the 
wavelength is much shorter and the frequency much faster, affording a much 
higher resolution and greater distance than the others; in terms of the processing 
resources needed to realize those benefits, these advantages are costly. 
This embodied physics addresses the idea of polyphony as it applies to the singular 
organism‘s experience of common sense. Rather than regarding one strand as being 
directly equivalent to a TCP/IP layer, the senses provide services to each other non-
hierarchically.  
Next, in order to get a sense of human sensory polyphony in an evolutionary context, 
we need to ask who or what has access to such services, and consider a variety of 
outlooks. We can envisage a multi-storied assemblage (not vastly different, in fact, from 
the scheme in Aristotle‘s De Anima) that can simultaneously accommodate the breadth 
of a Churchland-style ecumenism and a Chalmers-style chauvinism. For Paul 
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Churchland, ‗the dynamical cognitive profile that constitutes consciousness has been the 
possession of terrestrial creatures since at least the early Jurassic‘ (cited in Dennett 2006, 
204). The Jurassic is the point of emergence for early mammals; presumably the somatic 
configuration Churchland has in mind is mammalian. Others, notably the proponents of 
quantum consciousness (principally Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff), go 
considerably further back along the line of last common ancestry: 
Based on an upper limit of hundreds of milliseconds of sustained quantum coherence, the Orch OR 
model predicts a lower limit for consciousness at the level of about 300 neurons (e.g. small worms 
and urchins). A single-celled paramecium, while clever, seems unlikely to sustain sufficient quantum 
coherence to reach threshold for OR reduction (up to one minute would be required), and is thus 
unlikely to attain conscious experience (Hameroff 1998, 126).1 
David Chalmers, on the other hand, insists that the ‗hard problem of consciousness‘ is 
missing from the story as Dennett presents it: 
…an organism is conscious if there is something it is like to be that organism, and a mental state is 
conscious if there is something it is like to be in that state. Sometimes terms such as ‗phenomenal 
consciousness‘ and ‗qualia‘ are also used here, but I find it more natural to speak of ‗conscious 
experience‘ or simply ‗experience‘ (Chalmers 1995).2 
So we have: 
 Penrose‘s Orch-OR liberalism (organisms as simple as the earthworm, but not 
simpler);  
 Churchland-style ecumenism (mammals, emotional regulation; intersubjectivity);  
 Chalmers-style chauvinism (introspective humans);  
Most interestingly, we also have 
 Gramsci‘s political humanism, in which consciousness is something to be raised 
by humans behaving intentionally in particular, organized ways.  
This last view informs the specifically technological aspects of modern consciousness 
that I discuss in part three. However, the idea here is that the tools we routinely use in 
the performance of consciousness have been carefully and patiently installed in us by 
                                                 
1 Orch OR is an abbreviation of Orchestrated Objective Reduction, a theory that posits a specific form of 
quantum computation underlying neuronal synaptic activities. The proposed quantum computations 
occur in structures inside the brain‘s neurons called microtubules. 
2 The paper, Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness, appeared in the Journal of Consciousness Studies 
2(3):200-19, 1995. Cited here is a version posted on Chalmers‘ personal website. 
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others, and that this immersion in learning and acculturation is neither topic-neutral nor 
an externality in the matter of understanding human consciousness.  
 
Connecting sensory polyphony to the capacity of human organisms to experience a 
shared, consensual common sense requires a similar psychological polyphony. This is 
where the mind–tool ontology comes in. Dennett remarks that ‗words are tools for 
making more tools‘ (1998, 6/10), a statement that we will need to interrogate at length 
in the next two chapters, with the same corrective as that applied to Ong‘s 
‗technologizing of the word‘. For the moment, though, let us pay attention to the 
relationship between ‗words‘ and the idea of narrative gravity foreshadowed in chapter 
2.2.1. It arises usefully in the preamble to Dennett‘s articulation of ‗multiple drafts‘ in 
Consciousness Explained: 
Consider the advantages of adopting the tactic of interpreting [Conan Doyle‘s] texts as …generators 
of a theorist’s fiction (which might, of course, prove to be true after all). The reader of the novel lets 
the text constitute a (fictional) world, a world determined by fiat by the text, exhaustively extrapolated 
as far as extrapolation will go and indeterminate beyond; our experimenter, the 
heterophenomenologist, lets the subject‘s text constitute that subject‘s heterophenomenological world, a 
world determined by fiat by the text (as interpreted) and indeterminate beyond. (1991, 81) 
Dennett continues, ‗Heterophenomenological objects are like centres of gravity or the 
equator, abstracta, not concreta … They are not idle fantasies but hard-working theorists‘ 
fictions‘ (95–6). 
Dennett builds an analogy with the practices of fictioneers, comparing things that can 
be claimed to be ‗true‘ of Sherlock Holmes‘ London with things that cannot. We can say 
that Holmes lived in Baker Street, but not that he was a devoted family man (79–80). 
However, the assertion that there are no jet aircraft in Holmes‘ London, is less firmly 
grounded. Conan Doyle may not have imagined aircraft, making the assertion about jets 
literally true, but other contemporary authors may have imagined aircraft in London—
there is a spacecraft in the roughly contemporaneous London in which Jules Verne sets 
From the Earth to the Moon (albeit fired by a gun)—so Conan Doyle might have imagined 
Holmes imagining an aircraft and discounting the notion. It would have been a vague 
notion, to be sure, but that is the point.  
The rhetorical style of Holmes adventures is such that the theorist can follow the salty 
fictional trajectory in comfort and safety; Holmes‘s superior deductive skills are part of 
his charm. However, this Holmes persona is not ‗a‘ text, but more of a gravitational 
phenomenon that emerges from a series of texts—not only those created by Conan 
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Doyle, but also by a series of actors (in the ordinary theatrical sense) and scriptwriters 
reinterpreting the originals. The idea of London, correspondingly, is inscribed in a series 
of iterations and interpretations in which Holmes‘s London is (approximately) one 
among many. Moreover, the Conan Doyle text is itself an ensemble of such gravitational 
phenomena. By analogy with Callon‘s obligatory passage point (OPP), we can deploy it 
as a pragmatic passage point (PPP), a device of moving-through in a similar way to the 
OPP, but with an important difference. The OPP tends to emerge relatively late in the 
process of enquiry, and represents a point of transition from abductive to inductive, 
where a number of hypotheses held by a number of actants converge and become a 
single, shared hypothesis; a stable perlocutionary array. By contrast, the 
heterophenomenological object being used as a PPP is more likely to be posited early in 
the process, and may well be eliminated entirely before the work is complete. 
Nevertheless, it shares with the OPP the potential for different epistemic trajectories to 
converge before moving through. 
Returning, then, to the theme of psychological polyphony, I want to turn to a 
heterophenomenological object that is almost totally the inverse of Dennett‘s Conan 
Doyle, being (one might say) unreliable, charmless, and incoherent. Why? First, because 
the text in question presents with rich concision the model I want to use; second, 
because extracting this model from its context serves to exhibit the idea of 
intersubjective technology in action; third, because there are certain similarities between 
its  author and Peirce, regarding the relationship of their personal performances of 
society to that of their oeuvre. In the narrative gravity analogy, such a text is more in the 
nature of a perlocutionary singularity; it is something like a mind–tool, but (presumably) 
more complicated. As a PPP, this text would be traversed differently by a historian, a 
philosopher, a psychologist or a novelist, but each of these actants would (hopefully) 
find themselves attuned (for different reasons) to the rhetorical service it is being asked 
to provide. 
The text in question is William S. Burroughs‘ novel The Western Lands, specifically an 
early passage in which he introduces the Egyptian ‗hierarchy of souls‘ (1988, 4–5). It is 
intriguing—in the same way that it is intriguing of Holmes‘s London—that something 
more or less true (in the sense of being historically authentic) should arise in a work of 
fiction. Correlated with the orthodox scholarship of Erik Hornung (1992, 167–85), 
Burroughs‘ scheme is more or less authentic, though his hierarchical arrangement owes 
somewhat to later influences, such as Aristotle‘s De Anima and the Hindu Chakra 
system. Particularly interesting, in relation to our pursuit of a distinction between 
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sensory and psychological ‗common sense‘, is his simplification of a difficult aspect of 
Egyptian thought: he notes that the upper three souls ‗are eternal‘ and ‗go back to 
heaven for a new vessel‘. We can recast this in secular terms as a distinction between the 
somatic and extra-somatic properties of the individual. This resembles the orthodox 
notion of body–mind dualism closely enough to make its relevance clear while at the 
same time offering a fresh perspective on problems such as Chalmers‘ ‗what it is like‘ 
formulation cited above. 
What problems are the seven souls the answer to? Generally speaking, Foucault‘s 
vocabulary of resemblance and signature offers a useful perspective. Connected to that 
capacity to act remotely through time and space, though, is a peculiarity of the Egyptian 
climate that intervened significantly in ‗ancient‘ funerary practice. Rather than decaying 
normally, buried cadavers could be subject to desiccation and natural mummification. 
When uncovered (‗reborn‘) through climatic intervention, conjecturally, this 
phenomenon focused speculation about the nature of death and the possibility of a 
persistence of personality beyond—an otherwise common but vague facet of oral 
cultures—speculation that seeded the fabrication of a rough psychology. As a 
technology of mummification developed, so too did a literature—notably the Pyramid 
Texts (dating from around 2400 BCE), the Coffin Texts, the so-called Book of the 
Dead, and the Book of Breathings.3 What is striking about this rough psychology—as 
parsed by Burroughs—is its resemblance to a variety of present-day perspectives on 
problems in consciousness studies.  
One thing I want to stress about these centres of narrative gravity is that rather than 
exhibiting hierarchy, they provide services to each other. Hence their relationship is 
polyphonic in the musical and not merely the literary sense. 4 I do not claim that the 
seven form an exhaustive list, nor should any of these ‗lights‘ be regarded as indivisible. 
To the contrary, since the polyphonic notion is suggested as an analytical approach 
rather than a realization, it is likely to be scalable to finer grains of detail from this 
interpretation of what we might call the molar illusion. 
                                                 
3 The term ‗book‘ is misleading, because the texts mutated constantly around relatively stable themes. 
4 Musicians in the north Indian traditions use the term ‗light‘ where we might use the word ‗note‘ as the 
gravitational focus. The sense suggests the light that attracts the moth, and the note a point of stability 
such as at the centre of a Lorenz attractor. 
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Sekhu: the remains—Dennett‘s robots or Chalmers‘ zombies. Although these two 
thinkers use the stated terms to pursue contrary lines of argument, their paths cross at 
this fundamental notion of material reality universally founded on the replicative 
property of DNA. 
Khaibit: the shadow (Noë et al.)—human physiology conserves configurations that have 
succeeded in a variety of environments foreign to our own. Taking locomotion to be 
implicated in the ground-floor level of consciousness, Alva Noë says that ‗perception is 
not something that happens to us, or in us. It is something we do‘ (2006, 1). He goes on: 
‗To be a perceiver is to understand, implicitly, the effects of movement on sensory 
stimulation.‘  
Ka: the double—mirror neurons (Rizzolatti et al.). The mirror neuron system‘s 
functionality corresponds more to the idea of rehearsal and shadowing than to the kind 
of precise replication that mirroring implies. It seems to be implicated in 
operationalizing the kind of intersubjectivity that dawns in mammals and which justifies 
the breadth of Churchland‘s reach. 
Ba: the heart—emotion (Damasio). The basic stand/run away instinct is stabilized by an 
increasingly elaborate attunement to the physiological states we are accustomed to 
calling emotions. Antonio Damasio (1995, 2000) has shown how important a role 
emotions play in the regulating and management of cognition. These emotions are 
implicated in the experience of the ‗gut feeling‘ Dennett speaks of. 
These four ‗lights‘ are explicitly somatic and enactive. That is, our account of their 
relationship to each other is focused on their role in enacting bodily consciousness. 
They are closely bound to the services provided by sensory polyphony. The remaining 
three ‗lights‘ exploit these enactive modes, but project their services out into the 
environment in a process of reciprocal feedback and performance. Hence they 
constitute a performative modulation of the enactive, and operationalize the 
intersubjective experience of psychological conspecificity: 
Khu: the guardian angel – experience/acculturation/education. The achievement (or 
not) of performativity, in Austin‘s sense of a happy or unhappy action, depends on 
attunement to social environmental contexts in a way that harks back to the Aristotelian 
concept of eudaemonia, whose literal meaning ‗good spirits‘ can be regarded as the 
essence abstracted from the actual people performing the actual feedback received in 
context. Looked at from a different perspective, we can see the idea of a sense of place 
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as being composed of a spatial, mapping dimension, a temporal, historical dimension, 
and a metaphysical dimension that more closely concerns one‘s personal orientation to 
the social dynamics of one‘s immediate environment. Let us say that the outcome, and 
continuing expression, of these processes is skilled engagement.  
Sekem: energy, power, light – reward neurochemistry. Here we can connect Austinian 
happiness with Damasian emotional states through recent (cerebroscopic) work by Read 
Montague & colleagues on the neurochemistry of reward (Montague et al., 2006). The 
brain needs to represent available choices in terms that enable the calculation of 
differential value, evaluating both near and distant reward potentials—near or far, that 
is, in both spatial and temporal senses. Following Gomart‘s work on addiction, (2004, 
85), the organism establishes ‗dependability‘, becoming a functional member of society 
and not someone who is diverted from performing society towards instead performing 
self-indulgence. Regarding the self-absorption associated with creative practice, the 
practitioner, and society, must mutually (though not necessarily contiguously) evaluate 
near and distant reward potentials. 
Ren: the director – the confluence of hylozoism and the demiurge; the technologizing 
of intersubjectivity. The sense that these enactive and performative constituents are 
subject to a coordinating discipline is difficult to resist. A fortiori it is difficult to resist 
making an appeal to language (at least to oral language) as the means by which 
coordination is operationalized. However, as I have already argued, Dennett‘s 
heterophenomenology invites us to include language as one kind of evidence for the 
functionality we seek to understand, and therefore to consider its semiotic basis in the 
physiological attributes of the organism. After all, as Tomasello et al. remark, 
saying that only humans have language is like saying that only humans build skyscrapers, when the 
fact is that only humans (among primates) build freestanding shelters at all. Language is not basic; it 
is derived. It rests on the same underlying cognitive and social skills that lead infants to point to 
things and show things to other people declaratively and informatively, in a way that other primates 
do not do, and that lead them to engage in collaborative and joint attentional activities with others of 
a kind that are also unique among primates (Tomasello et al. 2005, 690). 
Whether we want to call this kind of intersubjective exchange a technological artefact 
is—at this point—moot. Some might wish to reserve to the concept of technology an 
explicit intentional dimension. Others might be willing to acknowledge that the key 
characteristic differentiating technology from naïve tool-use is a path-dependent lock-in 
that in time privileges certain types, or even brands, of tool over others. Thus the 
emergence of distinct languages and semiotic systems is accounted for under the term 
‗technology‘ whether originally guided by intention or not. Nevertheless, granting that 
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the term ‗intersubjective technology‘ may be appropriate at some level of analogy, to go 
further would be to imply that first subjectivity had to become technologized, which 
would be a harder claim to substantiate. That would be to suppose, however, that 
subjectivity preceded intersubjectivity, evolutionarily speaking. There are grounds to 
suppose that it was the other way around, so that subjectivity is a technology that 
intersubjectivity affords. For present purposes, it is useful to be able to conceptualize 
consciousness as a suite of capabilities that, in concert, supports the progression 
through intention to what I am calling ‗recombinant intentionality‘—an intentionality 
that is supported by shared, skilled interventions in the environment.  
 
Hence the notion of semiotic polyphony. Like psychological polyphony, this is a notion 
with ancient roots—the pre-Socratic doctrine of hylozoism, ‗which sees in nature a 
living force and regards its processes and continuous alterations as spontaneous 
developments of life‘ (Hammond 1895, 402). Heraclitus even anticipates the significance 
of thermodynamics in present-day autocatalytic notions about the nature of life:  
The principle of fire, which is the concrete correlate of the metaphysical notion of life, is for 
Heraclitus the ultimate essence. This is in constant mutation and activity; the world is a process. 
There is nothing stationary, no fixed Being; all is Becoming, and this is figured forth in the restless, 
mobile, altering, and consuming fire (ibid., 404). 
The idea of harnessing and quantizing this flux through the concept of the mind–tool 
has definite attractions, but these entail hazards.  
As Jeffrey Goldstein points out, the hylozoic view, which finds life and therefore 
continuity in all matter, spares us the need for the ‗magical‘ addition of élan vital (2003, 
297). The cost, however, is an appeal to a primordialism that displaces rather than solves 
the problems at issue. Goldstein discusses Varela‘s autopoiesis and Goertzel‘s self-
generating cognitive systems as exemplifying the seductiveness of hylozoism:  
Like Varela‘s hylozoist strategy of explaining organic referential closure by appeal to an algebra of 
self-referentiality, Goertzel hylozoistically explains cognitive referential closure through the positing 
of a primordial self-referentiality in the form of hypersets (304). 
Unfortunately, 
…although both autopoeisis and self-generation may be plausible models of referentially closed 
systems, as far as viable models of emergence go, they are seriously deficient for they amount to 
emergents emerging by their own bootstraps! (305) 
Because the phrase ―all the way down‖ recurs hereabouts, the term ‗quantize‘ occurs as 
a provisional solution to the quest for closure on the assumption that the quantum-
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mechanical world is adjacent to the bottom of ―all the way down‖. There, Max Planck 
discovered that ‗a quantum of energy is indivisible. An oscillator cannot receive a 
fraction of a quantum of energy; it must be all or nothing‘ (Kumar 2008, 26). It is not 
indivisibility that is relevant to the model of semiotic polyphony I propose to elaborate, 
although it is conceivably the end envisaged in functional enquiry. Rather, it is the 
emergence of a particular problem associated with the observation of quantum 
phenomena—the uncertainty principle, which states that it is not possible to measure 
beyond a finite degree of accuracy certain pairs of observables such as position and 
momentum simultaneously (ibid., 385)—which pursues the problem of ascribing function 
―all the way up‖ and everywhere else besides. 
In order to develop Dennett and Clark‘s notion of the mind–tool as the ‗note‘ 
articulating semiotic polyphony, we will need to pay close attention to the meanings of 
both terms, ‗mind‘ and ‗tool‘. Although Rorty has already to some extent counterfeited 
the question as it relates to ‗mind‘, retaining the common-sense usage has residual value 
in illuminating the term‘s political dimension. What we mean by using the term ‗mind‘ 
has certain interesting similarities both with what we mean by using the term 
‗institution‘, and with the notion of dispositif discussed in part one. I will pursue the 
parallel in section 5.4.2 below. The uncertainty issue arises in relation to the nature of 
the tool, the exploration of which entails attention to the concept of function. Clark 
(1999) cites one of two papers by Beth Preston that jointly argue for a pluralist theory of 
function, which I will characterize as a relationship between ‗system function‘ and 
‗selected function‘, the former being causal and atemporal, the latter being temporal and 
acausal. Preston‘s thinking enables us to be permissive in our definition of a tool so as 
to refuse a somatic boundary between found (or made) objects in the environment, the 
exploitation of physical attributes such as hands, and abstract constructs supported or 
scaffolded by these resources. 
In part one I argued that ―The relationship between dispositif and interessement constitutes 
a sort of ‗perlocutionary lens‘ acting to focus and guide the subjectivity of the 
mobilized‖ (p. 64). The userless tool model depends on the transitive performance of 
perlocutionary lenses, which, composed in arrays, enable the interpretant to ‗fetch‘ a 
dynamic interpretation of experiential flux in real time. Just using the term ‗tool‘ implies 
that a performative dimension has been foundational in its conception. Adopting a typo 
found in Clark‘s manuscript, we can say that tools-are-use. I prefer the term 
‗environmental coupling‘, however. When Andy Clark asks of Daniel Dennett: ‗could it 
really be mind-tools all the way down?‘ (1999, 2/29), I have no difficulty replying, 
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without feeling contradictory, ―yes, it is environmental coupling all the way up‖. This is 
peripherally a matter of one tool being coupled to another, but what is coupled ―all the 
way up‖ is a relationship between ‗system function‘ and ‗selected function‘ that I will 
elaborate presently. I represent this parity with the en dash joining the terms ‗mind‘ and 
‗tool‘ in a from–to relationship. In Clark‘s paper ‗mind-tool‘ is a hyphenated compound 
noun. 
In developing his mind–tool argument, Clark draws on three perspectives that 
supplement the notion of parity just advanced. Via Preston he adduces the Heideggerian 
notion of equipment; he draws on James Gibson‘s notion of affordance (which would 
have been useful to Preston); and he brings in Stanislaus Dehaene‘s work on the human 
capacity for mathematical intuition. Between them, these perspectives help to build an 
alternative, or rather corollary, story to the overly neat idea of higher-level intentionality 
endorsed by Dennett and also by Robin Dunbar, which will carry us forward into the 




Recalling the modalities Dennett proposed in Consciousness Explained, the Stalinist and 
the Orwellian, the former might be regarded as ‗proto-nominalist‘ and the latter as 
‗proto-essentialist‘, making the point between them that both dynamics are in play. 
However, having first found Dennett‘s labels unsatisfactory, the task of abstracting 
terms that replace them with reusable theoretical passage points suggests not the 
straightforward opposition between two terms, but rather a polyphonically interwoven 
relationship between three: the spectral, the temporal, and the ordinal.  
I first abstracted a pair of concepts, the ordinal and the adaptive, in place of Stalinist and 
Orwellian. These seem to fit neatly with Clark‘s discussion of code-switching in the 
context of human numerical cognition (1999, 13/15). In extended dialogue with 
Dehaene‘s work, Clark cites research carried out with English/Russian bilinguals where 
subjects were trained and then tested in tasks, firstly with the training and testing taking 
place in the same language, and then with the training being done in one language and 
the test presented in the other. The researchers discovered that where the tasks required 
exactitude, subjects‘ performances between the two modes of presentation showed 
significant difference, but where the tasks required only an approximation, the mode of 
Performativities 5: Polyphonic consciousness 104 
presentation showed no difference. This lends support to the view that exact calculation 
is language-dependent; approximation is visuo-spatial, and non-verbal. The idea of 
‗ordinal‘ is linked to this notion of exactitude, and ‗adaptive‘, correspondingly to that of 
approximation, although it may be felt that the assertion of a human viewpoint begs an 
important question regarding the nature of function. 
Regarding the ordinal, there are a number of similar terms etymologically related to the 
Latin root ōrdō, which together constitute the general sense-area: 
order …classical Latin ōrdō regularity of procedure, established method or practice (cf. extrāōrdinem 
out of order), sequence, succession, orderly arrangement, disposition of troops 
ordinary …common to a large number of people (a1615), which does not exceed the ordinary level, 
average (1675), everyday, non-technical, of modest social standing (1864) and their etymon classical 
Latin ōrdinārius regular, orderly, customary, usual, arranged in regular lines or courses (OED) 
I choose ‗ordinal‘ because it shares the somatically-centred sense of continuing 
evaluation conveyed by the two definitions above, specifically in the context of Catholic 
ritual, where it is counterposed by the ‗proper‘—a matter whose significance will 
become apparent in due course. At the same time it has a specific technical meaning: 
ordinal, a. and n.2 … 2. Marking position in an order or series; applied to those numbers which refer 
something to a certain place in a series (e.g. first, second, third, etc.) 
Ordinality is a tendency to find order, more loosely a tendency to attune discrete items to 
form a singular narrative progression. Although this idea fits the native human mind 
well, the more important context is in basic physics: a closed thermodynamic system 
tends toward a state of perfect disorderly equilibrium, in which material elements are 
distributed in consequence of the statistical tendency of the system to pass randomly 
through all possible arrangements (the so-called ergodic hypothesis: Kauffman 1995, 9–
10). The universe is supposed to be such a system, but our solar system is not. What can 
happen in an open system of Earth‘s scale, given material diversity and the sustained 
throughput of energy, is that local equilibriums can temporarily skew the progress from 
low to high entropy. From a human perspective, such equilibria can be immensely 
durable: the sun has been there, physicists tell us, for a few billion years, and will still be 
there in a few billion years‘ time. In the same way that mind–tools are conceived as 
affording relationships that fit our physical equipment, so too does the kind of order we 
find tend to fit the equipment we find it with.  
The adaptive seems to be a process of mediation between early drafts of ordinal 
hypotheses, operationalizing the editorial process that Dennett posits in his ‗Orwellian‘ 
mode. We are most confident of functional ascriptions, however, once the tuning has 
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been done. It is the realization that, from certain perspectives, tuning is never finally 
‗done‘ that urges the necessity of a further distinction between the temporal and the 
spectral. The insight is related, once more, to the musical allegory—this time, to the 
harmonic series and Pythagorean tuning. The harmonic series is a straightforward 
functional property of vibration. Vibration, in turn, has been exploited in natural history 
as a sensory resource that humans and others use to capture information about the local 
environment. The point of interest is the relationship between exactitude and 
approximation in the way humans exploit this native facility in the practice of music-
making and the extended cultural experiences that revolve around it. 
On a modern equal-temperament piano keyboard, cycling through a sequence of fifths 
leads, after twelve steps, back to a pitch that is mathematically similar to the 
fundamental. That is, it is identical apart from its octave displacement. But if you take a 
string and divide it in three, then repeat that process of division twelve times, you end 
up not with the mathematically similar pitch but an ordinary, close-but-no-cigar 
similarity, displaced from the original fundamental by an interval known as the 
Pythagorean comma.5 The implied conclusion is that any musical tuning system—
including the Pythagorean—is derived. There is no ideal system of which any other 
system is a corruption. Tuning in the musical sense refers to the establishment of a 
dynamically derived equilibrium—a spectral accommodation—rather than an intrinsic 
‗perfect‘ property of acoustic physics. 
That brings us to the first of Beth Preston‘s papers (1998a) where she analyses Ruth 
Garrett Millikan‘s distinction (1984, 1993) between system function and proper 
function. This distinction illuminates the relationship I propose between the spectral 
and the temporal, but first we need to review the issue. Preston glosses Millikan‘s 
argument thus: 
… biological traits, language devices, and tools are alike in three very important respects. They all 
have functions that they sometimes fail to serve; they all have forms that are … arbitrary in relation 
to their functions; and they all have proper functions—that is, there is something specific they are 
supposed to do, even though they may never perform this function, or may be temporarily coopted 
for some other use (215). 
                                                 
5 The ‗syntonic comma‘ discussed by Wibberly (op. cit.) is the smaller difference between a major third 
made from four justly tuned perfect fifths (e.g. from the viola‘s C string to the violin‘s E string), and from 
two octaves plus a major third (equivalent to the relationship between fundamental and fourth harmonic), 
where ‗just intonation‘ is a tuning where intervals‘ relationships are governed by whole-number ratios. 
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Preston goes on to note that the function of artefacts is held to be so transparently 
obvious [among function theorists] that no one has bothered to examine the matter at 
any length. The problem for design-oriented accounts of function-ascription is to draw 
the function–accident distinction in the right way (218). It has no bearing on the 
‗proper‘ function of the heart—which is to pump blood—that it makes a noise in doing 
so. Nevertheless, to a skilled listener, the noises a heart makes can have characteristics 
that enable the listener to draw specific conclusions regarding the health of the owner, 
giving the heart an additional diagnostic function. The theorists‘ solution to this is to 
consider the heart‘s function to belong to the circulatory system for the purposes of 
pumping blood, and also to a putative diagnostic system if and when it is used in this 
way.  
The weakness of system function as a concept is that it transfers the specifically human 
blend of teleology and intention to the arena of natural history. Things—especially 
machines—made by humans have system functions because they are designed in that 
way. The temptation to transfer the idea of ‗design‘ to nature is strong, and to some 
extent justified, but it brings with it the presumption of ‗a designer‘. If we want to resist 
the latter, we ought to resist the former. The notion of proper function offers an avenue 
of escape, but one with its own hazards.  
The relationship between the heart‘s blood-pumping and noise-making is a recurrent 
trope in the literature, probably because the noise-making attributes have attracted our 
attention in a variety of ways for longer, historically, than have the purely functional 
pumping attributes. Eliminating these various metaphysical attributes is obviously 
necessary in a purely biological account of function, but, equally obviously, the word 
‗heart‘ then becomes a passage point that simplifies a number of material trajectories 
such as the function of stem cells in building the organ, and abstract trajectories such as 
the function of rhythm. Once these trajectories open their multiple paths, it is less easy 
to establish that the proper function of ‗the heart‘ is to pump blood.6  
                                                 
6 Millikan had earlier used the term ‗selected function‘, adopting the later term presumably for 
grammatical reasons beyond the etymology of the respective terms—it is more fluent to speak of ‗derived 
proper function‘ than ‗derived selected function‘ since ‗derived‘ and ‗selected‘ joined in this way would 
make the second term seem a half-pleonastic second thought. I believe that the original term expresses 
the evolutionary issue in a more satisfactory way, since ‗proper‘ implies teleology, however much the 
theorist might protest that it is professionally understood not to do so. 
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Addressing the problem of failure-to-function, Larry Wright (1973) is concerned that a 
functional account should draw the function/accident distinction in the right way. The 
fact that a belt buckle deflected a bullet, he argues, doesn‘t make it the belt‘s function to 
deflect bullets. In this artificially simple example his case is reasonable, but a parallel in 
poker argot is instructive: a ‗gut-buster‘ draw is one that the player is statistically unlikely 
to fill; in the event that it is filled, it is the opponent whose gut receives the blow. 
Although it is a statistically unlikely outcome, it is nevertheless a statistically possible—i.e. 
rationally repeatable—outcome. In Wright‘s example, the relationship between the 
relative properties of the bullet and the buckle (density, tensile strength and so on) give 
a functional account of the outcome that is similarly rationally repeatable, while the 
question of why the wearer put on the belt (and became exposed to flying bullets) will 
remain a question about intention. This is an important distinction (though not one that 
Wright makes), because, as Preston notes, Millikan‘s goal is a functionalist account of 
intentionality (223). To twist this slightly, what is sought is a functionalist account of 
intentionality that incorporates risk, and is therefore not merely correlative in an indexical 
sense, but fully ordinal, in the Peircean sense of thirdness. 
Wright‘s concern foreshadows the difficulty that the concept of exaptation introduces. 
An adaptation is presumed to be a feature ‗built‘ by selection for its current role, 
whereas an exaptation is a characteristic that emerged for other purposes or no purpose 
at all, which has been ‗coopted‘ to its current role—it is an evolution of Gould & 
Lewontin‘s ‗spandrel effect‘ (Preston 1998a, 226–7; Gould & Vrba 1982). There is 
something unsatisfactory about the legalistic presumption that clear and unambiguous 
priority and relative weight can be established and ascribed in complex systems at the 
root of the problem Preston seeks to uncover. Is it the function speaking, or the 
theorist? James Gibson remarks that 
A wildcat may be hard to distinguish from a cat, and a thief may look like an honest person. When 
Koffka asserted that ―each thing says what it is,‖ he failed to mention that it may lie. More exactly, a 
thing may not look like what it is (Gibson 1986, 143). 
In the human domain, making functional ascriptions runs the hazard of misreading 
skeuomorphic phenomena. These are instances where form is preserved but function is 
changed. Generally speaking the preserved form is semiotically rather than semantically 
functional: a fibreglass boat hull might be shaped to look like a clinker-built wooden 
hull, purely to ‗sell‘ the item to a prospective owner who might want the ‗authentic look‘ 
but not the authentic price. However, the QWERTY layout of my computer keyboard, 
though mechanically redundant, retains a functional connection with the old typewriter 
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keyboards through lock-in mechanisms such as the teaching regime in which I learned 
to touch-type (cf. 9.3 below). It is a skeuomorphic eigenvector. 
The solution suggested by Preston is that both a system-function and a selected-
function account of the focal matter is necessary for an adequate general theory. Here 
the point of the ordinal/temporal/spectral distinction emerges: selected function is 
acausal and temporal; system function is causal and atemporal. In other words, the way in 
which relational performance of contributory factors is expressed in time has a critical 
bearing. Ultimately, the approach to a satisfactory settlement is likely to require an 
abductive interplay between the two; a spectral attunement or spectral binding. Note that 
the claim is not that there are two kinds of function, selected and system. Rather, the 
claim is that analysis of function leads ultimately to a point where certainty about one of 
these two functional aspects must be secured at the expense of certainty about the 
other.  
In both cases there is an assemblage of lawful material relationships under analysis, but 
we need to pay attention to the emphases that differentiate one approach from the 
other. Stories involving selected function tend to be found in natural history, where we 
assume that there has been a once-and-only selection event that ‗caused‘ the 
phenomenon under observation to stabilize (though an ‗event‘ might last thousands of 
years). Moreover, there was something ‗random‘ about the particular environmental 
circumstances. This is an issue that scales from the behaviour of sub-atomic particles to 
deep layers of Polyà-locked variables, and correlates with Peirce‘s stress on the firstness 
of chance. Stories involving system function tend to be found in contexts where the 
human perspective is central, in particular where relationships between working parts 
are intentionally ordained. Here, physical laws of cause and effect predominate, and are 
taken to govern the model so that in any iteration the prescribed set of relationships will 
reliably reproduce their performance. Although an iteration is expressed through time, 
the explanation is made in movie time.  
Referencing the 1926 debate between Einstein and Bergson (Bergson 1999), C-time is 
the fundamental, universal constant related to the speed of light. S-time is the subjective 
experience of the passage of time, what can be termed ‗somatic metre‘. Not only is the 
human body (like other organic bodies) highly rhythmic in its coordination, but it is 
attuned to numerous external periodicities such as the diurnal, lunar and annual cycles. 
Human S-time is also sensitive to the attunements of other humans, both in short-term 
entrainments such as musical performance, and in long-term, ingrained intersubjective 
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coordinations such as speech. Although this experience of time is governed by, and 
exists in, C-time, the variability of expression, both between individuals and within 
individuals, enables humans to become aware of the possibility of the third kind of time, 
which I call ‗movie-time‘ or M-time. This too is derived from C-time, but on the face of 
it the capacity to edit, re-run, reverse, juxtapose and randomly jumble causal 
fragments—sometimes voluntarily, sometimes accidentally—is a distinctively human 
capacity, especially when deliberately bound to environmental signs sculpted to afford 
cognitive support. It is likely, however, that many such fragments of extended causality 
have been jumbled and randomly juxtaposed over the course of evolutionary history. 
Bergson did not argue his point with Einstein in this way, and his cinematographic 
analogy was intended to be a criticism of nominalist mechanism rather than an 
endorsement. The allusion to film theory affirms a philosophical connection that has 
evolved out of his work (including Deleuze‘s contribution to the theory of the 
dispositif) perhaps in spite of Bergson‘s original intent. If the distinctions between C-
time, S-time and M-time seem excessively sharp, perhaps it is useful to correlate the 
progression with the way Platonic symplokē impinges on Peircean agapism (cf. 1.3, 
especially the concluding paragraph). In other words, it is a progression towards an 
increasingly rich temporal expression of semiotic entanglement. 
 
Something is still missing, however, and perhaps it is best understood in terms of the 
gravitational pull between functional elements in the context of action planning. Let me 
tentatively label this pulling as ‗fetch‘. In part this concept draws on Deleuze‘s 
naturalistic interpretation of Bergson regarding intension, which he represents in terms 
reminiscent of muscular contraction and relaxation (1988, 18–19; 75–6). Here I want to 
stress that the elements that gather in the Deleuzian notion of intension are not 
elementary particles, but nodes of semiotic valence infused with hylozoic potential. In 
part, too, ‗fetch‘ draws on the anthropology of the gift, specifically the Maori concept of 
hau. The routine gloss is ‗wind‘, but John Frow (1997, 109–10) reports Tamati Ranaipiri 
explaining that the term‘s meaning is more a matter of metaphysical force of 
obligation—a sense of push to intension‘s pull.  
Fetch is a sort of supervenient double-entendre composed of the simple go-get sense of 
fetch, and a more obscure, metrological sense that relates wind speed, duration and 
direction to distance over water in accounting for the size of waves. Fetch is the 
distance over which the wind blows from the same direction. A larger fetch makes 
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bigger and longer waves, other things being equal. In a sheltered location, waves will be 
much smaller and shorter, which can make them quite steep. Fetch, then, conflates the 
necessity of doing with the impact of doing it. Significantly, from the perspective of 
developing a functional account of intention, this sense of fetch needs to be inferred 
from the context in which it arises. It is effectively the lens through which the causal–
atemporal system function must pass in order to take the sense of acausal–temporal 
selected function. To put it more simply, fetch refers to the simple human performance 
of cognition in M-time. 
What the term is useful for concerns the problem of analysing intention. Although that is 
a topic for the next chapter, the groundwork begins here by using the term to 
operationalize the relationship between the notion of a tool and that of affordance. So 
far, we have taken apart and reassembled the term ‗function‘, but paid no attention to 
the term ‗tool‘. As Preston argues, the term has been somewhat taken for granted by 
functional theorists. What is a tool? There is a question that links the social to the 
ecological hypotheses reviewed by Dunbar (cf. 4.2 above). How far ahead can primates 
plan action? The notion of fetch addresses the assembly of elements constituting an arc 
of intensional duration that can be conceived in terms of a direct relationship between 
plan and action. It is an issue that brings into focus what is at stake in the shift from an 
entirely somatic modality to one scaffolded by extra-somatic resources. At the outset, 
the advantage conferred by the incorporation of extra-somatic resources may be slight 
but nonetheless telling.  
The performative modulation of the enactive posited previously left out the problem of 
understanding the relationship of consciousness to mind. Implicitly, though, if the 
dispositif story is to carry weight then mind, perhaps as a higher-resolution version of 
consciousness, needs to move through the performative and into language. To understand 
Austin‘s performative in this way is to reconfigure it as a sort of linguistic analogue to 
the so-called ‗lizard brain‘, a primitive antecedent that has been subjected to meliorized 
stochastic elaboration. As we saw, ‗perlocutionary‘ is the term Austin coins for the class 
of utterances in which change is effected in the witness to the satisfaction of the 
speaker—common examples are persuading or frightening—where the witness ascribes 
responsibility to the speaker (1976, VII). The idea that the speaker must first gather and 
filter the thoughts that substantiate the utterance is what connects it to Peirce‘s deloma, 
the moment of making something known to one‘s self. The utterance is an act of 
fabrication, but in being an act it is part of a performance and therefore difficult (if not 
impossible) to atomize—or rather, to bring to a close. 
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As previously remarked (p. 47), Austin‘s performative can be seen as an elaborate 
attempt to scaffold the translation process by which homeostatic immediacy can reach 
beyond the present. One dimension is intention, another is signification, and meaning is 
a co-creation that must precariously negotiate the scaffolding as it moves between 
actants (Foley 1997, 5–11). The scaffolding is not, of course, neutral, and that is where 
the ‗mind–tool‘ ontology comes into its own. As Andy Clark puts it: 
The idea that external items can augment and scaffold both behavior and thought is pretty evidently 
true, and arguably of deep importance. … the way such tools work is by affording the kinds of inner 
reasoning and outer manipulation that fit our brains, bodies and evolutionary heritage. (1999, 3/15) 
The concept of affordance recruited here has been adapted from the work of 
psychologist James Gibson to help with the analysis of tool use in non-human primates 
by capturing ‗action possibilities‘ available objectively in the environment. It arises 
referentially in relation to a body of thought that is concerned with making a distinction 
between objects that may be useful, and objects that have been purposively shaped to be 
useful.  
Observing a chimpanzee probe a termite mound with a branch and then eat the insects 
that it manages to pull out, we are disposed to categorise this behavioural tactic as tool-
use. But if a cat uses that same branch to sharpen its claws, is the branch still a tool? We 
are creeping up on the problem of intentionality and the confusingly related problem of 
the forming of intension: the chimpanzee‘s selection criterion is more stringent than the 
cat‘s, for whom texture alone is sufficient to afford the necessary sharpening utility, and 
for whom a variety of shapes and sizes will do. Moreover, sharp claws are handy no 
doubt, but we do not suppose that the cat conceives the sharpening teleologically with 
the purpose of preparing for a specific hunting expedition. The chimpanzee, however, 
selects a branch that is the right size to fit holes in the termite mound, and does not do 
this by trial and error but rather seems to have a preconceived sense of suitability 
criteria. Recalling Dunbar‘s gradient difference between monkeys and apes, we can 
compare the chimpanzee‘s tool use with that of Capuchin monkeys. These can learn, in 
experimental conditions, to break open nuts with a stone, and to prise out the kernel 
with a stick. However, they repeatedly lose the distinction and start trying to break the 
nut with the stick, or to prise out the kernel with the stone (Byrne 1997, 296–7). 
Somewhere between the cat and the ape is a transition from affordance to tool, but 
again the relationship is one of modulation. 
Gibson introduced the term ‗affordance‘ (1966), (1982), (1986) to capture a dynamic 
relationship between animal and environment that no previously existing term satisfied. 
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Although there is a degree of similarity with aretē, the classical term identifies an essence 
that was supposed to exist independently of any given iteration. Gibson‘s term was 
coined in response to a notion in Gestalt psychology which held that the ‗valence of an 
object was bestowed upon it by a need of the observer, and a corresponding tension in 
his field‘ (1982, 409). 
In contrast, the affordances of something is assumed not to change as the need of the observer 
changes. The edibility of a substance for an animal does not depend on the hunger of the animal. 
The walk-on-ability of a surface exists whether or not the animal walks on it (although it has links to 
the locomotor capacities of that species of animal, its action system) (loc. cit.).  
For instance, while the probing potential of the branch referenced previously is available 
to the chimp but not the cat, its probing affordance is available independently of either 
animal‘s capacity to exploit it.  
When we come to adapting this perspective to the nature of the tool, a problem arises. 
A bird may use a stone as an anvil to break the shell of a snail, or it may, in effect, use 
the snail as the anvil and the stone as a hammer. In both cases, we are content to treat 
these behaviours as being analogous to tool-use. But what if a larger bird ingests the 
stone and uses it, in its crop, to assist with the digestion of food. Is that still tool use? 
The same relative durability is being exploited in each case, so why should the crossing 
of the somatic boundary implicitly change our sense of function? 
Clark develops this transparency, referencing Beth Preston (1998b) and ultimately 
Heidegger, by refusing an inside/outside distinction, instead endorsing ‗a function-based 
account in which bodily parts (e.g. hands) and biological cognitive elements (e.g. 
biological memory) end up on a par with rakes and shopping lists‘ (7/15). 
Here, then, is a point to ponder: does Dennett‘s story imply the breakdown of the distinction 
between ‗thinking with a tool (e.g. English)‘ and ‗thinking in a code‘ (e.g. Mentalese)? 
… One cost of such a breakdown looks likely to be the consequential lack of any clear distinction 
between the tools and the user. 
Instead, a loose coalition of tools (or ‗skill-supporting components‘) together support the range 
of flexible engagements and responses characteristic of intelligence and thought. (ibid.) 
‗Skill-supporting components‘ is a happy way of putting it, though it recruits the sense 
of coalition perhaps too readily, leaving a question concerning the location of the point 
of intervention where appropriation, the reflexive step beyond affordance, may lie. 
Maybe the story looks something like this: given an incorrigibly self-contained initial 
move that we can call adductive inflation, skill obtains in the appropriate application of 
inductive deflation (or meiosis); skill-supporting components, therefore, impinge on this 
process by guiding the subject towards the right inductive course at the right time. 
Performativities 5: Polyphonic consciousness 113 
Unfortunately, meiosis can also be construed in terms of distillation, a process that 
yields essences—abstractions that inherit the vagueness of the medium from which they 
are distilled. Yet these abstractions appear capable of being exploited as though they are 
material objects in the conventional sense of a tool-object. It would be useful to 
conceive terminology that effects a reliably reproducible material–semiotic link, some 
kind of multiplanar transaffordance. 
The price of such a link is, to paraphrase Clark, the breakdown of the somatic boundary. 
For some this is an elimination too far (see, for example, Fodor 2009); fences make 
good neighbours. However, there is good reason to pay up: Preston‘s (1998b) case 
builds on a Heideggerian language of equipment to critique the standard ethological 
definition of tool use, which, she argues, ‗involves itself in insuperable difficulties 
precisely because it adheres to individualistic assumptions‘ (514). The notion of semiotic 
polyphony, by stressing the mutual support that separate narrative trajectories afford 
each other as they develop and express themselves, identifies the emergent ‗tool‘ with 
the ‗pragmatic passage point‘. A problem with Aristotelian hylomorphism is that the 
master narrative trajectory is open and ultimately, therefore, unfinalizable. Preston‘s 
reading of Heidegger points towards a means of accommodating the many partial 
closures we experience at the human scale within this open narrative.  
‗Equipment‘ renders the German Zeug, widely translated as ‗stuff‘, which Heidegger uses 
in a way that embraces pejorative connotations—such as ‗litter‘—available under the 
term (Heidegger 1962, 97–8).7 Everything has Zeug-potential; the term is neither singular 
nor plural. However, practically speaking, ‗everything‘ is the local environment, the 
Umwelt, where things are ‗ready-to-hand‘. Preston (1998a, 237) discusses the knife—a 
familiar implement in the function literature—as a tool that affords digging (when 
planting out seedlings), or screwing (in the absence of a screwdriver), or crushing (when 
peeling garlic), in addition to whatever cutting excellence the knife may have. Regarding 
this item as a thin-strip-of-metal-attached-to-a-handle is uneconomic, cognitively 
speaking. The term ‗knife‘ quickly identifies general characteristics and some sense of 
‗proper‘ usage. Trusting this proper name to exhaust the totality of the item‘s valence, 
however, is uneconomic in a different way. Insisting on its knifeness may deny the user 
the item‘s utility on the occasions when it could be used as a screwdriver. Categorizing 
                                                 
7 Heidegger traces his usage to the Greek pragmata, ‗things‘, which have to do with ‗concernful dealings, 
praxis‘ (1962, 96). 
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the knife as a skeuomorph when it is used ‗improperly‘ seems uneconomic in a third 
way, since it depends on there being a ‗proper‘ implement to use for which the knife has 
been skeuomorphically substituted.  
Equipment, then, is intermediary between nominal rigour and pure flux in a way that 
accords with Peircean thirdness, because it signifies a regime in which item and user are 
bound economically to relationships with other items and users. Heidegger says: 
Equipment—in accordance with its equipmentality—always is in terms of its belonging to other 
equipment: ink-stand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, table, lamp, furniture, windows, door, room. ... 
What we encounter as closest to us ... is the room; and we encounter it not as something ‗between 
four walls‘ in a geometrical spatial sense, but as equipment for residing (loc. cit.). 
Preston develops the point by enumerating ways in which Heidegger deals with binding: 
Heidegger mentions three basic types of assignments: assignment to the work produced by using the 
equipment (its ‗towards-which‘ in Heidegger‘s terminology); assignment to the user (its ‗for-the-sake-
of-which‘); and assignment to the raw material (its ‗where-of‘) (1998b, 529). 
Further, ‗there is a relationship of mutual constraint between the ―towards-which‖ and 
the ―where-of‖ of any item of equipment‘ (532), and this sense of attunement feeds into 
theorizing the composition of bound relationships. 
 
There is an incipient problem in Heidegger‘s ‗ready-to-hand‘ (Zuhanden), concerning the 
suspicion that the ‗hand‘ element begs a question about Dasein (Being, which is 
Heidegger‘s organizing concept). Is ready-to-hand something available only to hand-
havers? Surely a hand is just like a knife in this respect? The abstraction of Heidegger‘s 
language generally succeeds in avoiding such questions, but the hand‘s dual implication 
in pointing (indicating intention, cf. Burroughs‘ ‗Director‘, p. 100 above) and 
manipulation requires further analysis. Preston notes the relationship in Heidegger 
between ready-to-hand and present-at-hand, saying that 
An entity is ready-to-hand when it is encountered by Dasein in terms of its functionality. An entity 
becomes present-at-hand when this functionality is ignored in order to encounter the entity 
‗objectively‘ in a detached, theoretical way. On Heidegger‘s view, presence-at-hand is a secondary 
mode of encounter, parasitic on first encountering the world as ready-to-hand (534, fn15). 
Present-at-hand resembles the notion of transaffordance mooted previously, in that the 
entity is contemplated in terms of its action possibilities (which include inaction). The 
entity‘s singularity is deceptive because the context remains that of equipment, but now 
the plurality of equipment becomes apparent. In some sense, the difference between 
ready-to-hand and present-at-hand is the difference between improvisation and 
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composition. However, we remain in need of means to theorize the reproduction and 
reiteration of encounters with Zeug. 
Preston references Benjamin Beck, enumerating four conditions that between them 
constitute, for Beck, tool use: 
 An object (the tool) must be used to do something, or alter some condition of the environment or 
the user. 
 The object must be external and unattached to the user.  
 The user must hold or carry the object in the process of using it. 
 The user must be responsible for its effective orientation at the time of use (523). 
Unfortunately, this handsome order breaks down under scrutiny. We have already 
considered stones that may be used as hammers, as anvils or that might alternatively be 
swallowed. When a human uses stones as missiles, they appear to fit Beck‘s definition 
while the stones are ready-to-hand, but not for any longer than the duration of the 
throwing event. They change back to being a stone, and may never be used as a missile 
again. This is not why the stone-as-missile seems not to be a tool, however. A stone 
used as a hammer, by comparison, may similarly be used only once, but in this case the 
connection between user, tool, and further items in the local environment, begins to 
exhibit the characteristics of a story. Its presence-at-hand is a matter of conjectural 
rather than physical encounter. Not only is there a semiotic chain, but the organism‘s 
capacity for storing and communicating this chain becomes one of its defining 
characteristics: it is the story-ness that contains the tool-ness, not the individual links in 
the semiotic chain. 
Interestingly, Preston points to research suggesting that clearly worked stones in the 
archaeological record, which have previously been interpreted as tools, may in fact be 
the precise inverse—the discarded remnant of an item that functioned as a tool until its 
usefulness wore out (519–21). The conclusion she ultimately draws is that 
... it does not matter whether you try to individuate tool use individualistically or non-
individualistically; in neither case is it possible to delimit any such behavioural category in a 
satisfactory fashion (527). 
This owes in part to a generative tendency that is incipient in extensional semantics. 
Preston‘s contemplation of the shoe as an item of equipment (543) shows how quickly 
an array of affordances becomes apparent, really through the act of asking the question: 
what is a shoe? The towards-which, in Heideggerian terms, is always found in the 
dynamic engagement between organism and environment that lends definition to the 
organism—or dispositif—by continually dispensing with that-which-is-not-engaged. 
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In the philosophical tradition, the problem of individuation is associated with questions 
about essence and substance that lead again back to Aristotle, where we encounter 
difficulty. Essence is from the Latin rendering of the phrase , which 
Lukasiewicz regards as ‗an ancestor of Kant's Ding an sich, and a relative of Heidegger‘s 
Nichts.‘ (Lukasiewicz, Anscome, and Popper 1953, 72).8 He cites Ross, who renders the 
Greek thus: ‗―The answer to the question what was it to be so-and-so.‖ ... ―only those 
things have an essence whose account (logos) is a definition (orismos)‖‘ (73). In other 
words, the Aristotelian term closely and unsurprisingly resembles Peirce‘s pragmatic 
maxim. An essence has triangulation as the mechanism by which the fixation of belief is 
achieved. It is therefore the focal part of a story, the aboutness for so long as that focus 
remains thereabouts. It has the intriguing quality of being at once precise and vague. 
There is a sense, though (and this is the difficulty) that something remains unchanged as 
a story evolves, and that is where the essence is; the problem is to find the right language 
with which to state the obvious. Popper, in the same symposium, points out that  
There appears to be a sense of the word ―individual‖ in which only organisms, or only higher 
organisms, are individuals. While an individual brick may be said to have lost its unity, or its self-
identity, if a considerable piece has been knocked off, Socrates‘ unity or self-identity as an individual 
appears to remain the same after an amputation (104). 
An intriguing thing about ‗essence‘ is its relationship to some notion of ‗way of life‘ that 
attaches itself to the seeker of essence—a social symploke not available to the brick. 
Something of this persists in Peirce‘s concept of abduction, but historically it is 
entangled with the practice of certain religious sects—notably the essenes, but also the 
Cathars—who discard material aspects of living in the quest for spiritual satisfaction. 
Such satisfaction is found in the realm of knowledge, hence the association between 
such religious practice and the practice of scholarship. The matter of abduction enters 
the picture because the sense of something intangible, a ‗towards-which‘ just out of 
intellectual grasp, guides enquiry. Distillation, one of the drawing-off senses of apogoge, 
fuses matter and story in continuing performance. As an example, Oregon craft distiller 
Steve McCarthy (2009) explains his recreation of a French eau de vie made with spruce 
buds: 
I struggled with getting the intense spring conifer aroma of the Douglas Fir, the citrus flavor, and the 
emerald green/chartreuse color of the buds to reveal themselves in the same batch. We‘d get the 
color we wanted, but not the aroma; or we‘d get the color, but at ... a strength that made it 
undrinkable. And when we brought the proof down, we would lose the color. 
                                                 
8 Nichts being notness, I presume (cf. nichtheit). Anscombe (ibid., 86) doubts Lukasiewicz on this point. 
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This went on for 15 years... Then, a couple of years ago, with the help of a new employee, Daniel 
Ruiz, we finally got flavor, color and aroma to come together at 95.46 proof. We have a beautiful 
light green, ridiculously aromatic, robust eau de vie of Douglas Fir. 
What appears significant here is the triangulation sought between aroma, flavour and 
colour. This necessity for triangulation guided the distiller‘s experiments, and ultimately 
yielded a ‗formula‘—a set of procedures by which the desired result could be 
reproduced. The story requires the drinker‘s complicity, though, to be complete. For the 
semiotic polyphony to amount to a semantic episode, the customer needs to experience 
a sense of ‗tree‘, of ‗forest‘, ‗spring‘, and so on. These simple terms translate, through 
the extended process of experimentation, into complex procedures involving specialized 
knowledge in various fields—and then back again into the relative simplicity of the 
‗formula‘. 
The intervention of the second distiller is a further point of interest. One explanation 
for his contribution could simply be that extra hands multiply the number of trials 
possible in a given time and season, increasing the chance of finding a viable formula. 
The other, more likely explanation is that the process of mutual communication, of 
explaining the problem(s) and planning approaches to finding solutions, had the effect 
of filtering out ‗doesn‘t matter‘—this is as true if the second person was an apprentice 
with no knowledge at all as it is if he brought, say, expert theoretical knowledge of 
organic chemistry. 
We can summarize this in a simple, partly Heideggerian, partly Peircean, partly 
Foucauldian schema, that falls in, additionally, with the Peircean categories and the 
hylozoic view of nature: 
First: the name, the stuff  
Second: the formula or algorithm (the proper name, which has been out into the 
world and returned as a set of discrete relationships) 
Third: the signature (the performance binding the name to the formula) 
In practice, a human organism is out in the world for the duration of its human-ness, 
and that set of ‗out-nesses‘, that set of transaffordances, seems to have some bearing on 
our comprehension of the human-ness so involved. (Peirce wrote that the ‗rational 
meaning of every proposition lies in the future‘ (1998, 340).) Being precise about an 
organism‘s individuality, though, brings us back to where we started in pursuit of 
function and the significance of the heart. The development of radical surgery 
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techniques adverted to by Sorabji (1964, 291) quickly led to organ transplantation, which 
in turn led quickly to the discovery of rejection.9 The immune system was found to treat 
the organs of another person as not-self, and to mobilize ‗natural defences‘ to protect 
the host body from intrusion. However, the process of developing an understanding of 
the way the ‗immune system‘ performs this mobilization has more recently come to 
problematize the idea of a self/non-self distinction. 
The intense debate represented in two series of papers, one in Theoretical Medicine and 
Bioethics 19 (1998), the second in Seminars in Immunology 12 (2000), is a classic instance of 
‗science in action‘ (Latour 1987; 164ff below). At its conclusion, Langman & Cohn 
(2000) summarize: 
There is an obvious and dangerous potential for the immune system to kill its host; but it is equally 
obvious that the best minds in immunology are far from agreement on how the immune system 
manages to avoid this danger (343). 
They continue: 
Some [contributors] regarded self as an essentially fixed state that lasted from the embryo to the 
adult, while others regarded self as ever changing throughout life (ibid.). 
Enlarging on the problem, the philosopher Moira Howes first remarks on the different 
senses of teleology in play between name and algorithm. Many of the terms used in 
describing immune function are conveniently teleological in the former sense while the 
explanations behind them are either algorithmic in the second sense, or else the name 
stands in for an algorithmic explanation yet to be discovered (Howes 2000, 249–50). 
Noting that 
One of the assumptions that most derailed accounts of self-identity in analytic philosophy is the 
assumption that there must be one necessary and sufficient criterion capable of accounting for the 
identity of the self over time (254).  
As a result,  
The assumption that any real self must be discrete is a difficult one to dislodge. Nonetheless, an 
indiscrete view of the self has its merits, some of which are relevant to the situation in immunology. 
A view of the human self as overlapping and multi-factorial makes the most sense given our actual 
experience of self in the world (ibid). 
The indiscrete self is a sort of rhizomorphic surfer, harnessing multilayered platforms of 
equipment, affordance, semi-closures and incomplete return. If the immune system is 
not to be seen as a self/non-self arbitrator, though, what is it? In search of a germline 
                                                 
9  In fact these techniques and discoveries were already under way in the 1940s; Schaffner (1998, 428) 
suggests that rejection was theorized at this time, before it was observed.  
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explanation that conserves immune function through evolutionary history, Anderson & 
Matzinger present the ‗danger model‘, arguing that 
If we view these [evolutionary] pressures as a response to danger, rather than as a general 
xenophobic aversion to nonself, we can step back and see the vertebrate immune system as an 
extended family of communicating bodily tissues that allows an individual to be an environment as 
well as to live in one, ignoring nonself that is harmless and welcoming nonself that is useful 
(Anderson & Matzinger 2000, 237; see also Matzinger 1994). 
 
Before continuing with the symmetrically disconcerting question of what, after Rorty, 
we might mean by ‗mind‘, a brief summary of the terminology reviewed or introduced in 
pursuit of a definition of ‗function‘ is in order. The specified task was to define ‗tool‘, a 
task that cannot be accomplished without a definition of ‗function‘. The reason for this 
anti-teleology concerns the mind–tool ontology articulated by Clark (1999), which is 
found to rest in part on Preston‘s (1998b) discussion of Heidegger. This discussion, in 
turn, complements a separate discussion (Preston 1998a) of Millikan‘s theory of proper 
function which, to cut a long story short, is embedded in deep philosophical history. 
In particular, the relationship between functions, ends and intentions is deeply 
engrained in traditions reaching back to the Greeks. A particular challenge in this regard 
is the task of disentangling pre-Christian Greek thought from that of its medieval 
interpreters, where the latter permitted certainty about ultimate, exterior cause to 
normalize the context of debate. One consequence of this disentanglement is to find the 
Platonic notion of demiurge to be a cumulative and disinterested marshalling of material 
more akin to the Dennettian idea of consciousness supervening on the interactions of 
billions of DNA robots than the intentional (and malevolent) creature of medieval 
dualistic heresy.10 A recurring theme that emerges is a conflict between a notion of ‗folk 
name‘ and ‗algorithm‘ in which the former is frequently taken either to stand in place of 
tediously detailed explanation, or to stand in place of research and theorization yet to 
take place. 
If the question of function is associated with the story to be told about the entity at 
issue, a problem arises concerning the order in which the events of the story take place. 
What this boils down to is that we can either be certain of one parameter (precedence in 
                                                 
10 ‗we are robots made of robots—we‘re each composed of some few trillion robotic cells, each one as 
mindless as the molecules they‘re composed of, but working together in a gigantic team that creates all the 
action that occurs in a conscious agent‘ (Dennett 2001, 2). 
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time) or the other (what the entity does), but not both simultaneously. The ultimate reason 
for this is that the individuation of the entity is necessarily provisional and unfinalizable 
because the pursuit of individuation leads inexorably to primordial vagueness. However, 
it is convenient and productive to adopt a plural notion of function that gives 
precedence either to causality or to temporality according to the demands of the task at 
hand. ‗Selected function‘ (later to be called ‗proper function‘ by Millikan) prioritizes 
temporality because natural selection recognizes a degree of randomness (supported by 
probabilistic mathematics), so that ‗cause‘ is in part merely a matter of temporal priority 
(though see 9.2 below for further reflection on the nature of ‗cause‘). System function 
prioritizes causality because the explanations it seeks are ‗best fit‘, where fitting is 
directed by a process of enquiry that is necessarily design-led. This design process 
exploits human capabilities that include, crucially, an orientation to time that is first 
somatic (i.e. attuned to bodily rhythms and environmental circuits) and second 
cinematic (capable of all kinds of rerunning, editing, jump-cutting and so on). 
Combining these two aspects of function is a ‗deep procrustean‘ reconciliation between 
matter (the ordinal) and time (the temporal) continually mediated through (spectral) 
attunement. 
Deploying this perspective in pursuit of the nature of tools, we find that ‗tool‘ is a folk 
category, frequently an attractively simple means of articulating complex relationships 
but vulnerable to skeuomorphic appropriation and reinterpretation. In part, the 
definition of a tool involves what else it might be used for, by which means the definition 
introduces unwanted (unanalysed) intentionality. To circumvent this defect, we call in 
aid first Gibson‘s concept of affordance, which articulates the action possibilities 
incipient in the environment with a symmetry that challenges inside/outside 
distinctions. Second, we call on Heidegger‘s language of equipment, a plurality of 
mutually supporting entities in the local environment. Lurking in Heidegger‘s ‗zuhanden‘, 
though, is a similar unanalysed intentionality, concerning the double entry of the hand-
as-manipulator and hand-as-indicator. 
Thirdly, we call in the idea of individuation as a performative phenomenon that 
implicates the code-switching capacities analysed by Dehaene. Switching between 
approximation and precision is effected, in part, by exploiting body parts (such as 
fingers) and local environmental resources (things pointed to). However, a connection 
needs to be made between this analysis of individual situated performance and the social 
brain model. The latter stresses the roles of significant individual others in the 
immediate environment affording communicative feedback. The term ‗fetch‘ 
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conveniently encapsulates the ordinary performance of oral resolution, of ‗finitizing‘ in 
real time, exploiting in addition to the immediately available data such rhythms and 
routines as may have been tuned in to, learned or ingrained in both near and distant 
history. 
 
Both the ‗extended mind‘ and the ‗social brain‘ stress the organism‘s relationship with its 
immediate environment. We have seen how the former problematizes the 
inside/outside distinction that enables us to conceive a distinction between organism 
and environment at all. Now, building on that disconcerting breach with the familiar 
folk notion of self, it is time to return to the definition of another folk notion, ‗mind‘. 
Previously I suggested that human performativity is a modulation of enaction, the latter 
being taken to be a rich, polyphonic account of strictly somatic capacities in relation to 
an unproblematically external environment. (Much enactive philosophy deals with visual 
cognition, where the externalness of stimulus is not controversial, whatever else might 
be.) I want, now, to pursue the performative modulation through territory that we are 
accustomed to associating with the concept of mind, linking it to the prevailing topic of 
consciousness.  
In waking, we are able to do ‗thick‘ things (we might alternatively say, ‗we are able to 
move through enactive intensions‘) like making a cup of coffee or telephoning a friend, 
without bringing to mind the individual steps—without assembling the necessary tools 
and ingredients from an explicit list, or recalling each individual number in the 
sequence.11 Consciousness, here, seems to imply a prosody of thought supporting, by 
analogy with the prosody of oral language, the mental administration of semantic 
content. Some of the content of speech is conveyed purely by the quality of sound—
anger sounds angry, and questions sound like questions, irrespective of the language 
being spoken. So, by analogy, the content of the intension is—partially, at least—created 
by its enactment. 
                                                 
11 Note: Gilbert Ryle‘s ‗thick description‘, advanced in his lecture ‗The Thinking of Thoughts: What is 'Le 
Penseur' Doing?‘, (http://lucy.ukc.ac.uk/CSACSIA/Vol11/Papers/ryle_1.html, accessed 5-4-09)  
influenced the anthropologist Clifford Geertz in the 1970s, and, through Geertz, Stephen Greenblatt‘s 
formulation of New Historicism. Discussion of Grice in the next chapter amplifies the matter, though not 
through this particular trajectory.  
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In Kinds of Minds (1996, 107–56), Dennett proposes a fourfold categorization, which he 
calls stages in the evolution of consciousness: successively, the Darwinian, the 
Skinnerian, the Popperian and the Gregorian.  
In the Darwinian model, function is entirely governed by the genome, although 
there is scope for phenotypic plasticity—meaning that the organism can 
accommodate limited shaping by the environment as it matures. 
The Skinnerian model sees a development in the organism‘s relationship with 
the environment so that behaviourist learning can equip it with options. This 
can improve the genotype‘s flexibility, but also makes it more subject to luck.  
Popperian minds permit hypotheses to die in place of the organism that invents 
the hypothesis. Whereas Skinnerian minds are the subject of trials imposed by 
the environment, Popperian minds are capable of simulating the consequences 
of behaviour before executing the act. This improves the organism‘s relationship 
with chance. However, this internal selection process can function without 
explicit representation.  
With the Gregorian mind, a relationship has developed in which the organism 
actively shapes the external environment in order that the environment should 
support the inner means by which it (the organism) makes choices with respect 
to the environment. The ability to make tools is key to realizing the Gregorian 
mind. Tools encode knowledge, and they facilitate the organization and 
transmission of knowledge between conspecifics. 
Perhaps this scheme privileges the technical intelligence hypothesis regarding the 
evolution of the human brain. Certainly, contention over the respective merits of the 
technical and the social brain hypotheses is germane to the problem of understanding 
just what a mind is. Dennett remarks that ‗the fundamental purpose of brains is to 
produce future‘ (1991, 177). The extent to which this claim is differentially true of brain, 
mind and consciousness is potentially illuminating. It is easier to credit Dennett‘s 
Darwinian organism with consciousness than it is with a mind, precisely because it 
appears to fail the test of ‗producing future‘. Future just happens to the Darwinian 
organism.  
At the other end of the scale, an observation by Richard Gregory regarding Dennett 
(inter alia) gives pause for thought. Gregory says Dennett discusses ‗from the basis of 
detailed knowledge of neurophysiology and brain anatomy how the mind can be brainy‘ 
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(1998). Surely, though, it should be the other way round: Dennett should be discussing 
how the brain can be mindy? It is an interesting counterposition. Informally, colloquially, 
a brainy mind would seem to be an improvement in the area of calculation and 
computation. A mindy brain would seem to be an improvement in the area of tracking, 
more particularly keeping multiple track of the possible outcomes of transactions 
involving multiple actants. The difference is subtle, but involves an inversion that 
Gregory goes on to discuss, in which the brain is held to project hypotheses onto the 
world rather than being implicated in the receipt of projections from the world as the 
classical Humean model proposed.  
Recall the consonance between the term dispositif as used by the actor–network theorists 
and Peirce‘s interpretant. A suite of social configurations developed by the public policy 
theorist Fritz W. Scharpf throws interesting light onto Dennett‘s kinds of minds. These 
styles of social aggregation help disclose the relationship between ‗mind‘ and 
‗institution‘, and also the poietic scaling implicit in Dennett‘s scheme. They are not 
identical to the notion of dispositif—and Scharpf does not use the term—but, via 
Dennett, they suggest a set of modulations that I call ‗tuned dispositifs‘. Tuning 
negotiates a spectrum in which performative skill, offline craft skills, and artefactual 
semiotics (the fact of tuning conventions built in to the material design of the 
instruments in use) combine to create the satisfactory total effect. 
Colloquially, ‗mind‘ resembles a community of memory, while ‗reason‘ resembles a 
society of representations. This community/society distinction is an echo of the 
Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft analysis associated with the 19th century sociologist Ferdinand 
Tönnies, but refracted through Scharpf‘s work on actor constellations (1997, 69–115; 
135–45). For Tönnies, the distinction was between a sense of individuality subordinate 
to the collective interest of the constellation on the one hand, against, on the other 
hand, a sense of self-interest that differentiates the individual‘s relationships with 
discrete elements of the constellation. There is a sense, therefore, in which the latter is 
implicitly tool-using in the naïve sense whereas the former need not be. Scharpf is 
interested in the relationships between aggregates of individuals acting corporately, 
which he theorizes using economists‘ modelling techniques:  
‗Actor constellations‘ are meant to represent what we know of the set of actors that are actually 
involved in particular policy interactions—their capabilities (translated into potential ‗strategies‘), 
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their perceptions and evaluations of the outcomes obtainable (translated into ‗payoffs‘), and the 
degree to which their payoff aspirations are compatible or incompatible with one another (72).12 
Talk of capabilities, perceptions and evaluations is compatible with the language of 
intention that we will discuss in the next chapter, where aspects of Scharpf‘s perspective 
will help further develop the issues under consideration. The succession of 
organizational paradigms he posits, whose relationships are effectively policed by the 
ability of the organization to impose discipline on the individual member, represent the 
context in which intentional dynamics play out. These are: anarchic field; minimal 
institution; network; regime; joint-decision system.  
The term ‗field‘, in the anarchic field, follows Dahl & Lindblom‘s work on 
systematising ‗basic social processes‘ in the 1950s. They introduced the term to show 
that mutual adjustment and ‗spontaneous field control‘ among independent actors may 
lead to a form of ecological coordination even without a priori order. In the absence of a 
preexisting relationship, or of specific obligations, individual actors are free to use any 
strategy within their capability, and they are constrained only by physical limitations and 
by the countermoves of other actors. They might communicate and conclude 
agreements but they are also free to break such agreements if it suits their interests (98). 
In terms of independently-functioning bio-minds in Dennett‘s scheme, the anarchic 
field would be pre-Darwinian. (Of course, the principles of selection still apply to 
organisms of this kind.) 
Minimal institutions are minimal with respect to the cognitive powers of the 
individual organism. Of the global laws of nature operating, only those locally and 
immediately relevant bear on a particular situation. Actors‘ choices are minimally—and 
exogenously—regulated by the institutions that protect certain interest positions against 
unilateral violation. These are the constraints presupposed by economic theories of 
market transactions among strangers (98–9); it is interesting to note that in these terms, 
actors have no opportunity to exercise rationality, unless blindly obeying the laws of 
nature is considered rational. 
Networks parallel the Skinnerian capacity for simple trial-and-error learning, and 
Scharpf‘s account additionally maps routes to niche-finding and stabilization. Scharpf 
distinguishes between relationships from which low-cost exit is possible, and 
                                                 
12 Though Scharpf‘s ‗actors‘ mobilize structuralist ‗actant vectors‘ as discussed in chapter 2.2.1, he appears 
to conceive them as holistic beings rather than abstractions. 
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relationships among actors who cannot avoid dealing with each other. The former type 
relates to the Skinnerian modality where a successful trial leads to reinforcement but not 
substantive change, since operant conditioning can be completely erased. In Scharpf‘s 
latter case, differential cooperation is likely to lead to actors sorting themselves into 
opposing coalitions. An incipient consequence in this circumstance is the phenomenon 
of ‗negative coordination‘, in which one group will decline an improvement in their 
circumstances for fear that their consent will yield an even more beneficial improvement 
for other groups, to their own ultimate disadvantage.  
The prevailing characteristic of networks that establishes their superior efficiency over 
the minimal institution is their ability to reduce the transaction costs of negotiated 
agreement. The risk of opportunism is moderated by two mechanisms: a deeper sense 
of future, and higher visibility of transactions to relevant others. As a consequence, the 
existence of a network influences the interactions that take place among its members by 
promoting feedback stability, by making some interactions more likely than others, by 
enabling some interactions that would not otherwise have been possible, and by 
developing outcomes to favour one or another of the actors (136–7). 
For Scharpf, a regime is a purposefully created normative framework. Actors 
participate on the basis of explicit undertakings by which they a) respect certain interest 
positions of other parties, b) share certain substantive goals, and c) follow certain 
procedures in their future interactions.  Common to a range of examples discussed by 
Scharpf is the observation that outcomes are determined not by the regime itself but by 
the subsequent interactions of parties committed to observe its rules, once the regime 
has been established. The regime stands or falls by the effectiveness of these continuing 
(rhizomorphic) outcomes (141–2). 
For Dennett, the characteristic mode of the Popperian mind is its ABC learning style. 
ABC stands for Associationist/Behaviourist/Connectionist, but implies a question-
begging rationality of which Popper would conceivably approve, and of which the 
strong programme in the sociology of knowledge does not. The problem is that Dennett 
conflates two modalities—we might call them respectively the Turingian and the 
Dawkinsian—which both have a pre-Gregorian legitimacy, but which pull in opposite 
directions. 
The Turingian concerns the notion of robotic transparency (cited above, fn. 10, p. 119), 
but the Dawkinsian mode fits more comfortably with Scharpf‘s notion of regime. 
Dennett argues elsewhere that Turing reconfigured Cartesian and Kantian questions 
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about cognitive performance as an engineering problem by asking ‗How could we make 
a robot that had thoughts?‘ (Dennett 2001; Turing 1950). The relevant Dawkins 
argument is the theory he develops in The Extended Phenotype (1982), though the first and 
perhaps most telling aspect of his argument (in relation to present business) occurs 
almost as an afterthought—although it is an argument with which we have already 
become familiar.  
Remarking in his final chapter that he has not attempted to give a rigorous definition of 
the term ‗organism‘, Dawkins posits that ‗the organism is a concept of dubious utility, 
precisely because it is so difficult to define satisfactorily‘. The term ‗actor constellation‘ 
captures the essential nature of phenomena such as the siphonophore, where the term 
‗organism‘ may with equal justification apply to the schema or to its constituent zooids. 
Each zooid is a discrete entity, and most zooids are specialized so that they lack the 
ability to survive on their own. But their integration with each other is so strong that the 
colony attains a singular character (the Portuguese Man o‘ War is an example). Inversely, 
some plants are able to propagate themselves from severed portions of a parent, which 
urges a distinction between the ‗ramet‘, or unit of clonal growth, and the ‗genet‘, the unit 
that develops from a single-celled zygote (253–4). The British politician Margaret 
Thatcher once famously declared that there is no such thing as society. From Dawkins‘ 
point of view, it might be argued that neither is there any such thing as an individual.  
One of the key factors Scharpf identifies as perpetuating the more intensively tuned 
forms of dispositif—the regime and the joint-decision system—is the relatively high 
cost of defection or renegotiation. Dawkins coins a term—meliorization—that 
admirably captures the point of view of the individual organism as it negotiates its local 
problem-space. From a root meaning ‗better‘, meliorization is a process of passing 
through a succession of better immediate alternatives, distinguishing it from the notion 
of optimization in which a deeper teleological oversight would be required (46). What 
sustains the accumulation of ABC learning (as Dennett styles it) in Dawkins‘ meliorizing 
account is a form of irreversibility, but unlike the notion of irreversibility that sustains 
the concept of technology (more properly understood as quasi-irreversibility; see 9.3 
below) this is strong irreversibility, concerning the logic of instruction theory (the 
Lamarckian idea that acquired characteristics are passed on in virtue of having been 
acquired) versus selection theory (the Darwinian idea that characteristics pass through, 
or fail to pass through, in virtue of selective pressure). Dawkins distinguishes two forms 
of the central dogma, appropriate respectively to molecular genetics and embryology: 
Performativities 5: Polyphonic consciousness 127 
The first is the one stated by Crick: genetic information may be translated from nucleic acid to 
protein, but not the other way. …the other central dogma… [is] that the macroscopic form and 
behaviour of an organism may be, in some sense, coded in the genes, but the code is irreversible. If 
Crick‘s central dogmas states that protein may not be translated back into DNA, the central dogma 
of embryology states that bodily form and behaviour may not be translated back into protein (174). 
Instruction theory enters the picture with modern humans, although in reality it is still 
selection theory that does the genetic work. Humans, in the course of developing 
subjectivity, developed a reflexive relationship with the environment, specifically with 
regard to organisms in the local environment that could be recruited to mutual 
advantage. An example is the domestication of dogs (Hare & Tomasello 2005), in which 
the question is raised whether in fact a kind of co-domestication operated, such that the 
behaviour of certain people preferentially developed as they responded to the behaviour 
of certain wolves. There is no route ‗back‘ to wolfhood for the modern dog, though this 
does not mean that the dog‘s future survival is dependent on its relationship with 
humans. I think this example makes clear the relationship between dispositif and the non-
human element in the actor–network. Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that on 
Dawkins‘ account this kind of extended phenotype relation, in which the genetic 
interests of one organism are non-trivially bound up with the corollary interests of other 
organisms‘ genes, is a recurring theme in nature. 
So we reach the modulation envisaged by Dennett in conceiving the Gregorian mind. In 
Scharpf‘s scheme, this corresponds with the Joint-decision system, which describes 
constellations where parties that cannot prosper through unilateral action realize that 
joint, harmonious action is to the mutual benefit of each. ‗Mutual benefit‘ does not 
really capture the valence of this configuration, although mutual benefit is obviously the 
immediate attraction that recruits participating actors. Rather, valence lies in the elusive 
sense in which addition gives way to multiplication:  
Such constellations may arise naturally from physical adjacency or functional interdependence, when 
goals of a particular kind or beyond a certain order of magnitude cannot be attained without 
collaboration (143–4). 
To use terms like ‗magnitude‘ and ‗goal‘ introduces a sense of teleology or determinacy 
that perhaps begs the question. Where does a sense of magnitude, and of future, come 
from? 
On the other side of the community/society distinction I posited previously is a 
corresponding distinction, or rather a suitable correspondence, concerning memory and 
representation. This may be the place to look for an answer to the teleological problem. 
Here is an important cognitive shift decisively effected by the intervention of mind–
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tools, according to the Dennett–Clark analysis, and here is the point of couching this 
discussion in explicitly social language. How exactly the brain manages memory and 
representation, in biochemical terms, is to a degree unimportant; we can black-box the 
question. But if it is necessary for these mind–tools to be installed as a matter of social 
process and, a rortiori, if this is necessary because there is a correlation between the 
performance of society and the desirable expression of specific genes that are active in 
the development of the immature brain, then it follows that the benign portrayal of this 
field of scholarship as impartially and disinterestedly engaged on behalf of humanity as a 
whole is in fact underpinned—scaffolded—by an elaborate social structure whose 
corporate input is critical and needs to be accounted for.  
Evidence presented by Matt Ridley (2003, 214–6) regarding the developmental 
contribution of the gene FOXP2 suggests that this kind of genetic transaction is indeed 
implicated in the longitudinal development of social competence. Its significance is that 
its trace leads both to the fine motor control of the larynx and to the management of 
gesture, grasp and touch. Ridley (167–70) also cites a variety of evidence suggesting that 
systematic exposure to language prior to the onset of puberty is essential for the 
acquisition of competence. In cases where the FOXP2 gene is not defective but 
environmental constraints have impeded full cerebral development in childhood, it is 
exceedingly difficult for the subject to repair the deficit later in life. Making a mindy 
brain, then, becomes transparently a project of acculturation and attunement. This is not 
passive attunement, however: the individual performance of attunement is a small 
contribution to the continuing performance of the dispositif that actively structures the 
theatre in which the performance takes place. 
 
In the next two chapters, more attention will be focused on the ways in which social 
attunement is effected. In the next chapter, the focus is on second-person, oral issues 
relating to the expression of intentionality. In the chapter that follows, the focus is on 
the third-person entanglement of individual and group intention via material–semiotic 
realization. Before we set off, though, we should briefly review the claims made so far 
about the first-person, somatic dimension. 
Our starting point was Dennett‘s Multiple Drafts model of consciousness, supported by 
Dunbar‘s Social Brain Hypothesis, and the Dennett–Clark Mind–Tool ontology. The 
polyphonic model builds on multiple drafts by suggesting that the human experience of 
consciousness is an emergent phenomenon arising in real time out of the coherence of 
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multiple parallel cognitive processes. What my version offers over Opie‘s is a more 
precise sense of polyphony, resting on an early-modern, rather than medieval & 
renaissance interpretation where voice-leading, functional harmony and measured pulse 
afford mutual support, enhancing the rhetorical capacities of the medium.  
Transferred to human cognition, I argue for a Peircean polyphony of polyphonies. 
Supporting a polyphony of firstness (sensory, somatic), secondness (psychological, 
enactive/performative) and thirdness (semiotic) is, in each case, a constitutive 
polyphony. In the case of sensory polyphony, the mutually supporting elements are the 
‗frequencies‘ to which our sensory organs are attuned. In the case of psychological 
polyphony, the elements are less clearly defined, and are articulated epistemically—for 
convenience using a mythological model to indicate the confluence of scholarly 
trajectories implicated. While these are clearly not as well defined as the sensory 
elements, they have the virtue of incorporating methodological polyphony, especially in 
relation to individualist, social and institutional perspectives.  
Regarding semiotic polyphony, the core issue is the individuation of function. If 
functional ascription is the equivalent of the musical term ‗note‘, by which any 
polyphonic composition is articulated, then functional ascription is found to require a 
notion of functional coupling in which the term ‗coupling‘ refers not to the functional 
elements so engaged, but rather to the reconciliation of selected function and system 
function, where the former is temporal and acausal while the latter is atemporal and 
causal. The term I have coined for the human oral performance of this dynamic process 
of reconciliation is ‗fetch‘. 
 
 
Andy Clark rates language as the ‗tool of tools‘ among mind–tools (1999, 6). ‗Language‘, 
though, is a term as vague and various in its meaning as ‗mind‘. Its secondness and 
thirdness is deeply and recursively entangled, making it difficult to analyse. However, 
Tomasello‘s stress on pointing as a uniquely human attribute gives us a useful 
collocation of two trajectories. One aspect of human pointing concerns intersubjectivity. 
There is no point in pointing other than to communicate, hence to engage the 
subjectivity of another regarding one‘s own intentional state. I claim, in short, that there 
is no subjectivity without intersubjectivity. The other aspect is that pointing requires 
fine motor control, hence the relationship between hand and equipment in Heidegger‘s 
‗zuhanden‘. The distinction I am seeking to make is between language use as an oral 
performance and language as an algorithmic apparatus in which speaking plays little or 
no executive role but hand-use does. 
This chapter is mostly concerned with the former—the physiology of oral performance, 
and issues arising—while the next chapter deals with the algorithmic extension of 
performativity. What carries us forward into the substance of the present chapter from 
the previous one is the relationship between Dennett‘s notion of narrative gravity, my 
notion of fetch, and the drive towards individuation in its ‗folk‘ sense of settling or 
satisfying a query. There are grounds for equating the centre of gravity with dispositif, and 
considering the indiscrete self to be articulated through interrelating engagements with 
the designs and intentions behind the semiotic cues presenting themselves for sensory 
experience. Hypothetically, the first step is for intention to be affirmed in the absence of 
the manipulator; the second step is for the structural integration of this manipulative 
modality to realize an increasingly complex semiosphere.  
Recall that Dunbar elaborates the concept of ‗mind-reading‘ in terms of nested 
intentionality, a topic that had germinated in the ‗Machiavellian intelligence‘ hypothesis 
that preceded the social brain. In his 1998 paper he reports that tests on humans show 
oral management of deep intentionality to be difficult to accomplish. ‗Deep‘ means the 
ability to keep track of intermediate intentions of others where, for instance, A believes 
that B wishes to interrupt C‘s conversation with D; and that {A or B or C believes that} 
D would prefer to engage in conversation with E: 
The high error rates at these levels do not reflect a memory retention problem: All subjects pass the 
tests that assess memory for the story line. Moreover, the same subjects show considerable 
competence on reasoning tasks that involve causal chains of up to the sixth order. The difficulty 
seems genuinely to be something to do with operating with deeply embedded mental states (1998, 
188). 
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Both Dennett and Dunbar invest in the idea that hierarchical orders are implicated in the 
progress towards the remote ascription of intention. Implicitly, what is envisaged is an 
inflationary progression in which extra layers of intentionality are added to a singular 
substrate. Second-order intentionality is built on first-order; third on second and so on. 
I think this is wrong as an evolutionary story. It confuses the selected function of 
intention with its system function. The evolutionary trajectory leads the other way, from 
an indeterminate and approximating relationship with the immediate environment in 
which conspecifics play a minimal role, to a code-switching relationship where 
indeterminacy and approximation support rapid hypothesis generation, where 
conspecifics and local equipment support a higher degree of precision. This perspective 
rests on four things in particular: 
 Dehaene‘s conclusion that precise mathematics is language-infected, while 
approximate math is visuo-spatial (Clark 1999, 23–7);  
 Dunbar‘s ‗grooming circle‘, the small, socially stable locus of oral conversation. 
The grooming circle is at its most stable with between three and five 
participants, with larger numbers of participants tending to lead to breakdown 
and smaller circles forming;1  
 My observation of poker players, who frequently find third-level ‗mind-reading‘ 
difficult, especially in situations where more than two players are involved in a 
hand; 
 My own ‗musical‘ input, noting first that music has ordinal characteristics that 
entitle it to be called ‗a mathematics‘ as well as the rhetorical characteristics that 
often find it dubbed ‗a language‘. This turns it into something resembling Clark‘s 
‗bridging manipulada‘ (ibid, 20), something that perhaps effects the code-
switching or constitutes its prosody. Further, four-part diatonic harmony is 
(normally) made out of three notes sounding simultaneously (one note being 
doubled), and string quartets exhibit the ideal realization of classical four-part 
harmony. 
In the first half of this chapter I will enlarge on the somatic aspects of intention with a 
view to reconciling the evolutionary story about human intentionality with the analytic 
story about the value of human intentionality as a creative force. In the second half of 
                                                 
1 The fine detail of this—circles of five break down after approximately a minute—was received in 
conversation with Prof. Dunbar, February 2009. 
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the chapter, I will seek to disentangle what I consider to be a second-person deployment 
of intentionality from a third-person deployment, with a view to further developing the 
latter in subsequent accounts of technology and creativity. 
 
We should first review the status of intentionality and its place in Dennett‘s philosophy.  
According to Dennett, the apparatus of belief/desire psychology provides, not a causal theory, but a 
schematization of behaviour. Using this apparatus amounts to adopting a particular explanatory 
stance: the intentional stance, which involves ascribing beliefs and desires according to a rationality 
assumption (roughly that an intentional system will mainly believe true things, and mainly desire what 
is good for it). From this viewpoint, all there is to being a believer is being reliably predictable from the 
intentional stance (Opie 1998, 8). 
The goal, from the cognizer‘s point of  view, is to find the most economical explanation 
for a phenomenon. The simplest is to adopt the physical stance, of  which Dennett says: 
…if  you want to predict the behaviour of  the system, determine its physical constitution (perhaps all 
the way down to the micro physical level) and the physical nature of  the impingements upon it, and 
use your knowledge of  the laws of  physics to predict the outcome for any input (1987, 16). 
In fact you do not even need to use your knowledge of  the laws of  physics, 
remembering that a highly serviceable physical model is implemented in our bodies at 
the enactive level. ‗Law‘, thus used, can be taken in its social sense as a regulatory 
instrument that is the provisional outcome of  the accumulation of  observed 
phenomena. Its meaning is contiguous with ‗common law‘ as it is understood in the UK 
and USA, and beyond that with the notion of  orally-sustained lore. In consequence of  
its provisional nature, there are times when this approach fails: 
Sometimes in any event, it is more effective to switch from the physical stance to what I call the 
design stance, where one ignores the actual (possibly messy) details of  the physical constitution of  
an object, and, on the assumption that it has a certain design, predicts that it will behave as it is 
designed to behave under various circumstances (16–17). 
In other words, the design stance is effectively a ‗black box stance‘—while the subject of  
attention is presumed to function in a certain way because of  the way it is made, it is not 
necessary to ‗read the manual‘. However, there is a significant advance in a ‗designed‘ 
system over a physical system in that its failures have a semiotic differential over its 
successes. I put two slices of  bread in my toaster. Two minutes later, the bread pops out 
again. The hermeneutic load is minimal: the bread is now toasted, and I can go and eat 
it. Suppose, though, that the bread pops out white and untoasted. Then I am obliged to 
analyse the situation and locate the cause of  the failure. 
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In the TV comedy Fawlty Towers, there is an episode (‗Gourmet Night‘) in which Fawlty 
gets out of  his broken-down car and thrashes it with a branch, fulminating about the 
number of  warnings it has been given, treating the car as though it intended to break 
down. The comedy depends on the viewer‘s understanding that machines do not have 
intentions: 
Sometimes even the design stance is practically inaccessible, and then there is yet another stance or 
strategy one can adopt: the intentional stance. Here is how it works: first you decide to treat the 
object whose behaviour is to be predicted as a rational agent; then you figure out what beliefs that 
agent ought to have, given its place in the world and its purpose. Then you figure out what desires it 
ought to have, on the same considerations, and finally you predict that this rational agent will act to 
further its goals in the light of  its beliefs (17, emphasis added). 
If  the design stance is the equivalent of  a black box, then the intentional stance may 
seem to resemble a Russian doll of  black boxes inside black boxes where rationality is at 
odds with economy. In evolutionary terms, the emphasis on economy prevails over the 
temporal depth entailed by the practice of  reason, so the costs and benefits of  the 
trade-off  need to be accounted for. Access to the presumed-rational party‘s decision 
processing is dependent, on Dennett‘s account, on language. However, since we have no 
difficulty ascribing beliefs and desires to domestic pets on the one hand, and are inclined 
to ascribe certain performances in humans to design, or ‗the way we are made‘ (such as 
the tendency for young males to fight, for instance) on the other, accounting for the 
special place of  language requires a modifier.  
To accomplish this, Dennett introduces the notion of  orders of  intentionality. A first-
order intentional system may have beliefs and desires, but not beliefs and desires about 
beliefs and desires. A second-order intentional system has intentional states about other 
intentional states, both its own and those of  others. Dennett gives examples like ‗x 
believes y expects x to jump left‘ or ‗x fears that y will discover that x has a food cache‘ 
(243). In other words, we have here more than simple about-ness, aboutness that has 
temporal or environmental immediacy. It is the next step that becomes characteristically 
human; we could call it the language layer: ‗x wants y to believe that x believes that he is 
alone‘ (ibid.). It is not so much that language is necessary in order to articulate this level of  
belief, but rather that it is hard to imagine how it might be possible to articulate without 
language. Certainly, when it comes to fourth and higher orders, the necessity for 
registers—storage of  some kind, or scaffolding—becomes apparent, as in this sixth-
order example given by Robin Dunbar (1998, 188), where names function as registers: 
‗Peter knows that Jane believes that Mark thinks that Paula wants Jake to suppose that 
Amelia intends to do something‘.  
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From the observer‘s point of  view, making evaluative distinctions between Dennett‘s 
physical, designed and intentional explanations is a progression that entails increasing 
degrees of  risk. Because these distinctions are somewhat arbitrary, with the so-called 
‗design stance‘ being especially problematic in light of  the distinction between selected 
and system function explored in the previous chapter, I propose a single term 
‗actuarial‘.2 It corresponds to Dennett‘s progression quite simply, by being actuarial with 
respect to individual objects (in the case of  the physical stance); with respect to 
equipment (Zeug, in the case of  the ‗design‘ stance); and with respect to organic systems, 
subject to further discriminations to be elaborated shortly. 
The question that now arises is whether intentionality is the mark of  the mental 
(abductively speaking) in virtue of  the subject having an intention, or is it rather the case 
that a further step is necessary, that the subject should be able to reify that intention in 
some way in order for the observer to deem that an intentional mental performance has 
taken place? To put the matter differently, observing that third- and higher-order 
intentionality is hard to sustain points to an entangled relationship with Zeug. Without 
material–semiotic scaffolding, I argue, without the technologizing of  intersubjectivity, 
these higher levels are simply not available to the interpretant.  
Actually the idea is more complicated than that. I call the basic version of  third-order 
intentionality as analysed by Dennett and Dunbar ‗bucket brigade intentionality‘, after 
the classifier algorithms developed by John Holland in his simulations of  economic 
behaviour, where a payoff  is passed back along a ‗bucket brigade‘, reinforcing the 
trajectory that led to the payoff  for the benefit of  future iterations (Waldrop 1992, 188–
9). I call the fancy, de luxe version ‗recombinant intentionality‘. This variety is sustained 
in and through scaffolding, by entanglement in equipment. By analogy with 
recombinant DNA, which is the creation of  artificial DNA sequences by blending 
material in a manner that would not occur naturally, ‗recombinant intentionality‘ 
involves the conscious, intentional manipulation of  intention. I will develop this concept 
further in the next chapter.  
                                                 
2 With reservations: the Latin root merely means ‗account keeper‘. Since the term has become associated 
with the analysis of risk for insurance purposes, it recruits the mathematics of probability, effecting a 
Peircean link. 
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A concomitant of  stance-taking is the notion that the attitude struck is part of  a 
narrative rather than a freestanding ‗lightbulb moment‘ in which everything suddenly 
becomes clear. As such, the actuarial dimension becomes clear as the notion of  certainty 
gives way to the notion of  confidence. ‗Belief ‘ is a folk term, and although it is often 
coupled with ‗desire‘, the two terms have distinct valences. According to Dennett, 
An implication of  the intentional strategy, then, is that true believers mainly believe truths. If  anyone 
could devise an agreed-upon method of  individuating and accounting beliefs (which I doubt very 
much), we would see that all but the smallest portion (say, less than ten percent) of  a person‘s beliefs 
were usable under our first rule [concerning the relevance of  sensory data to belief  formation] 
(1987, 19). 
One cannot easily substitute ‗desire‘ for belief  and speak of  ‗true desirers mainly 
desiring ...‘ what? Truth? Happiness? Goodness? What is a true desire? Recognizing that 
belief  and desire are commonsense terms, we should be careful not to regard them as 
orthogonal to one another, despite a sense that the former concerns a world-to-self  
relationship while the latter concerns a self-to-world relationship. 
Truth and falsity is a matter of  confidence on a scale of  diminishing certainty, where, at 
the point of  maximum confidence and maximum certainty, truth and falsity are 
equivalent. Hence the notion that Austin‘s ‗happiness axis‘ is orthogonal to this 
‗verification axis‘, and that ‗belief ‘ is found fixed at their intersection. The move 
Dennett makes in a footnoted distinction between belief  and opinion is a useful 
advance: 
… once one makes a distinction between belief  and opinion … according to which opinions are 
linguistically infected, relatively sophisticated cognitive states—roughly states of  betting on the truth 
of  a particular, formulated sentence—one can see the near triviality of  the claim that most beliefs 
are true (loc. cit.).  
The word ‗opinion‘ is aligned with the Platonic notion of  doxa, in which the weight of  a 
given opinion accumulates through the property of  being communally shared (Havelock 
1963, 234ff). While there is no question of  doubting the ‗linguistic infection‘ attending 
opinion, there is an ambiguity between the communal and personal usages that requires 
resolution in order to move beyond the oral to the literate. Havelock suggests that the 
appropriate Platonic term for the formation of  personal opinion is phronesis, but that 
does not really disconnect the public from the personal, since the notion of  ‗good 
judgement‘—a personal virtue no doubt—has no meaning without a relationship to the 
public, or at the very least a sustained and ongoing relationship with one‘s local 
environment. A better approximation can be found in the term ‗delome‘, previously 
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adopted from Peirce‘s semeiotic, which stands in relation to ‗rheme‘ and ‗pheme‘ as 
‗discourse‘ stands in relation to ‗word‘ and ‗sentence‘—though perhaps ‗syntagmic‘, 
‗syntactic‘ and ‗semantic‘ are closer to the progression he envisages: 
…I sometimes use the term Delome (pronounced deeloam, from δηλωμα [a means of  making 
known]), though Argument would answer well enough. It is a sign which has the Form of  tending to 
act upon the Interpreter through his own self-control, representing a process of  change in thought 
or signs, as if  to induce this change in the Interpreter (cited in Ogden & Richards 1944, 285). 
Peirce‘s term is not about opinion as such, although it bears on the way in which an 
opinion may become apparent to its user.3  
Subsequent to The Intentional Stance, Dennett has taken other approaches to the same 
issue. For instance there is ‗florid representing‘, which appears in ‗Making Tools for 
Thinking‘. The distinction he wants to make is between ‗true believers‘ and ‗genuine 
understanders‘. Because beliefs are normally true in the naïvely tautological sense, this 
distinction concerns moving beyond belief-loops, stepping outside them and querying 
them. Representation seems a good candidate, though florid representing seems to 
spiral instead of  looping: ‗it seems you can‘t engage in florid representing without 
knowing and appreciating that you‘re engaging in florid representing‘  (Dennett 2000, 
2/10). 
What is (a) representation? It turns out that the Latin repraesentatio carries a meaning 
additional to ‗exhibiting, manifesting‘, which is ‗a cash payment‘ (Lewis & Short); or, 
more urgently, under repraesento, ‗to pay immediately or on the spot; to pay in ready 
money‘ (ibid.). Although the Scholastics discarded this monetary sense (Lagerlund 2004), 
it reminds us of  the transactional property of  a representation and invites the thought 
that a better term than ‗florid‘ might be ‗fungible‘. Indeed, ‗function‘ (functio) derives 
from fungi (to perform official functions), where the individual in fungi vice acts in place 
of  another in the sense of  being in place by virtue of  the task required as opposed to 
being in place in virtue of  the individual‘s unique dignitas. Cash tokens are the everyday 
familiar example of  a fungible article, but with this idea of  cash comes the idea of  
deferral and associated trajectories of  simulation and implicature.  
                                                 
3 Delome correlates neatly with Heidegger‘s gelichtet: ‗When we talk in an ontically figurative way of the 
lumen naturale in man, we have in mind nothing other than the existential-ontological structure of this 
entity, that it is in such a way as to be its ―there‖. To say that it is ‗illuminated‘ [―erleuchtet‖] means that as 
Being-in-the-world it is cleared [gelichtet] in itself, not through any other entity, but in such a way that it is 
itself the clearing.‘ (1962, 171). The translators note that ‗Lichtung‘ is used in the sense of ‗a forest 
clearing‘ rather than as ‗clarification‘. 
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The fact that understanding is transactional—generally speaking—deepens the problem, 
though not unhelpfully. What it means to understand is frequently a matter of  
satisfaction, which is an emotional constraint often bound up in social interaction. At 
the same time, to understand is implicitly to withhold or foreclose curiosity, which lands 
us straight back in the realm of  belief. However, humans—some of  us, anyway—are 
not content with understanding; we wish to move beyond understanding or rather to 
exploit our current holdings productively. It is an account of  this productivity that is 
sought, in which the terms constituting ‗florid representing‘ contribute an operational 
sense of  how thinking happens. Both terms (‗florid‘ and ‗representing‘) are vague, 
though, and combining them does not lend clarity. 
Because he contrasts it with a possible version called ‗pastel representing‘, Dennett 
appears to be using ‗florid‘ in a cultural rather than botanic sense. Clark, on the other 
hand, contrasts it with a possible ‗wilting representation‘ (1999, 5/15), which advances 
(or more accurately retreats) from the botanic sense. The cultural sense, associated 
particularly with the European baroque, is of  flamboyant, decorative flourish. But 
pursuing the pastel comparison, the issues would be twofold: first, using the same 
pigments, oil paints and pastels differ in the permanence of  the medium; second, oil 
paint permits finer detail. Both are germane to the problem of  understanding the 
operationalization of  continuity, but nothing about these intrinsic qualities helps 
understand what is being perpetuated.  
In its botanic sense, florid derives from flowering—the advertising of  gametes, or of  
media conducive to the goal of  matching gametes. Successfully florid plants go on to 
produce seeds, which go on to produce new plants. Although cross-pollination can take 
place, gametes are normally fairly loyal to their own kind, and the ecosystem locks in to 
a slowly modulating stability. Wilting, here, is the natural stage that follows flowering, 
unless the organism as a whole has been caused to wilt by an environmental crisis of  
one sort or another. The transferred idea is that something of  the purpose of  the flower 
remains although the flower itself, and any memory of  its actuality, have gone. This 
echoes the nature of  the transaction in Austin‘s perlocutionary speech act, and gives 
conceptual operationalization to the Barnesian performer whom we will encounter in 
part three. 
Transforming the concept of  representation into a mind–tool entails a move that leans 
simultaneously on the idea of  representation as selected function (that is, a ‗nouny‘ 
usage in which the representation stands for the stuff  it represents), and on system 
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function (that is, a ‗verby‘ sense in which representation is the performance of  re-
presenting). If  we take as granted the computational function of  the brain in resolving 
mind–tool equations, the question is whether the organ is a sort of  art museum 
containing a bunch of  representations (pictures and their sensory analogues, however 
you want to parse the notion of, say, a ‗smell-picture‘) or whether it contains a repertoire 
of  enactive routines that enable its host organism to ‗catch the rhizomorphic wave‘ 
when the environment re-presents an opportunity to do so. Re-presentation in the 
second sense is a property of  the environment that the organism is adapted to exploit. 
Dennett‘s Kinds of  Minds can perhaps be reconfigured as an enumeration of  the 
organism‘s plasticity with regard to these environmental re-presentations. 
Adopting enactive terminology, we can say that the performance of  representing 
becomes a matter of  pre-enacting, enacting, and re-enacting (the latter both physically 
and virtually). Simulation theory stresses the ‗act‘, while vehicle theory attends to its 
environment. Representations, then, become ‗props‘ that can span a performative 
spectrum ranging from simple exploitation of  affordance to active participation in the 
effecting of  recombinant intentionality (see chapter 7.3 below for further discussion). 
Understanding this spectrum requires a nuanced account of  intentionality that ranges 
from the dawn of  higher-order intentionality in the evolutionary antecedence, through a 
sense of  what is innate in humans, and on to a sense of  how scaffolding supports and 
extends those innate capacities.  
 
Let us begin by asking how far back along the evolutionary family tree would we identify 
a common ancestor whose behaviour requires an external observer to adopt the 
intentional stance in order to interpret it? We have already established that the apparent 
behaviour of  relatively simple mechanical devices can be accounted for from the 
intentional stance, though we don‘t believe that such devices have intentions. By what 
metric do we understand biological organisms to be simple or complex? Let us adopt a 
working hypothesis. The junction I suggest is the one between ectothermy (for 
convenience, the reliance on the environment for warmth) and endothermy (the ability 
to regulate body temperature).4 The latter, broadly embracing birds and mammals, is 
                                                 
4 We might call this the ‗Churchland boundary‘, with reference to the discussion of consciousness in the 
previous chapter. The broad terms ectothermy and endothermy correspond to the crude categories ‗cold‘ 
and ‗warm‘ blooded. 
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expensive to maintain relative to the former. It takes a significantly higher food intake 
relative to body mass to sustain an endothermic system when compared to the 
requirement of  an equivalent ectothermic system. 
Suppose that the brain evolved, in endothermic systems, to sustain the expensive 
organism in the style to which it has become accustomed—to improve the efficiency of  
evaluative procedures relating action to sensory data. The supposition that follows is 
that new capacities in the hormonal management of  the richer biochemical system 
needed to be accommodated by supplementing the pre-existing reptilian brain structure. 
While the phenetic outcome of  this adaptation—emotion—may not be new, exactly, 
there does appear to be a qualitative difference, a scaling-up.  
Speculatively and loosely, an intention can be thought of  as the coordination, or 
threading together, of  distributed neural excitations, following Damasio‘s enumeration 
(2000, 50–3). He (talking specifically about humans, of  course) names six primary 
emotions: happiness, sadness, fear, anger, surprise, disgust. There are additionally a 
number of  social emotions (embarrassment, jealousy, guilt, pride, for example), and he 
adds to the conventional enumeration what he calls background emotions, such as well-
being or malaise, calm or tension. While he points out that the processing sites occupy ‗a 
fairly restricted ensemble of  cortical regions, beginning at the level of  the brain stem 
and moving up to the higher brain‘ (51), it is not clear whether the ‗social emotions‘ 
occupy distinct regions, or are derived functions of  the primary regions. We may 
conclude that these secondary emotions are woven from relationships among the 
primary, and that the primary are shared with other creatures, following his remark that 
notwithstanding the reality that learning and culture alter the expression of  emotions and give 
emotions new meanings, emotions are biologically determined processes, depending on innately set 
brain devices, laid down by a long evolutionary history (51). 
But, to repeat the question posed earlier, how far back among the last common 
ancestors is it useful to go? Again, the endotherms seem rich in emotional response 
when compared to ectotherms. The justification for walking this border is that the 
question of  the nature of  a frog‘s thought on the one hand, and the lion‘s potential 
candidacy for rudimentary second-order intentionality on the other, has occasioned 
debate in the literature. 
In the case of  frogs, Clark (1992, 74–6) and Dennett (1987, 103ff) are responding to 
arguments raised by Stephen Stich and others, ultimately going back to a paper on frog 
vision published by Lettvin et al. in 1959. Dennett cites Stich: 
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Ought the frog to believe that there is an insect flying off  to the right? Or merely that there is some 
food there? Or perhaps should it only have a conditional belief: if  it flicks its tongue in a certain way, 
something yummy will end up in its mouth? Suppose the fly is of  a species that causes frogs acute 
indigestion. Ought the frog to believe this? Does it make a difference how many fellow frogs he has 
seen come to grief  after munching on similar bugs? [?1981 pp. 60-61] (106) 
Stich obviously regards these propositions as absurd; Dennett seems unwilling to 
abandon the frog to the design stance so easily, even while asking ‗Does any frog so 
much as want to find lots of  insects today?‘ (108) His hunch is that the difference between 
froggy beliefs and human beliefs would essentially be a matter of  scalability (112). 
The idea that we may grant the frog the barest of  intension develops in arguments that 
Andy Clark makes in the course of  responding to criticisms of  the Parallel Distributed 
Processing (PDP) model in AI. Here, he discusses the requirement of  systematicity 
posited by Fodor & Pylyshyn as an essential component of  linguistic competence. That 
is to say, a system capable of  saying ‗Mary loves John‘ would be able as a matter of  
principle to say ‗John loves Mary‘:  
… it is certainly true that an animal might be able to respond to aRb and not to bRa. But my 
contention is that in such a case (ceteris paribus) we should conclude not that it has, say, the thought ‗a 
is taller than b‘ but cannot have the thought ‗b is taller than a‘. Rather, its patent incapacity to have a 
spectrum of  thoughts involving a, b, and the taller-than relation should defeat the attempt to ascribe to 
it the thought that a is taller than b in the first place. Perhaps it has a thought we might try to 
describe as the thought that a-is-taller-than-b. But it does not have the thought reported with the 
ordinary sentential apparatus of  our language (Clark 1989, 145). 
Thus, if  you can really think Fa, and really think Gb, you must (as a matter of  stipulation) be able to 
think Fb and Ga. But a frog may be able to have the proto-thought ‗there is a fly over there‘ and 
some other types of  proto-thought and yet be quite incapable of  having any other kind of  thought 
about flies. And what this shows … is that it lacks the concept of  a fly. Thus, the content of  the 
frog‘s experience cannot be a conceptual content… (Clark 1993, 74). 
The implication is that at the frog level of  cognitive competence, it may be worthwhile 
to encapsulate actions—seen from the frog‘s perspective—in terms of  intension. That 
is, to gather the receptor cues, effector cues, and their cerebral coordination, inside a 
single stretch and call that a ‗thought‘. We can do that while denying (since there is no 
evidence to support the hypothesis) that the frog is capable of  any sort of  extension—
any means of  making comparisons between these ‗thoughts‘. 
Accounting for the frog‘s behaviour in this way is equivalent to ascribing that perception 
of  its behaviour to the design stance. The question, then, is what would be the value of  
shifting from the narrative-rich concept of  intention to the design-rich concept of  
intension? Over what range of  instances might it be useful? And—a question of a 
different kind altogether—can the raid on terminology developed for enquiry in the 
field of logic be justified? 
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The value of  the shift is to render the matter of  narrative more precise, since narrative 
seems to be the exclusive domain of  human communication. In any case, it is not so 
much a shift as a fine-tuning, the simplest category of  case that falls within the 
intentional stance. The range will be instances whose behaviour is 
i) too complex to be reliably accounted for from the design stance,  
ii) is nonetheless predictable within a sufficiently narrow range of  possibilities 
for a working hypothesis to be formed by the observer on the basis of  
imputed belief  and desire, and  
iii) which cannot (at least in the case of  non-linguistic animals) be corroborated 
with accounts told from the subject‘s perspective.  
The implication of  iii) is that we are looking for a point where the term ‗intension‘ can 
realistically be coupled with its logical correlate ‗extension‘ as the locus where narrative 
brings coherence to intensional flux. What we have in this correlation looks rather like 
an abstraction that matches the functional coupling paradigm discussed in the previous 
chapter, a point where a relationship between organism and environment is enriched, 
perhaps by the development of  the means to model the environment internally and to 
test outcomes against that model before selecting a best fit for a particular circumstance.  
To ease the discomfort of  this appropriation, some equivalence can be suggested 
between intension and Saussure‘s term ‗syntagm‘, derived from Greek roots meaning 
‗with‘ and ‗to arrange‘. Thus it denotes an arrangement of  semiotic items distinct from 
the more precise concept ‗syntax‘, meaning ‗orderly or systematic arrangement of  parts 
or elements‘ (OED). For Saussure, the syntagm is a primitive unit of  meaning, a 
molecular formation compared to the atomic nature of  the sign, but primitive and 
unbound.  
Ruth Garrett Millikan has developed a ‗biological‘ sense of intension, meaning a set of 
properties associated in the minds of language-users with a given term. To elaborate, the 
sanction is indirect, coming via Jay Rosenberg‘s (1987) review of  Millikan (1984): 
It follows, then, that where ‗intension‘ is interpreted as something like a set of  properties 
―associated‖ in the minds of  language-users with a term and thereby serving as a ―criterion of  
application‖ for that term reference or extension is not determined by intension. ―Rather, it is routed 
through the history of  the term which determines the proximate Normal explanation for proper 
functioning of  its interpreter devices or programs‖ (p. 104). Intension is, indeed, a ―third aspect of  
meaning‖, but only in a low-grade and secondary kind of  way (433). 
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More recently, Millikan has written that Fregeian ‗sense‘ was the name for what she now 
calls ‗semantic mapping‘, while ‗intension‘ stood for what she now terms ‗conception‘ 
(2005, 54; 72–5). For Millikan, intension (or conceptualizing) performs a stabilizing 
function that participates in the operationalization of  meaning, which is necessarily a 
transaction between the private and the public, and, further, an intentional gesture. Its 
biological sense draws in the Bergson-Deleuze notion of  intension, an accumulative 
trajectory whose concomitant is a discharging trajectory termed détente. Deleuze‘s 
interpretation (1988, pp. 18–19; 75–6) suggests a naturalistic resemblance to breathing, 
but a more apt simile would be with peristalsis, the propulsive flexing that normally 
ushers food through the gut (and occasionally sends it the other way). Deleuze puns on 
the logical and emotional connotations of  intensity; Damasio‘s work points us to a 
physiological correlation between the logical and the emotional through vagus nerve 
elevation (Yoffe 2008) and the neurochemistry of  reward referenced previously (p. 100). 
 
Recall the working hypothesis that sets a cognitive boundary at the level of  sustaining a 
warm blood economy. With it came Damasio‘s enumeration of  ‗primary‘ emotions: 
happiness, sadness, fear, anger, surprise, disgust. Which of  Damasio‘s catalogue of  
emotional states would we ascribe to frogs? Fear, perhaps, but coupled with surprise; a 
couplet that simply corresponds to the basic ‗run away‘ mechanism common 
throughout the animal kingdom. Happiness? Sadness? Probably not. Could we conceive 
of  an angry frog? A disgusted frog? Probably not. Of  course, in part our inclination to 
make these ascriptions to animals depends in part on whether the perceived emotion is 
recognizable in human terms. Hence Burns‘ famous address to a mouse, ‗Wee, sleeket, 
cowran, timrous beastie,/ O, what panic‘s in thy breastie!‘ works because there is enough 
about the mouse‘s behaviour that seems familiar to make the comparison register, albeit 
in conjunction with the registering of  bathos. Could we conceive an angry mouse? For 
that matter, are there any circumstances in which an angry dog is not angry because of  
some human intervention? 
A small worry in respect of  animals and intention concerns the etymology common 
also to intension that connects the word, via the stretching of  a bow and the presumed 
release of  an arrow, to a correlation between explicitly predatory behaviour and the 
fixing of  attention. If  this is a legitimate behavioural antecedent for the emergence of  
oral language and the primitives of  rational thought, it can only be part of  the story; let 
us, nevertheless, pursue it further. To put the matter at its vaguest, there seems to be a 
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continuum of  increasingly rich attention measured—faute de mieux—by quality of  eye 
contact. Our frog seems fairly impoverished in the quality of  its eye contact, registering 
little sign of  drawing intelligent conclusions from the sensory data it receives. A 
domestic cat seems to do rather better; a prosimian such as the slow loris better again; 
and best of  all there are the chimpanzees and gorillas, whose quality of  eye contact 
seems to intimate a degree of  empathy little short of  human. 
Domestic cats are interesting because their behaviour is familiar to a lot of  people, most 
of  whom will be inclined to account for the things that cats do in the language of  belief  
and desire. Many of  these things, from the point of  view of  the ethologist, resolve to 
easily-understood instances of  design. For example, forepaw kneading, salivation, and 
tail-raising when the back is stroked: all of  these reflexes can be observed in feeding 
kittens. However there are times when the things that cats do really seem to be best 
described as ‗thinking‘, or evaluating the desirability of  a goal compared to the hazards 
entailed in achieving it.  
In ‗Making Tools for Thinking‘, Dennett relates an anecdote about lions hunting in 
Amboseli Park, Kenya, observed by the ethologists Robert Seyfarth and Dorothy 
Cheney: 
One lion stepped forward into full view of  the wildebeests, which all turned, with some nervousness, 
to eye her cautiously, ready to bolt the moment she made her move. While lion A held the herd‘s rapt 
attention in this fashion, lion B crept off  to the left, circling around into position in a shallow ditch, 
unseen by the herd. Meanwhile lion C crept around to the right, more or less on the opposite side of  
the small herd from lion B. Once in place, lion C leapt out and gave chase. The herd bolted away, of  
course, and stampeded right over the ditch where lion B lay in wait. Lion B merely had to leap up to 
catch and bring down one animal, providing supper for all (2000, 1/9). 
This apparently coordinated cooperation seems to be a significant advance, if  it is the 
case that the individual lions are capable of  understanding the situation from the point 
of  view of  the others, however vestigially. (Obviously, as Dennett jokes, they don‘t meet 
beforehand to plan, agree tactics, draw diagrams and so on.) The lion perhaps has a 
second order of  intension that enables it to imagine what it would do if  it were in the 
position of  one of  the other lions, and to imagine how the herd of  wildebeest might 
behave in response. Alternatively, in the way that it has become a commonplace that a 
fish‘s knowledge of  hydrodynamics is encoded in the shape of  its body, and likewise a 
bird‘s knowledge of  the principle of  lift and drag is encoded in its wings, it may simply 
be that the lion‘s knowledge of  the group dynamics performed by the herd of  
wildebeest is similarly engrained in its genome—or rather their respective genomes, 
since the wildebeest are not neutral bystanders. However, as I have argued, the reason 
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we observe few convincing candidates for second-order intentionality in nature is that 
the concept rests on a false premise.  
The trajectory we should be seeking is towards the capacity for individuatory 
discrimination. When a human sees a heron perched in a distant tree, or a bluetit in a 
nearby bush, the capacity for discrimination is implicit in the choice of  noun. Assuming 
that the visual arc occupied by the two birds is similar, what does a domestic cat see; and 
how? The question is posed because a cat seemingly ‗knows‘ that it cannot catch the 
heron because it is too big even if  it were not too far away. That it can catch the bluetit 
seems to be enactively coded, so that the bird‘s proximity and characteristic movement 
style cues the cat‘s predatory reflexes. No discrimination is made between bluetit, coal 
tit, great tit and so on; there is no question of  one kind of  catchable bird being more 
desirable than another. 
If  Dennett‘s lions are parsing intensions, it is still a long way from there to full-scale 
narrative-inflected intention, and still some way beyond that narrative level of  
achievement—which can be regarded as universally human—to the art-mediated 
narratives characteristic of  modern, urban, civil society. I use the term ‗art‘ here in its 
broadest possible sense to mean ‗that which is made‘ as opposed to ‗that which occurs 
naturally‘. It is not readily apparent that this latter shift has any extra input from the 
intentional stance, but it is perhaps the case nevertheless that there is something 
systematic about the way our cognitive apparatus is fine-tuned by the artefacts 
surrounding us, something that ought to fall within the remit of  the intentional stance 
to accommodate. There is, after all, a hint of  hylozoism in Dennett‘s design stance, at 
least insofar as items so perceived really are designed. 
 
The progression by which quality of  eye contact appears to correlate with richer 
cognitive faculties is a simple way of  expressing the concept of  empathy. Oddly, Gallese 
(2001) notes (and OED confirms), the word ‗empathy‘ enters the English language fairly 
recently, from the German Einfühlung. Intersubjectivity arrives at about the same time, 
but along a less reliable etymological route that takes in a concept of  interdisciplinarity 
imagined in Carnap‘s quest for a universal scientific language as well a psychological 
sense that is similar to that of  empathy. In recent years the terms‘ meanings have 
gravitated towards a role in understanding the role of  mutuality in sensorimotor 
neurophysiology—that is, the place of  the other in action understanding.  
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Let us begin with eye contact and the related topic of  gaze direction. Human eyes are 
structurally dissimilar to other primates in having distinctively pale and elongated sclera 
(whites of  the eye) that ease the interpretation of  gaze direction (Kobayashi & 
Kohshima 1997). The importance of  mutual gaze to the relationship between human 
neonates and their caregivers focuses attention on the richness of  prelinguistic 
communication, and focuses attention on the antecedence of  this richness. There is no 
smooth or simple progression. Hare & Tomasello report that dogs are more likely to 
avoid approaching forbidden food when a human‘s eyes are open than when they are 
closed, but chimpanzees do not make this differentiation spontaneously (2005, 440). 
Indeed, the interpretative capacities of  chimpanzees may be at the level of  postural 
heuristics rather than ‗seeing‘ as humans understand the term. Povinelli & Barth report 
that chimpanzees prefer to gesture to a conspecific facing towards them but with eyes 
closed, rather than another who is turned away but looking back over its shoulder with 
eyes open (in Tomasello et al 2005, 713). 
Tomasello argues that many of  the aspects of  human language that make it such a 
powerful cognitive tool are already present in the act of  pointing. Firstly in being 
collaborative, secondly in requiring an evaluative sense of  the collaborator‘s perspective. 
Thirdly, the motive for linguistic communication is already there in pointing, and 
fourthly in relating two fundamental components of  linguistic communication—
proposition and propositional attitude (Tomasello 2006, 17–19).  
In a test where a human adult responds to an infant‘s gestures with a range of  possible 
responses—‗she wants me to look‘, ‗she wants me to get excited‘, and so on—the 
response that most satisfied the infant was the response which demonstrated an 
understanding of  a positive correlation between infant, adult and object. Tomasello 
interprets this result as showing that the sharing of  interest is in itself  rewarding for 
infants in a way that differentiates humans from all other species (ibid., 7). In 
comparative tests, chimpanzees and human infants are presented with pointing data 
relevant to a foraging task. The chimps see the interpretation as one problem-solving 
challenge among several, whereas the humans understand that the gesture is ‗meant for 
them‘, and helpfully relevant to the task at hand (4–5). Chimpanzees use gestures as 
one-way procedures for accomplishing ends rather than for sharing and coordinating 
intention. They do not engage in role-reversing reciprocal acts (12–13).  
Apes do not point, Tomasello concludes, because:  
 they do not understand communicative intentions  
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 they do not participate in joint attentional engagement as common communicative ground 
within which deictic gestures are meaningful  
 they do not have the motives to help and to share  
 they are not motivated to inform others of  things because they cannot determine what is 
old and new information for them (i.e., they do not really understand informing, per se)  
 they cannot imitatively learn communicative conventions as inherently bidirectional 
coordination devices with reversible roles (13-14). 
The ability to create joint intentions and joint attention through collaborative interaction 
thus delimits the boundary of  the theatre in which distinctively human cognitive skills 
are displayed (15). 
Gallese‘s shared manifold hypothesis proposes a theoretical basis for linking the data 
Tomasello and associates have assembled with the neurophysiological action literature. 
The shared manifold is a kind of  sensory slush fund that participants can draw on and 
use in the process of  developing shared meaning. This connects with Fodor & 
Pylyshyn‘s requirement of  systematicity (see above, p. 140), and some of  the discomfort 
in that assertion attends Gallese‘s terminology too. Recall that if  John loves Mary, then 
Mary loves John—a simple mirror condition that draws attention to the fact that its 
cerebral correlate has become known as the mirror neuron system (MNS). However, 
mature humans go far beyond this simple symmetry, understanding that while John 
loves Mary, Mary may not love John, or that the relationship might be between parent 
and child, or between child and pet.  
In reality, the function of  the MNS is nuanced, such that witnessing an action causes 
equivalent, though less intense, activation, while imagining an action causes activation 
that is less intense again. The subject is able to relate to conspecifics through correlated 
and reversible extensions resting, probabilistically, on knowledge of  the other embodied 
in the self  (Gallese 2001, 44). Gallese continues: 
When we enter in relation with others there is a multiplicity of  states that we share with them. We 
share emotions, our body schema, our being subject to pain as well as to other somatic sensations. At 
this point we need a conceptual tool to capture the richness of  the experiences we share with others. 
I will introduce this conceptual tool as the shared manifold of  intersubjectivity. I posit that it is by 
means of  this shared manifold that we recognize other human beings as similar to us. It is just 
because of  this shared manifold that intersubjective communication and mind-reading become 
possible (44–5). 
At issue is not only the idea of  intention as a useful way of  articulating one‘s own 
objectives, and as a means of  understanding the motivations of  others. Where humans 
have the greatest edge over primates is in the ability to construct or reconstruct 
intention by inference from the failed, unrealized or undisclosed intentional acts of  
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others. This extension beyond mutuality extends also beyond the acts of  conspecifics to 
the interpretation of  acts and events in the broader environment. It should be stressed 
that these conclusions are founded on data gathered in experiments that focus on 
agent/object interactions. Control experiments show that characteristic MNS activity is 
not observed when the subject can observe only the agent, or only the object—it is the 
relationship between the two that stimulates the MNS response (34–5). 
It is interesting to note that toddlers can observe a human performance of  an intended 
but unsuccessful action, and then enact the successful completion of  the same action. 
When instead a mechanical device demonstrates the failed action, the ability to infer 
successful completion disappears. An embodied link must be established, Gallese argues, 
between the observed agent and the observer in order that the intended goal is 
understood and subsequently re-enacted. Action observation, he says, implies action 
simulation. ‗Although we do not overtly reproduce the observed action, nevertheless our 
motor system becomes active as if   we were executing that very same action that we are 
observing‘ (36–7, emphasis inherited). 
Gallese proposes that the key benefit of  the MNS is in the area of  ‗understanding‘, a 
mutuality operationalized in the sensorimotor system by modelling a performative 
equivalence between what conspecifics are observed to do and what the observer could 
do (39): 
This implicit, automatic, and unconscious process of  motor simulation enables the observer to use 
his/her own resources to penetrate the world of  the other without the need for theorizing about it, 
without the need to necessarily use propositional attitudes (41). 
One consequence of  the theory Gallese and his colleagues put forward is to invite a 
reconfiguration of  traditional ‗what it is like‘ questions in phenomenology such as 
Thomas Nagel‘s well known query, ‗What is it like to be a bat?‘ (1974). On Nagel‘s 
account, the fact that an organism has conscious experience at all, irrespective of  form, 
means that there is something it is like to be that organism (436). We can see that there 
may be neurophysiological preconditions that underpin the evaluation of  ‗what it is like‘, 
if  that formulation is to be regarded as a strong test. The implication of  MNS theory is 
that language in the human sense is not one of  these preconditions, even while the 
presence of  the MNS may be a necessary precondition for language in the human sense.  
 
We can further embellish the term ‗fetch‘ now. It is an organic (and therefore complex) 
scaling up of  the input side of  function. Where stance-taking might be taken to be a 
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rational and static analytic practice, fetch has the dynamism necessary for an organism 
to respond in real time and update its abductive status. It is convenient, linguistically, to 
speak of  the ‗fetch of  an intention‘, but the polyphonic model has not suddenly turned 
monophonic: intentions are both plural in virtue of  their evaluative nature, and in virtue 
of  their compositionality. We need to analyse both. Regarding compositionality, I will 
develop a perspective (Grice‘s implicature) that offers useful insights into the informal 
logic of  abduction. I contend, however, that in relation to the evaluation of  intention, 
there is a longstanding failure to distinguish between second- and third-person 
perspectives. 
Epistemic issues regarding the disciplinarity of  psychology, sociology and philosophy 
overlap here, much as they were overlapping at the time of  Austin‘s zenith (cf. 2.1.2; 
Grice 1989, 173). Recent interdisciplinary work by Joshua Knobe considers the problem 
of  attributing intention to outcomes that are peripheral to the goal of  an action. One 
view is that it is always wrong to say that a side-effect was brought about intentionally, 
while another holds that it may, in the right circumstances, be realistic to make the claim 
of  intentionality (2003, 190). Knobe sets about the problem by explicitly incorporating 
social science methodology to the study of  intention, suggesting that in situations 
involving multiple intentions, people (ordinary users of  language, interviewed in public 
spaces) are far more likely to ascribe intention when an anticipated negative side-effect is 
the outcome of  a specified primary objective than when an anticipated positive side-
effect is the outcome.  
For example, where ‗corporation x intends to maximize profit with its new product line, 
and making this product will harm the environment‘ people (82% of  them) are willing 
to say that corporation x intended to harm the environment, but in the case where 
‗corporation x intends to maximize profit with its new product line, and making this 
product will help the environment‘, people (77%) will not say that corporation x 
intended to benefit the environment (191–2). The difficulty here is perhaps in assuming 
parity between ‗harm‘ and ‗help‘. It is easy to imagine how a harmed environment may 
impact directly on one‘s self, because harm implies damage of  some kind and therefore 
an ideal state before the damage has been done. If  the environment is already in this 
ideal, unharmed state, maybe it is less clear either how helping it will make it more ideal, 
or how such an improvement will impact on the witness. 
In a second example, Knobe personifies the actions in a military operation, where in 
one version the side-effect is that troops will be placed in the line of  fire, and in the 
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other version they will be removed from it. He asks whether, in the first case, the 
commander should be blamed, and in the second case commended. Again, respondents 
were much firmer in attributing blame than praise. In this case, though, respondents 
might have been acting in the capacity of  literary critic as much as social commentator, 
since the ‗positive‘ story requires pleonasm to make it equivalent to the ‗negative‘ story. 
Where the sergeant protests: but sir, if  we do that then I will be putting my men in the line of  
fire!, cause, effect and lines of  responsibility are clear. However, when the sergeant 
protests: but sir, if  we do that then I will be taking my men out of  the line of  fire!, this hardly 
seems plausible dialogue (192–3). We may conclude from this that language is better 
equipped for evaluating hazards than benefits, or alternatively that discriminating 
between neutral and positive outcomes and attributing their cause is statistically 
disadvantaged by the sheer potential volume of  information that would need to be 
processed. 
 
Some philosophical entanglements with intention may bespeak no more than an attempt 
to detemporalize, to fuse system and selected function, or to substitute transmission for 
communication. Dennett says: 
Grice … and other philosophers …have developed an elaborate and painstakingly argued case for 
the view that genuine communication, speech acts in the strong, human sense of  the word, depend on 
at least three orders of  intentionality in both speaker and audience (1987, 243). 
Paul Grice was a colleague of Austin‘s, one more clearly engaged with the philosophical 
conundrums that arise from treating oral language in its immediate, performative 
environment as the primary evidence available to heterophenomenological enquiry. 
Grice foreshadows Dennett‘s multiple drafts model in his argument that the meaning of  
a word (he uses the construct ‗non-natural sign‘ to extend beyond word to intentional 
gesture and action) is derived from speakers‘ meanings by that word in individual 
instances of  uttering it, in much the same way that Foley found communication to 
emerge in the act of  communicating (engaging in intersubjective semiotic exchange, cf. p. 
111 above). For Foley, observing the linguistically mutable and diverse New Guinea 
region, drafting is a shared endeavour (of  which more in part three), hence a communal 
practice. The same is true of  Grice‘s linguistic world, but his analysis (generally 
speaking, a variant of  the natural/non-natural distinction) is in need of  clarification. 
Grice‘s distinction between natural and non-natural meaning is apparently drawn from 
G. E. Moore, for whom ‗natural properties are ... construed nominalistically as simple 
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particulars‘ (Hochberg 1962, 366–7), while non-natural properties are apparently 
compositional in some underdetermined way; they are ‗not substantial‘; and further, 
‗Only non-natural properties are universals‘ (ibid., 370).5  For example, the statement ‗these 
spots mean measles‘ has its natural meaning in virtue of the statement‘s subject‘s 
medical condition. Either the patient has measles, in which case the statement is true, or 
the patient (or doctor) is mistaken, in which case the statement is false. However, the 
statement can also refer to the matrix of dots making up the individual letters of the 
words comprising the statement. The latter version is doubly knavish because it 
represents an oral expression in writing where the written form can be true but the 
spoken form cannot (except at deep algorithmic remove, such as the synthesized voice 
of a robot programmed in binary code, which is still a digital simulacrum of the human 
form). The point, anyway, is that in the second case, the statement can be true of the 
dot matrix, and still be false with respect to the patient about whom the statement is 
written. 
Michael Hancher comments that for Grice, ‗the universal ―type‖ meaning, or set of such 
meanings, for a given word is an abstraction from the ―token‖ meanings that speakers 
mean for the word in specific instances of use‘ (1978, 1/8). Grice doesn‘t use these 
deracinated Peircean terms. Moreover, the natural/non-natural distinction brings us 
again to the system/selected plurality of function. Hancher argues that in ‗conventional‘ 
semantics, the token is derived from the type, and that Grice inverts this. In reality, 
neither way round can claim precedence because of the functional question. Type is 
equivalent to system function; token to selected function; while Peirce‘s forgotten term 
of firstness, ‗tinge‘, is integrative at cost of meaninglessness. Grice is interesting because 
of his work on the performative, bartering aspect of intentional traffic represented by 
these terms. The misapplication of the Peircean categories can be remedied with 
beneficial consequence, an outcome that will help illuminate, in turn, the Peircean 
notion of continuity. 
In his William James lectures (Logic and Conversation, 1967, in Grice 1989), Grice treats 
the topic of implicature at length. These are conversational junctures where the 
speaker‘s meaning is scaffolded by context, but not entirely foreclosed by that 
scaffolding. Grice‘s first example finds two people (A & B) conversing about a third, 
                                                 
5 Forty years on, Hochberg reports (366), Moore accepted Broad‘s criticism and deemed the argument 
‗utterly silly and preposterous‘. 
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who has recently taken a job with a bank. B says: ‗he likes his colleagues, and he hasn‘t 
been to prison yet‘ (1989, 24). The second clause might imply that C is vulnerable to 
temptation, or it might imply that his new colleagues are a bunch of rogues. Since C is 
known to both A and B, they probably share an assumed implication one way or 
another, one that requires no further elaboration. However, someone overhearing the 
conversation would not be able to judge without further information. 
Grice adduces his ‗Cooperative Principle‘ to generalize from this: ‗Make your 
conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the 
accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged‘ (26). He 
fortifies this principle with four maxims, which interlocutors are recommended to 
adopt: the maxim of quality (be truthful); of quantity (be economically informative); of 
relevance; and of manner (be clear). These conventions constitute a kind of oral 
scaffolding fabricated, one might say, from good-will. This scaffolding is minimally 
coercive—coercive by consent—but there are instances of implicature where the 
speech-act itself is intended to coerce. The speaker wishes to lead the interlocutor to 
form a particular conclusion, in a similar way to Austin‘s perlocutionary act, and in a 
way that exemplifies the connection between speech-act and mind–tool. 
In ‗Meaning‘ (1989, 213ff), Grice introduces the Avaricious Man. 
I have a very avaricious man in my room, and I want him to go; so I throw a pound note out of the 
window. Is there here any utterance with a [non-natural meaning]? No, because in behaving as I did, 
I did not intend his recognition of my purpose to be in anyway effective in getting him to go (219). 
We need to query the grounds on which the described behaviour can be counted 
rational. The major premise seems to be that money is to humans as sticks are to dogs. 
The minor premise is that philosophers do not chase money as assiduously as other 
humans. Therefore, the avaricious man is to conclude that Grice, in throwing the money 
from the window, is indicating that he does not regard his visitor as a bona fide 
philosopher (how humiliating!). 
The example reappears, in more elaborate form, in a later paper, ‗Utterer‘s Meaning and 
Intention‘ (1969). As a preliminary, Grice gives the following definition of  occasion-
meaning: 
―U meant something by uttering x‖ is true iff, for some audience A, U uttered x intending 
(1) A to produce a particular response r 
(2) A to think (recognize) that U intends (1) 
(3) A to fulfil (1) on the basis of  his fulfilment of  (2) (151). 
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The series of  counterexamples Grice discusses in further refining this definition are all 
performances rather than statements. The torturer intends (by tightening the 
thumbscrews) that the victim understand that he should volunteer the required 
information (152). The customer intends (by placing precisely the right sum of  money 
on the counter) that the shopkeeper should understand that the customer wishes to 
purchase a particular brand of  cigarettes (though in this example, the customer‘s 
intention is in fact scaffolded by the habitual performance of  regular purchase 
presumably ‗trained‘ by prior use of  the voice) (153). The bridge player A should 
understand from the nuance of  his opponent B‘s smile (which, the example asserts, is 
subtly but conspicuously false) that B intends A to understand that B‘s hand is weak—B 
apparently being required to perform social subordinacy in favour of  A (154).  
The return of  the Avaricious Man introduces a number of  intriguing puzzles, including 
the need to resolve simultaneous intentions: 
The utterer U is in a room with a man A who is notoriously avaricious, but who also has a certain 
pride. U wants to get rid of  A. So U, in full view of  A, tosses a five-pound note out of  the window. 
He intends that A should think as follows: ―U wants to get me to leave the room, thinking that I shall 
run after the £5 note. He also wants me to know that he wants me to go (so contemptuous was his 
performance). But I am not going to demean myself  by going after the banknote; I shall go, but I 
shall go because he wants me to go. I do not care to be where I am not wanted.‖ 
…A feature of  this example seems to be that though A‘s leaving the room was intended by U to be 
based on A‘s thought that U wanted him to leave the room, U did not intend A to recognize that U 
intended A‘s departure to be so based. A was intended to think that U‘s purpose was to get him to 
leave in pursuit of  the £5 note (155–6). 
The functional elements appear to be these: two actors; a room with a door and a 
window; a currency token (the £5 note).The drama revolves around the function of the 
£5 note, because of the way in which a singular but non-accidental selected function is 
derived from the ‗normal‘ system function. Confusion arises, though, not because A is 
conflicted in how to respond, but because of several embedded ambiguities concerning 
the actors‘ status as performers and witnesses. 
First, we should insist on a distinction between audience and witness. Audience is 
usually plural, but in this example must be singular (otherwise, U could not be assured 
that the effect of  his action would be felt by A and only by A). In that case, the word 
‗audience‘ could be acceptable if  the action it witnesses is ‗normal‘—that is, the effect 
of  the action, and its motivation, is reliably repeatable in front of  multiple singular 
audiences. To further assess this reliability, we then need to query the viewpoint from 
which the story is told. Implicitly, again, it must be U‘s viewpoint (as it was when Grice 
first conceived him), since any third-party presence would cause a difficulty with respect 
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to Grice‘s definition of  occasion-meaning by introducing an audience that is 
simultaneously singular and plural. The asymmetry in available personal information 
corroborates the assumption that we share U‘s viewpoint—A‘s characteristics need no 
further substantiation since their evaluation constitutes the opinion of  U. 
U intends that A should follow a highly elaborate process of  reasoning, on Grice‘s 
account, rather than choosing between several equally elaborate processes of  reasoning. 
Something in the picture must focus all participants‘ attention on the semiotics 
necessary to effect this course, and in Austin‘s terms we must be seeking something in 
the nature of  a perlocutionary speech act. The next question is whether the 
perlocutionary force is vested in U, in the £5 note, or whether it is an emergent property 
of  the constellation. In the event of  a £5 flying through the window of  its own 
accord—blown by a momentary gust of  wind caused perhaps by the opening of  the 
door—the note‘s perlocutionary force is capable of  causing A to leave the room in 
pursuit. If  this minimum condition is not true then the rest of  the apparatus cannot 
follow. What perlocutionary force, then, does U contribute in order that A should leave 
the room because of  the £5 yet not in pursuit of  it? Surely it makes a difference 
whether U is a peer of  A‘s—a fellow professor, perhaps. This, again, is implicit: imagine 
two socially asymmetric counter examples. In one, U is the leader of  a political party 
and A is a newly-elected representative; in the other U is the son of  A. In the former 
case, other means of  causing the subordinate to leave the room, entailing the 
reinforcement of  that subordinacy, can easily be imagined; in the latter case, a verbal 
reproach from A might be anticipated. U may very well find himself  sent from the 
room to recover the note himself. 
The condition U allegedly wishes to achieve—A leaving the room but not pursuing the 
£5 note—would be achieved with equal satisfaction if  the piece of  paper U threw from 
the window merely resembled a £5 note from the distance at which A could observe it; 
implicitly, though, U intends to recover the £5 note after A has left, otherwise why 
would it matter which of  the two outcomes (A pursues the £5; A leaves the room but 
does not pursue the £5) U achieved? Since the recoverability of  the note is contingent 
on the outcome, further conditions can be inferred: the window does not open onto a 
busy street; it is likely to be at ground-floor level; the weather is likely to be clement. 
What if  A entered the room precisely because U was known to throw £5 out of  the 
window whenever A entered the room? To know that A is ‗avaricious‘ but ‗proud‘ 
requires an evaluative matrix of  some depth and substance, but we know little about U 
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except that he possesses a £5 note that may or may not be superfluous to his needs. To 
say that A seeks out U whenever he is hungry would be as reasonable an interpretation 
as any other (perhaps A has an accomplice waiting outside the window). Another 
plausible explanation for A leaving the room is that, on witnessing a behaviour that that 
many people would regard as eccentric or unbalanced, he has gone to phone a doctor. 
Grice does not say that U is successful for whatever reason. A might not, in fact, have 
left the room at all. 
Ultimately at issue here is the confusion that arises from conflating second- and third-
person conceptions of  audience. The former tends to be provisional and discovered in 
the moment, whereas the latter suggests by the presumption of  substitutability (any 
audience subset will be equally competent to understand the performance) that a 
performance can be repeated. It is useful to separate the orality of  communication (in 
which meaning emerges from the interaction of  the interpretative community) from the 
technologized, institutionalized meaning that is capable of  more or less reliable 
transmission. The problem facing the second-person A witnessing U‘s performance in 
casting a £5 note from the window is to discover, with precision, the depth of  the fund 
of  meaning vested in the gesture and to determine the correct course of  action that 
should follow from separating and reassembling his second- and third-person 
experience of  the moment. He needs to assay the fetch of  U‘s intention, to infer some 
sense of  U‘s action-planning. 
 
The ‗correct‘ interpretation of  an intersubjective event may very well depend on the 
tacit assumption of  mutually-shared accumulations, otherwise negotiation is necessary. 
In the torture example, the victim may understand the form perfectly and be completely 
willing to give the interrogator the information that is sought. But because he does not 
in fact possess the information the interrogator believes he possesses, the victim is 
subjected to further extremes of  misery because he has no means of  communicating 
this deficit. Failures of  intersubjectivity arise when the fetch of  an intention is 
misinterpreted owing to incompatibilities in the participants‘ respective reservoirs of  
tacit knowledge—one such repertoire being the acquisition of  ‗literacy‘.  
Faced with Grice‘s intractably complex trains of  implicature, economists (and political 
scientists) use statistical modelling techniques, the best known being game theory. An 
informal example, from the game of  poker, illustrates how the evaluation of  third-level 
intentionality is difficult to do: at showdown, player A needs to have formed 1) an idea 
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of  what player B has; 2) an idea of  what player B believes player A to have; and 3) an 
idea of  what player B thinks player A believes player B to have. If  that is not 
complicated enough, either player must also evaluate whether the other is capable of  
thinking so deeply in the first place, because, in the same way that you cannot put a 
weak player on a hand, nor can you put a weak player on a thought (Sklansky 1999, 237–
9). While knowledge of  odds, a memory for cards seen and opponents‘ prior play are all 
assets, computation needs to be done ‗in the head‘, and in the moment—without 
recourse to pencil and paper or a calculator.  
Formal game theory models decision-making in interactive environments, where 
rewards and costs depend on choices made by others; most frequently these models 
represent dyadic, or second-person interaction. Poker is a pure conflict, or zero-sum 
game, in theoretical terms, because one player wins at the expense of  the other. More 
interesting and realistic situations can be modelled in which outcomes—sums—are 
variable; certain decisions may have positive or negative outcomes for both parties. The 
numbers can become as unfathomably large as any vocabulary fairly quickly, but in 
practice a repertoire of  a few simple instances tends to recur in the literature. Given two 
players, and ordinal preferences weighted from one to four, it is possible to identify 
seventy-eight distinct ‗games‘; if  restrictions on preferences are relaxed, this rises 
beyond sixty-four thousand (Scharpf  1997, 79–80). 
Out of  the seventy-eight games, four have become well-known. These are ‗assurance‘ 
(or ‗the hunt‘), ‗battle of  the sexes‘, ‗prisoner‘s dilemma‘, and ‗chicken‘.  It is interesting 
to review these as models of  the intentional stance in practice, paying particular 
attention to the transformative effect that an evaluation of  ‗fetch‘ can have. Additionally, 
these transformations bring dynamism to the ‗tuned dispositifs‘ discussed in the 
previous chapter, hence the continuing liaison with Scharpf. 
1 – untransformed grids, from the left: ‗assurance‘, ‗battle of  the sexes‘, ‗prisoner‘s dilemma‘, ‗chicken‘. 
(Scharpf 1997, 75) 
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In Assurance, cooperation entails catching a high-value quarry that requires two 
hunters (a stag), but each hunter may instead choose to hunt a smaller quarry that 
requires only their own skills to catch—a hare. If  they cooperate, then both achieve 
their maximum payoff. If  one ‗cooperates‘ but the other defects, then the defector 
catches the hare while the cooperator catches nothing; if  both defect, then both catch 
the hare (there being only one stag and one hare), which is of  less value jointly than it is 
individually. This models the role of  perception and mutual predictability in social 
interaction. If  Row cannot trust Column‘s understanding of  the situation, defection is 
optimal because the second- or third-best payoffs are both preferable to the fourth, 
even if  Column acts from the same uncertainty—where both would end up with their 
second-worst outcome, sharing the hare (73–4). 
The Battle of  the sexes models situations where participants are inclined to cooperate, 
but cannot benefit equally from doing so. The problem is that ‗agreeing to disagree‘ is 
the next worst solution, so that one participant must intend to cooperate while the other 
intends not to. Without coordination, the optimal solutions can only be achieved by 
chance, since there is no rational basis on which to evaluate the other‘s likely behaviour. 
Since both parties prefer the less attractive of  the two coordinated outcomes to either 
of  the rational noncoordinated outcomes, agreement is likely to be negotiated, but 
communication and negotiation will not under all conditions lead to outcomes that are 
socially superior to unilateral and self-interested action (74–5). 
By contrast, in the Prisoner’s dilemma, the rational choice is to cooperate with the 
other player, but a higher payoff  is available to the first player if  the second player goes 
along with this but the first player chooses not to. If  the players cannot trust each other 
and both choose to defect, both receive their second-worst payoff. Prior communication 
could enable players to coordinate their responses to the deal on offer, but the rather 
obvious hazard is that such an agreement is not only not binding, but should one player 
break it unilaterally, the other is in the worst possible position to wreak revenge. When 
played experimentally, with iteration, players typically reward or punish each other by 
employing a simple tit-for-tat strategy such that any defection is met with defection in 
the next game, while cooperation is met with renewed cooperation. However, this 
stability breaks down in multi-actor constellations. Where unilateral defection is a 
dominant strategy for each individual actor, typically the outcome is that several 
participants defect, leading to collectively sub-optimal outcomes. The only 
endogenously available sanction—to punish defection by defecting one‘s self—cannot 
so easily be targeted to the offender (76). Chicken is like the Prisoner‘s Dilemma, but 
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joint defection now has the worst outcome for both players. There is thus pressure to 
cooperate, especially in iterated games where repeatedly punishing a defector with 
defection will systematically harm the retaliating defector. If  iterated games are also 
staggered so that the second player is responding to the action of  the first, the first 
mover always wins (77–8). 
Scharpf  introduces the notion of  interaction orientations to account for the roles that 
such factors as envy, mutual support or gloating may play in resolving game situations. 
The impetus arose from apparently anomalous laboratory results whose interpretation 
required theorists to look beyond failures of  rationality (players being assumed not to 
have understood the games‘ structures). Thibaut & Kelley, pioneers of  social exchange 
theory, found consistent explanations could be found that transformed a ‗given matrix‘, 
which solely noted each subject‘s payoff, into an ‗effective matrix‘ where weight can be 
given to each subject‘s perception of  what the other will receive. The specific form of  
the transformation depends on the nature of  the relationship between the players, 
where considerable variance can be observed as a result of  either one player‘s 
personality traits or the other‘s previous behaviour (85). 
In the following transformations, the general rule is the function Ux = aX + bY where 
Ux is the total utility that is subjectively experienced by a player; X and Y are the 
‗objective‘ payoffs received by each player respectively; and a and b are parameters 
varying between -1 and +1. 
The members of  the selected set of  transformations tend to be ‗social‘ in nature. 
Scharpf  footnotes a further set that are possibly more appropriate to intimately personal 
interactions, but which tend not to impinge on the social sphere.6  
                                                 
6 The ‗personal‘ transformations are: Ux= -1X + 0Y (masochism); Ux= -1X + 1Y (self-sacrifice);  
Ux= -1X - 1Y (mutual destruction); Ux= 0X + 0Y (indolence) 
2 - Standard transformations (Scharpf 1997, 86) 
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The Individualism rule (Ux = X) represents the assumption of  self-interest 
maximization. Only personal gains and losses will be considered. The Solidarity rule 
(Ux = X + Y) defines the precondition of  unrestricted cooperation. Both players value 
gains to themselves or to the other player equally. In the graphical representation, 
desirable outcomes are located above and to the right of  the northwest/southeast 
diagonal, but outcomes can be located to the left of  the vertical axis, where a real loss to 
the self  can be justified by a larger gain to the other. In the Altruism rule (Ux = Y), the 
normative rule of  the helping professions, a gain to the other player will be considered 
as a positive outcome, the self ‘s own payoffs being considered irrelevant. This need not 
presuppose selflessness in the moral sense: In interactions with a patient, a doctor may 
act with exclusive regard for the patient‘s well-being precisely because remuneration is 
not affected by the outcome of  the treatment. 
3 – effective transformations. Cells marked * represent equilibrium outcomes (Scharpf 1997, 88) 
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In the Competition rule (Ux = X – Y), which describes the psychological mechanisms 
of  a need to win, a gain to the self  or a loss to the other will be equally valued—what 
matters is the relative gain. A gain that is overshadowed by a larger gain to the other will 
be counted as a loss, while a loss will be regarded as a victory if  the other party‘s loss is 
greater. The Hostility rule (Ux = -Y), by contrast, describes the psychological 
mechanisms of  hate. In the same way that an altruistic act confers benefit to the other 
irrespective of  the self ‘s gains, the self  under the hostility rule considers any loss to the 
other as a gain to the self, the self ‘s own gains or losses being deemed irrelevant (85–6). 
The impact of  these transformations on the original matrices can be striking. Both 
‗competitive‘ and ‗solidaristic‘ transformations of  the Prisoner‘s Dilemma simplify it 
substantially. The ‗competitive‘ rule converts all varieties of  constellations into zero-sum 
games. Cooperation—predicated on the notion of  common interest—is ruled out, and 
negotiation, ‗cheap talk‘ at best, is likely to be regarded as an attempt to deceive. The 
recommendation urged by theory in such circumstances is that a player should follow a 
‗maximin‘ strategy that will maximise the minimal payoff  in the worst case. Thus, in the 
Prisoner‘s Dilemma the Row player should choose the bottom row—where the 
minimum payoff  would be zero—rather than the top row, where it would be -3. 
Likewise, the Column player should choose the right-hand column. By contrast, 
‗cooperative‘ transformations convert all kinds of  actor constellations into ‗games of  
pure coordination‘ in which actors are only interested in coordinating their choices on a 
solution that produces the best combined payoffs. (87) 
 Both ‗battles of  the sexes‘ grid forms used by Scharpf  are 
recognized by that name in the literature (Kilgour & Fraser 
1988, 109); why he switches from one to the other is not 
clear. However, the dissonance draws attention to an 
imprecision behind the apparent clarity provided by the 
numbers. Suppose that the issue being modelled in these 
grids is ‗doing what he wants to do‘ versus ‗doing what she wants to do‘—a 
conventional battle-of-the-sexes scenario. In the former version, the coordinated 
responses correspond at worst (1,1) to both doing what the other wants to do (implicitly 
alone) and at best doing what each wants to do by themselves (2,2), while one partner 
defecting—going along with what the other wants—makes both happy, though the one 
who gets their way is obviously the happiest (clearly, cf. Knobe, there are multiple 
intentions involved here). In the latter version, the same story sees the stipulations 
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coordinating on the one or the other will make both happy, though differentially as 
before; failing to coordinate will make neither party happy.  
 
What would happen to Scharpf ‘s grids if  we applied one kind of  transformation to one 
party, and a different kind to the other, so that (for instance) the row player is 
attempting to behave competitively while the column player is playing individualistically, 
as we might imagine of  Grice‘s £5 actors? We would probably have to say that the 
narrative valence of  the construct had broken down, and for a fairly clear reason: a third 
dimension, by which the two actors arrived in the grid, has come into view. Previously, 
although implicitly present, this dimension was functionally irrelevant as though being 
viewed head-on. The symmetry of  the grid neatly parodies the transactional capacities 
of  the mirror neuron system discussed previously, but drawing in the historical 
dimension requires further neural theorization. 
Recall the difficulty in reconciling the mind–tool ontology with the notion of  
representation raised previously (in section 6.1.1). For the brain to be able to fabricate 
mind-tools reliably but flexibly there is implicitly a cyclical relationship with the 
immediate environment, an environment that might very well have been shaped 
deliberately to foster certain cycles and to minimize or exclude others. In this 
rhizomorphic picture, it may be intention that furnishes an essential modulation, 
ouverture—the opening, priming, thematic statement that asks questions of  the cycles 
and adapts to their replies. A particularly acute question concerns the role of  mirror 
neuron physiology, and related empathic capacities, in the absence of  conspecifics.  
In ‗The Brain‘s Concepts‘, Gallese & Lakoff  (2005) argue that concepts are elementary 
units of  reason, conventional and relatively stable, which must somehow result from 
neural activity in the brain. The broadly functionalist orthodoxy is that concepts are 
abstract, amodal, and arbitrary, made up of  symbols and having such properties as 
productivity and compositionality. The trouble has always been that the symbol begs its 
own question. For a symbol to symbolize, it must already participate in its extension. 
Gallese & Lakoff  propose that conceptual knowledge comes about as the consequence 
of  embodied autopoietic potentiality, and that the sensorimotor system plays a critical 
role in operationalizing this. Imagining and acting, they stress, use the same neural 
apparatus, leading them to propose that ‗understanding is imagination, and that what you 
understand of  a sentence in a context is the meaning of  that sentence in that context‘ (455–6). For 
example, the action-concept ‗grasp‘ gets its meaning—it‘s ‗concept-ness‘, if  you like—
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from the parallel capacities of  performing, perceiving and inferring the physical act of  
grasping. The same neural architecture participates in all three aspects. 
Evidence accumulated since the 1990s shows that cortical premotor areas possess 
sensory properties:  
They contain neurons that respond to visual, somatosensory, and auditory stimuli. Posterior parietal 
areas, traditionally considered to process and associate purely sensory information, in fact play a 
major role in motor control. The premotor and parietal areas, rather than having separate and 
independent functions, are neurally integrated not only to control action, but also to serve the 
function of  constructing an integrated representation of  (1) actions together with (2) objects acted on 
and (3) locations toward which actions are directed (459–60). 
Just as the traditional notion of  a ‗central meaner‘ finds no place in Dennett‘s multiple 
drafts model of  consciousness, the old notion of  supramodality—that sensorimotor 
integration is achieved at some ‗higher‘ level where separate modules are brought 
together in a putative ‗association area‘—is not sustained by research data. Rather, 
several classes of  premotor and parietal neurons are inherently ‗multimodal‘. The firing 
of  a single neuron may correlate with either performing, perceiving or imagining an 
action, meeting Gallese & Lakoff ‘s proposed condition that an action-concept must fit 
both the performance and perception of  the action. Multimodality is not consistent 
with the idea of  strict modularity. Supramodality accords with a picture of  the brain 
containing separate modules for action and for perception that require the assistance of  
a ‗central meaner‘ to coordinate; multimodality denies the existence of  such separate 
modules. 
Instead of  modules, Gallese & Lakoff  adopt a notion of  parameterization whereby the 
same substrate is capable of  multiple phases of  performance stabilized by sensory 
feedback. The cat‘s transitions between walking, trotting and galloping are presented as 
an example: the step patterns for each are robust and discrete, licensing a distinction 
between the neuronal firing frequency (parameter) and settled pattern (value). Whether 
simulation plays a part in the cat‘s transition from stalking (slow walking) to pouncing 
(short gallop) is a question that goes unasked (perhaps because the research cited was 
conducted in a laboratory). The transition has to be initiated at just the right time in 
order to maintain the element of  surprise while minimizing the target‘s scope for evasive 
action.  
An action such as moving an object involves parameters for direction and force whose 
values determine where and how hard one pushes. If  sufficient force is required, 
pushing comes to shoving—an act that requires a different motor programme: setting 
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the weight on the back foot, and so on. Gallese & Lakoff  insist on a distinction between 
parameter structures and actions (real, observed and imagined). While action is 
dynamically and contextually adapted, parameters are fixed. This may be a firmer claim 
than absolutely necessary, made in order to maintain compatibility with the modular 
orthodoxy. They go on to claim that  
…parameters and their values are accessible to consciousness, while anything below the parameter 
value level is inaccessible.  
Similarly, language may express parameters and their values, but language cannot express anything 
below the level of  parameter values (464).  
By this somewhat creaky fiat, they make language an explicit element in their argument, 
resting on the notion of  ‗basic-level‘ category. In hierarchies such as furniture/ chair/ 
rocking chair, or vehicle/ car/ sports car, they claim that the characteristic of  the ‗basic‘ 
level is that it is embodied. This is somewhat in accord with the notion of  individuation 
discussed in the previous chapter. The embodied has a simple familiarity that is 
analogous to the precided particularity yielded by Dehaene‘s code-switching. However, 
the underdetermination of  the related universal (furniture, vehicle) has an implicit 
instability that affords, or even primes, the faculty of  preciding.  
What is interesting is the way in which artefacts support the extension of  
conceptualizations that are initially embodied. The deep question is whether artefacts 
exploit cerebral structure to effect a sustained and in some degree indelible translation in 
the brain, such that once technologized, the brain does not easily become de-
technologized. If  the answer to this deep question is ‗yes, that is (more or less) what 
happens‘ then a second deep question arises: how many routes interweave, how many 
plateaux do the routes connect, and at how many levels? Is there only one outcome—
the rational actor—or are there several stable configurations, each of  which might be 
thought of  as a troupe of  actors performing the plays that their particular set of  
intersubjective technologies insist they rehearse?   
The definition of  ‗technology‘ required by the question as parsed in the previous 
paragraph rests in large measure on the analysis of  function and tool use from the 
previous chapter, allied to further attention to the Peircean understanding of  chance 
that will develop in part three. Before we get there, though, we need to pay further 
attention to the fabrication of  mind–tools. In particular, it is the capacity to harvest 
intersubjective, intentional and implicative transactions and to reify them in the absence 




Recombination is a term that applies to the shuffling of genes during ‗The formation by 
a sexual process of genotypes that differ from both the parental genotypes‘ (OED). It is 
the means by which fidelity is highly conserved so that offspring closely resemble their 
parents without being clones of one or the other. It is theorized that the benefit of this 
is to afford protection against genes whose propagation would be detrimental to the 
genotype‘s inclusive fitness (Haig & Grafen 1991; Grafen 2006). 
The term ‗recombinant‘ has come to mean a more specifically artificial intervention, 
where a genetic engineer might splice a gene from one species into the DNA sequence 
of another. Implicitly, this action may have effects and consequences besides or in 
addition to those sought. Although individual genes are chemically complex, they are 
compositional particulars. This makes it hazardous to draw an analogy with intentions, 
which cannot be regarded as compositional in the same way. Nevertheless, the 
distinction between ‗recombination‘ and ‗recombinant‘, applied to intention, echoes the 
arguments between Austin and Feyerabend for and against ‗ordinary language‘: one 
privileges stability; the other, change. 
The term ‗recombinant intentionality‘ makes a similar modulation from ‗natural‘ 
occurrence to deliberate action, with similar scope afforded for unexpected 
consequences. The key aspect of it, though, is the capacity for implementations of 
fungible (nouny) representation to induce performances from intentionally-aware actors 
in the absence of the sign-maker. In simple terms, this chapter develops themes from 
the previous one, focusing on the material–semiotic realization of intention and 
implicature, complementing the third-person aspect to the fetch of an intention with a 
sense of ‗put‘, giving specific emphasis to the role of the hand in making signs.  
To begin with, let us reacquaint ourselves with two ideas that have emerged along the 
way. One is the passage point, which first occurred in chapter 2.2.1, and has mutated 
into a placeholding alternative to the notion of representation. The other is ‗movie-
time‘, from chapter 5.4.1, the idea that humans have the capacity to shuffle and 
rearrange ‗cognitive instances‘ (a deliberately loose term) remote from the environment 
in which the original experience might have occurred. A simple, singular vehicle for 
these ideas is the term ‗anaphora‘, though the simplicity is deceptive. The term has a 
rhetorical meaning, and also (in the form of ‗anaphor‘) a more precise, derived linguistic 
term. The concept is valuable in part because of this capacity to show two 
complementary faces, one being oral and the other literate. It is able to take the 
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theoretical load of founding a scalable series of mind-tools capable of operationalizing 
‗movie-time‘.  
Literally, anaphora means ‗carrying back‘, and is thus animated with the state of 
evaluating or hypothesizing so that the term‘s relationship with what has gone before 
becomes meaningful. Again, the distinct cognitive processes marshalled in acts of vocal 
communication, as opposed to manual communication, are dramatized in a single term; 
an implicative ‗towards-which‘ is in tension with a hylozoic ‗where-from‘. If ‗ordinary 
language‘ is an equipmental hoard of common-sense indubitables, of unextended 
particulars, the anaphor further distils the attendant sense of fungibility. The 
mathematical term ‗eigenvector‘ is a further, ultimate distillation of equipmentality, from 
which we can build out—technologize—and stabilize our relationship with 
environmental flux.  
In the polyphonic model, the term ‗eigenvector‘ most reliably characterizes the sensory 
strand, in terms of the faithfulness with which one conspecific can assume that the 
other shares a sensory experience. However, this sensory experience is shared (more or 
less) well beyond the human domain. Psychological polyphony is more obviously 
unique, but less reliably shared, owing to differences in gender and age (for instance) 
among conspecifics; semiotic polyphony is less reliable again, since it is dependent on 
the local environment. If you have never seen an olive, you need no word for ‗olive 
green‘. 
 
A familiar argument in the philosophy of the extended mind is that cognition in general, 
and human cognition in a particularly refined degree, uses the environment as one vast 
storage space. If we are to treat anaphor as a category of mind–tool that operationalizes 
an explicitly stigmergic mode of performativity in the environment so conceived, then 
we need to develop a sense of how we are able to index this storage space.1 Historically, 
the thought that humans are a good deal more efficient at navigating search-space than 
traditional symbol-processing computers is one of the influences that prompted the 
emergence of parallel-distributed-processing models in the 1980s (Clark 1989, 1993; 
Opie 1998). In retrospect, this emergence complemented a model of computing 
operations based on the human capacity for precise individuation with one based on the 
                                                 
1 ‗Stigmergic‘ derives from stigma = sign + ergon = work, cf Clark 1997, 73–5.  
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capacity for approximation that was previously considered (if it was considered at all) to 
be waste material, the proverbial ‗doesn‘t matter‘. 
Modern search algorithms exploit both dimensions. In approximate terms, the Google 
search engine indexes web pages by analysing patterns in the relationships between pages. 
This ‗nodes and authorities‘ coupling works well, and is suggestive of a mind–tool 
category that may be transparent across the somatic boundary. In other words, the 
hypothesis-formulation that goes on inside the brain has its counterpart in the way 
natural and artificial semiotics feed and interact with sensory traffic. Authorities 
correspond to working hypotheses: as long as a hypothesis withstands scrutiny, it has 
authority; a hypothesis being inherently relational, it will inherently require a plurality of 
authority. Nodes, or foci, are provisional concentrations of data about data, and 
information can be inferred from the way in which these data relate to each other. 
Although Google is perhaps the most familiar name among the pioneers of the 
technology in question, the search logic they implemented is discussed by Jon Kleinberg 
(1999) in a paper that serves as the foundation for arguments presented by Andy Clark 
in his (2002b) paper ‗Local Associations and Global Reason‘, which addresses the 
problem of modelling hypothesis formulation. The underlying issue, the dynamic 
negotiation of authority, arises in Bruno Latour‘s (1987) exploration of the social 
processes that underpin the accumulation of influence in the natural sciences. 
Developing the Foucauldian sense of signature as an act of authorization, Latour‘s text 
draws on citation indexing, a field of scholarly endeavour consolidated in the 1970s as a 
technique for evaluating the worth of scientific papers, and a field that owes something 
to Peirce‘s work on indices a century previously. 
Latour cites Eugene Garfield as the authoritative source on citation indexing 
(algorithmic historiography, as Garfield calls it). Garfield identified the need, in the 
1950s, for a means to evaluate contributions to the scientific literature in terms of the 
scholarship an individual work makes reference to. Citation indexing can reveal the 
currents of thought that carry forward the propagation of knowledge. Latour (1987, 21–
62) explores the rhetorical dimension of the patterns revealed in citation analysis, 
noting: 
The presence or the absence of references, quotations and footnotes is so much a sign that a 
document is serious or not that you can transform a fact into a fiction or a fiction into fact just by 
adding or subtracting references (33). 
Performativities 7: Recombinant intentionality 166 
For the author of a paper, says Latour, the rhetorical tactic is to interrogate the prior 
literature in such a way as to make it as valuable as possible to the position being argued. 
Accomplishing this includes speaking with due humility; securing lines of 
communication to authoritative sources; aiding vulnerable allies; getting opponents to 
fight each other; undermining or neutralizing opponents. For any paper to survive as an 
authoritative source in turn, however, it needs to be able withstand exactly these tactics 
in the hands of others. At best, the new paper will become a classic like Einstein‘s or 
Turing‘s; if not then the best hope is for it to become a locus of debate; if the tone of 
the debate is harsh then the paper will probably join the forgotten; it may alternatively, 
survive in garbled form as other scholars help themselves to tangential ideas that may 
emerge; worst of all, the paper may be ignored entirely (37–41). 
The force of Whitehead‘s famous remark that all philosophy is no more than a series of 
footnotes to Plato was to emphasize the futility of attempting to harmonize a synoptic 
ontology out of the widely divergent philosophical opinions accumulated over the 
centuries. It is interesting, though, that Plato himself makes extensive use of citation—
more so than Aristotle, since citation fits the dialectic style so well: a good deal of 
knowledge about prior Greek philosophy comes either from Plato‘s writing or from 
research prompted by it. 
 
The efficient navigation of search-space has been an abiding concern in Andy Clark‘s 
work. In Microcognition he remarks that the function of heuristic search methods ‗is 
precisely to increase the intelligence of the system by reducing the extent of the search 
space it must traverse to solve a particular problem‘ (1989, 122). He goes on to identify 
the connectionist phenomenon of cross-talk as a specific type of ‗creative error‘ 
characteristic of human thought processes. In connectionist simulations, retrieved data 
might be lightly garbled in the same kind of way that a human might mix up two similar 
telephone numbers. The source of the problem—superpositional storage, to cut a long 
story short—is also, he argues, ‗the source of much of the power and flexibility of such 
systems. The tendency to generalize is one example of this‘ (123). From the classical 
perspective, which solely valorizes consistency in the performance of retrieval, cross-talk 
is regarded as a nuisance. From the connectionist perspective, the phenomenon begins 
to suggest that ‗something else is there‘, something other than the explicitly-encoded 
data that is ‗meant‘ to be there. 
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In Associative Engines (1993) the concern with heuristic search has developed into his 
signature concept of the embodiment of an organism‘s relationship with the distal 
environment: 
Consider, however, a somewhat different range of cases: cases in which a system can in fact access 
certain information (i.e., generate an internal representation of it), but only in virtue of some wider 
processing environment than that constituted by its onboard processing and storage apparatus. For 
example, I may be able to further exploit the individual parts of some problem solution only if I am 
augmented by some external memory (paper and pencil), or I may be able to retrieve and deploy 
some specific item of information only in a particular external setting (one in which it is cued by a 
written reminder) (1993, 127–8). 
A concrete domestic example furnished in Being There (1997) helps to develop the point. 
A classical approach to modelling the problem of locating a particular coffee cup might 
focus on properties such as shape and capacity. For the human, though, a property such 
as its colour might prime the search since colour is computationally cheap to detect. 
Because the human is sensitive to context too—a yellow blob near the kitchen sink, for 
instance, attracting the subject‘s attention—this search is context-dependent and non-
generalizable; additionally it is, as Clark puts it, ‗heavily agent-o-centric‘ (1997, 149–50). 
It is, however, much more efficient than the ‗classical‘ method.  
The problem is to isolate semantically significant content from the noise and rubbish 
that characterizes the global search space. Content involves reference, whether to 
objects, properties, or relations. The classical model builds content from, for instance, 
Fregean sense and reference, or from Russellian objects and properties, but effectively 
they are built from a self-contained, noise-free, rubbish-free base. For the 
environmentally-coupled model, ‗…representational contents of such states can often 
involve referential relations to external entities with which thinkers are causally quite 
unconnected‘ (Papineau 1994), and thus, conceivably, anything might be relevant. Noise 
and rubbish are the net remainder, but of course one person‘s noise is another‘s music; 
the problem of framing content in the first place is merely displaced. 
This problem has emerged as a key issue, both in the Artificial Intelligence field, and in 
the various avenues of cognitive science that pursue a symbiotic programme with it. To 
this point, I have been using the term ‗anaphor‘ fairly casually. The frame problem 
concerns just how, and under what conditions, something becomes an anaphor and, in 
that process of reification, becomes a pragmatic passage point with the capacity to 
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engross the interpretant in further refinement and resolution of an initial hypothesis.2 As 
Clark puts it: ‗It is the puzzle of finding the right stuff (information, data) to consider 
(update, or use in reasoning) at the right time‘, a puzzle that has Jerry Fodor ‗worried half 
to death‘ (2002b, 3/16). Clark goes on to cite Fodor‘s gloss of the problem as an issue in 
cognitive science: 
The frame problem is a name for one aspect of the question how to reconcile a local notion of 
mental computation with the apparent holism of rational inference; in particular with the fact that 
information that is relevant to the optimal solution of an abductive problem can, in principle, come 
from anywhere in the network of one‘s prior epistemic commitments (Clark 2002b, 4/16). 
Fodor‘s signature concept is the so-called ‗language of thought‘ (LOT, or sometimes 
LOTH—the H standing for ‗hypothesis‘), a compositional model in which ‗thoughts‘, 
or propositions, are assembled according to theoretically tractable formal procedures, a 
model closely associated with the ‗classical‘ approach to artificial intelligence mentioned 
previously: 
A thought is depicted as a structure of internal representational elements, combined in a lawful way, 
and playing a certain functional role in an internal processing economy. … Public language words 
pick out real inner representational complexes which are causally potent and thus capable of bringing 
about actions. … What distinguishes an intentional action from a mere reflex is … the fact that 
intervening between input and action there is, in the intentional case, an episode of actual tokening 
of an appropriate symbol string. (Clark 1994) 
Clark finds the elegance of this seductive—hence his ongoing engagement—but he 
cautions against three potentially lethal pitfalls. The first objection is that LOT entails 
commitment to a strong nativism that requires all the potential resources necessary to 
operationalize this ‗language‘ in mature specimens to be implicit in the individual 
organism from conception. Secondly, LOT entails a representational atomism that 
                                                 
2 The Frame Problem, posed as an issue in artificial intelligence by McCarthy and Hayes in 1969, concerns 
how to express a dynamical domain in logic without explicitly specifying which conditions are not 
affected by an action. Folklore has it that the approach emerged at MIT in cross-pollination with a class 
Hubert Dreyfus was teaching on Husserl‘s concept of noema:  
The noema must contain a rule describing all the features which can be expected with certainty in 
exploring a certain type of object—features which remain ―inviolably the same: as long as the 
objectivity remains intended as this one and of this kind  The rule must also prescribe 
―predelineations‖  of properties that are possible but not necessary features of this type of 
object: Instead of a completely determined sense, there is always, therefore, a frame of empty sense. 
(Professor Dreyfus kindly supplied this self-citation by e-mail 25-3-08) 
There is, on the face of it, a correlation worth exploring between this aspect of Husserl, Peirce‘s diamond, 
and Callon‘s OPP. In rhetoric, a noema is ‗an obscure and subtle speech‘ (Burton 2007), speech that gives 
up its meaning only at the expense of close and detailed contemplation. 
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restricts semantic structure; and finally, under LOT, globally sensitive information 
processing is an intrinsically intractable problem.  
The first two of these objections, in classical AI terms, concern inflexibility in the face 
of environmental variables or alternatively combinatorial explosion stemming from a 
priori attempts to anticipate such challenges. The frame problem concerns the third 
objection; the frame problem is precisely where the orderliness of the language of 
thought hypothesis breaks down altogether. For the environmentally-coupled model, 
the problem is compounded: in the face of global plenitude, how to discriminate? The 
environmentally coupled organism may be able to devolve specific resources to fellow 
organisms and to the environment it shares with them. Further, the identification, 
negotiation and ratification of any given code need not occur until required. However, 
while the computational load may be theoretically tractable in a way that the classical 
model cannot match, the suggestion that Kleinberg‘s procedure offers the means for 
achieving such tractability, or at least a promising research direction, underlines the fact 
that the frame problem has not disappeared but has merely been displaced.  
The algorithms discussed by Kleinberg suggest that all may not, after all, be lost. The 
domain Kleinberg‘s (1999) paper addresses—the World Wide Web—is virtually 
synonymous with the idea of unfolding action. Indeed, addressing the parameters of the 
problem initially, Kleinberg speaks of ‗global‘ searching of the Web in terms that suggest 
a finite boundary between Web and not-Web, but later he cites the dynamism of the 
environment in terms that acknowledge its unfinalizability. Key to Kleinberg‘s argument 
is the observation that, while individuals impose local order on that corner of the Web 
for which they are personally responsible, the global organization of the set of pages 
that constitutes the Web as a whole is totally unplanned. Nevertheless, Kleinberg shows, 
the data inscribed in the decisions individuals make when creating links between pages 
in their local domain can be harvested and processed to yield valuable, informed search 
results.  
Kleinberg identifies three classes of query, each of which poses a different problem for 
the search engine: specific topic queries, broad topic queries, and similar page queries. 
Of these, the first is held to be tractable within the limitations of classical database 
search techniques; it is the second and third, the broad topic and similar topic queries 
that Clark (2002b) focuses on. Although Kleinberg‘s technique operates on Fodorese 
syntactic elements, it operates on the relationships between discrete and sometimes 
disparate instantiations of elements that are sufficiently similar to fall within the remit of 
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the same query. This, Clark surmises, may give some theoretical purchase on the way 
that the brain manages broad-search tasks. 
The nature of the core problem with broad topic queries is the sheer volume of material 
with potential relevance and thus the difficulty of identifying authoritative material. 
Kleinberg uses the example of ‗Harvard‘. One day there were 52 million pages 
containing the word (today may be different; that is in the nature of the Web). By what 
means would one determine that the domain name www.harvard.edu ought to be 
among the authoritative responses, when, for the university, using the name Harvard 
would be equivalent to an individual talking about themselves in the third person? 
Similarly, the result for a search on ‗search engine‘ might be skewed by the fact that the 
websites of prominent search engines do not use the term to describe themselves. This 
is where the analysis of relationship enters the picture. Kleinberg says: ‗Hyperlinks 
encode a considerable amount of latent human judgment, and we claim that this type of 
judgment is precisely what is needed to formulate a notion of authority‘ (606). 
Kleinberg‘s procedure applies eigenvector-based heuristics to a fixed set of 
conventionally-indexed pages. In this context, ‗heuristics‘ are context-independent 
algorithms that give satisfactory results in a variety of situations at cost of precision with 
respect to any particular situation. Conventional indexing assumes that a page 
containing a precise match for the query search string is the best match. Referring back 
to the initial outlining of the frame problem, the eigenvector corresponds coarsely to 
that which remains unaltered in the belief database after updating: 
In mathematics, an eigenvector of a transformation is a non-null vector whose direction is 
unchanged by that transformation. The factor by which the magnitude is scaled is called the 
eigenvalue of that vector. … ―Eigen‖ can be translated as ―own‖, ―peculiar to‖, ―characteristic‖ or 
―individual‖—emphasizing how important eigenvalues are to defining the unique nature of a specific 
transformation. (Wikipedia entry on Eigenvalue, eigenvector and eigenspace, accessed 10 May 2006) 
Given the number of pages containing the word ‗Harvard‘, most of which probably 
have several hyperlinks encoded, links of themselves would seem only to invite 
combinatorial explosion. What contains and defeats this potential is the assumption that 
patterns of association may be determined by analysing the relationships at a deeper 
level: 
Our model is based on the relationship that exists between the authorities for a topic and those 
pages that link to many related authorities—we refer to pages of this latter type as hubs. We observe 
that a certain natural type of equilibrium exists between hubs and authorities in the graph defined by 
the link structure, and we exploit this to develop an algorithm that identifies both types of pages 
simultaneously. (607) 
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hub pages … are pages that have links to multiple relevant authoritative pages. It is these hub pages 
that ―pull together‖ authorities on a common topic, and allow us to throw out unrelated pages of 
large in-degree. …  
Hubs and authorities exhibit what could be called a mutually reinforcing relationship: a good hub is a 
page that points to many good authorities; a good authority is a page that is pointed to by many good 
hubs. (611, emphasis inherited) 
In the intrinsic mutuality of this coupling, and its on-demand dynamism, lies its power. 
If one performs a similarity search on a corporation in a competitive market such as the 
automobile industry (www.ford.com, let‘s say), the resulting list defeats the natural 
tendency of each individual corporation‘s website to avoid publicizing the products of 
its rivals, let alone providing hyperlinks leading to such rival products. 
Clark sees parallels between this property of the global set of web pages and the 
connectionist approach, which stores data not in syntactic units but as weights 
distributed between nodes, blurring the distinction between processing and 
representation. First-generation connectionist architectures were far too simple to 
simulate global abductive inference, but Clark cites promising second-generation work: 
These ―control neurons‖ serve to open and close channels of activity, and allow for the creation of a 
kind of instantaneous, context-sensitive modular cortical architecture: control neurons weave 
functional models ―on the hoof‘, in a way sensitive to the effects of context, attention and so on. … 
Related proposals include Edelman and Mountcastle‘s work on ―reentrant processing‖ in which 
feedback and feedforward pathways are used to control and co-ordinate activity in multiples sites, 
and Damasio and Damasio‘s (1994) notion of ―convergence zones‖, which are neuronal populations 
which likewise initiate and co-ordinate activity in multiple neuronal groups. (2002b, 11/16) 
A key property shared by these approaches is their distributed nature. Individual units 
by themselves have no syntactic properties. Such properties, when realized, are (more or 
less) the emergent consequence of units‘ interactions. But these interactions are 
conditioned (as they are not in first-generation models) in part by the structure of their 
organization.  
 
The application of Kleinberg‘s algorithm, Clark speculates, might contribute to the 
expansion of second-generation capabilities to the point where the frame problem 
might be tackled. The underlying puzzle animating this train of thought is made plain 
when Clark draws a link, in his concluding remarks, with previous work in collaboration 
with Annette Karmiloff-Smith concerning the concept of representational redescription 
(RR). Karmiloff-Smith‘s field is cognitive development. The prevailing view when she 
began to develop the theory of RR in the late 1970s was that developmental learning is 
accomplished through negative feedback—learning by one‘s mistakes, to put it crudely. 
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RR does not deny that such mechanisms play an important role, but Karmiloff-Smith 
‗felt obliged to lay great stress on the fact that RR could also be internally and 
spontaneously generated‘ (Clark & Karmiloff-Smith 1993b), and could be the 
beneficiary of positive feedback too. Humans, as Clark elsewhere puts it, ‗are compelled 
by endogenous forces to go beyond simple success in a domain and to seek a more 
abstract representation of the strategies which brought success‘ (1993, 77–8).‘  
The attraction, for Clark, of Kleinberg‘s algorithm, connects to the PDP approach to 
the problem of representation. According to Clark & Toribio (1994), 
Classicists opted for a ‗quasi-sentential‘ approach in which key contents were tokenable as strings of 
symbols, and were operated on by a ‗read/write/copy‘ architecture. By contrast, connectionists 
opted for an architecture in which representation and processing were deeply intertwined, and 
strings of symbols participating in ‗cut and paste‘ processing were replaced by episodes of vector to 
vector transformation in high dimensional state spaces (403). 
RR would conjecturally figure in the progress towards ever richer dimensionality, 
securing regimes of semantic mapping and making them available for higher-level, 
computationally economical heuristics to exploit. However, Karmiloff-Smith‘s RR, for 
Clark (1993, loc. cit.), shares the failings of the Language of Thought: the elegance is 
seductive, but the theorization is not sufficiently robust to account for encounters with 
the real world of human interaction with the environment. 
This is not surprising, given that the two terms Representation and Redescription owe 
their significance, in this context, to the meaning of the other. We have already 
rehearsed the difficulty concerning the ambiguity of ‗representation‘ as noun and verb. 
In the case of verbal use, there is inevitably a performative dimension as the significance 
of the representation is being contested to a lesser or greater degree, whether in the 
enthymematic interpretation of a work of art, or in the rigorous examination of evidence 
in a laboratory or court of law. As a noun, the term has the parallel disadvantage of 
being pressed to service in any and every instance of experience that conjoins 
hermeneutics and semiosis. Schwartz (1994) raises two questions: ‗What is it that 
distinguishes items that serve as representations from other objects or events? And what 
distinguishes the various kinds of symbols from each other?‘ In respect of the second 
question, Schwartz cites Peirce and later work by Nelson Goodman (1976), whose 
analysis falls in line with the code-switching scenario discussed previously.  
In respect of the first question, Schwartz says that ‗Representations, along with mental 
states, especially beliefs and thoughts, are said to exhibit INTENTIONALITY in that they 
refer to or stand for something else.‘ This statement makes explicit the coupling 
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between thoughts (the ‗structure of internal representational elements, combined in a 
lawful way‘ as defined by Fodor‘s LOTH, cf. previous section) and the range of things 
we purposefully put there in the environment to remind ourselves of these thoughts.  
Representational Redescription, as Karmiloff-Smith applies the term, refers to a set of 
staged learning outcomes broadly related to the childhood acquisition of language and 
literacy, and by extension the skills recruited to the dynamic management of thought. I 
will turn to this developmental-process aspect shortly. First, though, a specific and 
useful example of the instantiation of these skills in adulthood is provided by Andy 
Clark (2001a, 147–50; 2001b, 17ff), following research conducted by Van Leeuwen, 
Verstijnen and Hekkert into the practices of visual artists. These subjects‘ practices are 
‗heavily dependent on ―an interactive process of imagining, sketching and evaluating‖‘ 
(147).  
The focus of van Leeuwen et al. is the function of sketch-making in the creative process. 
Why do painters make preparatory sketches, rather than executing their conception 
directly and immediately to the frame? In fact van Leeuwen et al. over-commit to the 
notion of abstract art, and to the sketch: the same argument applies equally well, in 
respect of the specialized definition of ‗abstract‘, in historical terms from Impressionism 
onwards in one sense, and as far back as any instance of extant sketchbooks such as 
Leonardo‘s permit in another. Further, as Galenson (2001) points out, in the work of 
such artists as Paul Cezanne or Jasper Johns, one commitment to the frame should be 
regarded as the sketching of the next commitment to the frame with more theoretical 
weight than the banal conception of ‗artist‘s thumbprint‘ can capture.  
What van Leeuwen et al. uncover is a sharp distinction between the capacity for 
manipulating abstract mental images—for thinking about images—and the way in which 
perceptive faculties parse incoming sense data. In particular, synthesis is easier to 
perform in real-time than analysis—while it is fairly simple to look at the letters D and J, 
and imagine them recombined to form the shape of an umbrella, decomposing complex 
forms into simpler components on the fly is much more difficult.  
Certain forms of abstract art, it is then argued, depend heavily on the deliberate creation of 
‗multilayered meanings‘—cases in which a visual form, on continued inspection, supports multiple 
different structural interpretations. Given the postulated constraints on mental imagery, it is likely 
that the discovery of such multiply interpretable forms will depend heavily on the kind of trial-and-
error process in which we first sketch and then perceptually (not imaginatively) reencounter the 
forms, which we can then tweak and resketch so as to create an increasingly multilayered set of 
structural interpretations. (149) 
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The relationship between iteration and environmental feedback, between externalizing 
and re-assimilating is, Clark stresses, integral to some forms of artistic cognition. 
Barbara Tversky suggests additionally that sketching is intrinsically analytical, eo ipso 
eliminating the irrelevant. Reconstructing the relevant, however, is a skilled activity: in 
an experiment where trained designers and laypeople were shown abstract, ambiguous 
sketches and asked to generate interpretations, the experts generated a greater number 
than laypeople were able to (Tversky 1999; 2002).  
What usefully isolates creativity as a performance, in these terms, is precisely the 
focused, iterative attention—the element of intentional return. The defect in the 
convenient approximation of this procedure as ‗trial-and-error‘ lies with the second 
term, ‗error‘. It‘s a determinist‘s word. The term I would substitute is simply ‗feed‘. 
Developing Karmiloff-Smith‘s initial concern about failure-led learning, any ‗trial‘ is 
subject to a range of feedback possibilities, from negative to positive, passing through 
no-feedback-at-all. Negative versus positive is a false opposition. What matters for a 
learning experience is that feedback occurs at all; more often than not the null feedback 
response is the norm. Rather than an opposition between positive and negative 
feedback, then, the appropriate modifier that fosters creativity is the idea of feedforward.  
In information theory, feed-forward behaviour is predefined response to measured 
perturbation, especially when the state after perturbation is stable in such environments 
as gene regulation of growth. In this sense the sketch is a temporary eigenvector, 
enabling the experimental exploration of a local space that can subsequently be re-
sketched as stability is established, stretched in the sense discussed in relation to 
tuning in chapter 5, or etched in the sense in which a product is finalized and presented 
for inspection. The product can be a work of art, and equally it can be the reporting of 
experimental data in a scientific paper. Feedforward, thus conceived, is a natural internal 
correlate to the hubs-and-authorities query model discussed above. 
Marshall McLuhan, following I.A. Richards, uses the term ‗feedforward‘ in a different 
way, meaning the anticipation in a speaker of the listener‘s potential response to what is 
spoken. Given the continuity between this interactive discursive mode in the research of 
Simon Garrod (e.g. Fay, Garrod & Carletta 2000; Garrod & Pickering 2004), and his 
current work on meiosis effects in graphical interaction, the mental correlation 
suggested by McLuhan may connect fruitfully to the more technical sense. 
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We are evolving a definition of the individual subject‘s relationship with local search-
space that establishes oral language and cognate semiotic schemes as the ordinal 
constituents of a relatively stable local network of referents that combine the economy 
implicit in stability with a degree of flexibility that enables the subject to develop 
adaptive hypothetical responses to perturbations in the local environment that fall 
outwith the hermeneutic scope of the referent network. It is not yet clear, though, to 
what extent this skill-set is the same thing as literacy. Trans-domain cognitive flexibility 
is regarded as the distinctive feature of humanity tout court, but some of the skills that 
facilitate the performance of representational redescription seem to depend explicitly on 
the acquisition of a set of mind-tools that correspond not to oral language but to literacy 
(broadly defined). We need to place RR in its developmental context. 
We saw previously that current neurophysiological research in the area of 
intersubjectivity and the dual observation/action functionality of mirror neurons offers 
richly promising lines of theoretical development concerning long-standing 
philosophical problems such as the nature of intuition. We discovered, however, that 
while mirror neurons may help us understand the performative differential between 
humans and our nearest evolutionary relations, the explanatory power vested in 
intersubjectivity is sapped by the problem of conceptualization. Already, around the 
lower age range discussed by Clark and Karmiloff-Smith—three years—children 
(normatively speaking) have developed not only linguistic skills far in excess of any adult 
primate, but a proactive curiosity about their immediate environment and the manual 
dexterity to pursue that curiosity.  
Gallese, Keysers and Rizzolatti (2004) make the same shift from first- to third-person 
that characterizes Dennett‘s move from phenomenology (the first-person experience) to 
heterophenomenology (the evidence reported to the researcher of others‘ first-person 
experience) when they state that: 
A crucial element of social cognition is the brain‘s capacity to directly link the first- and third person 
experiences of these phenomena (i.e. link ‗I do and I feel‘ with ‗he does and he feels‘).  
Implicitly, the ‗he‘ in this citation is a present ‗he‘, and we have to deal with an ambiguity 
between the sense of second- and third-person arising from the physiological context. I 
take it that in oral contexts, it is available to me to conceive a thought about another both 
as a ‗you‘ thought and a ‗he‘ thought—the former being perhaps the more sophisticated 
since it would implicitly be a communicative thought: ―I think you think so-and-so, and 
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now let me corroborate my hypothesis by asking‖. Where there is no other ‗he‘ present, 
a distinction between ‗you‘ singular second-person and ‗you‘ plural third-person is 
unnecessary unless the context demands it. 
There is an intermediate, second-person stage between the asymmetric intersubjectivity 
that characterizes the parent‘s relationship with the infant, and the relatively 
independent early learning environment in which formal education begins. Asymmetry 
here concerns the natural sense of a reportable self, possessed by the parent and 
engendered in the infant. Rapidly, with the acquisition of language, the infant develops 
the ability to conceive of itself in the first person, passing through a stage of referring to 
itself in the third person because that is how it is accustomed to hearing its self referred 
to. It cannot acquire this in the same way as it can acquire the notion of ‗apple‘, for 
instance, by imitation (Davie 2002, 10). 
The foundation for this process, vocal exchanges in what I previously called somatic 
metre, might be thought of as an extended period of protocol negotiation or 
alternatively the acquisition of the prosodic substrate on which oral language is built. As 
Colwyn Trevarthen has discovered, exchanges between caregiver and infant have 
characteristics that go beyond mere similarity to the elements of poetry and music as 
they are familiarly understood in the adult world. The intriguing and compelling 
suggestion is that the cooperative intersubjectivity experienced by the infant is the 
foundation on which language and music are directly built.3  
No source is more authoritative than an infant‘s caregiver. The second-person stage, 
prior to acquiring a secure sense of third-person experience, is, I suggest, a distinctive 
period in which early language acquisition is governed by a shared attention regime in 
which the infant comes to understand basic things and relationships in a process 
supported by the cognitive enabling provided by mirror neurons. While vervet monkeys 
are observed to utter distinctive calls that are associated with particular kinds of 
predatory threat—leopard, eagle, snake—the monkey sounding the alarm does not 
point as it does so in the direction of the threat, nor does it engage individual others 
with intersubjective gaze (Cheney & Seyfarth 1988, 255–69; Dennett 1988, 182–201). 
                                                 
3 Trevarthen is a member of Edinburgh University‘s Institute for Music in Human and Social 
Development scientific committee; his papers are somewhat elusive, but a good primer is Trevarthen 
1979. The idea of intersubjective technology owes somewhat to his public presentations, both at 
Edinburegh University and at the ASA conference, ‗Creativity and cultural improvisation‘ at Aberdeen in 
April 2005. 
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Although it is a large leap from vervet to human, linguistically speaking, the 
intensification of intelligence in the higher primates is not expressed in a form that has 
the recognizable specificity of proto-language. There is no smooth transition; 
understanding the ontogeny of human languages depends in large measure on the 
observable steps to acquisition in subjects—i.e. young children—whose reliability as 
informants is perhaps not as significant an advance over the vervets as might be desired. 
In their paper ‗Joint attention and argument realization‘, Barbora Skarabela and Shanley 
Allen (2004) present fascinating data that helps correlate issues in early language 
acquisition with the feedforward search-space model, additionally shedding light on how 
the capacity for abductive inference may be initiated. A recognized characteristic of 
infant speech is the tendency to omit arguments. Known information, in the context of 
a specific discursive instantiation, tends to be represented by general-purpose linguistic 
forms such as a pronoun or null argument, whereas new information tends to be 
expressed lexically. Theorizations developed to account for this phenomenon fall into 
three groups: grammatical, performance-process, and discourse-pragmatic. Both of the 
first two, Skarabela and Allen note, fail ‗to account for a noticeable difference between 
the much higher omission rate of first and second person referents and the much less 
frequent omission rate of third person referents.‘ (8)4 Both of the first two, in general 
terms, are influenced by the strong-nativist theories of Fodor and Chomsky. 
Chomskyan linguistic performance, in this respect, is the heterophenomenological 
evidence for linguistic competence, a concept which ‗assumes that to acquire language is 
essentially to come into possession of knowledge of a biologically endowed code which 
is impervious (and prior) to reflexive shaping‘ (Werry 2002, II, 12). 
Skarabela & Allen show that joint attention is correlated with children‘s realization of 
verb arguments. Specifically they observe that omission of arguments representing new 
                                                 
4 An interesting performance account cited by Skarabela & Allen presents a metrical explanation to 
subject omission that correlates nicely with Trevarthen‘s work on infant intersubjectivity: ‗Gerken (1991) 
builds her argument on the observation that children omit weakly stressed syllables in their speech. 
Namely, in disyllabic words, children are much more likely to omit a weak syllable from an iambic foot 
than from a trochaic foot. Gerken argues that a similar pattern is observed on the sentence level, i.e. 
subject pronouns, that tend to occur at the beginning of a sentence, form an iambic foot with a strongly 
stressed verb, whereas object pronouns can potentially be the weak syllable of a trochaic foot. The results 
of an imitation task showed that children indeed omit subject pronouns significantly more frequently than 
object pronouns. In addition, the results showed that this account successfully predicts significantly more 
frequent omission of full lexical NPs from the subject position than from the object position.‘ (7) 
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referents correlates with joint attention, whereas production of overt arguments 
representing new referents correlates with the absence of joint attention: 
87% of arguments representing new referents were omitted in the presence of joint attention, whereas 
71% of overt arguments representing new referents were produced in the absence of joint attention 
(2004, 36; emphasis added). 
The conclusion suggested by this result is that richer joint attention leads to richer 
acquisition, but it is not entirely clear what is richer. The role of joint attention in 
vocabulary development has long been established, and richness of vocabulary is a 
desirable achievement, all other things being equal. But a repertoire of words requires 
grammatical marshalling. In this respect, the correlation between intersubjective 
engagement and argument realization is intriguing because plainly the infant already has 
a competence framework, however sketchy, that enables it to deploy its linguistic 
resources economically. This conclusion is borne out by the low number of outright 
errors that lead to communication failure reported in the dataset presented by Skarabela 
& Allen (26–31). 
The significance of this in the broader developmental context is that, as Clark puts it, 
‗evolution does not operate so as to ―solve‖ a fixed problem. Instead, the problems 
themselves alter and evolve in a complex web of co-evolutionary change‘ (1997, 93). 
After a discussion of the ‗learning to walk upright‘ challenge as a complex of evolving 
solutions, he cites work on robotic walking simulation: 
More interesting by far were the results obtained when sensory feedback was intermittently present 
during evolutionary search. Under these uncertain conditions, controllers evolved that could produce 
smooth walking using sensory feedback when available, switched to ‗blind‘ pattern generation in the 
absence of sensory feedback (and hence produce a viable albeit less elegant locomotion), and even 
compensate automatically for certain structural changes (e.g., alterations of leg length, such as occur 
during biological growth). The explanation of this last property involves the modulation exercised by 
sensory feedback on the pattern generator in these ‗mixed‘ solutions (91–2).  
The inference to be drawn is that the intermittence of intersubjective feedback, in the 
early language acquisition process, is of itself a contributing developmental factor. Recall 
the argument about trial-and-feed, in which feedforward is a mechanism with the 
potential for securing or formalizing speculative structures. Recall also an earlier 
reference to the contribution of the gene FOXP2 to cortical development. The 
consequence of the mutation discovered by researchers was ‗a diffuse condition that 
affects grammar, speech production, non-verbal intelligence and non-speech related 
movement of the mouth and face, with detectable brain pathologies caused by a 
mutation in a single gene‘ (MacAndrew 2005). The reason that a single mutation—
changing the amino acid arginine to histidine—can present a range of developmental 
Performativities 7: Recombinant intentionality 179 
issues whose connection is not intuitively singular, is that the FOX genes are 
transcription factors. Their role is to regulate feedforward processes—A activates B, A 
and B activate C, and so on; but out of these simple combinations, complex properties 
can emerge. Thus seen, language falls into the category Clark calls indirect emergence. This 
‗relies on the interaction of individual elements but requires that these interactions be 
mediated by active and often quite complex environmental structures‘ (1997, 73-4). 
Linked to the idea of stigmergic algorithms, this account helps us understand why the 
achievement of grammatical stability is invariant across the planet‘s diverse linguistic 
forms, irrespective of the grammatical content of any individual linguistic form. In this 
respect it is interesting to note that that the grammar of a four-year-old child already 
approximates adult grammar (Skarabela & Allen 2004, 6). 
It is perhaps worth pointing out that the successful realization of a basic grammatical 
framework is essentially an oral competence. At this stage, knowledge is represented and 
activated in response to external stimuli; it is knowledge in the system, but it is not yet 
knowledge to the system (Clark & Karmiloff-Smith 1993a, 495). The concept of 
Representational Redescription (henceforth RR) posits a systematic advance over this 
state of affairs, when consistent behavioural mastery of a particular task leads to the 
abstracted availability of that mastery to be applied to other tasks (496). Although 
precisely when is something of a grey area, this is about the stage when the child enters 
the broader social world in which the range of authoritative sources of information 
about the world starts to be delegated by primary carers to a network of trusted others, 
supplemented by the solidarities established with peers. 
Theorization of this step is influenced by the developmental psychologist Lev Vygotsky, 
who, working under the Soviet regime in 1920s and 1930s Russia, was engaged in 
developing theoretical underpinnings for the vast project of modernization under way in 
his time and place. His signature concept, the ‗zone of proximal development‘, is 
defined as ‗the distance between the actual developmental level as determined by 
independent problem solving and the level of potential development as determined 
through problem solving under adult guidance or in collaboration with more capable 
peers‘ (1978, 86). In Western pedagogic theory this is taken to mean the difference 
between a child‘s assisted and unassisted test performances, the terminologies ‗child‘ 
and ‗test‘ indicating that the concept has become assimilated to a structural focus on 
formal education. However, Vygotsky‘s later remark that ‗Instruction is only useful 
when it moves ahead of development… leading the child to carry out activities that 
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force him to rise above himself‘ (1987, 212–3) need not be restricted to children, nor to 
the individual.  
If we elide the roster of capable others in the first stage (parents, teachers, experts, 
peers, coaches) by replacing ‗more capable others‘ with ‗trusted other(s)‘ we have a 
simplified version that corresponds to the pre-modern learning environment 
experienced by the majority in any given human population. We can then conceive the 
building of structured models of the proximal zone (featuring detailed explications of 
the roles and functions of the various categories of ‗trusted other‘, including note of by 
whom the other is trusted) to theorize the relationship between the repertoire of skills 
acquired at various stages, and the formality with which those stages are expressed in the 
social structures supporting them. Comparing these models in low-population-density 
agrarian cultures and high-population-density post-industrial cultures then gives an 
informal measure of the scale of the task involved in mastering the competences 
associated with RR.  
RR is theorized to occur through three stages: first the child learns to become a master 
of some activity; then it analyses introspectively what it has learned; and, finally, it 
reconciles its performance with its introspection. By the time this latter point is reached, 
the child has developed the means to create working hypotheses concerning the reasons 
for things functioning in the way that they do. The process involves re-codifying 
information from one representational format (the procedural one) to another (a peri-
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linguistic format), enabling the subject to map domain-specific principles onto alien 
contexts.  
Although a significant dimension of this acquisition of RR concerns the development of 
language skills, we need to acknowledge that for all the codification and regulation of 
language (and for that matter other symbolic systems, such as mathematical and musical 
notation), these remain unfinalizable. As Vygotsky remarks, 
Accord between syntactical and psychological organization is not as prevalent as we tend to 
assume—rather, it is a requirement that is seldom met. Not only subject and predicate, but 
grammatical gender, number, case, tense, degree, etc. have their psychological doubles. A 
spontaneous utterance wrong from the point of view of grammar, may have charm and aesthetic 
value…. Our daily speech continually fluctuates between the ideals of mathematical and of 
imaginative harmony. (1962, VII, ii) 
This issue, competence in the face of imprecision, is discussed in detail by Clark & 
Karmiloff-Smith (1993a). At first, the child simply has competence over two unrelated 
representations that perform two different functions. The first step beyond is for this 
knowledge to become available to the system so that the similarity can be compared. At 
this second stage, however, the child cannot yet explain the difference between the two 
different functions. The knowledge has become available to the system, but the system 
requires further development before knowledge becomes fully available to introspection 
(496–8). What exactly characterizes that further stage is difficult to pin down, but there 
is a possible answer lurking in the observation that while three-year-olds perform word-
boundaries, they differentiate between what they will call a word and other things that 
they say but do not consider to be words: 
Numerous studies have shown … that it is not until about age 6, and for some tasks even later, that 
children know explicitly that both open class words … and closed class words … are words. When 
asked to count words in a sentence, young children frequently neglect to count the closed class 
items. When asked directly if ‗table‘ is a word, they agree, but when asked if ‗the‘ is a word, they 
answer in the negative. Yet at 3 years of age children can perceive, produce and correctly segment 
words like the (498). 
Normatively speaking, between the ages of three and six, Occidental children have 
begun the process of learning to read and (a distinctively separate though obviously 
related task) learning to write. They are learning about number, and they are learning 
how to tell the time. If the closed-class words in this experimental setting are broadly 
the same kind of linguistic element that is either produced or omitted in the argument-
realization study referenced previously, then the three-year-olds maybe have a point! 
Words—from their point of view—are the intentional vectors, and the rest of the stuff 
is eigenvector. The marshalling of intentional vectors relative to self-oriented 
eigenvectors is thus, I suggest, the foundation of recombinant intentionality.  
Performativities 7: Recombinant intentionality 182 
The normative context is something of a worry, in respect of RR in general: how close is 
the connection between the concept of representational redescription and the concept 
of literacy? If it is close, then does that mean that oral cultures do not enjoy the benefits 
of mastering RR, or does it just mean that they are less capable users of it? Especially if 
the former, stronger, conclusion is the case then we have discovered something 
important about the distinction between oral and literate culture, but we are then left 
with a difficulty. Does the acquisition of literacy ‗cause‘ RR, or is it the other way round? 
The ontogenic evidence reviewed suggests that RR mind-tools get installed first, though 
it is not so much a matter of cause as facilitation. We would not claim that ‗thinking‘, 
‗reason‘ and ‗intelligence‘ are the preserve of literate culture, but these seem to be just 
the kind of thing that mastery of RR promises. 
 
In part three we will explore these questions further, extending the somatically 
transparent mind–tool thesis by positing that literacy can be regarded as a suite of 
intersubjective technologies. We will need a robust definition of technology, for 
which the examination of function in chapter 5 has laid the foundation. First, here is a 
brief résumé of the key concepts that we are taking forward. 
The Extended Social Brain Hypothesis is drawn from three principal sources:  
Philosophy: the extended mind ontology, a minimal-nativist, vehicle oriented 
approach to the analysis of cognition that lays particular stress on the role of 
environmental cues. It is, nonetheless, methodologically individualist. 
Evolutionary psychology: the social brain hypothesis, developed out of ‗theory 
of mind‘ stories about human evolution, which argues that brain size is 
correlated with social complexity. 
Sociology: actor–network theory, an ontology that treats the relationship 
between agent and environment as a systematic articulation of semiotic 
(meaning, in this context, disembodied) rhetoric. 
Its key terms are 
Performativity: the term is inescapable. The etymological trail of ‗function‘, for 
example, leads to individuals performing certain tasks by virtue of the task‘s 
necessity rather than the individual‘s capacities. Performativity is used as an 
umbrella term in relation to a hybrid made by collocating natural conjugations 
(first-person, second-person and third-person) with the Peircean categories, 
firstness, secondness and thirdness. It is explored first as a problem concerning 
the individual organism (individual, maybe, but indiscrete), under the heading of 
polyphonic consciousness; second as a problem concerning direct interaction 
with conspecifics, under the heading of intersubjectivity, intention and 
implicature; then thirdly as a problem concerning the harnessing and 
redeployment of these intersubjective competences under the heading of 
recombinant intentionality. 
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Function: following Preston, the term is conceived plurally, a collocation of 
‗system function‘ (a view that treats the assemblage causally and atemporally as a 
working compositional entity) and ‗selected function‘.48 The latter term is a 
reversion of Millikan‘s ‗proper function‘ that attends to the architectural 
assemblage temporally and acausally. That is, questions about the compositional 
status of individual parts are subordinate to questions about what parts there are 
in a system (functional or otherwise) and how they were assembled. The 
temporality referred to is embodied movie-time, a characteristically human 
capability distinct from somatic time and constant time, though continuous with 
both. 
Mind: has been abolished (cf. chapter 3). Nevertheless, the natural term is 
recognized as useful in exemplifying the convenience of code-switching between 
natural terms in general, and algorithmic analyses of the rich environmentally 
situated processes for which natural terms frequently stand in. The concept of 
the mind–tool captures this environmental coupling by harnessing plural 
function, Heideggerian equipment, Gibsonian affordance and Dehaenean code-
switching to the processes of polyphonic consciousness. 
Polyphonic consciousness is an evolution of Dennett‘s multiple drafts model, 
which was adduced as a holistic alternative to dualist, especially Cartesian, 
models. Additionally, the polyphonic model draws on the semeiotics of Peirce‘s 
interpretant, and the structuralist dispositif, discussed in part one, while the 
parity between musical note and analytic mind–tool grows from the eliminative 
thrust of Rortian meiosis. 
Polyphony has a natural sense of stuff happening simultaneously, but the sense 
used here is technical and specific. It refers to the practice of early-modern 
composers such as J.S. Bach, for whom three musical elements—melodic voice-
leading, functional harmony, and measured pulse—give each other mutual 
support enabling the extension of musical structure and with it the extension of 
emotional impact. The key aspect, then, concerns mutually supporting 
components. These, following the Peircean dimensions outlined previously, are 
(first) sensory polyphony, the mutually supporting data received by the senses; 
                                                 
48 There is an ambiguity (not unwelcome) in Preston where plural may be by reference to Heideggerian 
equipment, or by the incompleteness of either system or selected function taken singly. 
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(second) psychological polyphony, the integration of these data with 
sensorimotor activity in the brain, and correlation of this activity with that of 
local conspecifics; and (third) semiotic polyphony, the capacity of the conscious 
entity to interact with the hylozoic content of its environment. 
Intersubjectivity. A concomitant of psychological polyphony is the strong 
claim, grounded in Dunbar‘s articulation of the social brain hypothesis, that 
there is no subjectivity without intersubjectivity. Intersubjectivity is a term that 
refers to the human capacity to ‗read‘ the minds of, firstly, other humans; 
secondly, other creatures with similar cognitive architectures; thirdly, and with 
reduced reliability, dissimilar creatures and inanimate entities. With respect to 
this third category in particular, the claim is that the apparatus that facilitates 
intersubjectivity between humans also facilitates the hylozoic reading of the 
environment. 
Narrative gravity was posited by Dennett to be the locus of self as an adjunct 
of the multiple drafts model. A number of ‗indiscrete self‘ ontologies have 
subsequently emerged, rendering the term ‗self‘ in Dennett‘s formulation 
problematic. The Peircean term ‗interpretant‘, which is impartial regarding the 
somatic configuration of the cognizer, can stand in at risk of sounding 
tautologous. (Since the term ‗sign vehicle‘ is used by Peirce, it is wise to avoid 
potential confusion by speaking of the interpretant as ‗semeiotic vehicle‘, that 
which is mobilized by semeiotic traffic.) The structuralist dispositif, a 
performative sense of taxis, may also stand in (though for different reasons) as 
the centre of narrative gravity. 
Fetch is a natural term I have drafted as a means of articulating the fast 
hypothesis formulation that acts on sensory inputs. The relative weight of 
urgency (its critical mass as a matter of subjective assessment), and the 
differential impact of skilled reading of the environment, means that two 
embodied interpretants might formulate starkly different hypotheses based on 
the same sensory input. 
Passage points (obligatory, pragmatic, ritual). An obligatory passage point is a 
confluence of heterogeneous, but mutually interested and mutually supporting 
fetches. Implicitly, where an OPP becomes stabilized, it becomes a point of 
return. In this regard it is suggestive of the Hegelian term Bestimmt, 
determination in its sense as the sum of agreed deliberation. Thus, an OPP can 
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become a Ritual Passage Point, a point of unreflecting return. In relation to the 
next term, stigmergy, a ritual passage point marks the sublimation of 
performative to enactive. A Pragmatic Passage Point is also heterogeneous, also 
mutually interested, but not mutually supporting. Finally, Passage Points in general 
are semiotic inversions of the Platonic term aporia. Instead of being ‗difficult of 
passing‘, they are euporia, ‗solutions of doubts or difficulties‘ (Liddell & Scott), 
typically in this context arrived at because previously there was an aporia needing 
resolution. Hence they are structurally similar to Husserl‘s noema. 
Stigmergy (from stigma and ergon, meaning sign+work) is a term that translates 
the action possibilities in the environment conferred by affordances into 
algorithmic (that is, repeatable, scalable and manifoldly realizable) environmental 
cues. Such cues are, in a sense, ritual passage points that have emerged out of 
natural, evolutionary meiosis without the necessity for intentional deliberation. 
Recombinant intentionality is what an intentional agent can do with 
stigmergic algorithms by exploiting physiological attunement to hylozoic cues. 
Typically, an agent will apply extended attention to the problem at hand, 
recruiting new perspectives, discarding redundant ones, reworking and 
redrafting until an equilibrium is reached. It may not require an embodied agent 
such as a human to accomplish this, but it will (I believe) require facility with 
movie-time, and it will require the tolerance to accommodate accidental inputs 




Part three concerns embodied performance in its environmental context. This entails a 
change of register, enlisting the sociohistorical dimension and venturing into 
philosophical territory that the analytical tradition has come to regard as ‗strictly 
meaningless‘. The hazard Peirce diagnosed in the Hegelian historical method, which, in 
contrast to the analytic method, ‗studies complex problems in all their complexity, but 
which cannot boast any distinguished successes‘ (Peirce 1931, 9.64) can be mitigated by 
separating the phenomenological from the social and treating the former in terms of 
Peircean firstness and the latter as thirdness, which I call the sociohistoric. It matters 
because Peirce elsewhere remarks that when an experimentalist speaks of experimental 
phenomena, ‗he does not mean any particular event that did happen to somebody in the 
dead past, but what surely will happen to everybody in the living future who shall fulfil 
certain conditions‘ (1998, 339).  
What part three sets out to theorize is the way in which the hylozoic scaffolding of 
nature is appropriated by the interpretant/dispositif to secure a platform for ever more 
ambitious projections into the future. Creativity, after all, must entertain some scope for 
failure, and must therefore proceed in a dialogic relationship between certainty and 
doubt. John Law, the third principal theorist of the Mine School, coined the term 
‗heterogeneous engineer‘ for the polyphonic relationship between actants and resources. 
From a sociohistoric perspective he argues persuasively for a ‗document/device/drilled 
person‘ reading of the material expansion of geographical control in renaissance Europe 
(Law 1986). Part three seeks an analogous ‗long-distance control‘ of the imagination. 
Accordingly, the abstraction of the ‗interpretant/dispositif‘ will ultimately give way to 
the flesh-clothed work-maker. 
The term ‗Sociohistoric‘ recognizes Peirce‘s commentary on the experimentalist as an 
invariant characteristic of human culture. Simply and obviously put, not all humans are 
the same age. Oral history and tacit knowledge is homeostatically sustained and 
forwarded, but its reach can be extended through the technologizing of intersubjectivity. 
The work-maker is the key figure in accomplishing this. In oral culture, the figure of the 
shaman performs a number of functions that have some equivalence with familiar 
notions of the professional from which the work-maker is drawn: lawyer, doctor, 
minister (in both political and religious senses), journalist. In each case the community 
supports the function—recognizes its necessity—but does so on the basis of trust.  The 
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assumption that shamanism is bound up with secrecy, hierophancy and exclusivity 
should be balanced against the exigencies of continuity.  
Alongside Law‘s perspective, which will figure importantly in chapter 10, a second 
theoretical strand concerns the relationship between orality and literacy. Both terms are 
exceedingly vague, the former all the more so because it is (literally) impossible for the 
literate imagination to experience the world from an oral perspective. Moreover, the 
powerful somatic tools that supplement the literate imagination create the strong 
impression that the reverse is true! Nevertheless, there is a clear continuity between the 
oral modality and the anthropology of the social brain. The principal text supporting 
this argument is Walter Ong‘s Orality and Literacy (1982). The key concept that I propose 
to develop, the technologizing of intersubjectivity, is a direct modulation of Ong‘s 
subtitle, the technologizing of the word. 
We cannot proceed without theorizing the key term ‗technology‘, but there is a 
rhetorical difficulty concerning the order of continuation. One choice would be to 
continue immediately in hot pursuit of the issues discussed in the last chapter of part 
two. The other—which I have favoured—is to respect the historic bias of part three and 
proceed more or less chronologically. This entails a return to the Acts of Institution 
material in chapter two in order to develop the contextualizing relationship between 
speech acts and the creation of institutions. Accordingly, I will attend to Ong‘s 
orality/literacy model before picking up the technological questions hanging over from 
part two, concluding thereafter with the delineation of the work-maker. 
 
 
Roughly speaking, an anthropological line can be traced historically from the 
establishment of continuity with the emergence of grandparents some 25,000 years 
ago, which leads to the establishment of consistency characteristic of the classical 
Mediterranean, and from the mutual security assured by consistency to the non-
homeostatic, clock-oriented developmental regime characteristic of enlightenment and 
modernity. Each modulation in effect re-starts the cycle under more intensely entangled 
initial conditions.  
Walter Ong attempts to understand the trajectory that leads from orality to literacy, on 
the unstated presumption that the highly technologized nature of occidental culture is at 
the other end of an orthodox enlightenment progression whose starting point is—
mythologically speaking—the fall of Adam (Ong was an ordained Jesuit priest). But 
what is literacy? What is its relationship to the various polyphonic strands of ‗common 
sense‘, and how does its acquisition modulate the environmental competence of its 
agent? Obviously literacy is not something simple. Should it count as literacy, for 
instance, if the subject can read fluently but not write at all? On the other hand, if we 
accept that the proverbial ‗three Rs‘ between them constitute the elementary foundation 
of literacy, should we ask whether there is anything else, besides numeracy, that ought to 
be added to that foundation? Skilled mutuality rests on oral skills concerned with 
standards of speaking and listening, or ‗feedforward‘ in the sense McLuhan inherited 
from Richards (meaning approximately the practice of thinking about what you intend 
to say before you speak).  
What do the factors mobilizing the growth of educational institutions, and the trajectory 
towards full adult literacy in western Europe over the last four centuries, tell us? To the 
protestant church, promoting silent reading in the early modern period, the urge to 
share the comfort of religion is a motivating factor. To working parents, the fact that 
systematic education offers child-minding for those not yet old enough to earn a wage 
could potentially be the greater motivating attraction. Contrary to suggestions that the 
drive for literacy was fuelled by ideologies of resistance (for all that such ideology is 
multi-edged), there is room to admit that at least in part it was fuelled by ideologies of 
conformity. Hereabouts a distinction between parentalism and grandparentalism has 
some purchase: oral competence seems primarily a domestic achievement whereas 
symbolic and conceptual competences emerge under the guidance of trusted others—
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more especially the conceptual, since exposure to conceptual polyphony benefits from a 
corresponding polyphony of authoritative guidance.  
Such trust can be vested in materials as much as in people. When that happens, a cadre 
emerges whose function is to mediate the significance of these material objects—since 
of course their makers are no longer present and able to do this for themselves. From 
this cadre emerges a fraction whose function is to mediate the mediators and to 
orchestrate the conceptual polyphony ensuring that complicated social processes run 
smoothly. Any claim to speak ‗with authority‘, any constitution of corporate authority, 
and any relationship between authority thus conceived and the coercive apparatus of the 
state, falls within their remit.  
Gramsci‘s thinking about the emergence of the intellectual (2001) elegantly conflates the 
material and the semiotic dimensions of the arguments rehearsed to date, and suggests a 
continuation of the thesis from the Palaeolithic, where continuity is established, 
through the Hellenic, where consistency is established, to—approximately—the 
Enlightenment, where a human-centred ideology of development takes hold. Certainly 
in Britain, agrarian reforms feed (both figuratively and literally) a process of urbanization 
that culminates, in late modernity, in a culture that depends heavily on mediations 
capable of translating oral production into reliable mass outcome. This culture depends 
on trust in its organs of mediation. The body of cultural artefacts being produced by the 
emerging class of creative professional stands hylozoically in loco grandparentis as this 
process takes hold. The key shift that occurs with this departure from the oral is a shift 
of focus from the maker to what has been made.  
 
Nicholas Humphrey makes some intriguing speculations about a link between drawing 
and the origins of language in a 1998 paper on Pleistocene cave art and the products of 
a present-day autistic child with a remarkable gift for drawing. In concert with another 
paper of his, and other work on the foundations of human intelligence, a working 
hypothesis can be sketched in which continuity—the oral communication of localized 
virtual repertoires—can begin. Humphrey (1999) cites evidence suggesting that IQ is 
asymptotic at a brain size of around 750 cc, by which measure homo erectus ought to have 
been capable of intelligence equal to that of homo sapiens. If that is so, then there may be 
a further dimension to the carefully-weighed arguments of Robin Dunbar discussed in 
chapter 4. Humphrey suggests that the extra element is redundancy—the larger brain 
helps modern humans to live longer, because it enables mental faculties to last longer.  
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Evidence tentatively supporting this proposition can be found in a paper by Rachel 
Caspari and Sang-Hee Lee (2004), which finds a rapid change in the proportion of older 
(c.30-year-old) to younger (c.15-year-old) adults in the fossil record at about 30,000 
years ago. Caspari and Lee hypothesize that grandparents became a significant factor in 
extending survival success. The ratio change they report is striking, from an old-to-
young ratio of 0.12 in Australopithecine, to 0.25 and 0.39 for early Homo and 
Neanderthal respectively, to 2.08 in the early upper Palaeolithic. Among Neanderthal 
fossils there is less than one old adult for every three young adults. By the early upper 
Palaeolithic that changed to a ratio of two old adults for every single young adult. The 
argument supported by this discovery is that grandparents provide cultural support. Not 
only are they able to share their experience of child-rearing, hunting and so on, but by 
their very presence they extend the time available for learning and reflection by the 
community as a whole.  
Simulations created by Stephen Shennan (2001) to model the impact and survival of 
cultural innovation in the upper Palaeolithic suggest that innovation produces low 
equilibrium fitness and low attractiveness values in small local populations. In larger 
populations, though, the values are more than an order of magnitude greater. This 
strongly suggests that Caspari and Lee‘s data tells a significant story about the early 
emergence of modern human culture. In theory, longer lives stabilize Pòlya effects, 
while larger numbers and increased age differentials deepen the potential relationships 
between authoritative sources and dynamic hubs. The richer contact range available to 
any individual population member both facilitates specialized craft skills and their 
vertical transmission, and, via diagonal transmission (outside, that is, the immediate 
family unit), a richer cross-fertilization and mutuality. 
Humphrey (1998) proposes an intriguing, albeit associative, development of this 
contextualization of craft. Comparing the remarkable artwork of Nadia (a modern 
autistic child) with examples of European Palaeolithic cave art, Humphrey speculates 
about a vestibular state where drawing was uncontaminated by ‗designating and naming‘. 
Of course there is no reason to suppose that gifted artists were any more numerous in 
the cave population than they are now; there is reason to suppose, however, that there 
was a point in the evolution of human culture where linguistic skills were as basic as 
Nadia‘s. Since nascent language is likely to have been stable before the ancestral group 
left Africa around 150,000 years ago, it is difficult to speculate about what elements the 
cave-dwellers had and what they lacked (172–4). However, Dunbar‘s emphasis on 
grooming and gossip—on second-person, conversational language as distinct from 
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third-person, rhetorical use—suggests a possible route for developing Humphrey‘s 
argument.  
Commenting on the naturalistic style of cave art, Humphrey claims that nothing like it 
emerged until Renaissance Italy, Egyptian and Hellenic art being, he says, stylized and 
conventional by comparison. Somewhat melodramatically, he supposes that the loss of 
naturalistic painting might have been the price to be paid for the gain of poetry: ‗Human 
beings could have Chauvet or the Epic of Gilgamesh but they could not have both‘ 
(176). Some aspect of cave culture evidently lent itself to stigmergic encoding, and it is 
not inconceivable that populations propagating throughout Europe after the ice receded 
about 11,000 years ago carried forward foundational cultural elements fostered in the 
caves. The explanation is likely to be bound up in opportunistic relationships with local 
environments. The caves would have had an enframement function, conjecturally 
involving the safe schooling of young hunters.  
 
Humphrey‘s reference to poetry invites our focus to shift to Eric Havelock‘s thesis 
(1963) regarding the emergence of Hellenic literacy. Havelock‘s main claim is that 
Plato‘s Republic is primarily a treatise on education rather than on politics. He regards 
this as the key to understanding why Plato elects to attack poets and poetry in particular. 
Poetry—especially as practiced in the Mediterranean bardic tradition—is an oral 
technology, one that privileges somatic skill and correspondingly minimizes dependence 
on extra-somatic resources. Even at its most basic, literacy depends by contrast on the 
hylozoic potential of extra-somatic materials. 
Plato cites authorities liberally, in other contexts, but in Republic not even Homer and 
Hesiod are spared: 
[Socrates:]…if Homer had really been able to educate and improve mankind—if he had possessed 
knowledge and not been a mere imitator—can you imagine, I say, that he would not have had many 
followers, and been honoured and loved by them? … And is it conceivable that the contemporaries 
of Homer, or again of Hesiod, would have allowed either of them to go about as rhapsodists, if they 
had really been able to make mankind virtuous? Would they not have been as unwilling to part with 
them as with gold, and have compelled them to stay at home with them? Or, if the master would not 
stay, then the disciples would have followed him about everywhere, until they had got education 
enough? (Republic, X) 
Now, while there is sufficient corroborative material to confirm that ‗Hesiod‘ was a 
named individual, there is conjecture about whether ‗Homer‘ was an individual or, 
instead, the generic term for a species of griot. Omeros means ‗hostage‘, and, by custom, 
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the descendants of hostages captured in the course of warfare were not sent into battle 
because their loyalty could not be counted on. Instead, they were entrusted with the task 
of remembering and recounting social histories among which war stories were an 
important element. There is general agreement that the Iliad and the Odyssey as they 
become known in the heyday of the Hellenic city-state are the product of a narrative 
tradition, and not the invention of a single individual. The regularization and notation of 
the epics—conjecturally at the direction of the Athenian tyrant Hipparchus in the sixth 
century BCE—may account for the organizational unity that Milman Parry (1971) and 
others have discerned, and which has been adduced as evidence of Homer‘s indivisible 
personhood. Recent parallel scholarship in the scribal culture of early Judaism suggests a 
similarly and contemporaneously rich process in the assembly of the Torah (Alter 2007). 
Havelock shows, in a detailed analysis of the Homeric canon (1963, 61–86), that a great 
deal of encyclopaedic information is stocked in the narrative structure over and above 
the historical pageantry. Such things as the ‗utterance of rules, the expressions of 
standards‘ (70), both public and personal, proper conduct of religious rites, marine 
technology, geography, all of these elements are embroidered on a fabric composed of 
mnemonic and prosodic techniques including poetic metre and formulaic procedure 
applied at both the level of stock-phrase (bright-eyed Athene, wine-dark sea, etc.) and a 
deeper-level ordering of events, acts and objects. These stock phrases, Havelock says, 
can serve a wide range of verbal formulae. We recognize the encyclopaedia in print 
culture as being an indexed, ordered and arranged body of knowledge where redundant 
repetition is minimized; it is precisely the redundancy of the oral epic that licenses its 
encyclopaedic function.  
It seems a large leap, from one unique, individual bard named Homer to an 
unpersonified community function, but such people were evidently fairly common. 
According to Rosalind Thomas, these were people whose role was to remember civic 
history: 
... officials called mnemones, literally ‗remembrancers‘… crop up in inscriptions, therefore by 
definition after the poleis have started to use writing. But the name must reflect an early function of 
remembering. By the Hellenistic period mnemones are simply clerks, but earlier mnemones were far 
more. …Thus in fifth-century Gortyn in Crete, the mnemon is closely attached to the judicial 
processes and act alongside the judge as witness for a past case...—that is, his role was partly to 
remember court proceedings, for which there were no written records. Another inscription, from 
Halicarnassus in first half of the fifth century, declares that ‗what the mnemones know is to be 
binding.‘ Even after the advent of writing the mnemon continued his role of remembering, and his 
memory was authoritative (Thomas 1992, 69). 
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The argument Havelock develops is that the oral technology employed by such officials 
to perform these broad functions renders their ethical and epistemological relationship 
dissonant. Because, in poetry, contradictory statements can be made of people or 
objects at different points in the course of an oration, the medium violates the principle 
of consistency (1963, 246). How did Plato come to realize that there was a principle of 
consistency to be violated? That is part of a large story about the development of 
Hellenic philosophy, which for the most part has no direct bearing on the issue at hand. 
The matter of writing itself, though, and the propagation of the alphabetic technology 
between about the eighth century BCE and the fourth, inspires Havelock to assert that: 
‗As a means of preservation, the acoustic technology of epic had been rendered obsolete 
by the technology of the written word‘ (293). However, he immediately concedes that ‗it 
takes time for obsolescence to be recognized‘ (ibid.).  
‗Obsolete‘ is an excessively confident term to use. Really the processes at work are too 
complex to admit the ‗progress‘ narrative.49 Some elements are hinted at earlier by 
Havelock in a passage lauding the aesthetic achievement of Hellenic orality: 
We can hazard a guess, in short, that the specific and unique Hellenic intelligence, the source or 
cause of which has baffled all historians, received its original nurture in communities in which the 
oral technique of preserved communication threw power and so prestige into the hands of the orally 
more gifted. It made the competition for power … identifiable with the competition for intelligence. 
… 
…This explanation can stand as debatable, but it conforms to the established fact that in the 
Classical Age the specific genius of the Greeks was rhythmic. What we call the Greek sense of 
beauty, in architecture, sculpture, painting and poetry, was more than anything else a sense of elastic 
and fluid proportion. (127–8) 
Havelock at times seems incautious in generalizing from the Athenian to the Hellenic; 
the success of the Spartan state in projecting its military power, for instance, was 
achieved in spite of restricted adoption of the literate technologies. The cultural 
achievements of Athens arguably owe as much to that city‘s disproportionate wealth, 
and its status as an intellectual entrepôt, as to the size of its citizen class. Certainly it is 
difficult to distinguish cause and effect between these and other contributory factors. 
The context Thomas explores in her study of the relationship between orality and 
literacy in classical Greece is fairly difficult to grasp, with so little evidence to go on. It is 
the development of the sense of poleis, of the associative link between citizenship and 
property, and of the idea that the rights of a citizen (however loosely defined that term 
                                                 
49 Peirce somewhere remarks that there is far too much poetry in Plato, but the writing styles of Nietzche, 
Heidegger and Wittgenstein clearly exhibit an attachment to the pre-Aristotelian ideal. 
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may be in different locales and at different points in the history of the era) have their 
basis in what ultimately comes to be identified as an abstract sense of justice. 
Effectively, this sense of justice is equivalent to Havelock‘s consistency argument. By 
the fifth century BCE, the populations of the major city-states approached or exceeded 
100,000. Of Sparta‘s population, 8,000 were citizens—adult, male, property-owning and 
native to the city. Athens‘ population was somewhat larger, nearer to 200,000 of whom 
some 40,000 were citizens. It is principally this citizen class that the alphabetic 
technology supported.50  
It is useful, perhaps, to think of the various Mediterranean scripts as recording 
technologies in an analogous relationship with the famous example of the VHS and 
Betamax video recording systems. Betamax was supposedly a superior technology but 
the market gravitated to VHS. Similarly, Linear-B possibly did a good job of accurately 
encoding the sound of speech as the speaker intended, but the equipment required to 
play it back—a skilled reader—was hard to find, with the consequence that exploiting 
the technology required a concentration of resources. The Greek alphabet, though more 
compact, more mobile, easier to learn and so on, probably owed its differential success 
to the changed environment in which it developed, where new pressures on social 
coordination were evolving as the culture started to recover in the eighth century BCE 
from whatever had caused its collapse three or four centuries previously. The point 
about making the comparison with familiar recording technologies is that reading, in 
classical Greece as elsewhere in the classical world, was a physical matter of giving voice 
to the encoded characters. The Greek introduction of vowels has been cited as a 
technical masterstroke, but Thomas downplays this aspect, suggesting that ‗perhaps 
what the Greeks heard as vowels were the Phoenicians‘ guttural stops‘ (1992, 54–6). 
What, then, were the benefits of writing technology for the Greeks? At an individual 
level, the evidence is that wealth (ploutos) trumps literacy. In Hellenic and Roman culture, 
it was perfectly feasible for a citizen to flourish without personal literacy provided they 
had the means at their disposal to hire literacy services or to own literate slaves. While 
that fact could hardly be regarded as conclusive proof one way or another, it does seem 
that the benefits of alphabetic technology are at the least on an interpersonal level, and 
really express themselves at the sociopolitical level. The issues highlighted by Thomas 
                                                 
50 Population estimates are very difficult to make. Some put the population of Athens at its height as 
500,000. 
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return to an idea of intentionality in which the encounter with writing initially finds the 
script functioning as a performative substitute for the person represented by it. What 
evolves, though, is a sense in which the performance comes to represent ‗opinion‘, joint 
authorship, and the will of the polis.  
Thomas points out that the available evidence about the uses of writing in the early 
Hellenic period—aside, obviously, from being scarce—may tend to focus attention on 
certain kinds of use, by virtue of the relationship between material and function. Thomas 
‗gets a strong impression that the new writing was seized on widely as a way for 
individuals to mark their possessions and to keep interlopers off‘ (1992, 59). However, 
the extent to which the content of such markings can be seen to possess the kind of 
self-contained semantic value we associate with written language in the modern world 
remains problematic. In a later example, Thomas discusses mortgage stones dating from 
fourth-century Athens. Here, the identity of the creditor and the sum owed are marked 
on stones that are placed on the debtor‘s land. The name of the debtor is not recorded, 
nor any explicit correlation between the stones and the land they stand on. Their very 
presence not only identifies the debt with the land, but also identifies the status of the 
debt as unpaid, since there would be no reason for the markers to remain after it had 
been settled (90). These mortgage stones excellently demonstrate three characteristics of 
the mind-tool: utility as memory-supplement, intersubjectivity in terms of the shared 
comprehension of creditor and debtor, and a specific graphic relationship with the local 
environment. We can see the writing technology participating in a broader repertoire of 
extended social relationships, supporting these but not—as yet—portable either 
physically or conceptually. 
Corollary to the assertion of ownership over property is the threat of sanction against 
potential transgressors. This is where hylozoism starts to be exploited intersubjectively. 
Early on, inscriptions include metaphysical incitements—not ―I, the owner of this item, 
will blind you if I catch you stealing it‖, but ‗may whoever steals me be blind‘. ‗It is hard 
to escape the conclusion‘, Thomas continues, ‗that writing down someone‘s name 
rapidly acquired a magical force‘ (58). The consequence of this separation of powers, 
distinguishing—perhaps for the first time—between performance and intention-to-
perform, is the establishment of a sort of prosodic cognitive substrate that builds the 
foundation for the first steps beyond homeostasis. The relationship between memorial 
and inscription creates the link between the quotidian curse and the preservation of 
ancestral presence. This ties in neatly with Havelock‘s argument about consistency, since 
consistency and continuity are natural correlates.  
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What we have in the Hellenic experience of literacy is a ‗grandparent stage‘ parallel to 
that of the upper Palaeolithic, where writing technology develops to preserve and 
support group know-how, especially regarding the conduct of social relationships over a 
range of dynamics. To summarize, writing in Hellenic Greece functioned to support oral 
practices and was inseparable from those oral practices. In particular, it supported social 
organization in a context of increasing complication where the virtue of settling disputes 
by means other than blood feud began to gain precedence over the opportunity for 
glorification offered by pursuing the mortal course.  
 
Corollary to the claim that the oral state is unavailable to the literate imagination is the 
realization that both terms—oral and literate—are natural terms whose undisclosed 
compositionalities are deeply entangled. In order to develop some theoretical purchase 
on the issues, I want to turn back to chapter 7.2, and the Husserlian term ‗noemata‘, 
which was introduced in relation to the frame problem. Ong gives ‗noetic‘ a social 
dimension, using it to characterize distinctions between ‗noetic worlds‘ differentially 
organized according to oral or literate mnemonic technologies (Ong 1982, 23–4; 50–4). 
However, much of Ong‘s argument rests on distinctions between European modes, 
where oral practices such as mnemonic oratory (viz. poetic recitation) are already clearly 
‗technological‘ in the way they support, and are supported by, material relationships with 
the local environment.  
There are few places left in the world where contact with ‗enlightened‘ European modes 
has not already reconfigured the noetic imagination of its inhabitants. Where such 
populations exist, anthropologists tend to be preceded by pioneers with transformative 
agendas, whether financial or spiritual. In Papua New Guinea, the linguistic 
anthropologist Bambi Schieffelin found an intriguing example of  the latter. In ‗Found in 
translating‘ (2007), she examines the problem of  rendering an instance of  Biblical 
reflexive speech into the Bosavi language. Does the difficulty lie in the plain fact that the 
Bosavi have not acquired literacy? Or does it arise from conflict between oral and 
literate versions of  intersubjective technology?  
The Christian bible is normatively regarded as being deeply implicated in the spread of  
occidental culture. In common, apparently, with other Papua New Guinea (PNG) 
communities, the Bosavi have a culturally engendered taboo on making precisely the 
kind of  speculation about the interior thinking of  others that the Biblical verses in 
question deal with. The question Schieffelin‘s research raises is whether it is what the 
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bible says that is effective (as, apparently, the missionaries believe), or is it rather a 
psycholinguistic question about how the text expresses its message? Conjecturally, there 
are three aspects to Biblical texts that might be regarded as ‗intersubjective technology‘, 
and which are not shared by bodies of  folklore that might in other respects be regarded 
as similar (for instance the Indian Mahabharata, or the Finnish Kalevala). One is prophecy, 
the second is critique (which lends rationality to prophecy), and the third is the 
representation of  high-level intersubjectivity. It is the last of  these that Schieffelin‘s work 
concerns. 
The text in question is from St Mark‘s gospel (II, 6–8), the ‗take up thy bed and walk‘ 
scene. The difficulty concerns the way in which the Scribes are represented as having 
thoughts about others‘ thoughts, while Jesus has thoughts about their thoughts—a fairly 
complicated higher-level intersubjectivity. As Mark describes it, the scene is immediately 
recognizable in modern terms as a media frenzy, the relationship of the scribes to the 
multitude being reminiscent of that between journalists and public opinion in the 
present day. Hordes are gathered around the house where Jesus is staying; the invalid‘s 
associates break him in to the house through the roof—a fairly immediate transgression 
for which the invalid presumably bears ultimate responsibility.  
If the objective is to persuade these interlopers to leave the premises, would saying 
‗please leave‘ (take up your bed and walk) be effective either as words directed at the 
individual or as a deterrent to the remaining hordes against doing likewise? Forgiving 
the sin, literally declaring God‘s forgiveness, recognizes the transgressive situation and 
conjures respect from the recognition of that transgression, not only in the individual 
concerned but in the witnesses. The flaw in translation (if it is a flaw) arises in the 
original English rendition of the dilemma as Jesus asking ‗which is easier?‘ (The St James 
version puts it thus, but ‗easy‘ seems somehow incongruous.)  
Melanesian cultures have been studied by occidental scholars since the anthropologist 
Bronislaw Malinowski‘s pioneering expeditions in the early 20th century. Conceivably 
Melanesians approach the ideal state of orality envisaged by Ong, with all the entailed 
overtones of Genesis and the Garden of Eden. Among these people, Ong says, 
language is a mode of action, and words are considered to have great power (32). 
Schieffelin‘s work studying missionaries among the Bosavi people of  Papua New 
Guinea suggests a more complex picture, both in terms of  the Bosavi and of  the way in 
which the relationship between literacy and reflexivity may have developed in medieval 
and early-modern Europe. 
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On William Foley‘s account (2000, 357–8), the geographical area designated New 
Guinea spans an area of  about 800,000km2 between 125°E and 175°E to the north of  
Australia. In this space—equivalent to the area of  New South Wales, or Texas plus 
Oklahoma, or continental France plus Germany—approximately 1,200 languages, about 
a fifth to a quarter of  the entire world‘s inventory, coexist in an unparalleled linguistic 
diversity. How such diversity is sustained is difficult to explain. The first human 
occupation of  the region dates back 50,000 years, but successive waves of  migration did 
not displace the languages of  earlier arrivals on the pattern familiar in Eurasia and 
Africa, instead simply adding to (if  not multiplying) the complexity. Perhaps because the 
environment is uniquely providential, the region does not have a history of  state 
formation. The basic unit of  social structure is the clan, and competition between clans 
is the basic arena in which political life is played out. Languages in the region are spoken 
by an average of  3,000 speakers spread over ten to twenty villages, distributions 
suggestive of  Dunbar‘s social-brain aggregates. 
The Bosavi, living north of  Mt. Bosavi on the Great Papuan Plateau in the Southern 
Highlands of  Papua New Guinea, follow this pattern—2,000 or so people inhabiting 
scattered communities of  60–100 (Schieffelin 2007, 143–4). Their world, prior to 
contact with anthropologists, missionaries, and government representatives, was oral 
and monolingual. Two Australian protestant missionaries established a mission station in 
the 1970s with a clinic, hospital, school, and store. The missionaries‘ approach rejected 
the incorporation of  knowledge about local cultural practices, regarding these not as 
irrelevant to their project but as an obstacle to its success. In conflict with this ideology 
was their policy of  working in vernacular languages, treating the vernacular as a code 
that could be separated from local cultural practices and meanings and used 
independently of  them. Everything was already in the Bible, which merely had to be 
translated, and heard. In practice, though, the missionaries relied on Tok Pisin—the 
dominant creole in the region—in order to communicate with local people, through a 
small group of  younger men who had learned Tok Pisin while working outside the area. 
The missionaries taught this group to read (though not to write) in Tok Pisin, and in 
time group members were working as village pastors and given the authority to preach 
to and baptize others (144). 
The central text was the Tok Pisin Bible, Nupela Testamen, which was read aloud during 
church services. Modelled after the American Good News Bible, an evangelical text 
geared towards children and uneducated adults, the Nupela Testamen evolved over three 
editions (1969, 1978, 1989) as linguists progressively stabilized Tok Pisin. Readings were 
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laboured, because the pastors were not fluent readers in the first place, and translating 
between Tok Pisin and Bosavi overlaid a further burden: 
Transcriptions from church services … reveal pastors‘ inconsistencies, extensive self-repairs, 
hesitations, and paraphrases; these flag culturally systematic and significant metalinguistic and 
metapragmatic differences. These same domains of difference are not only found in pastors‘ 
translations from Tok Pisin into Bosavi, but parallel those found in linguists‘ and Bible translators‘ 
revisions of the Tok Pisin Bible….these difficulties are not random, but center on reflexive language 
and specific speech act verbs (146). 
Before the missionaries arrived, the concept of  ‗sincerity‘, the idea that one‘s public 
demeanour and introspective economy should tally, was neither recognized nor valued 
by the Bosavi. The idea that one‘s private feelings could differ from what one reported 
them to be was not unknown, but speculating on whether someone had really meant 
what they said was deprecated. Only reports of  speech were regarded as evidence of  
someone‘s opinion, with syntactic distinctions making it clear whether the reported 
words were heard by the person repeating them, or whether the report was second or 
third hand. Translating the Christian texts brought into focus a linguistic problem that 
required a solution: how to make an explicit match between saying something and 
meaning it. The consequence of  this, Schieffelin argues, was profound, restructuring 
major portions of  their lexicon in the domains of  internal states, time and place: 
‗Without anyone talking about it, they gave rise to a new speech register, which 
indirectly indexed a new Christian identity and new ways of  knowing‘ (148). 
The verses analysed in detail concern an episode in which Jesus performs a 
perlocutionary act, declaring an invalid‘s sins forgiven. Scribes, observing this, inwardly 
dispute the authority behind this speech act. In turn, Jesus is represented as being able 
to read these scribes‘ thoughts. This short passage is rich in difficulties for the 
translators. Firstly the concept of  sin must be rendered, and the Bosavi pastors chose 
the concept of  sickness as the means to convey this. We might, following Rorty (1965, 
32–41), surmise that the Bosavi are merely trading one sort of  demon for another. 
Instead of  ascribing the cause of  sickness to the witchcraft of  others, the causative 
ascription was now directed inwards. This is, though, an eliminative move, a 
simplification with the potential to translate complexity into complication. 
Secondly, the pastors struggle to render the concept of  inward reflection, and with it the 
concept that the private thoughts of  one person might be available to another. This 
problem is conflated with that of  expressing the concept of  blasphemy, which the 
Bosavi pastors effected through the concept of  gossip. Reported thought is 
commonplace in the narratives and conversations of  many cultures. In consequence of  
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this shared heritage, the idea of  multi-dimensional intentionality being a built-in feature 
of  human equipment is easy to accept. For the Bosavi, though, the cultural norm is that 
only an experiencer can know their own internal state, and therefore only the 
experiencer has the right to speak of  that internal state. Defiance of  this norm is 
characterized as gossip, and is severely sanctioned—anyone proven to have gossiped is 
liable to pay compensation to the subject of  the offence. Children are actively socialized 
against talking about things for which they have no evidence, and their caregivers do not 
verbally speculate about the child‘s introspective states—an unwarrantable restraint from 
an occidental point of  view (155–6). 
Repeated revisions of  this passage in successive editions of  the Nupela Testamen 
suggest that the problem of  articulating the concept of  blasphemy was broadly 
generalizable in the region. The first version renders blasphemy as ‗tok bilas‘, meaning 
to ‗talk decoration‘, or to talk boastfully. The Bosavi pastors rendered this, in turn, as 
sada:dan—‘gossip‘, in the sense just described: saying things that one has no right to say 
about someone else, usually, though not necessarily, out of  that person‘s earshot. Jesus 
was being represented as behaving contrary to the social norms of  the community, 
while (in consequence of  his ability to cure the infirm) being legitimated in doing so. 
The comprehension of  this differentiation, one presumes, has the effect of  installing in 
the congregation the foundation of  a set of  mind-tools that will enable its members to 
digest the notion of  remote authority. This serves the missionaries‘ ends plainly enough, 
but it also serves the ends of  the government agencies whose secular and temporal 
authority the missionaries are instrumental in developing. The encounter with the 
missionaries effects a significant noetic reconfiguration, preparing the Bosavi to become 
constitutional subjects, fit to participate in the performance of  ‗the economy‘. 
 
Is it the case, then, that a similar process of reconfiguration took place in Europe during 
the period in which a single spiritual authority (the Catholic church), operating a 
network of shamanistic resource centres (providing such services as education and 
medicine), supervened on the various secular states as they emerged? This sense of 
ethical coordination, vague as it is, offers a context in which to consider the 
institutionalization of competition; a way of theorizing an evolution from interpersonal 
agonism to the non-lethal trials of strength characteristic of rational enquiry.  
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One of Ong‘s key arguments is that rising literacy accompanies a kind of ‗domestication‘ 
of agonistic display. At its mildest, agonism is a characteristic style of oral culture, as 
with the Cork man in Ong‘s anecdote who, when asked ‗is this the post office?‘, instead 
of simply giving an informative ‗yes‘ or ‗no‘, replied with another question: ‗would it be 
a stamp that you‘re after?‘ (68) It is conversational give-and-take, the characteristic style, 
also, of second-person intersubjective communication. We can align it with the display 
practices called ‗lekking‘ by anthropologists, and also with the notion of Spieltreib that 
intrigued Peirce. The challenge of reining in lethal agonism continues as a thematic 
thread in the continuing emergence of literacy from medieval to early modern England, 
but it is difficult to get clear theoretical purchase on such a broadly-drawn issue. 
According to Ong, the connection between oratory and agonism in Greek, Roman, and 
subsequent European cultures makes them distinct from Indian and Chinese traditions, 
which sought ‗programmatically‘ to minimise oppositions (1982, 109). Rhetoric long 
dominated the formal European educational curriculum, but it is more significant, Ong 
argues, that for about a thousand years, formal education was conducted in Latin. Being 
a dead language, Latin had to be learned from books. Those learning Latin were 
overwhelmingly male, and, moreover, while they were not learning their mother 
tongues, boys were also withdrawn from the oral familiarity of family life. Both of these 
factors—the dependence on books and the puberty-rite aspect, as Ong calls it—reduced 
the intersubjective, second-person element in learning. Consequently: 
Learned Latin effects even greater objectivity by establishing knowledge in a medium insulated from 
the emotion-charged depths of one‘s mother tongue, thus reducing interference from the human 
life-world and making possible the exquisitely abstract world of mediaeval scholasticism and of the 
new mathematical modern science which followed on the Scholastic experience (112). 
Ong makes a further distinction between chirographic culture and typographic culture, 
arguing for a similarly radical ontological reshaping in the wake of Gutenberg‘s 
invention of moveable type.  
Symmetrically, the eminent historian of the book, Roger Chartier (2005, 2007) draws 
attention to a number of performative facets entrained by the arrival of paper and print 
technologies. Paper-making from mulberry pulp was invented in China somewhere in 
the region of 2,000 years ago. The technology was captured by Arabs in the 8th century 
CE, and might very well have helped support the golden age of scholarship during 
which so many significant scientific and cultural advances were made, notably in 
mathematics. Paper-making arrived in Europe in the 13th century CE. 
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The obvious advantage of printing in terms of mass-producing and distributing 
standardized texts has become familiar and banal; Chartier points out some ways in 
which print created new uses for handwriting. Early in the story there is the matter of 
deciding what to bind, whether to combine printed text and manuscript, which texts to 
choose and so on. In different copies of a printed edition there are likely to be 
individually penned marginal commentaries. Later, editions are printed with blank space 
or blank pages that invite the owner to participate in authorship; college editions printed 
with widely spaced lines enabled students to insert commentary between the lines of 
text. 
Deciding what to bind is an editorial issue, but the performance of authorship is 
similarly complicated. Foucault linked a kind of ‗authoritas‘ in the scientific text with the 
author‘s name, a process serving to create the signature of the scientific author, 
conflating the author as inventor or discoverer with the author as narrator and 
witness—in general, an aristocratic figure predisposed in his cultural milieu to ‗speaking 
the truth‘. However, the practice in publishing plays in England during the Elizabethan 
period reveals a different set of criteria altogether. Analysis has shown that fees for two 
thirds of the plays examined are paid to at least two, and up to five authors, whereas 
collaboration is acknowledged on the title page in little more than a sixth of the sample. 
A difference emerges here between the preparation of a text, and the accreditation of an 
author. 
Chartier contrasts a determinist view of the printing press in which the invention has an 
intrinsic meaning and intrinsic properties on the one hand, with a tychic model on the 
other in which properties emerge from continually reconfiguring oppositions, 
negotiations, conventions and so on. The printing press is an important piece of 
scaffolding, but its significance can be overstated; its products still support rather than 
supplant oral performance. Maybe Plato‘s Socrates was the first to complain about 
‗dumbing down‘ and to articulate suspicions related to the impact of writing on the 
proper conduct of public debate in Phaedrus; especially in the story of Thoth‘s gift to 
King Thamus. Certainly a similar variety of ills have been ascribed to book culture in 
general, especially in the dread of wide circulation leading to a debasement of 
knowledge, reprised in the modern experience of Wikipedia. 
 
The focus, in Chartier‘s scholarship, on material evidence perhaps tends to emphasize 
consequences within the literate nexus, which in medieval and early-modern times is a 
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group of people substantially consistent with Gramsci‘s corps of ‗traditional 
intellectuals‘. The effects of literacy on the wider community, as literate practices 
became more and more widespread, are much more difficult to enumerate. As a matter 
of fact, attention to violence in the medieval period arises in part from the close study of 
material (i.e. written) evidence, prompted in part by altogether more present-day 
concerns about crime. At the time that Ted Robert Gurr was writing his major survey of 
historical crime trends (Gurr 1981), crime in the USA was reaching the peak of an 
upsurge. The homicide rate there remained at about 10 per 100,000 for the next decade, 
but has subsequently reduced by about a half.51 The question arose: was this upsurge 
something new; the answer was startling. Based on English evidence gleaned from 
fourteenth-century coroners‘ records, London and Oxford were dangerous places, the 
homicide rate in Oxford being computed at 110 per 100,000 in the period (the 1340s) 
for which the most complete set of data is available.  
The population of Oxford, at the time, was about 7,000, among whom about 1,500—
mostly young males—were associated with the university. The actual figures, then, were 
six or seven homicides in each of the years for which coroners‘ records remain intact. 
The assumption is generally made that homicides are the most reliable indicator of 
crime patterns in this period, because they were subject to public sanction to a greater 
extent than other crimes. Coroners were required to determine cause of death for 
revenue purposes, offenders‘ chattels being forfeit to the crown. Their records provide a 
more reliable basis for statistics than court records, because the determination of 
homicide did not necessarily lead to prosecution (Hanawalt 1976, 299). The Oxford rate 
is the highest discovered in medieval England, estimates for London ranging between 
30–50 per 100,000 (Hammer 1978, 12). Becker‘s analysis of Florentine crime in the 
same mid-fourteenth century period shows rates reduced from about 150 per 100,000 to 
about 70 per 100,000 in the latter part of the century (1976, 287). Hanawalt‘s figures for 
rural Northamptonshire are not conveniently comparable, owing to the difficulty of 
making demographic estimates—among other things, the Black Death is in play during 
this period. Guessing at a population of 50–100,000 (cf., indirectly, Ackerman 1976, 
113), her raw numbers, ranging between 10–20 homicides per annum, are broadly in line 
with the conclusions drawn elsewhere (Hanawalt 1976, 303). 
                                                 
51 Figures based on FBI reports, www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucr.htm (accessed 22 July 2007), most recently for 
2005. There are wide variations between rates in urban and rural areas, and from state to state. 
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Some patterns discerned in these figures are familiar: although the concept of ‗weekend‘ 
was a good deal less robust in this period, Saturdays, Sundays and Mondays were times 
of heightened risk, as were the hours between twilight and midnight. In the Oxford 
material, moreover, there is clear evidence of distinctions between safe and unsafe 
neighbourhoods. However, as Lawrence Stone observes, comparisons with later 
datasets suggest that other patterns changed radically. The reduction in the gross 
number is the most obvious indicator: rates halved by the period between 1550 and 
1650, and since then have reduced to a tenth of 17th century levels. From that point of 
view, the trend Stone identifies from a small percentage of homicides taking place 
within the biological family in the 14th century— 8%, rising to 15% in the late sixteenth 
century, about 20% in the seventeenth century, and about 50% in the twentieth—may 
be an artefactual residue left over after other focal areas diminished in significance 
(Hammer 1978, 14; Stone 1983, 25–7). A number of other factors arise, which more 
clearly implicate the onset of literate technologies. The burden of prosecution shifts 
from the relatives of the deceased to public authorities; medical care improves; public 
tolerance of violent conduct diminishes. The concept of public tolerance is an evolution 
of its own, a locus where the issues relating to literacy become particularly significant: a 
developing sense of personal horizon extending beyond the homeostatic is facilitated by 
the development of an increasingly effective range of administrative technologies.  
Stone (1985, 219–20) illustrates the shift by observing that in medieval times, a 
cuckolded husband would be likely to assault the seducer physically; by the eighteenth 
century he would take the offender to court and seek pecuniary damages. More 
generally, what develops in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century is a greater 
willingness to ascribe responsibility to other members of the community, with a 
corresponding diminution in the role assigned to fate, nature or God. An element in this 
is the effect of the protestant revolution, the cognitive re-orientation involved in 
personalizing the individual‘s relationship with scripture at the expense of the 
omniscient role previously ascribed to the parish priest. Another, more practical factor 
entrained by the dissolution of the monasteries was the release of numbers of literate 
individuals into the community—clerics who needed new sources of subsistence 
reconfiguring services previously provided by the church.  
Similarly, as Stephens (1990, 546) points out, the civil war a century later stimulated the 
development of an organized production and distribution system involving printers, 
publishers, wholesalers, booksellers, chapmen dealing in political and religious books, 
pamphlets, tracts, and newspapers. However, inferences about readership are largely 
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drawn from the nature of the material. Evidence of literacy in this and earlier periods is 
as difficult to assemble as crime statistics, and calls for the same kind of interpretative 
diligence and ingenuity. The principal source is signature evidence. It is assumed that 
people capable of signing their names on official documents, whether court affidavits or 
marriage certificates, could write in other contexts too. Reading, though, is an easier skill 
to acquire than writing, and there are no indicators that would identify a person who 
was capable of reading but not writing. Like the scallop larvae that did not attach to 
ropes in St Brieuc bay in chapter 2.2.1, people who could read but not write leave no 
trace in history. Correlating signature evidence with school records is not at all reliable, 
since, especially in the early modern period, there were many varieties of informal 
schooling and widely differing lengths of time spent in education. Some, indeed, learnt 
to write in adulthood. 
 
In England, the period between the reformation and the civil war seems to have been 
pivotal in negotiating the relationship between the decline in violent interpersonal crime 
and the rise in literacy. Since a similar transformation occurs across Europe, albeit over 
varying timescales, extracting firm conclusions about metaphysical and abstract concepts 
is an intensely challenging task. An early bifurcation followed the fourth Lateran 
Council‘s suppression of proof by ordeal in 1215. European Christendom adopted the 
inquisition. To convict someone of a serious crime required a minimum of two eye-
witnesses. Where eye-witnesses were lacking but the circumstantial evidence was strong, 
the confession of the suspect was an acceptable substitute, and torture an acceptable 
means of obtaining this. England, though, adopted the jury. Circumstantial evidence by 
itself was sufficient to convict, and juries might convict on the basis of prior knowledge 
of the accused and only a bare minimum of supporting evidence (Baker 1978). 
Supporting the English system was the rhetorical technology of common law. The 
accumulation of precedents improved the efficiency of the justice system by minimizing 
the recombinant load on individual judges. If a similar problem had been encountered 
before, and a solution reached, then there would be no need to devise a fresh solution 
ex nihilo. We are accustomed to the array of volumes in which individual judgements are 
preserved, in the modern, text-intensive world; it is easy to overlook the importance of 
the medieval scholar‘s disciplined training in the use of memory, and the way that 
writing must have supported oral performance by means that strongly resemble the 
classical Greek remembrancers. Further, while modern thinking about medieval justice 
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is perforce drawn to the capital end of the criminal spectrum, the function of clerics in 
administering a petty, subliminal, or ambient judicial needs is worth considering. The 
salving of bad consciences and the dispersal of lesser anxieties may very well account for 
a significant part of the pardoner‘s social function.  
Both in England and elsewhere in Christendom, the pardoner emerged as figure of 
ridicule, while the selling of indulgences became an increasing focus of discontent 
regarding the boundary between civil and spiritual aspects of daily life. Paradoxically, a 
contributing reason for this is likely to have been the church‘s success in generating a 
sense of ethical consistency. It is noticeable, though, that the sources of literature critical 
of ecclesiastical malpractice—figures such as Chaucer, Skelton and Lindsay—tend to be 
well-connected courtiers with the ear of the monarch. The emergence of ‗rogue 
literature‘ in the sixteenth century marks a transition to a more secular and more 
distributed critique. John Heywood‘s Play called the foure PP (c. 1520) sees the civil and 
clerical figures of the pilgrim, the pardoner, the apothecary and the pedlar compete over 
who can tell the most outrageous lie.  
Thomas Harman‘s Caveat or Warning for Common Cursitors (c. 1566) is entirely secular, and 
performs a second modulation too: the text represents itself as trustworthy even while 
being anecdotal, exaggerated and presumptuous (Woodbridge 2001). Harman was a 
Kent landowner whose court connections were indirect at best; his text was not 
performed but published. His audience was the literate fraction who had done well out 
of Henry VIII‘s reforms and were nervous about the social consequences. Although 
represented in retrospect as a constative account of 16th century vagabonds, Harman‘s 
text should be regarded as contributing to an ethical debate in which the rights of the 
new landowners needed the rhetorical arts of persuasion to establish a moral precedence 
over prior forms of mutual obligation.52 
Changes in land use, notably the ‗Wool Rush‘ enclosures of the 1540s, had two 
significant effects. One was to mobilize dispossessed, disaffected and dangerous 
populations, the other was indirectly to accumulate disaffected attention in times of 
dearth. (Among the vagabondage of the period, Woodbridge notes, were numbers of 
former clerics whose most dangerous asset was rhetorical fluency.) Enclosed lands were 
often put to grazing sheep instead of growing grain, a sustainable change in normal 
climatic circumstances. However, when grain crops failed—as they did periodically—
                                                 
52 Thanks to Robin Hamilton for his helpful advice on rogue literature. 
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tensions already fermenting between pre-modern notions of clan obligation and modern 
individualism became acute threats to public order (Stone 1947, 104–6; Walter & 
Wrightson 1976, 24). The rhythms of dearth can be regarded as a vastly scaled up 
reprise of the intermittent feedback issue discussed in chapter 7 (see page 178). Instead 
of a fatalistic acceptance of God‘s will, the dispossessed—literate or not—had concrete 
and identifiable targets to blame. On an individual case-by-case basis this might have 
represented no great change, but the recurring pattern obliged government 
administrators to develop structural means of restraining the mounting anger.  
Government records note around forty outbreaks of grain rioting in the period 1585 to 
1660; in the 1630–1 crisis, for example, grain riots were reported in Somerset, Suffolk, 
Sussex, Hertfordshire, Hampshire, Berkshire, Wiltshire and Kent (Walter & Wrightson 
1976, 26). Attention, especially in grain-producing areas, focused on the role of 
badgers—a generic term for commodity dealers trading in foodstuffs, to a degree similar 
to the original French sense of entrepreneur—who were blamed for removing supplies 
from where they were needed, as the locals saw the issue. Of course urban populations 
saw blame in a different light, since badgers supplied their gustatory needs. Parliament 
enacted regulations in 1552 and 1563, with orders in council tightening and elaborating 
these in response to the 1630–1 crisis (30–2). The speed and depth of the shift toward 
secular responses to dearth should not be exaggerated: periods of dearth occasioned 
morally-inspired drives against drunkenness and the sources of intoxication, seeking 
among other things to interdict the supply of grain to brewers—a trade in which 
badgers again were implicated. 
The etymology of ‗badger‘ is difficult to establish. It is perhaps significant that laders 
and kidders—other trades named in the 1552 legislation alongside badgers—are 
Germanic in derivation, remembering that in Plantagenet England the formerly-Saxon 
peasantry named the animals (sheep, cow, pig), while the formerly-French nobility 
named the meat (mutton, beef, pork).53 That line of argument points to the Germanic 
‗bag‘—bagging to render commodities moveable—at the head of the etymological trail. 
From there, marking the bags so that their contents are identifiable—badging—begins a 
transference that resembles (albeit imprecisely) Austin‘s locutionary/ illocutionary/ 
perlocutionary progression. From badging to badgering is a representational move, and 
                                                 
53 Laders dealt with the loading of ships, presumably in the sense of negotiating and delivering cargos 
rather than physically loading them; kidders dealt in firewood. Cf. George Robb (sic), White Collar Crime in 
Modern England, 2002, loading boats presumably included paperwork. 
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again it is significant that the OED definition gives prominence to negative 
connotations: ‗a cadger, hawker, or huckster‘.  
Skilled performance is implied: in making promises that are either not kept or are 
disappointingly kept; or representing the same cargo to several potential buyers in order 
to establish the best price; outright deceit is unsustainable, so interpretative dexterity, 
flattery and other persuasive arts are undoubtedly assets that a successful badger would 
be able to deploy. Concomitantly, the scepticism attracted by clerical intermediaries in 
the medieval period transfers to commercial intermediaries in the early modern. The 
articulation of that scepticism, though, passes from a privileged, oral context to a 
regulatory framework, inscribed in law and supported by the reified hermeneutic 
resources available through the new medium of print. 
In short, detachment engenders creativity on the part of the badger; this is the raw 
material of recombinant intentionality at its simplest. Grain, bagged, acquires intension. 
By itself, the intensional load on the bag is limited, but as one intension among many in 
the imagination of the dealer it acquires a multitude of potential extensions. This cannot 
be represented as a ‗new‘ cognitive development discovered in reformation England, 
but the harnessing of new paper, print and security technologies—and people capable 
of putting these to productive use—has the mark of a quasi-irreversible step. Paying 
attention to the bagging of commodities as a cognitive event is a gesture that echoes 
Tomasello‘s observation that much of what is unique about language can already be 
found in the act of pointing.  
Concomitantly, the badger is an anonymous and generalized figure, capable in turn of 
intensional transformation into a performative function in the working of the economy. 
He is the antecedent of the entrepreneur, and, once suitably furnished with 
intersubjective technologies, of the work-maker.54 It is time, now, to develop that notion 
of intensional transformation in terms of its speculative relationship with potential 
extensions, by theorizing intersubjective technology through the lens of polyphonic 
consciousness and recombinant intentionality. This entails the substantiation of the 
argument that technology is the transparent and seamless extension of skill—
transparent, that is, in the strong Dennett–Clark sense elaborated in part two. 
                                                 
54 The gendered ‗he‘ is a historical presumption. If a similar presumption of masculinity attends the 
entrepreneur and the heterogeneous engineer, this is not shared with the work-maker. 
 
 
The fundamental purpose of brains, says Daniel Dennett, is to produce future:  
In order to cope, an organism must either armour itself (like a tree or a clam) and ‗hope for the best,‘ 
or else develop methods of getting out of harm‘s way and into the better neighbourhoods in its 
vicinity. If you follow this latter course, you are confronted with the primordial problem that every 
agent must continually solve: 
Now what do I do?  
(Dennett 1991, 177) 
Let us take the notion of reaching for ‗better neighbourhoods‘, and cause trouble for it: 
better neighbourhoods are, by definition (one assumes) niches that are already occupied; 
getting there entails competition. Implicitly, the question ‗now what do I do?‘ is scalable 
through the ‗kinds of mind‘ rehearsed in part two. For a Darwinian mind, there‘s 
nothing for it but to bash away at the coveted niche and succeed or fail (will meets 
won‘t). For the Gregorian mind, conceivably negotiation—with all its scope for messy 
compromise—is the preferred course. 
Now lay this abstract philosophical form next to a piece of political analysis. From 
Antonio Gramsci‘s perspective, 
If not all entrepreneurs, at least an élite amongst them must have the capacity to be an organiser of 
society in general, including all its complex organism of services, right up to the state organism, 
because of the need to create the conditions most favourable to the expansion of their own class; 
(Gramsci 2001, 1138) 
Gramsci‘s organisms already have brains, bodies and histories, because his narrative 
mobilizes relationships between fairly crudely-drawn aggregates (or classes) of humans 
living in (relatively) industrialized societies. But the issue is the same: it concerns the 
procuring and securing of the best possible environment.  
Now, a question posed by Shirley Strum and Bruno Latour is as relevant to Dennett‘s 
primordial upscaling as it is to Gramsci‘s maximizing entrepreneur: 
How do baboons know who is dominant and who is not? Is dominance a fact or an artefact? If it is 
an artefact, whose artefact is it – is it the observer‘s, who is searching for a society into which he can 
put the baboons? … Or is it a universal problem, one that both observer and baboon have to solve? 
(Strum & Latour 1999, 118) 
Baboons are observed to spend a great deal of time in various acts of negotiation whose 
function can be ascribed to the need for constant evaluation of social links. There is no 
pre-existing hierarchy, according to the performative view, but rather order is 
established as the provisional outcome of a continuing process of arbitration. Because 
baboons have limited resources—their bodies and their social skills—colonies can 
organise only a limited social stability. Strum & Latour call this configuration social 
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complexity. The introduction of material resources and symbols—the distinguishing 
characteristic of humans—lead, on the other hand, towards social complication. 
Complication is here defined as an organism built from a series of simple operations, 
components or concepts.  
To some degree, it is a counterintuitive position to argue that primitive (oral) society is 
more complex than industrial (literate) society. The argument is rather that layered 
simplifications function in concert to enable more complexity at the social level. A 
simplification, in this context, can be understood in terms of the conservation of 
successful experimental outcomes, unsuccessful alternatives having been discarded. The 
idea of a social ‗level‘, then, floats on the interactions—intended or opportunistic—
between simplifications.  Memory and learning are no less important, but the ability to 
coordinate and even direct people, and the ability to explain and to enrol cooperation is 
expanded and reinforced symmetrically through recourse to innate human capacities and 
to supporting non-human artefacts—technologies.  
 
In the introduction to Knowing Machines (1996), Donald MacKenzie notes that the word 
‗technology‘ properly refers to knowledge of the practical arts rather than to machines 
per se. In modern usage, however, the term has broadened to encompass machines as 
well as the knowledge embodied in them (9, fn 17). Additionally the word is widely used 
with the explicit purpose of valorization. It is striking that socio-economic analyses of 
the machine, especially in relation to the British Industrial Revolution and cognate 
developments elsewhere, focus on the virtue of consistency. Peirce, for example, affirms 
that 
… machines are ―destitute of all originality, of all initiative.‖ In a machine, Peirce stresses, this is a 
good thing; it is precisely the machine‘s lack of originality that makes it predictable and hence useful; 
… ―we no more want an original machine than a house-builder would want an original journeyman‖ 
(Skagestad 2004, 255) 
This virtue of the machine accounts for the judgement of Andrew Ure, whose 1835 
Philosophy of Manufactures MacKenzie cites as stating that ‗when capital enlists science into 
her service, the refractory hand of labour will always be taught docility‘ (1996, 35–6). 
MacKenzie further cites Marx as stating that ‗the complaint that the workers lack 
discipline runs through the whole of the period of manufacture‘ (33). MacKenzie later 
cites the empirical evidence of Michael Piore, who found that, ‗as one engineer 
explained, ―if the cost comparison favoured labour but we were close, I would 
mechanise anyway‖‘ (53). The engineer, here, betrays the emotional appeal of 
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performing the kind of rationality that is widely believed to underwrite the central, 
maximizing thrust of neoclassical economics, so it is telling that the word Herbert 
Simon chooses to improve the concept of ‗rational expectations‘ is ‗consistent 
expectations‘ (1978, 2, fn 1). 
The point that MacKenzie stresses in respect of Marx, which bears upon the issue of 
valorization, is that in the advent of large-scale mechanised production, social relations 
moulded technology rather than vice versa (28). In this nineteenth-century context, 
mechanized production is straightforwardly a matter of transforming raw materials into 
saleable goods, a process in which valorization is the multiplication of the monetary 
value by which the capitalist can recoup the cost of manufacture and turn a profit. It is 
where the connection between added monetary value and accumulated intangible value 
is less obvious that the application of the term ‗valorization‘ becomes more difficult.  
Interestingly, MacKenzie notes that a definition of the machine as a complex 
assemblage of tools was worthless, for Marx, ‗because the historical element is missing from it‘ 
(34). In this sense, intersubjective technology is legitimately distinct from the automation 
of know-how. It is know-how about how to share or distribute know-how but, 
counterintuitively, this competence is founded on the range of oral skills that Havelock 
pronounces obsolete—skills that entail an essentially homeostatic sense of history. For 
Marx, though, the function of the machine was to supersede know-how, with all its 
unpredictable orality: ‗the machine … is a mechanism that, after being set in motion, 
performed with its tools the same operations as the worker formerly did with similar 
tools‘ (34); 
…the special skill of each individual machine operator, which has now been deprived of all 
significance, vanishes as an infinitesimal quantity in the face of the science, the gigantic natural 
forces, and the massive social labour embodied in the system of machinery, which, together with 
these three forces, constitutes the power of the ‗master‘ (35).  
Yet from resistance to this trend, MacKenzie points out, a significant contribution to 
the development of British thought—whether philosophy or social policy—emerged; 
notwithstanding that ‗strikes were a major reason for innovations‘ (37–8). Not only 
innovative machinery, however: the very task of organizing a strike demands innovation 
among discontented labour and, given the ultimate indispensability of labour, innovative 
tactics for managing labour relations on the part of employers and, subsequently, 
higher-level social structures.  
Technologies 9: Art loves chance 213 
 
For Heidegger (1977), this field of struggle approaches a hylomorphic understanding of 
individuation. Lost in his misty-eyed peroration he fails to disclose the significance of 
the underlying Aristotelian shift away from hylozoism and towards rational process, but 
repetition and return is the circuitry where the ‗essence‘ of technology is to be found, 
with heavy stress on the active deliberation involved in drawing forth that which is to be 
found. Heidegger turns technology into a sacrament from the outset: ‗Questioning 
builds a way... The way is a way of thinking‘ (3). In discussing Aristotle‘s four causes 
(material, formal, effective, final), he renders Aristotle‘s silver (material) bowl (form) as a 
chalice (5), introducing to final cause the performance of a sacrificial rite and to effective 
cause the maker‘s intention to make a suitable sacred object. Later, Heidegger allows an 
undisclosed distinction between ‗technology‘ and ‗modern technology‘ (14), claiming 
that ‗the work of the peasant does not challenge the soil of the field‘ (15)—apparently 
because the peasant is ignorant of chemistry, not because the field is unaffected by 
fertilizer and erosion. Heidegger ends up celebrating poetry, but chooses not to 
exemplify it as a living craft by citing a contemporary, instead turning to the Romantic 
poet Hölderlin rather as Plato was wont to turn to Hesiod.55  
The resulting ‗definition‘, valorizing long-term, devoted and painstaking labour, is 
apparently the very opposite of what we are accustomed to meaning by the term 
‗technology‘. Technologies afford convenience, do they not? Heidegger is somewhat 
equivocal about this. Convenience, articulated through the key concept of ge-stell 
(enframement), acquires a moral ambiguity that points towards the issue of risk and 
danger. The way he unfolds this ambiguity performs his message, being characteristically 
laborious, paying meticulous attention to the history of the significant words around 
which his argument is constructed. 
Regarding cause, he remarks that ‗we have acted as though the doctrine of the four 
causes had fallen from heaven‘ (6), and draws attention to the breadth of meaning 
available in aitia, the word Aristotle used: 
                                                 
55 See Pierre Joris on Paul Celan‘s famous 1966 visit to Heidegger. Reading ‗Todtnauberg‘, the poem 
Celan inscribed in The Thinker‘s guestbook, Joris finds Celan using the word ‗Waldwasen‘ in an archaic, 
significant way, almost a parody of Heidegger, implicitly humiliating The Thinker in so doing. 
http://wings.buffalo.edu/epc/authors/joris/todtnauberg.html 
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...things asked, assumed, demanded of it; responsibility, guilt, blame; in forensic oratory, invective 
without proof, the opposite of elenchus (cross-examining, testing); credited to, reputed to (i.e. indirect 
or unevidenced attribution) (after Liddell & Scott, ailia) 
Heidegger‘s gloss is ‗that to which something else is indebted‘ (7), but the element of 
indirect responsibility is discarded. This is a matter that Peirce‘s categorical thirdness 
presences; presencing being what, for Heidegger, cause does. ‗The four ways of being 
responsible bring something into appearance‘ (9), and we find ourselves engaged once 
again with the question of ‗florid representing‘ discussed in chapter 6.1.1, almost literally 
in terms: 
It is of utmost importance that we think bringing-forth in its full scope and at the same time in the 
sense in which the Greeks thought it. Not only handcraft manufacture, not only artistic and poetical 
bringing into appearance and concrete imagery, is a bringing-forth, poiesis. Physis also, the arising of 
something from out of itself, is a bringing-forth, poiesis. Physis is indeed poiesis in the highest sense. 
For what presences by means of physis has the bursting open belonging to bringing-forth, e.g., the 
bursting of a blossom into bloom (10). 
The trouble is that, although Heidegger confidently affirms that ‗Bringing-forth brings 
hither out of concealment forth into unconcealment‘ (11), it is not clear that bringing-
forth does anything more than presence hylomorphic transition, or rather bring a lens to 
magnify a local detail of transition. We have a performance of hylomorphic sampling, so 
to speak; just another name for the Bergsonian cinematograph. 
Noting the link between technē and craft skill, Heidegger points out a further link 
between technē and epistemē, highlighting a passage in Aristotle‘s Nicomachean Ethics (VI, 3–
4) where Aristotle‘s distinction between acting and making recalls his own distinction 
between ready-to-hand and present-at-hand. Aristotle here highlights two other 
recurring themes: the difficulty of accounting for where original thought comes from, 
and the concomitant relationship between technē and chance—the latter seeding 
Heidegger‘s later interrogation of danger. Because Aristotle claims for technē an element 
of reason, Heidegger draws the conclusion that ‗It is as revealing, and not as 
manufacturing, that technē is a bringing-forth‘ (13). 
However, modern technology does something else, something (pace Heidegger) connected 
to the overlooked element of indirect responsibility. Its mode of revelation is challenge; 
it ‗sets upon‘ nature. Hence, where previously the peasant sowed grain and left its 
increase to the soil, industrial agriculture sets upon nature so that the air yields nitrogen 
for fertilizer; the ground yields oil that either gets translated into pesticide or fuel for 
tractors, while other ground yields ore to be translated into iron to make tractors (14–
15). The term Heidegger develops to disclose the distinctively modern in technology is 
ge-stell, enframement—a term plainly linked to the previously footnoted issue of noema in 
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Husserl (p. 168), to the frame problem discussed in the previous chapter, and thus 
linked in a particular way to hylomorphic sampling. (Note that sampling is a probabilistic 
practice.) 
To set up ge-stell, Heidegger first discusses Bestand, translated by Lovitt as ‗standing-
reserve‘, but alternatively renderable as ‗resource‘—though Heidegger would probably 
insist on hyphenating (re-source) to stress the element of arbitrarily recurrent return at 
the core of his point:  
Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed to stand there just 
so that it may be on call for a further ordering. Whatever is ordered about in this way has its own 
standing. We call it the standing-reserve (17). 
A sense of primordial force animating the challenge channels human Entbergen— ‗Bergen 
means to rescue, to recover, to secure, to harbor, to conceal‘ (11, fn 10); to salvage, to 
retrieve (to find again), to hold—through a seeming pun:  
That which primordially unfolds the mountains into mountain ranges and courses through them in 
their folded togetherness is the gathering that we call ―Gebirg‖ [mountain chain] (19). 
Heidegger‘s rhetorical purpose is to place ge-stell outside the human scale, referencing the 
Kantian sublime so that experience becomes a theatrical dialogue between the evidence 
of the senses and the essential Platonic primitives around which such evidence 
germinates narrative trajectories. Ge-stell is not a passive byproduct, however: it is an 
intensifier of challenging. It brings ‗set upon‘—presumably in the predatory sense of a 
lion setting upon a wildebeest—and adds ‗producing and presenting‘ to give up poiesis, 
letting ‗what presences come forth into unconcealment‘ (21). 
The hylomorphic sense of the interpretant being in a state of perpetual in media res 
continues to beg certain originary questions as Heidegger‘s argument touches on the 
Hegelian notion of historical determinism. Heidegger‘s ‗destining‘ is a subtle piece of 
accountancy: 
It is from out of this destining that the essence of all history is determined. History is neither simply 
the object of written chronicle nor simply the fulfillment of human activity. That activity first 
becomes history as something destined. And it is only the destining into objectifying representation 
that makes the historical accessible as an object for historiography (24). 
The debate over system function and selected function appeals to this sense of history. 
Although Heidegger cites Heisenberg, my hunch is that the uncertainty principle is not 
integral to his argument. The Peircean view of the same issue, which I will address in the 
next section, does not contradict Heidegger‘s, but lends an evolutionary perspective that 
obliges us to dispense with Heidegger‘s ponderous theurgy. 
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With the Romantic sublime standing behind it, what seems to be happening in 
Heidegger‘s account is that the interpretant is being ushered towards an untimely 
resolution of whatever immediate crisis has one‘s attention fixed, so that danger is 
entailed in the denial of contemplation: 
But Enframing does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is. 
As a destining, it banishes man into that kind of revealing which is an ordering. Where this ordering 
holds sway, it drives out every other possibility of revealing (27). 
In the denial of contemplation, reason is reduced to the throwing of loaded dice. 
Knowing this, we trust the expected outcome, discounting improbable alternatives, thus 
dispensing with the rational processes required to resolve their consequences. However, 
this pessimistic withering of reason bears the seed of redemption. Heidegger cites 
Hölderlin:  
But where danger is, grows 
The saving power also. 
He comments: ‗―To save‖ is to fetch something home into its essence, in order to bring 
the essence for the first time into its genuine appearing‘ (28). By this means, re-source 
becomes modulated into resource, a positive compositional foundation that re-
normalizes contemplation.  
 
The skilled thinker chooses equipment wisely. Is it possible, though, that equipment 
chooses its thinker? If that question seems absurd, then maybe it can be posed more 
neutrally as a nature/nurture dichotomy. How do items emerge out of flux and establish 
relationships that sustain them while others are discarded? Recalling Strum & Latour‘s 
distinction between complexity and complication, how can we frame an interrogation of 
the processes that mediate this distinction, presuming that human volition is implicated 
but not supreme? We have already laid the foundation, discussing Peirce‘s work on 
chance in part one. The particular aspect that bears on the present question emerges 
from Brian Arthur‘s work on the Pòlya urn, developed as a tool of statistical probability 
in knowledge economics.  
The Pòlya urn is a method for modelling contagion effects. An urn of infinite capacity is 
primed with two balls of differing colour. The investigator removes a randomly chosen 
ball from the urn. Returning this ball to the urn, a second ball of the same colour is 
placed alongside it. As this procedure is repeated, the question arises: will the proportion 
of one colour to the other fluctuate indefinitely, or will it stabilize? Proofs developed by 
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Hill, Lane & Sudderth (for two-dimensional processes with stationary urn functions), 
and Arthur, Ermoliev & Kaniovski (for n-dimensional processes with nonstationary urn 
functions) show that stabilization does occur, but, for any iteration of the process, the 
stable proportion is randomly variable. On one occasion it may be 7:1, on another it may be 
3:2, and so on. Early in an iteration of the process, random fluctuations make a large 
difference; later on their impact is negligible. The significance of n dimensionality is that 
the technique models stable but non-deterministic outcomes in complex autocatalytic 
regimes (Arthur, Ermoliev, & Kaniovski, 1994). The n-dimensional regime is sufficiently 
pliable to account for the limited flexibility of Peircean habit while at the same time 
being sufficiently stable to account for its durability. Further, it helps illuminate the 
fixation of one belief by another in the complex epistemic regimes familiar, through 
language, to humans—not least the meaning and syntactic ordering of the words 
themselves. 
From this perspective, individual choice-acts occur in a dynamic milieu where choices—
enframements—are numerous and constrained by time and resource limitations. Pòlya 
effects accumulate as a probabilistic consequence of the nodal interactions generated. 
Because these effects are probabilistic but stable (once established), the strong 
temptation to retrospectively ascribe prior cause to the anterior state is problematized. 
Instead, analysis focuses on paths, strands of narrative whose entanglements collectively, 
polyphonically, propagate the story. 
Salganik, Dodds & Watts (2006) report lock-in effects in an artificial cultural 
marketplace. Participants were offered choice between 48 songs by unknown bands, and 
asked to evaluate each item they downloaded. One fifth of the sample were given no 
information other than the song titles and band names; the remainder were assigned to 
one of eight social ‗worlds‘, where songs were cumulatively ranked by popularity. 
Although there was correlation between the popularity of songs selected in each of the 
‗worlds‘ and the rankings conferred by the control group, two notable effects were 
observed. First, there was variance between the ‗worlds‘ regarding which particular 
songs were rated the most popular. Second, popular and unpopular choices tended to be 
more differentiated from the median in the social ‗worlds‘. The authors conclude that 
...social influence exerts an important but counterintuitive effect on cultural market formation, 
generating collective behavior that is reminiscent of (but not identical to) ―information cascades‖ in 
sequences of individuals making binary choices. ...the more information participants have regarding 
the decisions of others, the greater agreement they will seem to display regarding their musical 
preferences; thus the characteristics of success will seem predictable in retrospect (855–6). 
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Collective social deliberation, then, has the effect of economizing an individual 
participant‘s path to institutionally shared values, given artefacts whose properties are 
sufficiently open to accommodate a spectrum of opinion. 
According to economist Paul David, path dependence emerges from the interaction of 
three conditions: technical interrelatedness; economies of scale; and quasi-irreversibility 
of investment. In his famous paper on the story of the suboptimal QWERTY typewriter 
key layout (1985), he says:  
A path-dependent sequence of economic changes is one in which important influences upon the 
eventual outcome can be exerted by temporally remote events, including happenings dominated by 
chance elements rather than systematic forces. Stochastic processes like that do not converge 
automatically to a fixed-point distribution of outcomes, and are called non-ergodic. In such 
circumstances ―historical accidents‖ can neither be ignored, nor neatly quarantined for the purpose 
of economic analysis; the dynamic process itself takes on an essentially historical character. 
In the case of the typewriter, technical interrelatedness was a factor because, in addition 
to the corporations manufacturing the instrument (originally Remington in the mid 
1870s), and the customers buying it, the instrument required operators, and these 
operators required training. Training was provided by a variety of organizations, both 
private and public. As an investment, from the customer‘s point of view, the value of 
the instrument depended on the continuing availability of operators. From the 
operator‘s perspective, investing in the necessary training conferred a ‗pecuniary 
externality‘, and in time a symmetrical benefit accrued for an emerging market for 
instruction in touch-typing that reduced the per-unit cost of undertaking training, and of 
providing it. 
The QWERTY layout was prompted by a combination of factors—keys tended to jam; 
because the platen was oriented face-down, the operator would not be aware of 
jamming until the page was finished and removed from the machine. These problems, 
though, had been overcome as early as the 1890s, but already the marginal cost of 
retraining operators (though not especially high) was sufficient to dissuade corporations 
from making the investment. Hence quasi-irreversibility: the lock-in could in theory be 
reversed. 
In Understanding Media, Marshall McLuhan parses his famous slogan ‗The Medium Is 
The Message‘ as meaning that ‗the personal and social consequences of any medium—
that is, of any extension of ourselves—result from the new scale that is introduced into 
our affairs by each extension of ourselves‘ (1964, 7). In the case of the typewriter, there 
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are several independent vectors that between them support extension along the locked-
in trajectory of the qwerty keyboard. 
 Understanding Media focuses on the way in which a variety of technological extensions 
exploit the subject‘s innate oral resources at the expense of whatever rational faculties 
might otherwise be brought to bear. In the chapter on the typewriter, for instance (258–
64), McLuhan contrasts the fact that typewriters have not become fixtures in the 
classroom (imagine the noise!) with the radical impact they had on the work of poets 
such as Charles Olson, and Edward Cummings: 
Buffalo Bill 's  
defunct  
         who used to  
         ride a watersmooth-silver  
                         stallion  
and break onetwothreefourfive pigeonsjustlikethat  
                                                                 
                           Jesus  
he was a handsome man  
                         and what i want to know is  
how do you like your blueeyed boy 
Mister Death  
(Source: https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/html/1807/4350/poem602.html) 
In this Cummings poem, the intrusion of the visible clearly ―speaks‖. Space-games 
imitate timing-games so that one translates the space-elided onetwothreefourfive as a 
rapidly-spoken one-two-three-four-five representing fast gun-play. Echoing Arrow‘s 
remarks about the social availability of privately-held knowledge, the visual aspect ―says‖ 
‗this can be done‘, both overtly and subtly: the lower-case i, although characteristic of 
Cummings, here stands humbly in relation to Bill, Jesus and Death. 
For the novelist Henry James, too, the typewriter altered his mental habits, though in his 
case—ironically—this was because he found he preferred dictating to a secretary over 
composing by hand (Cutting, 2003, pp. 4–5). The effect of this was to skew the noetic 
process so that the later James has more of an oral feel than the earlier. Relating this to 
Heideggerian enframement, James relaxes his hylomorphic circuitry so that the intimate 
relationship between hand and thought is dissolved, relieving the heavy stress on active 
deliberation involved in drawing forth that which is to be found. 
The medium is not ‗the message‘, but it does possess an interpretant function the absence 
of which would obviate any semiotic content. (This is the reflexivity on which search 
engine algorithms depend.) For instance, the widely storied printing press would have 
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been of little use without the development of paper-making. It is not so much that there 
would have been nothing to print the books on. Rather, the authors of those books 
would have had a much harder time finding the materials on which and with which to 
draft their manuscripts. But the materials authors find are not neutral, not external to 
the process of making; nor are they (author or material, take it as you like) necessarily 
visible in the resulting text. 
 
Technology is anterior to individuation, yet technologies are made out of individuations. 
Somehow, volition opportunistically pulls at both ends of the thread. Is technology 
something other than, or more than, a special case of the extended phenotype? The 
instinctive answer is ‗yes‘, but this answer is reflexively grounded in the presumption of 
human exceptionalism, which aligns volition with teleology. We do not find a 
teleological explanation of the extended phenotype convincing because we cannot then 
account for volition in any way other than by recourse to external, supernatural 
causation. We are disinclined to ascribe to such external causes the option of declining-
to-cause that distinguishes volition from will. 
If we were to answer ‗no‘ on partly Humean, partly Peircean grounds, we have instead 
to account for volition in human terms. The Humean ground would be that reason 
alone cannot manage the nexus of impulses constituting the experience of volition. 
Therefore we cannot stand outside the circuits of obligation imposed by nature, 
therefore our accommodations of convenience are part of nature. The Peircean ground 
would nevertheless admit the role of ingrained habit in the practical management of this 
nexus.  
The follow-up question to Peirce (though also, implicitly, to Hume) is this: to what 
extent are my habits mine? Once I notice a number of mannerisms that I have in 
common with other members of my family, I have cause to wonder whether I have any 
mannerisms of my own. Ultimately, this question ends up challenging Peirce‘s cotary 
maxim, ‗nothing is in the intellect that is not first in the senses‘. If I have mannerisms 
and habits that are not, strictly speaking, my own, is it not possible that something 
present to my intellect has arrived there indirectly via other peoples‘ senses? And if that 
is the case, then surely the same indirection embraces the evolutionary history standing 
behind the accumulation of sensory competence in humans? 
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Volition is paronymically similar to will. The Latin root of volition, volo (to wish), is also 
the root of ‗voluntary‘, implicitly stressing the governance of reason. The root of ‗will‘ is 
Germanic, so a direct comparison might risk epistemic dissonance, but OED points 
both volo and will to the Sanskrit várati (chooses, wishes, prefers; will v.1). In ordinary 
use, ‗will‘ suggests something later in the cognitive cycle than ‗volition‘, something 
nearer to action. Under volition, the act has not yet been individuated. Comparing ‗will‘ 
to ‗evil‘ (ewil, ivil, yfel; evil a and n), in the latter‘s senses of ‗―exceeding due measure‖ or 
―overstepping proper limits‖‘, brings into focus a notion of risk implicit in an act of will. 
Hence, technology that is anterior to individuation minimizes risk on the assumption 
that the resource has shown itself to be durable under selection pressure. 
The resource does not voluntarily disclose its compositionality, and its compositionality 
may become partially exposed and exploited by trajectories entirely dissimilar to those 
contributing to its formation. The double-edged sword, then, is that anterior technology 
minimizes risk so that posterior technology can probe its durability thus exposing it to 
fresh risk. Oral performance finds the anterior moving through the interpretant towards 
the posterior. For the interpretant, technologies are articulations of volition, articulation 
meaning not only a reification in speech or prose, but semiotic reification that either 
intercedes as a passage point between mutual interests or, in exemplifying clarity in an 
otherwise indistinct or underdetermined field, accumulates a gravitational force capable 
of propagating passage points ex nihilo.  
By this definition, it might be argued that the notion of intersubjective technology is a 
pleonasm. All technology, in some sense, contributes toward the extension of the 
interests of the organism through which it moves. As a practical matter—if for no other 
reason—there is a point, nevertheless, in focusing on technologies whose specific 
function is, or appears to be, related to interpersonal communication in the widest 
(including temporal) sense. The impetus for the focus on intersubjectivity arises from 
the material discussed in part two, for two physiological reasons. First there is the 
question of translating the Peircean notion of habit into the durable cognitive 
architecture that (conjecturally) distinguishes the literate, inductive thinker from the 
purely oral, abductive thinker. On this basis, there is no inside/outside distinction about 
technology. Prosthetic extension reaches inward as well as outward. Secondly, there is 
the unresolved issue relating to voice versus hand in the performance of 
communication. The intuition here is that mastering the fine motor control of the hand 
entailed in writing, drawing or diagram making is implicated in the acquisition of 
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technologized habit, but, this is not necessarily something installed in every individual, nor 
need it be for the dispositif to evolve. 
 
 
This is where Donald MacKenzie‘s notion of Barnesian performativity takes over from 
the Austinian foundation outlined in part one and developed in part two. The work-
maker is conceived as a specifically Barnesian performer, but as a performer who also 
summarizes, integrates and embodies the epistemic, the phenomenal and the 
sociohistoric strands that have weaved polyphonically through this text. Accordingly, 
this final chapter is part conclusion, part summary, part case-study, but also part 
continuation. To begin with, then, a brief summary: 
The epistemic focus of part one correlates with Peircean secondness, but rather than 
being a performance of epistemology it is more in the nature of a sociology of 
epistemology. It sets up the interpretant/dispositif as an abstract cognitive construct 
ready to be fleshed out in subsequent argument. Peirce‘s interpretant is distinct from the 
conventional embodied common-sense ‗interpreter‘, while dispositif is ultimately from 
Aristotle‘s taxis, but via Foucault and Deleuze has come to mean an altogether more 
dynamic, fluid and evolving hylomorphic arrangement of parts. The 
interpretant/dispositif performs individuation, which is the rational counterpart, or 
continuation, of meiosis. This introduces a necessary modulation to Rortian elimination, 
because rational enquiry needs to be understood as a modulation of ‗natural‘ selection, 
and not merely a gift bestowed uniquely and universally on humankind. 
The phenomenological bias of part two corresponds to Peircean firstness, but in a 
similarly skewed way: its phenomenological sources are present by inference in a way 
analogous to that of the physicist inferring the existence of a previously undetected 
particle. Nevertheless, the term is understood to refer to those aspects of cognition that 
are uniquely the property or function of the interpretant/dispositif. Processes of 
inference are embodied in cognitive equipment in ways that are continuous across 
species. What we seek is a vocabulary that affords theoretical purchase on continuities 
and variabilities among humans as distinct from other species and as distinct from each 
other. 
The phenomenology of creativity is invariant. The necessary epistemic scaffolding is 
individuated at the disciplinary, not the personal, level—though the institutionality of 
discipline, in that sense, is an individuation that is distinct from the process of adding 
and removing epistemic scaffolding. According to this claim, there is no phenomenological 
difference between an artist composing, a politician developing policy, a physicist 
discovering a particle, a software engineer creating an application, or a cook making 
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dinner from leftovers. There is, though, an institutional difference, one that rests to a 
great extent on the accumulation of tacit knowledge to which an individual has been 
exposed and to which that individual retains access. This sociohistoric dimension 
corresponds to Peircean thirdness, but its theorization is informed by subsequent 
thought in perhaps a more marked way than the other two dimensions. In particular, 
beginning with Einstein (and Bergson), later thinkers have a more clock-oriented 
relationship with time. 
 
The notion of Barnesian performativity is a recent development that correlates neatly 
with the Peircean perspective just outlined. Proposed by Donald MacKenzie, the 
concept emerges from criticism of the apparently unrealistic model of rational action 
that neoclassical economics assumes. The general concept of performativity was 
introduced to economics by Michel Callon in his Laws of the Markets (1998). However, 
the Barnesian dimension, introduced by Donald MacKenzie (2007), specifically 
references Austin in a way that Callon did not.  
Though MacKenzie turned to Barry Barnes‘ paper ‗Social Life as Bootstrapped 
Induction‘ (1983) as a means of addressing a criticism related to the perception that 
Austin was solely concerned with language (Didier 2007), Barnesian performativity 
posits a relationship between theory and practice in which theory shapes practice 
through the perlocutionary force of the theorist. However, the Peircean perspective 
suggests that a revision of this familiar dualism is necessary. Rather than 
practice/theory, we need to contemplate a threefold relationship between 
practice/analysis/negotiation. We can place the Barnesian performer at the nexus, 
drawing on Dunbar-style social aggregation and interaction, via the tuned dispositif 
model put forward in chapter 5.4.2.  
Additionally, the three levels of performativity MacKenzie posits offer between them a 
fresh perspective on the problem of higher-level intentionality discussed in chapter 6. 
Pace my criticism of the inflationary trajectory in relation to its evolutionary history, the 
performative trajectory is once again upwards. In summary, 
 Generic performativity corresponds to hylozoism—the pre-Socratic doctrine 
that treats the universe (though, practically speaking this means the Umwelt) as 
‗alive‘ in totality.  Alternatively put, the term represents the view that nature is 
intrinsically semiotic—a narrower position than that of panpsychism, which 
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would assert a phenomenological dimension begging certain questions that are 
outside the scope of this thesis. 
Effective performativity corresponds to Aristotelian hylomorphism—the 
sense that there is a question in nature to which the answer is teleology. The 
purposive shaping of the environment practised by humans can be regarded at 
least as an ‗imitation‘ of hylomorphism. 
Barnesian performativity, the especially strong version of effective 
performativity, corresponds to poiesis—after Aristotle and Heidegger, this is a 
discursive relationship between reason and chance that depends on sustained 
mutuality in order that the practice of imitation be continuing and reflexive. In 
this respect, differential capacities lead humans to invest trust in skilled specialist 
practitioners.  
As Peirce‘s abductive shades into the inductive, so too does ‗effective‘, hylomorphic 
performativity shade into ‗Barnesian‘, poietic performativity. This conception of poiesis, 
extended from Heidegger, rests on a notion of skilled mutuality. The notion of 
environmental coupling now envisages a skilled or tuned, rather than neutral and 
passive, environmental context for action. As Richard Sennett remarks, a pianist cannot 
just support a singer; the singer needs to know how to be supported (2003, 55–6). To 
gain theoretical purchase, I use the term ‗work-maker‘ initially in relation to effective 
performativity, but work-making is subject to quasi-irreversible, path-dependent lock-in. 
The result is the extension of a valorized form corresponding more closely to this 
specifically Heideggerian notion of poiesis. 
MacKenzie also posits a fourth element, which he calls counterperformativity. 
Successful Barnesian performance has the effect of reshaping the environment in such a 
way that the attributes of success focus and mobilize a variety of responses whose 
collective consequence is to challenge the initial success. The case study that follows will 
develop this important notion in more detail. For now, suffice it to say that 
counterperformativity illustrates the connection between meiosis and hylomorphism. 
Rationally achieved elimination creates a re-source, from which future eliminations will 
be made. The work-maker represents this modulated performativity by investing the 
indexical characteristics of secondness in named, symbolic individuals whose Barnesian 
function is articulated by the oral, intersubjective processes of the sociohistoric.  
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Several strands of thought converge in theorizing the work-maker. First, Gramsci‘s 
organic intellectual (2001) represents in its most general form the notion of leadership as 
a process of social mediation. Second is Schumpeter‘s unternehmer. The unternehmer is 
normally rendered in English as entrepreneur rather than the more accurate ‗undertaker‘, 
but the German term contains useful etymology that I will articulate shortly. Third, with 
reservations, is Levi-Strauss‘s engineer. His distinction between mythic thought and 
scientific enquiry is worth making in order to work through its shortcomings, which are 
similar to those of Havelock‘s literacy thesis. Nevertheless, the idea of bricolage as a 
method corresponds quite happily with Popper‘s and Feyerabend‘s trial-and-error 
conception of scientific enquiry. It is Levi-Strauss‘s engineer who stands behind the 
Mine School conception of the heterogeneous engineer (Law 1987; Elzen & MacKenzie 
1996), who, in turn, stands behind the Barnesian performer. 
Returning to the unternehmer, then: for Schumpeter, innovation requires intentionality 
rather than intellect. His unternehmer is a Nietzschean prime mover of economic 
development, wreaking acts of creative destruction through acts of will (Hébert & Link 
2006, 594). Schumpeter‘s unternehmer needs to be distinguished from the prior French 
term entrepreneur, with which the unternehmer is normally conflated. The English sense of 
entrepreneur draws more on the French word (not surprisingly), where its antecedence 
can be traced to the eighteenth century. Previously used for government contractors, 
usually engaged in public engineering works, Richard Cantillon established the 
entrepreneur as a parallel figure to the badger, mediating between producers and 
consumers through market-day transactions (Cantillon, 2010, p. 31ff). The entrepreneur 
bears the risks associated with market judgments about what to source and where to 
distribute products; significantly, Cantillon‘s entrepreneur could innovate through 
arbitrage, creating time- and place-utility by choosing where and when to move goods to 
maximise the difference between purchase and sale price. Evolving from this, Nicholas 
Baudeau emphasized the significance of intelligence, stressing the entrepreneur‘s ability 
to collect and process knowledge (Hébert & Link 2006, 589–90).  
Where the orthodox literature on entrepreneurship perhaps stresses aspects of conduct 
most closely associated with young males, viz. self-interested utility maximization, the 
work-maker back-translates as entremetteur—the emphasis is much more on ‗putting stuff 
out there‘. This may very well be undertaken in self-interest, but the crucial difference is 
the element of prestation—the anthropological idea of a payment or gift made with 
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some indirect expectation of reciprocation. Where do such people come from? They 
mature in a cultural context, the local virtual repertoires in which individuals develop.  
Rendering unternehmer as ‗work-maker‘ comes from ‗work‘ being nothing more than the 
idea of an expenditure of effort that tangibly makes a change in the environment, with 
‗maker‘ adding that this work need not necessarily be done by the individual who 
devises it, like the Roman auctor. One translation of unternehmer is apparently ‗operator‘, 
and that is what I have in mind—except that in English an operator is either someone in 
a mundane and routine sort of occupation, or else a Machiavellian schemer. ‗Opera‘ 
translates as ‗work‘, in the plural sense of completion and accomplishment (the singular 
is ‗opus‘); ‗maker‘ in Scots is makar, which is also Scots for poet (thus effecting a 
connection with poiesis). There is one further, subtle distinction between unternehmer and 
its usual traduction ‗entrepreneur‘: whereas preneur in French means ‗taker‘, nehmer in 
German has a sense of absorption, of gathering in or of soaking up.  
Turning now to the heterogeneous engineer, the term coined by John Law (1986, 1987) 
captures a Peircean/Heideggerian flavour of essentialism that privileges the adductive 
modality (leading-towards/towards-which) that distinguishes the work-maker from the 
entrepreneur. I characterize this flavour as ‗the hylozoism of ideas‘, recognizing that the 
term is either a paradox or an oxymoron. It is operationalized by recombinant 
intentionality on the assumption that environmental interventions represent themselves 
intersubjectively only to skilled witnesses—drilled people, in Law‘s terminology. In 
Law‘s Portuguese case, it is difficult to individuate the idea beyond a general sense of 
desire (in the Bergsonian-Deleuzian sense that continues Peircean adduction), and it is 
hard to distinguish between a sense of power and wealth being a driving force, and 
these being an outcome. The hylozoic idea is easier to diagnose in modern technological 
contexts such as supercomputing (Elzen & MacKenzie 1996; MacKenzie 1996) and 
audio synthesis (Pinch & Trocco 2002). The former finds Seymour Cray pursuing the 
idea of speed, the latter finds Robert Moog pursuing a more amorphous idea of ‗tuning‘.  
Space precludes a detailed treatment, but briefly: Law‘s work refracts the Portuguese 
expansion through Callon‘s passage point notion in a way that discloses the hylozoic 
significance of entities when arranged in perlocutionary array. He argues for a dense 
interrelation between natural, technological and social elements: 
Of course kings and merchants appear in the story. But so too do sailors and astronomers, 
navigators and soldiers of fortune, astrolabes and astronomical tables, vessels and ports of call, and 
last but not least, the winds and currents that lay between Lisbon and Calicut (1986, 2). 
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 One key element, for instance, was the ability to navigate from the Cape of Good Hope 
(so named by the ardent Portuguese king) to Mombasa, where the Europeans could tap 
into an existing fund of Arabic knowledge that furnished access to a pre-existing 
network of Indian Ocean trade. This segment was particularly difficult in the face of 
contrary currents and winds, but once a successful method had been discovered, a map 
could be made that effectively eliminated the necessity for further trials and failures. 
Another key element was the development of the carrack, a vessel that afforded a 
greater envelope of stability in the face of environmental and human hazards. Carracks 
were difficult for small vessels to attack; they afforded plenty of cargo space; they were 
versatile enough to cope with many varieties of wind conditions; and they were 
manageable by a relatively small crew (ibid, 4). 
In the case of Pinch‘s Moog there is a similar negotiation with desire. Moog pioneered 
the consumer audio synthesizer, in an era of institutional computing and related 
technological advance. Institutions concentrated resources, and privileged certain styles 
of expertise (see, e.g., Born 1995). The consumer approach placed a much greater 
emphasis on portability and spontaneity, but the engineering challenge was to create an 
interface that allowed the musician to interact with the electronics. Pinch & Trocco 
contrast Moog‘s approach with that of Don Buchla, whose Buchla Box—initially, at 
least—deliberately avoided using a keyboard controller. At the time, oscillators tended 
to be unstable, so engineering a keyboard and harnessing a conventional idea of ‗in tune‘ 
was by no means an obvious thing to attempt. This idea of ‗tuning‘ is what Moog 
pursued, with the payoff that musicians could use his instruments without needing 
electronic expertise. 
In the case of MacKenzie‘s Cray, the quest is for speed. Cray‘s story begins at the 
infancy of the digital computer at the end of the Second World War. These hand-
crafted, purpose-built machines had evolved by the early 1950s into two distinctive (and 
reproducible) types: business and scientific. The term ‗supercomputer‘ generally attaches 
to the latter, and is particularly related to performance in floating-point arithmetic. The 
principal customers, with insatiable computing demands and the bottomless pockets to 
fund development, were the nuclear weapons laboratories at Los Alamos and Lawrence 
Livermore.  
A central feature of Cray‘s story is the blank sheet of paper. Repeatedly, when beginning 
a new design, he started from scratch rather than attempting to develop an existing 
model. This engendered a distinctive sociotechnical style that involved the engineering 
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of personal business relationships and customers‘ work cycles as well as the computing 
machines. Periodically, this involved Cray in founding new start-ups, though in 
increasingly competitive environments as the market evolved. Once computers were no 
longer craft-built items, the nature of expertise changed so that customers increasingly 
sought compatibility with available tacit knowledge at the expense of outright 
processing power: the notion of speed, for them, included the time taken to get the 
programming done.    
 
In recent years, MacKenzie‘s attention has turned to the world of financial engineering, 
and this is the context for his development of Barnesian performativity. With Michel 
Callon and others, he has been studying the sociology of economics, asking whether ‗the 
economy‘ is an ostensive/constative phenomenon that exists independently of its 
observers, or whether it is rather a performative phenomenon that is the constant 
creation of its participants.  
The idea that economists actively create the economy they purport to describe has taken 
shape relatively recently. Callon‘s principal authority is a 1988 paper by Faulhaber & 
Baumol, whose bibliography is notable on the one hand for a great weight of supporting 
evidence for the case they make, but on the other for the paucity of prior commentary 
on that evidence. Ault & Ekelund (1987)—one of the few exceptions—ascribe this state 
of affairs to an antihistorical bias: the cause, they lament, of ‗a great deal of unnecessary 
originality in our discipline‘ (650). What they mean by ‗unnecessary originality‘ is the 
reinvention or rediscovery of ideas and techniques that might already have arisen in 
other places and contexts beyond immediate Vygotskian horizons.  
Faulhaber & Baumol observe that while economists‘ formalizations of certain 
procedures helped actors reduce imperfection in their decision-making processes, 
believers in the ‗invisible hand‘ (as Adam Smith called it) will continue to argue that 
competition forces actors to behave optimally on pain of being driven from the market. 
The discovery of a formalization does not change behaviour, but merely describes it 
(1988, 578). The Schumpeterian model Faulhaber & Baumol propose in attempting to 
render the ‗hand‘ visible is linear, however: 
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Because Schumpeter argues for a distinction between ‗invention‘ as the act of generating 
a new idea, and ‗innovation‘ as the steps entailed in realizing it (580–1), Faulhaber & 
Baumol‘s model opens contradictions whose resolution requires a vagueness about 
standpoint reminiscent of the difficulties previously raised between second- and third-
person narrative in chapter 6.2. On the one hand, economists are generic inventors who 
fit endogenously into the innovation process; on the other, they are individuated 
innovators exogenously producing concepts, theories and tools (Callon 2007, 313–4).  
Callon introduces the notion of performativity as a mind–tool capable of effecting the 
transformation of the linear model into a dynamic one. It is Austin in particular that he 
turns to, though some of his criticisms are truer of post-Austin exegesis than of Austin 
himself. When Callon says, for instance, that ‗Austin was not explicitly referring to 
scientific discourse‘ (318), we know that Austin‘s quarry, the verification principle, was 
absolutely bound up in scientific discourse. Nevertheless, as Callon says, Austin‘s work 
was developed  
…either by highlighting the importance of the interlocutors‘ subjectivity (as Grice and Searle for 
philosophy or Butler for sociology do) or by noting the need to take social and cultural context into 
account (Bourdieu). But these critiques simply continued Austin‘s error by accepting an 
insurmountable boundary between discourse and that which lies beyond it (either in the form of the 
psychology of subjects or of society) (318, fn6).  
Callon argues that developing Austin should proceed first by insisting that the context 
of enunciation be included in the enunciation (he calls this the ‗semiotic turn‘, following 
Greimas), and secondly by taking into account the materialities composing that context 
(the ‗ANT turn‘, which inherits not only Greimas but Peirce, Saussure and Lotman too). 
He continues: ‗Humans in their somatic envelope, made of neurons, genes, proteins and 
stem cells are constantly overflowing’ (46, emphasis added). Elsewhere (Callon 2005, 4) 
he enlarges the point, saying:  
Action is a collective property that naturally overflows. To be attributed to a particular agency, it has 
to be framed; 
These agencies, like Hobbes‘ Leviathan, are made up of human bodies but also of prostheses, tools, 
equipment, technical devices, algorithms, etc. The notion of a cyborg aptly describes these 
agencements.56 
                                                 
56 Although Andy Clark‘s interest in cyborgs is well known, and the term ‗skinbag‘ that he uses in Natural-
Born Cyborgs seems to bear more than a passing resemblance to Callon‘s ‗somatic envelope‘, it is 
conceivable that Callon arrived independently at his formulation via Greimas, Haraway and Hutchins, as 
Lenoir (1994) indirectly suggests.  
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Callon‘s term of choice, agencement, is similar in meaning to dispositif. Hardie & 
MacKenzie (2006, 3–4) explain that agencement is a double-entendre that encompasses 
both ‗selected‘ and ‗system‘ function: a ‗locutionary‘ arrangement, configuration or 
layout of components is conflated with the ‗illocutionary‘ performance of agency. 
Hardie & MacKenzie note the parallels between agencement and the distributed cognition 
literature. 
Callon‘s choice appears to be a gesture that enables him to adopt the posture of 
observer rather than participant; agencement in this sense seems passive where dispositif 
seems deeply entangled in the processes of hylomorphism. Alternatively the difference 
can be posed as that between a third-person and first-person point of view—agencement 
in this respect perhaps more closely resembling heterophenomenology as practice than 
does dispositif, the putative subject of heterophenomenology. The distinction reflects an 
issue regarding the term ‗stigmergy‘ in relation to performativity and rhetoric. 
‗Stigmergic performativity‘ is more like agencement, concerning the organism‘s ability to 
read and act on the semiotic cues while ‗stigmergic rhetoric‘, more like dispositif, 
concerns the organism‘s capacity to intervene in and amend the environment‘s semiotic 
dispositions to better suit the organism‘s purposes.  
Let us characterize economic activity in terms of traffic channelled in these lines of 
force or flight. The question of determining the trajectory of a stigmergic vehicle can be 
regulated with a performative notion analogous to the perlocutionary lens developed 
previously, illocutionary feedforward. Adductive inflation is then a somatic 
performance informed by the subject‘s own processes of deloma (oral sentence-making, 
which is not necessarily linguistic) and meiosis (explosive simplification), but also by 
experienced (Vygotskian) or materialized (stigmergic) performances of others yielded to 
the subject‘s consciousness by adsorption. The ensuing model, the ‗adductive engine‘ 
(echoing Clark‘s Associative Engines), sees these processes harnessed in a kind of Rankine 
cycle: 
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The somatic terms (meiosis and deloma) have already been broached but adsorption, 
referencing T.S. Eliot‘s catalysis analogy, requires a further word. Writing about the 
creative process, Eliot envisions the poet as being like the platinum filament that 
catalyses sulphur dioxide and oxygen to produce sulphuric acid: 
This combination takes place only if the platinum is present; nevertheless the newly formed acid 
contains no trace of platinum, and the platinum itself is apparently unaffected; has remained inert, 
neutral, and unchanged. The mind of the poet is the shred of platinum. It may partly or exclusively 
operate upon the experience of the man himself; but, the more perfect the artist, the more 
completely separate in him will be the man who suffers and the mind which creates; the more 
perfectly will the mind digest and transmute the passions which are its material (1922, II). 
The gas molecules are adsorbed to the surface of the catalyst; their close proximity 
promotes reaction—the catalyst rigs the lottery. SO3 molecules fall from the platinum 
surface, leaving space for the process to continue.  
 The idea of a perlocutionary array is that it focuses the energy of these exterior 
performances. The regulation of their flow back into environmental flux is channelled 
through illocutionary feedforward. In the Rankine cycle, the energy of steam is 
harnessed as it expands through a series of turbines. It may be objected that adsorption 
and meiosis appear to be describing the same phenomenon, albeit on different time-
scales. Adsorption is unequivocally a physical process, though complicated by a sense in 
which it configures a shift from the performativity of strong rhetoric (as Latour 
conceives it) to the constativity of received wisdom (alternatively, a shifting-between 
relationship regarding selected and system function). Meiosis may have a supervenient 
relationship with adsorption, Pòlya processes, Markov chains and so on, but it is more 
convenient to regard this aspect as being metaphysical. At any rate, meiosis and 
intersubjectivity seem intimately linked, intersubjective technology lending the natural 
process a greater potency in those who know how to use it.  
 
To illustrate the feedforward effect, Callon discusses the example of ‗prosthetic prices‘, 
which modern-day badgers use in bargaining with primary commodity sources. Citing 
research by Koray Caliskan on the global cotton market, he notes the range of prices 
that exist at any given time. Parties to specific transactions have access to a range of 
these, which become transformed into ‗prosthetic prices‘—inputs to the calculations 
made by either party. One party, typically, is ‗material‘—there is a cotton crop to sell—
while the other is ‗virtual‘—there are a variety of options available in selling on this 
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crop, and a variety of options, too, in sourcing crops for disposal to any of these 
options. Caliskan notes the disadvantageous position of the ‗material‘ party: 
…the price he offers is reduced by his interlocutor to a prosthetic price among many others, and he 
loses control. He is calculated by one stronger than he as he delivers his bales of cotton, and at the 
same time he is rendered incapable of choosing another partner‘ (Callon 2007, 348).  
Both parties, however, are anonymous. The buyer is as expendable as the seller, as far as 
the market is concerned; so too are the commodities traders whose inputs are the 
buyer‘s outputs.  
Callon is interested, though, in a stronger sense of performativity: a sense in which the 
performance of someone like Adam Smith has the effect of bringing into being the 
phenomenon the performer purports to describe. The theorization of this stronger 
sense is substantially grounded in a series of papers by Donald MacKenzie that has 
recently culminated in the development of Barnesian performativity. The Barnesian 
hypothesis highlights the anaphoric role of identifiable individuals. Not primarily credit 
brokers and hedge fund managers—whose activities attract attention in a way that is 
similar (as we may suppose) to the sixteenth- and seventeenth century commentary on 
the activities of pardoners and badgers—but the theorists whose ideas are absorbed and 
reproduced by the educational system that produces such anonymous performers.  
The higher orders of intentionality are also implicated in the Barnesian hypothesis, but 
the modulation is not so straightforward as a distinction between the bucket-brigade 
and the recombinant. Rather, it is the disposition of perlocutionary force that is at issue. 
This has an effective dimension, as MacKenzie argues: fossilized Barnesian 
performances—the quasi-irreversible accumulation of creative input over the 
generations—channel the actions of present-day actors. However, we still have the 
problem of accounting for the cognitive and social factors that distinguish and incubate 
creativity. If there are consistent signs of such elements recurring in the development of 
economics as a discipline, given its avowed pursuit of abstract principles alienated from 
human variability, then we may feel more confident about generalizing these elements to 
other aspects of human culture.  
The Black-Scholes equation, now an indispensible tool in financial economics, is at the 
epicentre of MacKenzie‘s research, and takes a hylozoic role similar to that of the 
scallops in Callon‘s earlier work. It was an important factor shaping the development of 
modern futures trading, a factor that MacKenzie argues was performative rather than 
merely informative—the equation‘s authors‘ status communicating authority and 
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confidence to the financial actors who implemented its practical use. The story of its 
shifting relationship with the reality it purports to describe offers compelling evidence 
for the roles of prestige, chance and convention in performing the economy.  
The story is neither short nor simple. Each of the significant papers in the series is of 
substantial weight, so the first of three caveats in presenting this interpretation of 
MacKenzie‘s argument concerns the possible omission of significant details. The second 
caveat concerns the notion of performativity. The Barnesian concept arose in response 
to earlier criticisms of the use of Austin‘s name in making a distinction from generic 
performativity; it was felt that citing Austin implied an unwarranted linguistic focus. 
Further complicating the picture is that MacKenzie‘s and Callon‘s work on 
performativity includes the inheritance of (for instance) Greimas, Garfinkel and Butler. 
Although performativity‘s relationship with verificationism, personified in Austin‘s 
relationship with Ayer, is directly relevant to the question of performative economics, it 
is not through this route the present authors arrived at their starting point. The third 
caveat concerns the equation itself. MacKenzie writes that it requires college-level 
mathematics to grasp; MacKenzie is properly equipped and I am not. Fortunately, the 
equation involves the same kind of probability theory as that dealt with in section 9.3, so 
we are not leaping in the dark. Hopping in the twilight, perhaps—but that is an 
unavoidable hazard of interdisciplinary research. 
Finally, at the core of a Barnesian performance is an entirely human (i.e. intentional) 
capacity to persuade others to take a risk: this seems a reasonable conclusion to draw 
from MacKenzie‘s work, but it is not one that he explicitly draws himself. This is where 
the connection with Schumpeter‘s unternehmer—my work-maker—is made plain. The 
popular modern conception of the entrepreneur is of someone who takes risks; the 
regulatory framework is tuned to this idealized, self-interested figure. Without denying 
that the work-maker is self-interested (far from it: a notion of addictive enslavement is 
very much to the point), a potent motivation for the work-maker is the gratification that 
comes from building ever more elaborate relationships whose durability rests on others‘ 
willingness to expose themselves to risks for which the work-maker is responsible.  
Three themes emerge from MacKenzie‘s narrative:  
The significance of oral relationships—that is, direct interpersonal contact—
persists no matter how elaborate their technological support networks become. 
Such configurations appear to pursue a nomadic relationship with the outer 
boundaries of socio-technical agencements‘ capacity to support them.  
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However, the illusion of confidence that this avant-garde maintains in its 
infrastructure has to be negotiated and mediated through semiotic exchange 
with complimentary avant-gardes. In practice, the illusion is sustained by a 
continually reconfiguring personnel roster as individuals gain experience, ideas 
and contacts before moving on to the next camp. 
Because these relationships are non-linear and typically highly pressurized, they 
are prone to periodic failure. Often, these are failures of intersubjectivity. 
Husbanding risk and ascribing responsibility for breakdowns and failures is 
therefore an essential component in the continuing attunement of the dispositif. 
Paradoxically, however, the characteristics of the socio-technical network remain 
surprisingly stable even while those of any individual instance are mutable. This lends 
credence to the social brain hypothesis in the form proposed by Dunbar. That is to say, 
grooming circles, camps, clans and so on are a stable form, even while the natural 
evanescence of individual instances is probably hastened and multiplied by the 
accumulation of intersubjective technologies with stigmergic effects. The evidence 
becomes clearer as we turn to the social dimension of Barnesian performativity. This 
neat encapsulation of the social transformations contained within ostensibly similar 
populations in the financial world sets the scene: 
On the agricultural exchanges, the stereotypical belief was ―I got the trade ‘cos I‘m faster than you, 
buddy.‖ In New York, it was ―I got the trade ‘cos I‘m here,‖ because I am the designated specialist. 
In the CBOE‘s growing self-perception, it was ―I got the trade ‘cos I thought it out‖ (Doherty 
interview: MacKenzie & Millo 2003, 125). 
 
The first aspect of performative economics to consider, then, is the question of whether 
homo œconomicus, the egotistic, utility-maximizing rational actor, really exists. The 
assumption MacKenzie makes is that if such a specimen is going to be found anywhere, 
then the financial markets are the first place to look. The result is a qualified 
confirmation. Yes, there is evidence that utility maximization drives the financial 
markets towards a state of perfect efficiency, but the knots and wrinkles keeping it from 
such a state are ultimately symmetrical consequences arising out of the pressure to 
achieve it. Ultimately the efficient market depends on efficient human performance. For 
most of the time, while individual cognitive loads lie comfortably within the bounds of 
ge-stell and bucket-brigade intentionality, market efficiency and individual efficiency are 
in harmony. At times of crisis, which typically involve information starvation of one sort 
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or another, individual performance tends to shift towards the interpretative demands of 
recombinant intentionality. 
In normal times, a performative repertoire of sanctions keeps in check the potential 
inclination of individual traders to behave totally selfishly—simply ‗failing to see‘ a bid 
offered by an over-aggressive colleague, for instance. Pure ruthlessness is a short-term 
strategy at best. This suggests that rational actors acknowledge that an unforeseeable 
future has a bearing on the present. This of course is where the cognitive issue of 
simulation, and the related concept of intersubjective technology as a means of better 
projecting such simulations, becomes relevant. An instance explored in MacKenzie & 
Millo (2003) concerns the creation of the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE). 
The work-maker ontology suggests a way of understanding collective action as a blend 
of personal simulation and the active tuning of this cognitive performance by the 
perlocutionary investment of certain key players. Members of the Chicago Board of 
Trade—from which CBOE emerged—not only argued for the development of an 
options exchange, but invested considerable amounts of time (demonstrating 
commitment) and money (substantiating that commitment by extending loans without 
the assurance of repayment). 
If it is not obvious that the work-maker ontology is at work here, part of the 
explanation is found in the accounts offered for their actions by leading individuals: 
Asked why he devoted effort to collective projects, Melamed cited the influence of his father, a 
socialist and Bundist, who taught him to ―work for society as a whole. My father had instilled in me 
[the] idea that you gain immortality by tying yourself up with an idea, or a movement, or an 
institution that transcends mortality‖ (Melamed interview: MacKenzie & Millo 2003, 115–6).  
―We . . . never thought of even asking for reimbursement [for expenses involved in creating the 
CBOE],‖ says Eisen. ―This was part of the concept that was inculcated into all of us: ‗You owe it to 
your community.‘ We had all done very nicely, thank you . . . and we felt that we had an obligation to 
the Exchange and this is how you pay your obligations‖ (Eisen interview: loc. cit.). 
‗Your community‘, however, is typically well within the bounds of the Dunbar-style 
monkeysphere. What MacKenzie & Millo call ‗large memberships‘—most exchanges 
ranging between 500–3,500—are not only orally tractable but also are striated with 
marks of status and exclusion. For instance, trading on exchange floors is membership-
limited, and numbers are carefully regulated (116–7).  
Notably, the group coordinating the launch of the CBOE was small. The suggestion 
that such exclusivity is nomadic, travelling with the boundaries imposed on the 
sustenance of broader communal links by developments in information technology, is 
borne out by a more recent evolution in options trading, the hedge fund. Among the 
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characteristics Hardie & MacKenzie (2006) enumerate are an exclusivity of clientele 
buttressed by legal constraints preventing hedge funds from advertising, and limits on 
the numbers of investors a fund may recruit (8). Staffs, too, are small—in the fund 
under observation there are five group members. Fund managers typically court 
anonymity. This opacity is at odds with the Anglo-American presumption of efficient 
markets based on transparency, suggesting that from one side markets have as much 
information as practical, and from the other that they have as much as is necessary. 
Finding the ‗sweet spot‘ where the two pressures are in balance is for human 
performance to negotiate. 
What Hardie & MacKenzie observe, in effect, is a grooming circle. The physical layout 
of the trading room facilitates constant visual cuing, notwithstanding the plethora of 
computer screens. The team is normally assembled here, not in separate offices or 
cubicles—‗back office‘ facilities being located remotely. The system transmits a trading 
record to its ‗administrator‘, a separate firm whose relevant office is in Dublin; the fund 
is also linked electronically to its ‗prime broker‘, a leading international investment bank 
(14–17). It is striking that the interactions between group members resemble that of 
improvising musicians, especially in the jazz genre. There is give-and-take, mutual 
acknowledgement of individual skills and performances, cheerleading and 
commiseration: 
After discussions such as the above have stabilized an interpretation and generated a decision, or 
even when the trader has taken a decision without consulting his colleagues, they frequently provide 
him with emotional support. His work is stressful, involving actions in which large amounts of 
money (his own and his colleagues‘, as well as the fund‘s investors‘) are at stake. Support for 
decisions [already] taken was often restated explicitly: ‗I really like that trade‘ or ‗Yes, I would be 
pretty comfortable with that‘ (25). 
 
The inheritance from this close attention to social dynamics points toward a significant 
aspect of Barnesian performativity. Generally speaking, the effect is less a question of 
individual charisma, and more one of an abstract sense of the weight of authority carried 
by economics in consequence of its anti-charismatic (as we might call it) network of 
anonymous wisdom. Jeffrey Sachs, delivering advice to the Bolivian government from 
the International Monetary Fund on countering hyperinflation in 1986, had this 
anonymous authority behind him. Despite economic theory‘s indifference to Bolivia‘s 
unique geographical challenges, the advice successfully brought inflation under control 
(MacKenzie, Muniesa & Siu 2007, 1). The New York trader who gets the trade ‗because 
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of who I am‘ is not proclaiming mastery of the universe but rather the mastery of a 
specific corner of it, a discrete place in a perlocutionary array. 
In Chicago, the problem facing the CBT group developing the CBOE project in respect 
of options trading was as much ethical as theoretical. An option gives its owner the 
right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell an asset on or before a specific future date. 
Options have been traded since the seventeenth century if not before, but pricing was 
guided by rule of thumb—a matter of skilled judgement (MacKenzie 2007, 57). The 
prevailing conventional wisdom regarded options trading as being, if not 
indistinguishable from gambling, then certainly a dubious and potentially destabilizing 
practice. Folk memories of the 1929 crash influenced this view, but so too did an even 
less tangible unease regarding the probity of characters like the pardoner and the badger. 
Intuitively, we might say that received wisdom recognized that options trading puts a 
much greater stress on the intentional stance, especially its recombinant mode.  
The Black-Scholes equation promised a means of scaffolding that skill, and here the 
scaffolding metaphor is particularly apt. What first enabled CBOE to achieve sufficient 
structural robustness to withstand the vagaries of market flux was the comprehensive 
precision promised by the equation. The equation‘s initial performance, however, was to 
substantiate confidence. A significant element in achieving this was conferred by the 
perlocutionary authority of its authors, convincing regulators that options pricing was 
tractable to theory, and therefore not to be equated with gambling. The enrolment of 
Black, Scholes and Merton—whose work, related to the Capital Asset Pricing Model, 
was altogether more respectable than some of its antecedent hinterland—was part of a 
broader interessement strategy used by the CBT group to recruit economists willing to 
lend the prestige of their name to the moral underwriting of the project.  
The ‗random walk model of share price changes‘ appears in physics as Brownian 
motion, the movement of particles subject to minute, random collisions. The equivalent 
body of physical theory concerns phenomena such as the flow of heat. However, the 
theory governing the flow of heat is not affected by the observer‘s belief about that 
theory. The same assumption cannot be made about prices (MacKenzie 2000). The 
advent of the CBOE, its initial accumulation of credibility and stability, was 
accompanied by a process in which the initially loose fit between prices as Black-Scholes 
theorized they should be, and prices as market-makers found them, became closer. 
These two aspects of the equation‘s impact combine to make it an especially strong 
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example of perlocutionary force. The appeal, as with any effective mind–tool, is its 
portability: 
Black, Scholes, and Merton‘s arguments were at their core simple and elegant. If the price of a stock 
followed the standard model of a lognormal random walk in continuous time, and other simplifying 
assumptions held, it was possible to hedge any option transaction perfectly. …fellow economists 
quickly recognized their work as a tour de force. It was more than a solution of a difficult technical 
problem: it showed how to approach a host of situations that had ―option-like‖ features; and it 
linked options to the heartland theoretical portrayal of capital markets as efficient and permitting no 
arbitrage opportunities (MacKenzie & Millo 2003, 120–1). 
Computers were not portable enough to take onto the trading floor in the 1970s, and 
time spent consulting a programmable calculator was time in which a trader might lose 
an opportunity to a competitor. Fischer Black set up a consultancy which computed 
price tables and printed them out on colour-coded paper, thus simplifying the decision-
making range for the trader. In the process, Black and other consultants offering similar 
services helped shape the trajectory towards a closer fit with the predictions of the 
equation. Even traders who did not use the sheets found the prices they were obliged to 
offer or accept increasingly conditioned by the market‘s convergence towards reified 
theory. Gambling gave way to efficient pricing (MacKenzie 2007, 60–3). 
Ironically, the process by which Black, Scholes and Merton arrived at their theoretical 
perspective was itself something of a random walk. Moreover, much of the theoretical 
bricolage that the authors accumulated had been developed with the frank intent of 
finding tools with which to beat either the stock market or the casino. For instance, 
Edward Thorp, before he turned to finance markets, was a pioneer card-counter until 
casinos started vigorously discouraging the practice (MacKenzie 2003, 842). One might, 
for that matter, draw a parallel between the fabled goal of alchemy—turning base metal 
into gold—and the activities of financial theorists seeking to beat the market and ‗make‘ 
money.  
The academic world caught up with Black, Scholes and Merton only after their work 
had begun to exert its influence on the market. Initially, journals did not find the 
material especially interesting; the later adoption, MacKenzie speculates, might have 
owed something to the emergent professionalization of business in the USA creating 
demand for appropriate theoretical materials. A curious shift in audiences thus operated 
in which economic theory, having performed ‗to‘ the market, became the market‘s 
audience. Ultimately, Scholes and Merton received the Nobel Prize for their 
contribution (Black had died, and the award is not made posthumously). 
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A parallel shift occurred in the nature of the equation‘s role in the marketplace. It 
mutated from being more or less an ostensive guide to the price an arbitrageur should 
offer or seek, to being a mind–tool used to analyse volatility by traders performing the 
market. It became—and remains—a way to enframe risk. For the most part the risk 
being talked about is marginal, and the virtue of the equation is that it enables the 
efficient minimization of that degree of risk. Nevertheless, with increasing confidence 
came increasing volumes of trade. The nature of risk, concomitantly, became less a 
matter of reconciling marginal discrepancies in price, and more about the capacity of the 
infrastructure to provide the timely information on which efficiency depends. 
The ambiguous relationship between these two disparate factors has a bearing on the 
core doctrine of neoclassical economics, the ‗efficient market hypothesis‘. This simply 
asserts that prices in mature capital markets reflect all available information (MacKenzie 
2004b, 303–4). Debate, especially among sociologists, concerns the way in which the 
variability of human performance impinges on the achievement of efficiency.57 
Aggregated over the long term, market performance closely conforms to theory; the 
symbiotic relationship between traders and legislators in responding to novel challenges 
and opportunities suggests that even here a performative dimension is necessary in 
order to ensure that the semblance of efficiency remains intact.  
Legislators, though, cannot fix problems until they have occurred. The marketplace, 
mythical emblem of freedom, is a gaol insofar as every inmate may be spending every 
waking hour looking for the weakness no one has noticed in order to take advantage. 
One particular ‗gaolbreak‘ event is interesting in relation to the Black-Scholes equation 
and the question of performative economics: the great crash of October 1987. Before it, 
the equation was becoming an ever closer fit between theory and performance; after it, 
two related observations about its subsequent fit underwrite the evidential case for 
effective performativity. Firstly the fit became less exact, and secondly the signature of 
volatility skew now differs between jurisdictions—between, for instance, the USA and 
Britain. Since the great crash clearly marks this junction, its circumstances are the 
obvious place to look for reasons. 
                                                 
57 Note that the requirement of a college-level education in mathematics means in practice that such 
negotiations have a closely circumscribed transparency. How many legislators, for instance, are adequately 
equipped to understand the issues involved? 
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One immediately telling remark MacKenzie makes is that US legislators, investigating 
the causes of the crash, focused on the two days in which the market plunged (2004b, 
319). The day after this frame saw a rise in prices that was so steep as to be highly 
anomalous by historical standards; the reason for ignoring this was either that positive 
news needs no regulation, or else that the rectification was evidence supporting the 
hypothesis that the principal cause of the crash was ‗mechanical trading‘. It is this facet, 
which is subtly distinct from the notion of ‗computer trading‘, on which investigation 
focused. 
Portfolio insurance is an application of the Black-Scholes equation: option theory is 
used to set a floor below which the value of an investment portfolio will not fall. It is a 
further edge sought by certain traders, though not all of them. The term ‗insurance‘ is 
something of a misnomer: if stock prices adopted a trend of lowering discontinuously, 
there could be difficulty adjusting the replicating portfolio in time. Initially, the small 
number of investors using option theory in this way kept the danger in check. Theorists 
had already recognized, however, that as the market for portfolio insurance grew, the 
potential pressure increased on the resources needed to manage timely adjustment 
transactions. A critical point would be reached where the size of the market for 
portfolio insurance as a proportion of the total options market would reach a level 
where price movements would tend to snowball. Further complicating the situation, 
beyond the formal consultancy market for portfolio insurance was the much wider 
adoption of a pragmatic attitude to trading that effectively amounted to the informal 
implementation of the same principle (308–13).  
What happened in the markets was a kind of Bergsonian disconnection. In Creative 
Evolution, Bergson bases an extended analogy on the new cinematographic technology, 
arguing that ‗time is invention or it is nothing at all‘ (1911a, 361); ‗form is only a 
snapshot view of a transition‘ (319); and ‗…the cinematographical character of our 
knowledge of things is due to the kaleidoscopic character of our adaptation to them‘ 
(323). The illusion of a perfectly informed market is sustained, in effect, by the 
cinematographic projection of data—so long as the apparatus runs beyond the limits of 
human perception. Under pressure, it is not necessarily the equipment that fails, 
although computers programmed to run insurance trades very likely exacerbated the 
problem in 1987.  
The key to understanding the human dimension of the situation is to be found by 
examining the nature of the disconnection. In the trading room Hardie and MacKenzie 
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(2006) describe, the team has access to a constant stream of market and market-related 
data. It is tempting to call this stream ‗overwhelming‘, but a variety of cognitive 
strategies and technological prosthetics serve to filter data. Once a potential anomaly is 
spotted, there is normally time to investigate and verify its cause. A stock may be being 
sold because a particular trader requires liquidity, or it may be because adverse news 
about its performance has reached the market. During the 1987 crash, a variety of 
factors combined to reduce the quality of available information: 
For prolonged periods on 19 and 20 October the stocks of great US corporations such as IBM and 
General Motors – normally the most readily traded of all private securities – simply did not trade at 
all, as the New York Stock Exchange‘s specialists could not match buyers with sellers and feared 
bankruptcy if they stepped in to remedy the imbalance (as their regulatory obligations said they 
should). The printers at the specialists‘ booths could not keep up with the waves of sell orders 
arriving through the semi-automated DOT (Designated Order Turnaround) system, and there were 
also network delays and software problems. Those who tried to sell via telephones often found they 
could not get through. Some brokers simply left their telephones to ring unanswered; others tried to 
respond but could not cope with the volume of calls.  
The S&P and other indices were recalculated virtually continuously: as each New York stock 
traded, exchange employees completed cards and fed them via optical character recognition readers 
into the exchange‘s Market Data System, and computer systems … updated index values. If 
significant component stocks in the index were not trading, however, the calculated index value 
rapidly became ‗stale‘: its relationship to market conditions became indeterminate (MacKenzie 
2004b, 314–5). 
Under pressure, the tendency is to choose heuristically between explanatory hypotheses, 
and make decisions on the basis of the apparently more likely. There is simply no time 
to apply the Black-Scholes equation to any given transaction. At times like the period of 
the crash, there are orally-skilled people looking for the opportunity to make profitable 
trades. One, identified as Lewis J. Borsellino, was quoted as saying: ‗I could see it in the 
way their eyes darted around them and the uneasy fidgeting… They were sellers, I 
decided at that moment‘ (322). 
Further reinforcing the Bergsonian analogy, the subsequent structure of US financial 
markets was shaped both legislatively and psychologically by the events of October 
1987. Most strikingly, the provision of ‗circuit breakers‘ explicitly introduced boundaries 
to frame the trading routine. As a prophylactic against ‗ad hoc‘ trading interruptions, 
scheduled interruptions were established so that accumulations of paperwork (or the 
part of its electronic equivalent that requires direct human intervention) could be 
processed. This measure was introduced by legislators, without theoretical backing. 
Most financial theorists, MacKenzie notes, would regard circuit breakers as 
counterproductive (325–6). 
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MacKenzie‘s Barnesian hypothesis receives criticism from two quarters: from the 
anthropologist Daniel Miller, and from Emmanuel Didier, a social historian specializing 
in the structural function of statistics. In this concluding section, Didier‘s 
counterexample to MacKenzie concerning the case of Michigan‘s cucumbers usefully 
problematizes the shift from effective to Barnesian. By using it to calibrate the 
progression, we can draw together the epistemic, the phenomenological and the 
sociohistoric threads informing the work-maker, and send it, golem-like, out into the 
world. 
For Michel Callon, economics—the range of knowledge and equipment at the 
economy‘s disposal—‗performs, shapes and formats the economy‘. It cannot, then, be 
merely descriptive; this is evident as soon as the agencement of economics is analysed. The 
worry of opponents such as Daniel Miller is that theorists adopting a performative 
ontology become implicated in the phenomenon they describe, thus losing their valence 
as critics (MacKenzie, Muniesa & Siu 2007, 4). The trouble with Miller‘s proposed 
alternative, virtualism, is that it does not amount to a theory. The rhetorical style of its 
presentation is gauche—his essay, ‗A theory of virtualism‘ (1998) is placed last in its 
volume, and presents the substance of his case only after a lengthy and enthymematic 
exposition on the subject of ‗grand narrative‘. Even then, it is plain that ‗virtualism‘ is 
intended to be a complaint and not a celebration. Most problematically, the virtual as it 
is understood especially via Bergson and Deleuze, is already factored in to Callon‘s 
rhetorical array. Nevertheless, something of Miller‘s critique finds voice in the issue of 
dispositif versus agencement reviewed in section 10.3. 
Ironically, the debate on performative economics has had an effect on Miller that 
parallels the impact of the Black-Scholes equation on those market-makers who were 
either sceptical about, or ignorant of, its value. On Didier‘s account, Miller has recently 
written that economists‘ models increase their ability to be performative (Didier 2007, 
296); indeed, Miller himself, in somewhat Orwellian fashion, claims in a 2005 response 
to Callon that he was on board with performativity all along (Miller 2005, 4). Callon and 
Miller both seem to be wide of the mark, however, discussing the issue of whether 
economists are like priests: Callon because he apparently fears that anthropologists are 
too fond of accounting for social phenomena in terms of ritual; Miller because the 
priestly figure is not the economist per se, but rather the Barnesian work-maker in 
general. 
Technologies 10: The Work-Maker 244 
In this respect, Didier‘s own critique of MacKenzie is interesting. His paper focuses on 
semiotic materialization as an act, using an intriguing and characteristically offbeat ANT 
story about the expression of the gherkin in US agricultural statistics to illustrate his 
argument. A statistician-hero, Verne H. Church, notes that Michigan‘s cucumber crops 
are not recognized in the statistical returns and, believing that they are sufficiently 
important in scale to warrant such recognition, sets about developing the means to 
report, and thereby realize, the product.58 For Didier, statistics lie in a hinterland 
between the illocutionary feedforward generated by market transactions and the 
perlocutionary disposals of market-makers. Statistics represent a valve-like function that 
prevents the market from being reversible, but obviously a statistic cannot do this by 
itself. 
Didier calls this ‗expression‘, in the sense Deleuze develops from Spinoza where 
elements are gathered in a particular way whose relationship ‗evidences a new feature of 
the whole composed by that coming together‘ (2007, 303). This resembles the analytical 
notion of compositionality, the idea that ‗the meaning of a complex expression is 
determined by its structure and the meanings of its constituents‘ (Szabó 2007). 
However, a statistic, like that which it represents, is an element with the characteristics 
of noemata. It is the act of disclosing the element‘s significance that locates it in the 
dispositif. Distinguishing between the ‗natural‘ cucumber and the ‗compositional‘ 
statistic turns out to be a question not of fundamental fact but of semeiotic triangulation 
in the fullest Peircean sense.  
Finding a place for the statistician in the performative spectrum is problematic only if 
one remains overly committed to the perspective of methodological individualism. Must 
the statistician always be performing the task of statistic-making in order to be 
considered a statistician? Once Church has discharged his ambition to realize the 
cucumber crop, has an instance of effective performativity been concluded, or must 
counting continue? Surely the latter. Certainly the process of counting cucumbers 
contributes to the making of the economy, though it does not necessarily have a critical 
impact on economics. As Didier uncovers, the effect is more a matter of improving 
resolution, enhancing the illusion of a market represented in real time: The US census 
was able to count only once in ten years; agricultural statistics developed so that counts 
                                                 
58 A gherkin is a small cucumber enframed by a manufacturing process that includes, among other things, 
jarring and pickling in brine. 
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could be made several times in one year (294). The cinematographical product is the 
outcome of innumerable craft inputs. For a time, the world‘s knowledge of cucumbers 
is mobilized by Church, the charismatic performer; ‗it‘ moves through the performer, 
and the perspectives of performativity potentially enable us to understand how, as a 
social phenomenon, this takes place within the oral span of individual human lives. 
What makes Church‘s performance Barnesian is not the cucumbers, or even the 
statistics, but rather the irreversibility of the cinematic process, which discovers that it 
needs statisticians to perform in this kind of way. However, it is minimally Barnesian; 
Church‘s performance does not furnish a new tool that can be compared to the Black-
Scholes equation, even though it provides a new perspective on the agricultural product 
of Michigan and of the United States tout court. 
The case for generic performativity seems watertight; so too the case for effective 
performativity—to this point, in other words, MacKenzie‘s trajectory and mine appear 
to be fairly similar. There is a divergence, however, at this higher level. One way of 
accounting for this is to point out the different routes by which we arrive, MacKenzie‘s 
being empirical and mine being theoretical: we both worked it out, but on the basis of 
completely different raw materials.59 We differ, too, on the nature of 
counterperformativity. This seems to be a relativistic matter. For MacKenzie, attention 
is focused on the Barnesian train from the station platform, so to speak, as it recedes 
into the distance. Meiosis, on the other hand, is on board the train and sees the 
Barnesian performance waving as it recedes into the distance.  
This subtle difference feeds back into the problem of defining just what is ‗Barnesian‘. 
There is ambiguity in MacKenzie‘s account about the extent to which performances of 
this kind depend on the individual talent of the performer, and this problem goes right 
to the heart of the issue of whether economics is constative or performative. Let generic 
performativity be styled ‗hylozoic‘, meaning an arrangement of physical and semiotic 
relationships that is capable of sustaining complex, layered patterns of interaction. 
Probably the hylozoic is tractable in terms of ordinality and temporality in the terms 
discussed in part two. Let effective performativity be styled ‗hylomorphic‘, meaning the 
same thing as ‗hylozoic‘, but reflexively shaped through the plasticity of inclusive fitness, 
which introduces the spectral. We are left with few options to promote the Barnesian, 
                                                 
59 MacKenzie does not discuss Didier‘s example in terms of Barnesian performativity; the analysis is mine. 
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but Heidegger‘s analysis of poiesis comes to the rescue. We can style this third form of 
performativity ‗poietic’ , with all the assertion of craft valorization thus entailed.  
People look at the work of artists such as Tracey Emin or John Cage and say: ‗I could 
do that‘, and the intuition among economists seems similar. Once Black, Scholes and 
Merton had presented their equation, it became the obvious way of doing the task to 
which it was applied, but just as the answer in the case of Emin and Cage is: ‗yes, but 
you didn‘t, did you?‘, so too does the naming of the equation recognize the 
perlocutionary force behind it. To my mind, ‗poietic‘, Barnesian performativity celebrates 
exactly that element of perlocutionary force. The rhetorical aspect of stigmergy depends 
on this human factor although again the idea of a fossilized Barnesian performance is 
not explicitly sanctioned by a reading of MacKenzie. Elsewhere I have been at pains to 
minimize the anaphoric use of people‘s names since I generally believe the practice to be 
dangerously imprecise. In this case, however, ‗Barnesian performativity‘ conveniently 
elides the work-maker, adductive inflation and the first- second- and third-person 
domains of performativity into a single articulation, stressing that however much theory 
goes into configuring the concept, its ultimate shape is human. 
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The work-maker is an embodied agent situated in the specific cultural context of 
modern urban civilization, supported by the laws and institutions of the contract—as 
suggested at the very outset. Not only is the work-maker an economic actor, but the 
very fact of economic activity is predicated on this actor‘s capacity to mediate intention 
through the reliably systematic, evidential forms that I have called intersubjective 
technologies. Although the concept owes much to the somatically transparent notion of 
equipment and affordance modulated by Clark in the form of the extended mind, it is 
explicit about one aspect of scaffolding that Clark does not pursue in detail. Scaffolding 
is primarily composed of other people. 
That being the case, on the assumption that the argument for the ‗scaffolding‘ ontology 
is secure, we have sought to disambiguate certain overlapping senses of the social, in 
order to better press the claim. The principal overlap is between second- and third-
person senses of the social, but there is also an overlap between discrete senses of 
‗common sense‘, which impinges on the prior distinction. I have parsed the latter in 
terms of a series of polyphonies whose collective, singular output (or rather, 
throughput) I characterize as ‗polyphonic consciousness‘. These are the three Peircean 
polyphonies—‗sensory‘, the collective sum of our separate senses; ‗psychological‘, a 
collective sum that incorporates various aspects of enactive perception and their 
intersubjective complements; and ‗semiotic‘, which cannot be styled a ‗sum‘, but leans 
on the same sensory and psychological apparatus to individuate the constituents of the 
environment in which the conscious entity is embedded. The fourth polyphony, 
indebted to Peirce‘s work on statistics, is the ‗Polyà‘ polyphony, cultural polyphony. 
It is this latter form that affords the platform from which the extension of extra-somatic 
means of coordinating society, as argued by Strum & Latour (1999) can proceed. 
Polyphonic consciousness is performative, meaning that its existence is grounded 
entirely in the provisional, evolutionary outcome of its environmental situation. 
Dunbar‘s analysis of primate group size lends important clarification, identifying a 
continuity first in the human/primate relationship, and second in relationships among 
humans within the ‗ideal‘ collective of around 150 members. Most notably, there is a 
sharp rhetorical distinction between the communicative style relating members of the 
most intense groupings to each other—a style characterized by conversational give and 
Error! No text of specified style in document. 248 
take—and the more formal rhetoric of address appropriate for one-to-many 
communication. 
The appeal to rhetoric implicates an appeal to language, but as we have seen, the 
concept of language, in its simplest, oral sense, has become deeply entangled in 
prosthetic extension. The hand, which is strongly implicated in Heidegger‘s vorhandenheit 
and zuhandenheit, is also implicated in Wittgenstein‘s hinwisende. For Tomasello, 
everything that is unique to humans in the matter of language is already unique in the 
act of pointing. What is remarkable, though, is that human physiology is able to respond 
to its environment as though it, too, is engaged in acts of pointing, pushing, prodding, 
pressing and so on. The thought that follows from this draws on the presocratic 
doctrine of hylozoism—that life and matter are inseparable. Refracting it through the 
semiotic analyses of Peirce and Greimas, the sociology of Callon, Latour and Law, and 
the philosophy of Dennett and Clark, the ancient doctrine of hylozoism becomes the 
modern doctrine of stigmergy. Stigmergy conflates the sign (stigma) and action (ergon) 
into a continuum. Once the human capacity to shape the environment and filter it with 
cues and fabricated equipment is factored in, what we arrive at is, in effect, a theory of 
‗artificial animism‘, which I call ‗recombinant intentionality‘. 
Rhetoric is a form of intersubjectivity that is distinguished from ordinary semiotic 
transaction by an imbalance captured in the term ‗agogic‘, at the root of Peirce‘s 
investigation of abductive reasoning. This is from the Greek, and means ‗leading‘. Once 
we start experiencing agogic cues reflexively, we start a process of reification that 
transforms the abstract interpretant into an embodied agent. It seems that, for the 
interpretant to interpret, elements in the semiotic flux need to matter. It is mattering—or 
aboutness—that turns data into content, that modulates ‗recombinant intentionality‘ 
into intersubjective content. However, what may count as ‗doesn‘t matter‘ is in part a 
question of structure—an annoying circularity that poses a deep analytic problem. 
Chemistry may account for our response to agogic cues, but it does not—by itself—
account for selectiveness in our responses. 
One of the claims made by Austin regarding ordinary language is that it constitutes a 
resource that preselects among possible outcomes, pragmatically seeding a given 
problem-space with foregone conclusions. As Feyerabend points out, this resource is 
neither wholly reliable nor wholly complete, and is in need of constant appraisal and 
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renewal. Nor is this resource wholly made of words, or logoi. This is where 
intersubjective technology, and its concomitant, the technologizing of intersubjectivity, 
comes in. The latter recognizes the distinction Ong makes in terms of a difference 
between oral (spoken and performed) language/signification, and its literate (reified and 
disembodied) extension, support, and counterposition. Intersubjective technology, then, 
is a systematically reproduced and communicated—yet fallible—semiotic accumulation, 
reified without restraint across the somatic boundary. It serves to support the 
performance of society, yes, but in a sense society is intersubjectivity technologized—or 
rather, technologizing. Without a social context, there is no creativity. 
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